This paper explores and criticizes some aspects of David Lewis? theory of knowledge ascriptions. In section one I present the sceptical paradox and the basic assumptions of epistemic contextualism. In section two I explain how Lewis combines the relevant alternatives theory with epistemic contextualism in formulating his theory of knowledge ascriptions. In section three I show that this theory allows knowledge which is based purely on ignoring and I argue that this unfavourable consequence stems from the way in which Lewis formulated the rule of belief within his theory. In the concluding section I point out the problematic aspects and ad hoc character of Lewis? rule of attention and claim that it was thus formulated so as to be able to solve the sceptical paradox. Finally, I claim that Lewis? theory of knowledge ascriptions is untenable in its original form.
{"title":"Some weak points of Lewis’ theory of knowledge ascriptions","authors":"Aleksandra Davidovic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303021d","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303021d","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores and criticizes some aspects of David Lewis? theory of knowledge ascriptions. In section one I present the sceptical paradox and the basic assumptions of epistemic contextualism. In section two I explain how Lewis combines the relevant alternatives theory with epistemic contextualism in formulating his theory of knowledge ascriptions. In section three I show that this theory allows knowledge which is based purely on ignoring and I argue that this unfavourable consequence stems from the way in which Lewis formulated the rule of belief within his theory. In the concluding section I point out the problematic aspects and ad hoc character of Lewis? rule of attention and claim that it was thus formulated so as to be able to solve the sceptical paradox. Finally, I claim that Lewis? theory of knowledge ascriptions is untenable in its original form.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135649720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I am presenting Devitt?s Expertise Defence and the Modest Theory of Intuitions as a response to Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich?s claims that the method of cases is flawed and that we should consult folk intuitions in supporting theories of reference, which they in turn support by experimental data that referential intuitions differ cross-culturally. Some authors present Devitt?s response and his own project as an attempt to keep a moderate position between armchair philosophy and experimental philosophy that Machery et al. advocate, as he defends the position that although intuitions are not universally reliable, experts? intuitions are more reliable and could potentially be used for supporting adequate theories. In turn, I will try to show why Devitt?s Expertise Defence should only be considered as a negative project aimed at criticising both armchair and experimental philosophy based on testing folk intuitions, and why he does not have to fully justify the Modest Theory of Intuitions, and that is sufficient to introduce it as a further alternative in order to successfully object to mentioned styles of philosophy. I will support this view by using Ramsey and Cummins?s objections against the possibility of establishing a proper account of the reliability of any kind of intuitions. In the end, I will consider Devitt?s request to test language usage and to explore linguistic reality in theorising about language as the only proper part of his positive program and reconsider the role of philosophy of language that is forbidden to rely on intuitions.
{"title":"Intuitions and theories of reference","authors":"Miljana Milojevic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303005m","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303005m","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I am presenting Devitt?s Expertise Defence and the Modest Theory of Intuitions as a response to Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich?s claims that the method of cases is flawed and that we should consult folk intuitions in supporting theories of reference, which they in turn support by experimental data that referential intuitions differ cross-culturally. Some authors present Devitt?s response and his own project as an attempt to keep a moderate position between armchair philosophy and experimental philosophy that Machery et al. advocate, as he defends the position that although intuitions are not universally reliable, experts? intuitions are more reliable and could potentially be used for supporting adequate theories. In turn, I will try to show why Devitt?s Expertise Defence should only be considered as a negative project aimed at criticising both armchair and experimental philosophy based on testing folk intuitions, and why he does not have to fully justify the Modest Theory of Intuitions, and that is sufficient to introduce it as a further alternative in order to successfully object to mentioned styles of philosophy. I will support this view by using Ramsey and Cummins?s objections against the possibility of establishing a proper account of the reliability of any kind of intuitions. In the end, I will consider Devitt?s request to test language usage and to explore linguistic reality in theorising about language as the only proper part of his positive program and reconsider the role of philosophy of language that is forbidden to rely on intuitions.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135649731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Among the prominent aspects of our experience of time is its asymmetry which can be pointed at by using somewhat vague notions of fixity of the past and openness of the future. Among the influential attempts to explain this asymmetry is an analysis by David Lewis, based on his influential similarity semantic analysis of counterfactual conditionals. I examine Lewis? attempt and criticisms it was exposed to in the literature. By focusing on the criticism by Penelope Mackie, I show that Lewis? analysis can be fortified in a way consistent with his basic project so that it withstands the examined criticisms. However, one important consequence of this fortification is that its success depends on his counterfactual theory of causation. This means that every (successful) criticism of Lewis? theory of causation is a fortiori a (successful) criticism of his analysis of the relevant asymmetry of time.
