Rumfitt has given two arguments that in unilateralist verificationist theories of meaning, truth collapses into correct assertibility. In the present paper I give similar arguments that show that in unilateral falsificationist theories of meaning, falsehood collapses into correct deniability. According to bilateralism, meanings are determined by assertion and denial conditions, so the question arises whether it succumbs to similar arguments. I show that this is not the case. The final section considers the question whether a principle central to Rumfitt's first argument, ‘It is assertible that if and only if it is assertible that it is assertible that ’, is one that bilateralists can reject, and concludes that they cannot. It follows that the logic of assertibility and deniability, according to a result by Williamson, is the little known modal logic K4 studied by Sobociński. The paper ends with a plaidoyer for bilateralists to adopt this logic.
拉姆菲特提出了两个论点，说明在单边主义的意义验证论中，真理会归结为正确的可断言性。在本文中，我给出了类似的论证，表明在单边意义证伪主义理论中，谬误会归结为正确的可否认性。根据双边主义，意义是由断言和否认条件决定的，因此问题在于它是否会屈从于类似的论证。我证明情况并非如此。最后一节探讨了一个问题，即朗菲特第一个论证的核心原则 "当且仅当可断言 A$$ A $$$是可断言的A$$ A $$$"是否是双边主义者可以拒绝的原则，结论是他们不能拒绝。由此可见，根据威廉姆森的一个结果，可断言性和可否认性逻辑就是索博辛斯基研究的鲜为人知的模态逻辑 K4。本文最后提出了双边主义者采用这一逻辑的建议。
{"title":"Bilateralism, collapsing modalities, and the logic of assertion and denial","authors":"Nils Kürbis","doi":"10.1111/theo.12516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12516","url":null,"abstract":"Rumfitt has given two arguments that in unilateralist verificationist theories of meaning, truth collapses into correct assertibility. In the present paper I give similar arguments that show that in unilateral falsificationist theories of meaning, falsehood collapses into correct deniability. According to bilateralism, meanings are determined by assertion and denial conditions, so the question arises whether it succumbs to similar arguments. I show that this is not the case. The final section considers the question whether a principle central to Rumfitt's first argument, ‘It is assertible that <mjx-container aria-label=\"upper A\" ctxtmenu_counter=\"0\" ctxtmenu_oldtabindex=\"1\" jax=\"CHTML\" role=\"application\" sre-explorer- style=\"font-size: 103%; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\"><mjx-math aria-hidden=\"true\"><mjx-semantics><mjx-mrow><mjx-mi data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic- data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\"><mjx-c></mjx-c></mjx-mi></mjx-mrow></mjx-semantics></mjx-math><mjx-assistive-mml aria-hidden=\"true\" display=\"inline\" unselectable=\"on\"><math altimg=\"/cms/asset/b9f1cf52-d732-424a-be82-cd61386f4221/theo12516-math-0001.png\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"><semantics><mrow><mi data-semantic-=\"\" data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\">A</mi></mrow>$$ A $$</annotation></semantics></math></mjx-assistive-mml></mjx-container> if and only if it is assertible that it is assertible that <mjx-container aria-label=\"upper A\" ctxtmenu_counter=\"1\" ctxtmenu_oldtabindex=\"1\" jax=\"CHTML\" role=\"application\" sre-explorer- style=\"font-size: 103%; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\"><mjx-math aria-hidden=\"true\"><mjx-semantics><mjx-mrow><mjx-mi data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic- data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\"><mjx-c></mjx-c></mjx-mi></mjx-mrow></mjx-semantics></mjx-math><mjx-assistive-mml aria-hidden=\"true\" display=\"inline\" unselectable=\"on\"><math altimg=\"/cms/asset/39fd4d93-311c-4f8c-b2e5-da8117ff21cf/theo12516-math-0002.png\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"><semantics><mrow><mi data-semantic-=\"\" data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\">A</mi></mrow>$$ A $$</annotation></semantics></math></mjx-assistive-mml></mjx-container>’, is one that bilateralists can reject, and concludes that they cannot. It follows that the logic of assertibility and deniability, according to a result by Williamson, is the little known modal logic K4 studied by Sobociński. The paper ends with a <i>plaidoyer</i> for bilateralists to adopt this logic.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140146909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “Sidgwick on Bentham: the ‘Double Aspect’ of Utilitarianism”, Schofield argued that Bentham did not regard his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that natural benevolence is at his disposal to mitigate the problem of the “double aspect” of utilitarianism. This paper argues that Bentham regarded his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that, in a manner quite distinct from an internal, benevolence approach, he took advantage of self-preference and thus adopted a self-preference and artificial means-based approach, thereby still maintaining an internal approach supported by external, institutional contrivance. In so doing, he argued first that self-preference could add to the greatest happiness; second, that benevolence would tend to facilitate the achievement of the greatest happiness, with the consequence that he endorsed the artificial cultivation of benevolence; and third, that the artificial means of the junction-of-interests-prescribing principle should be adopted to bridge the gap between self-preference and the greatest happiness. Sidgwick failed to appreciate the depth and sophistication of Bentham's logic.
