In this article, we propose to analyze the impact of regret and rejoicing on the allocation of risky assets. Regret and rejoicing are two emotions that are defined by comparing the result of an action retained by an agent with respect to the result that he could have obtained from an alternative action. We show that the choice of the alternative action impacts the allocation of risky assets. When it is defined in relation to the ex post maximum expected result, the agent only receives regret. This may lead, for low values of the marginal cost of risk, to retain more risky assets than an agent who maximized a standard expected utility function. On the contrary, the agent could express a preference for certainty and defines his emotions in relation to what a total investment in risk-free assets would bring to him. In this case, we show that investment in risky assets is weaker than the one realized by an agent who maximized a standard expected utility function.
{"title":"L’impact du regret et de la réjouissance sur l’allocation d’actifs risqués","authors":"Franck Bien, Thomas Lanzi","doi":"10.3917/REDP.284.0613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.284.0613","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we propose to analyze the impact of regret and rejoicing on the allocation of risky assets. Regret and rejoicing are two emotions that are defined by comparing the result of an action retained by an agent with respect to the result that he could have obtained from an alternative action. We show that the choice of the alternative action impacts the allocation of risky assets. When it is defined in relation to the ex post maximum expected result, the agent only receives regret. This may lead, for low values of the marginal cost of risk, to retain more risky assets than an agent who maximized a standard expected utility function. On the contrary, the agent could express a preference for certainty and defines his emotions in relation to what a total investment in risk-free assets would bring to him. In this case, we show that investment in risky assets is weaker than the one realized by an agent who maximized a standard expected utility function.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"5 1","pages":"613-639"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80649323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the regulation of general consumption externalities by the liberal social contract. First-best liberal social contracts redistribute individual wealth and determine the level of provision of public commodities to achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources that is unanimously preferred to the allocation of a hypothetical initial situation of perfect communication. We show that the social welfare functionals that aggregate individual social preferences by means of the generalized bargaining solution of Nash support the liberal social contract if they verify non-paternalistic benevolence, that is, if the associate social welfare functions are strictly increasing in the private welfare of all individuals. The existence of a liberal social contract follows as a corollary of this property of supportability. We characterize the liberal social contract as a case of application of Habermas?s norms of communicative action to the allocation of scarce resources by public finance and the market.
{"title":"Non-paternalistic Benevolence, Consumption Externalities and the Liberal Social Contract","authors":"J. Ythier","doi":"10.3917/redp.282.0267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.282.0267","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the regulation of general consumption externalities by the liberal social contract. First-best liberal social contracts redistribute individual wealth and determine the level of provision of public commodities to achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources that is unanimously preferred to the allocation of a hypothetical initial situation of perfect communication. We show that the social welfare functionals that aggregate individual social preferences by means of the generalized bargaining solution of Nash support the liberal social contract if they verify non-paternalistic benevolence, that is, if the associate social welfare functions are strictly increasing in the private welfare of all individuals. The existence of a liberal social contract follows as a corollary of this property of supportability. We characterize the liberal social contract as a case of application of Habermas?s norms of communicative action to the allocation of scarce resources by public finance and the market.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"166 1","pages":"267-296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76180806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dans cet article, nous proposons une analyse de l’efficience des institutions de microfinance (IMF) dans la zone UEMOA. L’analyse est faite a partir d’une approche DEA en deux etapes. Dans la premiere etape, l’efficience des IMF est estimee de facon non parametrique, en executant un modele VRS (de rendements d’echelle variables) a orientation input. Au total six modeles d’efficience sont estimes dont trois concernent l’efficience financiere et trois autres, l’efficience sociale. Les scores d’efficience obtenus dans cette premiere etape sont regresses, dans la seconde etape, sur un ensemble de variables environnementales en suivant la procedure bootstrap truncated de Simar et Wilson [2007], plus robuste que les approches classiques basees sur la regression tobit ou les moindres carrees ordinaires. Les resultats de la premiere etape mettent en evidence une faible efficience des IMF de la zone UEMOA. L’inefficience est a la fois technique et d’echelle, mais s’explique davantage par une mauvaise combinaison technique des ressources. Elle est plus palpable sur le plan social que financier. Les resultats de l’estimation post-dea montrent que la rentabilite economique est un determinant essentiel de l’efficience financiere et sociale. Les IMF les plus rentables economiquement sont les plus efficientes tant au plan social que financier. Les IMF les plus grandes et les plus anciennes sont egalement les moins efficientes au plan social. De meme les IMF a profil non commercial sont les plus efficientes du point de vue social. Toutefois, les resultats montrent que les variables environnementales ont souvent un impact qui varie selon le type de modele specifie.