{"title":"Counterfactuals, causation and the asymmetry of time","authors":"Igor Stojanovic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303055s","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303055s","url":null,"abstract":"Among the prominent aspects of our experience of time is its asymmetry which can be pointed at by using somewhat vague notions of fixity of the past and openness of the future. Among the influential attempts to explain this asymmetry is an analysis by David Lewis, based on his influential similarity semantic analysis of counterfactual conditionals. I examine Lewis? attempt and criticisms it was exposed to in the literature. By focusing on the criticism by Penelope Mackie, I show that Lewis? analysis can be fortified in a way consistent with his basic project so that it withstands the examined criticisms. However, one important consequence of this fortification is that its success depends on his counterfactual theory of causation. This means that every (successful) criticism of Lewis? theory of causation is a fortiori a (successful) criticism of his analysis of the relevant asymmetry of time.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135650047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The work points to irreconcilable differences and internal tensions that under the term ?republic? are inherited, primarily, by the eighteenth century, which was favorable to it. Those disagreements and ambivalences, which determine modern theory to a good extent, are presented, respectively, through understandings of the republic in the Enlightenment, romanticism, republicanism and in the tradition of the ?republic of letters?. It is concluded that the emancipatory potential that is invested in the republic, if it has the same or a similar point of resistance - for example: monarchy, church domination of social life, what was once called the concise catchphrase ?throne and altar?, the abolition of privatized and/or particular decision-making monopolies and all misconceptions, prejudices, and the authorities that legitimize them - did not have at all the same or a similar vision of the desirable state after the coup has taken place, that is, in the name of what the republic should be established.
{"title":"How to concieve republic: Four visions","authors":"Predrag Krstic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303107k","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303107k","url":null,"abstract":"The work points to irreconcilable differences and internal tensions that under the term ?republic? are inherited, primarily, by the eighteenth century, which was favorable to it. Those disagreements and ambivalences, which determine modern theory to a good extent, are presented, respectively, through understandings of the republic in the Enlightenment, romanticism, republicanism and in the tradition of the ?republic of letters?. It is concluded that the emancipatory potential that is invested in the republic, if it has the same or a similar point of resistance - for example: monarchy, church domination of social life, what was once called the concise catchphrase ?throne and altar?, the abolition of privatized and/or particular decision-making monopolies and all misconceptions, prejudices, and the authorities that legitimize them - did not have at all the same or a similar vision of the desirable state after the coup has taken place, that is, in the name of what the republic should be established.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135649741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we will attempt to consider the issue of constructing and justifying political beliefs under the conditions of populist politics and authoritarian regimes. We will address the non-ideological nature of the so-called ?catch-all? populism, attempts to exclude the educated and intellectual elite from public political life, and the use of certain informal logical fallacies in the development of a populist propaganda model. We will also point out the similarities between religious and political propaganda. In this regard, we will try to interpret the leader-centric propaganda model from the perspective of Leibnizian theodicy and, relying on Wittgenstein?s religious fideism, introduce the category of political fideism as a way to better understand the effects of populist-leader propaganda.