{"title":"Sidgwick and Bentham's “double aspect” of utilitarianism revisited","authors":"Yanxiang Zhang","doi":"10.1111/theo.12517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12517","url":null,"abstract":"In “Sidgwick on Bentham: the ‘Double Aspect’ of Utilitarianism”, Schofield argued that Bentham did not regard his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that natural benevolence is at his disposal to mitigate the problem of the “double aspect” of utilitarianism. This paper argues that Bentham regarded his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that, in a manner quite distinct from an internal, benevolence approach, he took advantage of self-preference and thus adopted a self-preference and artificial means-based approach, thereby still maintaining an internal approach supported by external, institutional contrivance. In so doing, he argued first that self-preference could add to the greatest happiness; second, that benevolence would tend to facilitate the achievement of the greatest happiness, with the consequence that he endorsed the artificial cultivation of benevolence; and third, that the artificial means of the junction-of-interests-prescribing principle should be adopted to bridge the gap between self-preference and the greatest happiness. Sidgwick failed to appreciate the depth and sophistication of Bentham's logic.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140075755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many contemporary metaphysicians believe that the existence of a contingent object such as Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of the corresponding set {Socrates}. This paper argues that this belief is mistaken. The argument proposed takes the form of a dilemma. The expression “{Socrates}” is a shorthand either for the expression “the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates” or for the expression “the set that contains Socrates and nothing else”. However, Socrates' existence does not explain the existence of the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates, because there is such a set no matter whether or not Socrates exists. And although Socrates' existence does explain that of the set that contains Socrates and nothing else, this explanation is a conceptual rather than a metaphysical one. Both these claims rely on a deflationary account of the use of set theoretic vocabulary that is explained, though not properly justified, in the paper.
{"title":"Metaphysical explanations: The case of singleton sets revisited","authors":"Kai Michael Büttner","doi":"10.1111/theo.12511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12511","url":null,"abstract":"Many contemporary metaphysicians believe that the existence of a contingent object such as Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of the corresponding set {Socrates}. This paper argues that this belief is mistaken. The argument proposed takes the form of a dilemma. The expression “{Socrates}” is a shorthand either for the expression “the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates” or for the expression “the set that contains Socrates and nothing else”. However, Socrates' existence does not explain the existence of the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates, because there is such a set no matter whether or not Socrates exists. And although Socrates' existence does explain that of the set that contains Socrates and nothing else, this explanation is a conceptual rather than a metaphysical one. Both these claims rely on a deflationary account of the use of set theoretic vocabulary that is explained, though not properly justified, in the paper.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140019834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It has been claimed that friendship not only involves partial treatment of one's friends but that it also involves some degree of doxastic partiality towards them. Taking these claims as their starting points, some philosophers have argued that friendship not only involves such partiality but that this is also what is normatively required. This gives rise to the possibility of conflict between the demands of friendship on the one hand and the demands of epistemic norms on the other. In this paper, I consider some of the responses to this claim and show why they fail. I distinguish between different grades of doxastic partiality and explain why, although low grades of doxastic partiality fall within the bounds of the standard epistemic norm, the higher grades might infringe such norms. I conclude with an explanation of a fundamental intuition that seems to lie at the heart of the thesis of epistemic partiality.