{"title":"L’efficience technique des institutions de microfinance en zone UEMOA","authors":"F. Fall","doi":"10.3917/REDP.284.0667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.284.0667","url":null,"abstract":"Dans cet article, nous proposons une analyse de l’efficience des institutions de microfinance (IMF) dans la zone UEMOA. L’analyse est faite a partir d’une approche DEA en deux etapes. Dans la premiere etape, l’efficience des IMF est estimee de facon non parametrique, en executant un modele VRS (de rendements d’echelle variables) a orientation input. Au total six modeles d’efficience sont estimes dont trois concernent l’efficience financiere et trois autres, l’efficience sociale. Les scores d’efficience obtenus dans cette premiere etape sont regresses, dans la seconde etape, sur un ensemble de variables environnementales en suivant la procedure bootstrap truncated de Simar et Wilson [2007], plus robuste que les approches classiques basees sur la regression tobit ou les moindres carrees ordinaires. Les resultats de la premiere etape mettent en evidence une faible efficience des IMF de la zone UEMOA. L’inefficience est a la fois technique et d’echelle, mais s’explique davantage par une mauvaise combinaison technique des ressources. Elle est plus palpable sur le plan social que financier. Les resultats de l’estimation post-dea montrent que la rentabilite economique est un determinant essentiel de l’efficience financiere et sociale. Les IMF les plus rentables economiquement sont les plus efficientes tant au plan social que financier. Les IMF les plus grandes et les plus anciennes sont egalement les moins efficientes au plan social. De meme les IMF a profil non commercial sont les plus efficientes du point de vue social. Toutefois, les resultats montrent que les variables environnementales ont souvent un impact qui varie selon le type de modele specifie.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"76 1","pages":"667-689"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74146362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay clarifies the relations between positive economics and mainstream normative economics. If rationality can be characterized by conditions on preferences and choices and, in addition, people are, to a reasonable degree of approximation rational, then economists can invoke the theory of rationality to explain choices. If people are also, as in positive economics, largely self-interested and reasonably well-informed, then their preferences will also indicate their level of well-being. Modeling both choice and welfare in terms of rational preferences thus unites positive and normative economics. In explaining market outcomes in terms of individual choices, explaining choices by preferences, and taking preferences to indicate well-being, economists who are concerned with welfare defend a normative theory that piggybacks on their positive theory. This traditional mainstream normative theory is problematic, but because of its unity and its connection to positive economics, it is also very powerful.
{"title":"The Bond between Positive and Normative Economics","authors":"D. Hausman","doi":"10.3917/REDP.282.0191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.282.0191","url":null,"abstract":"This essay clarifies the relations between positive economics and mainstream normative economics. If rationality can be characterized by conditions on preferences and choices and, in addition, people are, to a reasonable degree of approximation rational, then economists can invoke the theory of rationality to explain choices. If people are also, as in positive economics, largely self-interested and reasonably well-informed, then their preferences will also indicate their level of well-being. Modeling both choice and welfare in terms of rational preferences thus unites positive and normative economics. In explaining market outcomes in terms of individual choices, explaining choices by preferences, and taking preferences to indicate well-being, economists who are concerned with welfare defend a normative theory that piggybacks on their positive theory. This traditional mainstream normative theory is problematic, but because of its unity and its connection to positive economics, it is also very powerful.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"11 1","pages":"191-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81465201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom were awarded the 2016 Swedish National Bank's Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their contributions to the Theory of Contracts. Their works build a theory of firms and organizations that is based on two pillars: (1) Parties exert efforts or incur investments that increase the value of their relationships, but these actions are sometimes hidden, not directly observed, and thus cannot be contractually enforced by courts, and (2) contracts and ownership structures are (imperfect) responses to such informational frictions. Together, the contributions of these authors have paved the way for a complete renewal of the Theory of the Firm and Organizations Theory.