{"title":"Political beliefs, “catch-all” populism, and political fideism: The leader-centric propaganda model","authors":"Drago Djuric, Sladjana Djuric","doi":"10.2298/theo2303141d","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303141d","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we will attempt to consider the issue of constructing and justifying political beliefs under the conditions of populist politics and authoritarian regimes. We will address the non-ideological nature of the so-called ?catch-all? populism, attempts to exclude the educated and intellectual elite from public political life, and the use of certain informal logical fallacies in the development of a populist propaganda model. We will also point out the similarities between religious and political propaganda. In this regard, we will try to interpret the leader-centric propaganda model from the perspective of Leibnizian theodicy and, relying on Wittgenstein?s religious fideism, introduce the category of political fideism as a way to better understand the effects of populist-leader propaganda.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135650041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This prolegomena initially consolidates ?meta-architectural constructionism? as a conceptual label for the operationalization of the architectural modalities of the philosophy of synthesis. After the heuristic definition of its key aspects was carried out through four key terms - reconstruction, relationism, processualism and projectivism, the second part of the article initiates a proposal of understanding and chronology according to the changing ontology of modernity, following Berthelot?s (Jean- Michel Berthelot) thesis about the three poles of the contemporary program of historical epistemology - the naturalistic, intentional and symbolic poles. His metatheoretical form of constructivism applies a version of the familiar scientific hypothetico-deductive model to cognition in general. As a kind of general vector of time, appropriation of epochal consciousness or a kind of sensibility in architecture, this post-positivist dogma deviates from theoretically too stabilized paradigms, categorical schemes or even less norms, but functions as a variable form of discursive, transdisciplinary, phenomenological and metaphysical identifications. Naturalistic metaarchitectural constructs indicate the core presence of the aspectuality of reconstruction and relationism, intentional constructs indicate the strong presence of metaarchitectural procedurality and projectivism, while the symbolic metaarchitectural pole is based on a complex combination of all heuristically recognized aspectualities as a modality of complex and combinatorial thinking and a methodology that is essentially postmodern scripture. The ontological vocations of metatheory of synthesis in the first two historical epistemologies of metaarchitectural constructionism are directed towards analytical constructs, while the third pole is directed towards the descriptive nature of constructs, but in all aspects of meta-architectural constructionism the role of some kind of structure or system appears. The intention is to theoretically standardize the ambiguity of constructionism in architecture as a text of culture, the consequences of which are rationalistic shaping of relativistic phenomena, as a meta-architectural procedure, protocol or a specific, simultaneously ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically based platform of thought.
这一现象最初巩固了元建筑建构主义。作为综合哲学的建筑模式的可操作性的概念标签。在通过重构主义、关系主义、过程主义和投射主义四个关键术语对现代性的关键方面进行了启发式界定之后，文章的第二部分继贝特洛之后，根据现代性本体的变化提出了理解和时序的建议。贝特洛(Jean- Michel Berthelot)提出了当代历史认识论的三个极点——自然主义的、意图的和象征的极点。他的元理论形式的建构主义将我们所熟悉的科学假设-演绎模型应用于一般的认知。作为一种时间的一般向量、时代意识的拨款或建筑的一种感性，这种后实证主义教条偏离了理论上过于稳定的范式、分类方案甚至更少的规范，而是作为一种话语的、跨学科的、现象学的和形而上学的认同的可变形式。自然主义的元建筑结构表明了重建和关系主义的独特性的核心存在，有意的结构表明了元建筑程序性和投射主义的强烈存在，而象征性的元建筑极点是基于所有启发式认识的独特性的复杂组合，作为一种复杂和组合思维的形态和一种本质上是后现代经典的方法论。在元建筑建构主义的前两种历史认识论中，综合元理论的本体论使命指向分析性建构，而第三极指向建构的描述性本质，但在元建筑建构主义的各个方面都出现了某种结构或系统的作用。其目的是在理论上规范建筑中作为文化文本的建构主义的模糊性，其结果是相对主义现象的理性主义塑造，作为元建筑程序，协议或具体的，同时在本体论，认识论和方法论上基于思想的平台。
{"title":"Prolegomena for the concept of constructionism in architecture","authors":"Aleksa Ciganovic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303157c","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303157c","url":null,"abstract":"This prolegomena initially consolidates ?meta-architectural constructionism? as a conceptual label for the operationalization of the architectural modalities of the philosophy of synthesis. After the heuristic definition of its key aspects was carried out through four key terms - reconstruction, relationism, processualism and projectivism, the second part of the article initiates a proposal of understanding and chronology according to the changing ontology of modernity, following Berthelot?s (Jean- Michel Berthelot) thesis about the three poles of the contemporary program of historical epistemology - the naturalistic, intentional and symbolic poles. His metatheoretical form of constructivism applies a version of the familiar scientific hypothetico-deductive model to cognition in general. As a kind of general vector of time, appropriation of epochal consciousness or a kind of sensibility in architecture, this post-positivist dogma deviates from theoretically too stabilized paradigms, categorical schemes or even less norms, but functions as a variable form of discursive, transdisciplinary, phenomenological and metaphysical identifications. Naturalistic metaarchitectural constructs indicate the core presence of the aspectuality of reconstruction and relationism, intentional constructs indicate the strong presence of metaarchitectural procedurality and projectivism, while the symbolic metaarchitectural pole is based on a complex combination of all heuristically recognized aspectualities as a modality of complex and combinatorial thinking and a methodology that is essentially postmodern scripture. The ontological vocations of metatheory of synthesis in the first two historical epistemologies of metaarchitectural constructionism are directed towards analytical constructs, while the third pole is directed towards the descriptive nature of constructs, but in all aspects of meta-architectural constructionism the role of some kind of structure or system appears. The intention is to theoretically standardize the ambiguity of constructionism in architecture as a text of culture, the consequences of which are rationalistic shaping of relativistic phenomena, as a meta-architectural procedure, protocol or a specific, simultaneously ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically based platform of thought.