Some 55 years after the publication of Russell's seminal ‘On Denoting’, Quine adopted the theory of definite descriptions presented therein to formulate his perspicuous lingua franca for the sciences. This paper illustrates how, in so doing, Quine's lingua franca inherited an old antinomy at the core of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, specifically, the lack of congruency between notation and metaphysical commitments when the variable assumes the role of fundamental singular reference. In this context, the paper contends that the phrase ‘to be is purely and simply to be the value of the variable’ is far from the straightforward solution Quine initially envisioned for his lingua franca. Additionally, it argues that it is unlikely that an attempt to account for a determinate object theory, such as those propounded by Russell and Quine, can prove successful when grounded in a referential theory of quantificational logic where the variable, seen as a simple range of values, holds fundamental singular referent‐position. The paper concludes by suggesting that Meinong's object theory could resolve the problem of the variable, albeit at the cost of potentially undesirable ontological and logical commitments. Alternatively, Kit Fine's recent work on other antinomies in the variable may provide a promising approach to exploring how to salvage the variable as a formal foundation for ontology.
在罗素开创性的《论指称》发表约 55 年后，奎因采用了其中提出的定语描述理论，为科学制定了他的明晰的通用语言。本文阐述了奎因的语言是如何这样做的，它继承了罗素定语描述理论核心的一个古老的对立面，具体来说，就是当变量承担基本单数指称的角色时，符号与形而上学承诺之间缺乏一致性。在这种情况下，本文认为 "to be 纯粹是变量的值 "这一短语远非奎因最初为其语言所设想的直接解决方案。此外，本文还认为，当变量被视为一个简单的数值范围，并具有基本的单一指代位置时，试图解释罗素和奎因提出的确定对象理论不太可能成功。本文最后提出，梅农的对象理论可以解决变量问题，尽管代价是可能不可取的本体论和逻辑承诺。另外，柯特-费恩（Kit Fine）最近关于变量中其他反义词的研究也为探索如何挽救变量作为本体论形式基础的问题提供了一种有希望的方法。
{"title":"The problem of the variable in Quine's perspicuous lingua franca of the sciences","authors":"Ivory Day","doi":"10.1111/theo.12548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12548","url":null,"abstract":"Some 55 years after the publication of Russell's seminal ‘On Denoting’, Quine adopted the theory of definite descriptions presented therein to formulate his perspicuous lingua franca for the sciences. This paper illustrates how, in so doing, Quine's lingua franca inherited an old antinomy at the core of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, specifically, the lack of congruency between notation and metaphysical commitments when the variable assumes the role of fundamental singular reference. In this context, the paper contends that the phrase ‘to be is purely and simply to be the value of the variable’ is far from the straightforward solution Quine initially envisioned for his lingua franca. Additionally, it argues that it is unlikely that an attempt to account for a determinate object theory, such as those propounded by Russell and Quine, can prove successful when grounded in a referential theory of quantificational logic where the variable, seen as a simple range of values, holds fundamental singular referent‐position. The paper concludes by suggesting that Meinong's object theory could resolve the problem of the variable, albeit at the cost of potentially undesirable ontological and logical commitments. Alternatively, Kit Fine's recent work on other antinomies in the variable may provide a promising approach to exploring how to salvage the variable as a formal foundation for ontology.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141738288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues for the significance of Kaplan's logic LD in two ways: first, by looking at how logic got along before we had LD, and second, by using it to bring out the similarity between David Hume's thesis that one cannot deduce claims about the future on the basis of premises only about the past, and the so‐called "essentiality" of the indexical.
{"title":"The I in logic","authors":"Gillian Russell","doi":"10.1111/theo.12543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12543","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues for the significance of Kaplan's logic LD in two ways: first, by looking at how logic got along before we had LD, and second, by using it to bring out the similarity between David Hume's thesis that one cannot deduce claims about the future on the basis of premises only about the past, and the so‐called \"essentiality\" of the indexical.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141738294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An inference can be seen as a speech act, in which one passes from a number of assertions called premisses to another assertion, the conclusion, which is presented as supported or justified by the premisses. To justify the assertion that appears as conclusion is the characteristic aim of an inference. Here, we confine ourselves to deductive inferences where the justification is taken to be conclusive. A short, natural explanation of what it is for a (deductive) inference to be valid is to say that it is valid if it succeeds in its aim, that is, if its premisses do (conclusively) justify the conclusion, given that premisses are justified. The paper is concerned with developing this explanation further.