{"title":"Friendship and the grades of doxastic partiality","authors":"Hamid Vahid","doi":"10.1111/theo.12514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12514","url":null,"abstract":"It has been claimed that friendship not only involves partial treatment of one's friends but that it also involves some degree of doxastic partiality towards them. Taking these claims as their starting points, some philosophers have argued that friendship not only involves such partiality but that this is also what is normatively required. This gives rise to the possibility of conflict between the demands of friendship on the one hand and the demands of epistemic norms on the other. In this paper, I consider some of the responses to this claim and show why they fail. I distinguish between different grades of doxastic partiality and explain why, although low grades of doxastic partiality fall within the bounds of the standard epistemic norm, the higher grades might infringe such norms. I conclude with an explanation of a fundamental intuition that seems to lie at the heart of the thesis of epistemic partiality.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139956189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the nature of the kind of behaviour English speakers call “acting”? A popular strategy is to say that acting is a kind of pretence, and onstage actors pretend to do and say what the character does and says. This paper aims to reject this “pretence theory of acting”. To do so, first, I introduce several counterexamples showing that actors do not engage in pretending but still enact their characters; second, I argue that the reasons in favour of the pretence theory of acting are not persuasive; finally, I argue that the pretence theory of acting can lead to a misunderstanding about acting.
{"title":"Acting and pretending","authors":"Yuchen Guo","doi":"10.1111/theo.12513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12513","url":null,"abstract":"What is the nature of the kind of behaviour English speakers call “acting”? A popular strategy is to say that acting is a kind of pretence, and onstage actors pretend to do and say what the character does and says. This paper aims to reject this “pretence theory of acting”. To do so, first, I introduce several counterexamples showing that actors do not engage in pretending but still enact their characters; second, I argue that the reasons in favour of the pretence theory of acting are not persuasive; finally, I argue that the pretence theory of acting can lead to a misunderstanding about acting.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139767302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), whether S knows that p depends not only on the subject's epistemic position (the presence of a true belief, sufficient warrant, etc.) but also on non-epistemic factors present in the subject's situation; such factors are seen as “encroaching” on the subject's epistemic standing. Not the only such non-epistemic factor but the most prominent one consists in the subject's practical stakes. Stakes-based SSI holds that two subjects can be in the same epistemic position with respect to some proposition but with different stakes for the two subjects so that one of them might know the proposition while the other might fail to know it. It is remarkable that the notion of stakes has not been discussed much in great detail at all so far. This paper takes a closer look at this notion and proposes a detailed, new analysis. It turns out that there is more than one kind of stakes, namely event-stakes, knowledge-stakes and action-stakes. I discuss several issues that even plausible notions of stakes raise and propose solutions.