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135649740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Objects and events from the outside world are represented in our consciousness through the structure of time. Temporality and consciousness are closely related phenomena and in this paper I intend to explore their relationship by referring to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. I will try to provide an adequate contemporary interpretation of Husserl?s understanding of temporality, as well as the relationship between the internal structure of time and consciousness, through the conceptual framework of dynamic systems theory and enactivist theory of cognition.. In order to succeed in my intention, I will rely on a special ability of the subject: activity.
{"title":"Husserl’s understanding of temporality as a reflection of active subject","authors":"Anastasija Filipovic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303039f","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303039f","url":null,"abstract":"Objects and events from the outside world are represented in our consciousness through the structure of time. Temporality and consciousness are closely related phenomena and in this paper I intend to explore their relationship by referring to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. I will try to provide an adequate contemporary interpretation of Husserl?s understanding of temporality, as well as the relationship between the internal structure of time and consciousness, through the conceptual framework of dynamic systems theory and enactivist theory of cognition.. In order to succeed in my intention, I will rely on a special ability of the subject: activity.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135650048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the position of ecumenical expressivism, a metaethical theory according to which moral judgments simultaneously express an individual?s sentiment of (dis)approval towards objects, actions, and practices instantiating certain properties, as well as their belief that these objects, actions, and practices instantiate the mentioned properties. After a detailed exposition of the central tenets of this philosophical position, we will analyze how successfully it can address the threat posed by the modified version of the open-question argument and whether it can resolve the famous Frege-Geach problem, which is rightly considered the most serious obstacle to adopting any form of expressivism. The conclusion of this analysis is that the claim that ecumenical expressivism can be considered a superior position compared to non-ecumenical forms of expressivist and cognitivist views is unjustified. This contrasts with the case of ecumenical cognitivism, where such a claim finds stronger support.
{"title":"Ecumenical expressivism: The Frege-Geach problem and the open question argument","authors":"Voin Milevski","doi":"10.2298/theo2303091m","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303091m","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the position of ecumenical expressivism, a metaethical theory according to which moral judgments simultaneously express an individual?s sentiment of (dis)approval towards objects, actions, and practices instantiating certain properties, as well as their belief that these objects, actions, and practices instantiate the mentioned properties. After a detailed exposition of the central tenets of this philosophical position, we will analyze how successfully it can address the threat posed by the modified version of the open-question argument and whether it can resolve the famous Frege-Geach problem, which is rightly considered the most serious obstacle to adopting any form of expressivism. The conclusion of this analysis is that the claim that ecumenical expressivism can be considered a superior position compared to non-ecumenical forms of expressivist and cognitivist views is unjustified. This contrasts with the case of ecumenical cognitivism, where such a claim finds stronger support.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135650040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Frankfurt?s critique of the principle of alternate possibilities led to a reexamining of many of the conditions that were rooted in the principle. One of these includes Kant?s famed maxim ?Ought-implies-can?. Since the alternate possibilities principle underscores the condition that is required for the subject to be morally responsible (could have done otherwise condition), the maxim also implies the condition?s validity also in situations where it is met and provides the basis for the attributiveness of morally relevant qualities. Although Frankfurt?s example showed that the presence of moral responsibility does not require the validity of the alternate possibilities principle - the condition of the possibility of acting differently need not be met - then even the attributiveness of moral qualities, in the way that the maxim implies, cannot be applied in situations where the subject is responsible, even though they could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt, however, refuses to draw this conclusion and believes that even under the conditions set forth, the maxim can apply. The provocative claim challenges Frankfurt-type compatibilists, and the paper examines whether it is founded, in addition to what consequences can be drawn pertaining to Kant?s maxim?s validity. The conclusion - contrary to Frankfurt?s initial optimism - is that in a world where causal determinism applies and where the alternate possibilities principle does not, although the subject may be morally responsible, their responsibility cannot be grounded in deontological reasoning.