{"title":"The aim and validity of inference and argument","authors":"Dag Prawitz","doi":"10.1111/theo.12546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12546","url":null,"abstract":"An inference can be seen as a speech act, in which one passes from a number of assertions called premisses to another assertion, the conclusion, which is presented as supported or justified by the premisses. To justify the assertion that appears as conclusion is the characteristic aim of an inference. Here, we confine ourselves to deductive inferences where the justification is taken to be conclusive. A short, natural explanation of what it is for a (deductive) inference to be valid is to say that it is valid if it succeeds in its aim, that is, if its premisses do (conclusively) justify the conclusion, given that premisses are justified. The paper is concerned with developing this explanation further.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141738291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is a slightly edited transcript of a lecture given by Per Martin‐Löf on 26 October 2022 at the Rolf Schock Symposium in Stockholm. In 2020, the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy was awarded to Dag Prawitz and Per Martin‐Löf, and the symposium was organised in their honour. The transcript was prepared by Ansten Klev and edited by the author.
{"title":"Correctness of assertion and validity of inference","authors":"Per Martin‐Löf","doi":"10.1111/theo.12540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12540","url":null,"abstract":"This is a slightly edited transcript of a lecture given by Per Martin‐Löf on 26 October 2022 at the Rolf Schock Symposium in Stockholm. In 2020, the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy was awarded to Dag Prawitz and Per Martin‐Löf, and the symposium was organised in their honour. The transcript was prepared by Ansten Klev and edited by the author.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141738290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and caused by this endorsement and yet not be necessitated. Free action requires indeterminism at the agential level—the kind of indeterminism that is compatible with physical determinism. I still think that our proposal was on the right track, but I believe it needs elaboration. As we already noted in the paper, our formal modelling—a standard branching model—was too extensional, and therefore in need of revision. Also, on a substantive side, what we say about the causal component of our proposal does not quite take care of the danger of ‘flukishness’ of an undetermined action. It was this threat to agential control that the requirement of causation by endorsement was meant to disarm in the first place. But the threat still remains and needs to be confronted. Revising the formal model and finding a solution to the problem of flukishness are my two objectives in this paper.
{"title":"Two intuitions about free will—Some afterthoughts","authors":"Wlodek Rabinowicz","doi":"10.1111/theo.12550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12550","url":null,"abstract":"In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and caused by this endorsement and yet not be necessitated. Free action requires indeterminism at the agential level—the kind of indeterminism that is compatible with physical determinism. I still think that our proposal was on the right track, but I believe it needs elaboration. As we already noted in the paper, our formal modelling—a standard branching model—was too extensional, and therefore in need of revision. Also, on a substantive side, what we say about the causal component of our proposal does not quite take care of the danger of ‘flukishness’ of an undetermined action. It was this threat to agential control that the requirement of causation by endorsement was meant to disarm in the first place. But the threat still remains and needs to be confronted. Revising the formal model and finding a solution to the problem of flukishness are my two objectives in this paper.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141738289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dating apps such as Tinder are designed to be played like a game. Users play by swiping left and right on others' profiles to indicate whether they are romantically or sexually interested in them. They match with those who reciprocate their interest. The goal of the game is to match with as many people as possible, prioritizing rapid gratification over the pursuit of meaningful connections. Tinder's design elements and monetization strategies incentivize users to prioritize gathering matches, replacing the complexity of actual dating with a series of discrete decisions. Playing the matching game on Tinder makes dating more immediately gratifying, so users have started to play the game as an end in itself. The app becomes a source of entertainment instead of a means to build valuable connections. This also transforms the activity of dating as users spend time building appealing profiles and attempt to manipulate the algorithm to maximize their matching potential. Gamifying our romantic and sexual lives has negative consequences on people's self‐image as their personal worth becomes entwined with their success on the app. Individuals are reduced to mere players in the game, and the algorithm itself disproportionately favors users with conventional preferences. Gamification can be dangerous when the boundary between the game and real life blurs.