根据主体敏感不变论（SSI），S 是否知道 p 不仅取决于主体的认识论地位（是否存在真实信念、充分理由等），还取决于主体所处情境中的非认识论因素；这些因素被视为对主体认识论地位的 "侵犯"。主体的实际利害关系并不是唯一的非认识论因素，但却是最突出的因素。基于利害关系的 SSI 认为，两个主体可以对某个命题处于相同的认识论地位，但两个主体的利害关系不同，因此其中一个主体可能知道该命题，而另一个主体可能不知道该命题。值得注意的是，迄今为止，人们还没有对利害关系这一概念进行过非常详细的讨论。本文对这一概念进行了深入探讨，并提出了详细的新分析。事实证明，利害关系不止一种，即事件利害关系、知识利害关系和行动利害关系。我讨论了即使是合理的利害关系概念也会引起的几个问题，并提出了解决方案。
{"title":"What's a(t) stake? On stakes, encroachers, knowledge","authors":"Peter Baumann","doi":"10.1111/theo.12512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12512","url":null,"abstract":"According to subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), whether S knows that <i>p</i> depends not only on the subject's epistemic position (the presence of a true belief, sufficient warrant, etc.) but also on non-epistemic factors present in the subject's situation; such factors are seen as “encroaching” on the subject's epistemic standing. Not the only such non-epistemic factor but the most prominent one consists in the subject's practical stakes. Stakes-based SSI holds that two subjects can be in the same epistemic position with respect to some proposition but with different stakes for the two subjects so that one of them might know the proposition while the other might fail to know it. It is remarkable that the notion of stakes has not been discussed much in great detail at all so far. This paper takes a closer look at this notion and proposes a detailed, new analysis. It turns out that there is more than one kind of stakes, namely event-stakes, knowledge-stakes and action-stakes. I discuss several issues that even plausible notions of stakes raise and propose solutions.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139767312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use recent developments within philosophy of science and within certain strands of linguistic research to throw light on each other. According to Ronald Giere's perspectivist philosophy of science, the scientific understanding of reality must proceed along different, mutually irreducible lines of approach. Giere's proposal, however, leaves unresolved the problem of how to integrate the ever-growing multitude of highly diverse scientific accounts of what is, after all, one and the same world. We propose a technique for the alignment of different perspectives that will permit cross-perspectival explanation, and thus allow for a more holistic picture of reality to emerge. With respect to modern linguistics, however, Giere's perspectivism merely legalises a de facto state of affairs, as this discipline displays the peaceful coexistence of a multitude of different theoretical perspectives. Still, this makes it all the more important to show how the different aspects of language picked out by these different perspectives combine to form one single complex reality. During our investigation, a largely overlooked type of reduction within linguistics comes to light, prevalent in classical as well as current work within speech act theory and politeness theory. We suggest how a more holistic understanding of language can be attained through our technique for integrating different perspectives.
{"title":"Reductivism versus perspectivism versus holism: A key theme in philosophy of science, and its application to modern linguistics","authors":"Finn Collin, Per Durst-Andersen","doi":"10.1111/theo.12508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12508","url":null,"abstract":"We use recent developments within philosophy of science and within certain strands of linguistic research to throw light on each other. According to Ronald Giere's perspectivist philosophy of science, the scientific understanding of reality must proceed along different, mutually irreducible lines of approach. Giere's proposal, however, leaves unresolved the problem of how to integrate the ever-growing multitude of highly diverse scientific accounts of what is, after all, one and the same world. We propose a technique for the alignment of different perspectives that will permit cross-perspectival explanation, and thus allow for a more holistic picture of reality to emerge. With respect to modern linguistics, however, Giere's perspectivism merely legalises a de facto state of affairs, as this discipline displays the peaceful coexistence of a multitude of different theoretical perspectives. Still, this makes it all the more important to show how the different aspects of language picked out by these different perspectives combine to form one single complex reality. During our investigation, a largely overlooked type of reduction within linguistics comes to light, prevalent in classical as well as current work within speech act theory and politeness theory. We suggest how a more holistic understanding of language can be attained through our technique for integrating different perspectives.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138826374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the paper, I first consider how his theory of social norms is connected to his theory of social evolution by examining the importance of learning in his theory of both social norms and social evolution. Then I turn to David Owen and Amy Allen's critiques of Jürgen Habermas. My aim is to develop their critique of Habermas by elucidating an important but neglected distinction between the developmental logic and the developmental dynamics in Habermas's theory of social evolution. Drawing on this distinction, I claim that Habermas's theory is problematic in that he underestimates the importance of the developmental dynamics. By introducing the distinction between individual learning and social learning, I also question his account of progress as accumulative experience of learning. This is because, unlike cumulative culture at the level of phylogenesis, individuals ontogenetically experience a kind of non-cumulative social learning. Unlike cumulative culture, each individual has to undergo a kind of non-cumulative social learning. The problem is that Habermas conceives the learning process too narrowly such that learning does not guarantee social evolution.