{"title":"Does Kant’s maxim ‘ought-implies-can’ apply if the principle of alternate possibilities does not?","authors":"Nedzib Prasevic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303075p","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303075p","url":null,"abstract":"Frankfurt?s critique of the principle of alternate possibilities led to a reexamining of many of the conditions that were rooted in the principle. One of these includes Kant?s famed maxim ?Ought-implies-can?. Since the alternate possibilities principle underscores the condition that is required for the subject to be morally responsible (could have done otherwise condition), the maxim also implies the condition?s validity also in situations where it is met and provides the basis for the attributiveness of morally relevant qualities. Although Frankfurt?s example showed that the presence of moral responsibility does not require the validity of the alternate possibilities principle - the condition of the possibility of acting differently need not be met - then even the attributiveness of moral qualities, in the way that the maxim implies, cannot be applied in situations where the subject is responsible, even though they could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt, however, refuses to draw this conclusion and believes that even under the conditions set forth, the maxim can apply. The provocative claim challenges Frankfurt-type compatibilists, and the paper examines whether it is founded, in addition to what consequences can be drawn pertaining to Kant?s maxim?s validity. The conclusion - contrary to Frankfurt?s initial optimism - is that in a world where causal determinism applies and where the alternate possibilities principle does not, although the subject may be morally responsible, their responsibility cannot be grounded in deontological reasoning.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135649743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01Epub Date: 2022-08-30DOI: 10.1111/theo.12431
Pietro Intropi
How is freedom valuable? And how should we go about defining freedom? In this essay, I discuss a distinction between two general ways of valuing freedom: one appeals to the good (e.g., to freedom's contribution to well-being); the other appeals to how persons have reason to treat one another in virtue of their status as purposive beings (to the right). The analysis of these two values has many relevant implications and it is preliminary to a better understanding of the relationships between freedom and justice. First, it contributes to shed light on the relationship between trust and the value of freedom, and on two attitudes towards freedom - promoting and respecting freedom. Second, it disambiguates between two versions of the claim that freedom has non-specific/content-independent value: one appeals to the good, the other to the right. And third, I show that certain implications concerning the definition of freedom follow from assuming an account of the value of freedom that exclusively appeals to the right, illustrating how the value of freedom can shape what freedom is.
{"title":"Freedom's values: The good and the right.","authors":"Pietro Intropi","doi":"10.1111/theo.12431","DOIUrl":"10.1111/theo.12431","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>How is freedom valuable? And how should we go about defining freedom? In this essay, I discuss a distinction between two general ways of valuing freedom: one appeals to the good (e.g., to freedom's contribution to well-being); the other appeals to how persons have reason to treat one another in virtue of their status as purposive beings (to the right). The analysis of these two values has many relevant implications and it is preliminary to a better understanding of the relationships between freedom and justice. First, it contributes to shed light on the relationship between trust and the value of freedom, and on two attitudes towards freedom - promoting and respecting freedom. Second, it disambiguates between two versions of the claim that freedom has non-specific/content-independent value: one appeals to the good, the other to the right. And third, I show that certain implications concerning the definition of freedom follow from assuming an account of the value of freedom that exclusively appeals to the right, illustrating how the value of freedom can shape what freedom <i>is</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10087774/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9309939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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