{"title":"The gamification of dating online","authors":"Karim Nader","doi":"10.1111/theo.12549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12549","url":null,"abstract":"Dating apps such as Tinder are designed to be played like a game. Users play by swiping left and right on others' profiles to indicate whether they are romantically or sexually interested in them. They match with those who reciprocate their interest. The goal of the game is to match with as many people as possible, prioritizing rapid gratification over the pursuit of meaningful connections. Tinder's design elements and monetization strategies incentivize users to prioritize gathering matches, replacing the complexity of actual dating with a series of discrete decisions. Playing the matching game on Tinder makes dating more immediately gratifying, so users have started to play the game as an end in itself. The app becomes a source of entertainment instead of a means to build valuable connections. This also transforms the activity of dating as users spend time building appealing profiles and attempt to manipulate the algorithm to maximize their matching potential. Gamifying our romantic and sexual lives has negative consequences on people's self‐image as their personal worth becomes entwined with their success on the app. Individuals are reduced to mere players in the game, and the algorithm itself disproportionately favors users with conventional preferences. Gamification can be dangerous when the boundary between the game and real life blurs.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anti‐discrimination laws draw a distinction between two kinds of discrimination by non‐state actors. Intimate choices are protected even if they are morally wrong. For example, even if it is morally wrong to discriminate on the basis of race in deciding whom to date, marry or befriend, anti‐discrimination laws permit these acts. By contrast, commercial decisions are commonly regulated. I argue that the reasons for regulating commercial decisions also extend to an intermediate case, commercial facilitators of marriage choices. In the context of the caste system, I argue that commercial facilitators should be banned from allowing customers to filter by caste. The argument is based on two considerations. First, this could mitigate the harmful effects of such discriminatory marriages choices in the (re)production of the oppressive caste system. Second, even if the ban fails in changing behaviour, it serves as an expressive goal of communicating the state's opposition to the caste system.
{"title":"Private discrimination, marriage markets, and caste","authors":"Bastian Steuwer","doi":"10.1111/theo.12536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12536","url":null,"abstract":"Anti‐discrimination laws draw a distinction between two kinds of discrimination by non‐state actors. Intimate choices are protected even if they are morally wrong. For example, even if it is morally wrong to discriminate on the basis of race in deciding whom to date, marry or befriend, anti‐discrimination laws permit these acts. By contrast, commercial decisions are commonly regulated. I argue that the reasons for regulating commercial decisions also extend to an intermediate case, commercial facilitators of marriage choices. In the context of the caste system, I argue that commercial facilitators should be banned from allowing customers to filter by caste. The argument is based on two considerations. First, this could mitigate the harmful effects of such discriminatory marriages choices in the (re)production of the oppressive caste system. Second, even if the ban fails in changing behaviour, it serves as an expressive goal of communicating the state's opposition to the caste system.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141504952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses some remarks Kaplan made in ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice’ concerning empty names. I show how his objections to a particular view involving descriptions derived from Ramsification can be avoided by a nearby alternative framed in terms of discourse reference. I offer a treatment of empty names as variables carrying presuppositions concerning unique occupants of roles, or sets of properties, determined by the originating discourse.
{"title":"Winged horses, rascals and discourse referents","authors":"Andreas Stokke","doi":"10.1111/theo.12544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12544","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses some remarks Kaplan made in ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice’ concerning empty names. I show how his objections to a particular view involving descriptions derived from Ramsification can be avoided by a nearby alternative framed in terms of discourse reference. I offer a treatment of empty names as variables carrying presuppositions concerning unique occupants of roles, or sets of properties, determined by the originating discourse.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141504953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Divers argued that there are modal truths that are inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. Noonan and Jago proposed an answer to the challenge, by invoking a duplicate interpretation of the modal truths. Here, I present a slightly different kind of modal truth that would prove inconvenient even for a Lewisian who accepts Noonan and Jago's proposal.
{"title":"One more inconvenient modal truth","authors":"Chaoan He","doi":"10.1111/theo.12532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12532","url":null,"abstract":"Divers argued that there are modal truths that are inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. Noonan and Jago proposed an answer to the challenge, by invoking a duplicate interpretation of the modal truths. Here, I present a slightly different kind of modal truth that would prove inconvenient even for a Lewisian who accepts Noonan and Jago's proposal.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141382644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
‘The other’ is one of the mysteries of modern philosophy. Since the other is thought to be essentially different from the self, how we can understand each other is a difficult problem. In the first place, what does it mean to understand the other? I address this question from the perspective of normative inferentialism, by explicating what it means to understand the other's beliefs and actions. I propose that we should distinguish between attributional and fundamental understanding. While attributional understanding serves to specify the other's ways of thinking, fundamental understanding is an endorsement of them. Contrasting these two types of understanding gives us a rational picture of how people understand each other.
{"title":"Understanding the other from an inferentialist perspective","authors":"Haruka Iikawa","doi":"10.1111/theo.12534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12534","url":null,"abstract":"‘The other’ is one of the mysteries of modern philosophy. Since the other is thought to be essentially different from the self, how we can understand each other is a difficult problem. In the first place, what does it mean to understand the other? I address this question from the perspective of normative inferentialism, by explicating what it means to understand the other's beliefs and actions. I propose that we should distinguish between attributional and fundamental understanding. While attributional understanding serves to specify the other's ways of thinking, fundamental understanding is an endorsement of them. Contrasting these two types of understanding gives us a rational picture of how people understand each other.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141195003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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