{"title":"A developmental logic: Habermas's theory of social evolution","authors":"Keunchang Oh","doi":"10.1111/theo.12509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12509","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper, I first consider how his theory of social norms is connected to his theory of social evolution by examining the importance of learning in his theory of both social norms and social evolution. Then I turn to David Owen and Amy Allen's critiques of Jürgen Habermas. My aim is to develop their critique of Habermas by elucidating an important but neglected distinction between the developmental logic and the developmental dynamics in Habermas's theory of social evolution. Drawing on this distinction, I claim that Habermas's theory is problematic in that he underestimates the importance of the developmental dynamics. By introducing the distinction between individual learning and social learning, I also question his account of progress as accumulative experience of learning. This is because, unlike cumulative culture at the level of phylogenesis, individuals ontogenetically experience a kind of non-cumulative social learning. Unlike cumulative culture, each individual has to undergo a kind of non-cumulative social learning. The problem is that Habermas conceives the learning process too narrowly such that learning does not guarantee social evolution.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138826450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
So-called Neo-Russellians, such as Salmon, Braun, Crimmins, and Perry, hold that the semantic content of ‘ is ’ in a context is the singular proposition o, P, where is the referent of the name in , and is the property expressed by the predicate in . This is also known as the Neo-Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the N
所谓的新鲁塞尔主义者，如 Salmon、Braun、Crimmins 和 Perry，认为'n$$ n $$ is F$$ F $$'在上下文 c$$ c $$中的语义内容是奇异命题 ⟨$$ Biglangle $$o、P⟩$$ Bigrangle $$$，其中 o$$ o $$是 n$$ n $$这个名称在 c$$ c $$中的所指，而 P$$ P $$是谓词 F$$ F $$在 c$$ c $$中表达的性质。这也被称为新鲁塞尔理论。在本文中，我将使用带有命题名称的真值描述，如 "哥德巴赫猜想"，来论证新拉塞尔理论与关于先验知识的高度可信原则一起，会导致不可接受的后果。我将称之为'哥德巴赫猜想'。由于解决哥德巴赫猜想的办法不能是否定所讨论的先验知识原则，因此这个难题将破坏新鲁塞尔理论。
{"title":"Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle","authors":"Stefan Rinner","doi":"10.1111/theo.12504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12504","url":null,"abstract":"So-called Neo-Russellians, such as Salmon, Braun, Crimmins, and Perry, hold that the semantic content of ‘<math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0001\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0001.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>n</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ n $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math> is <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0002\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0002.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>F</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ F $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math>’ in a context <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0004\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0004.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>c</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ c $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math> is the singular proposition <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0005\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0005.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mo>⟨</mo>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ Biglangle $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math>o, P<math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0006\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0006.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mo>⟩</mo>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ Bigrangle $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math>, where <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0007\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0007.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>o</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ o $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math> is the referent of the name <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0008\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0008.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>n</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ n $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math> in <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0009\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0009.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>c</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ c $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math>, and <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0010\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0010.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>P</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ P $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math> is the property expressed by the predicate <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0011\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0011.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>F</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ F $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math> in <math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:theo:media:theo12504:theo12504-math-0012\" display=\"inline\" location=\"graphic/theo12504-math-0012.png\" overflow=\"scroll\">\u0000<semantics>\u0000<mrow>\u0000<mi>c</mi>\u0000</mrow>\u0000$$ c $$</annotation>\u0000</semantics></math>. This is also known as the Neo-Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the N","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138565815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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