{"title":"Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners","authors":"Pierre Fleckinger, D. Martimort","doi":"10.3917/REDP.284.0493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.284.0493","url":null,"abstract":"Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom were awarded the 2016 Swedish National Bank's Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their contributions to the Theory of Contracts. Their works build a theory of firms and organizations that is based on two pillars: (1) Parties exert efforts or incur investments that increase the value of their relationships, but these actions are sometimes hidden, not directly observed, and thus cannot be contractually enforced by courts, and (2) contracts and ownership structures are (imperfect) responses to such informational frictions. Together, the contributions of these authors have paved the way for a complete renewal of the Theory of the Firm and Organizations Theory.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"7 1","pages":"493-533"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88668981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EnglishAlthough the opportunity cost of time spent recycling has long been recognized as a key determinant of household recycling participation, very few empirical studies have attempted to provide estimates of it. In this paper, we propose a model of household recycling that, while including pecuniary and non pecuniary motives for decisions, such as social or moral norms, reveals heterogeneous values of saving time from recycling (VSTR). The predictions of our model are tested using data from a discrete choice experiment on waste management conducted in 2008 in Corsica and estimating a latent-class rank-ordered logit model. We find VSTR clearly heterogeneous across individuals, ranging from 8 % to 76 % of one’s income. francaisBien qu’il soit clairement etabli que le cout d’opportunite du temps consacre au recyclage constitue un determinant essentiel des decisions des menages en matiere de tri des dechets, tres peu de travaux empiriques ont tente d’en fournir une estimation. Dans ce travail, nous proposons un modele de prise de decision des menages en termes de tri des dechets incluant des motivations pecuniaires et non-pecuniaires, telles que celles liees a des normes sociales ou morales, qui permet de mettre en evidence l’heterogeneite des valeurs du gain de temps consacre au recyclage. Les resultats de notre modele sont testes en utilisant des donnees issues d’une etude basee sur la methode des choix experimentaux discrets conduite en 2008 en Corse et estimees en utilisant un modele logit de classement ordonne a classes latentes. Les resultats permettent d’etablir que les valeurs du gain de temps consacre au recyclage sont fortement heterogenes entre les individus puisqu’elles sont comprises entre 8 % et 76 % de leur revenu.
{"title":"Time for Waste, Waste of Time? Assessing Heterogeneous Values of Saving Time from Recycling","authors":"Olivier Beaumais, D. Prunetti","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0915","url":null,"abstract":"EnglishAlthough the opportunity cost of time spent recycling has long been recognized as a key determinant of household recycling participation, very few empirical studies have attempted to provide estimates of it. In this paper, we propose a model of household recycling that, while including pecuniary and non pecuniary motives for decisions, such as social or moral norms, reveals heterogeneous values of saving time from recycling (VSTR). The predictions of our model are tested using data from a discrete choice experiment on waste management conducted in 2008 in Corsica and estimating a latent-class rank-ordered logit model. We find VSTR clearly heterogeneous across individuals, ranging from 8 % to 76 % of one’s income. francaisBien qu’il soit clairement etabli que le cout d’opportunite du temps consacre au recyclage constitue un determinant essentiel des decisions des menages en matiere de tri des dechets, tres peu de travaux empiriques ont tente d’en fournir une estimation. Dans ce travail, nous proposons un modele de prise de decision des menages en termes de tri des dechets incluant des motivations pecuniaires et non-pecuniaires, telles que celles liees a des normes sociales ou morales, qui permet de mettre en evidence l’heterogeneite des valeurs du gain de temps consacre au recyclage. Les resultats de notre modele sont testes en utilisant des donnees issues d’une etude basee sur la methode des choix experimentaux discrets conduite en 2008 en Corse et estimees en utilisant un modele logit de classement ordonne a classes latentes. Les resultats permettent d’etablir que les valeurs du gain de temps consacre au recyclage sont fortement heterogenes entre les individus puisqu’elles sont comprises entre 8 % et 76 % de leur revenu.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"85 1","pages":"915-934"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81223612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is related to the phenomenon puzzling unduly low take-up rate for social assistance benefits in France. In order to investigate this phenomenon, we conduct an experimental evaluation in the form of a randomized control trial involving the influences of informational availability and complexity. We examine the impact of a change in the information set which is sent to these households just after they claim the benefit, seeking a behavioral response to this particular ‘nudge’. Our findings suggest that a costless action on the part of program administrators is able to substantially increase take-up for certain types of beneficiaries. In order to be effective, these actions should target households according to their individual attributes.
{"title":"Raising take-up of social assistance benefits through a simple mailing: evidence from a French field experiment","authors":"Sylvain Chareyron, David Gray, Yannick L’Horty","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0777","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is related to the phenomenon puzzling unduly low take-up rate for social assistance benefits in France. In order to investigate this phenomenon, we conduct an experimental evaluation in the form of a randomized control trial involving the influences of informational availability and complexity. We examine the impact of a change in the information set which is sent to these households just after they claim the benefit, seeking a behavioral response to this particular ‘nudge’. Our findings suggest that a costless action on the part of program administrators is able to substantially increase take-up for certain types of beneficiaries. In order to be effective, these actions should target households according to their individual attributes.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"12 1","pages":"777-805"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73080777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the relation between elicited social preferences and attentional contribution in a pro-social environment. For this purpose, we propose a new experiment, namely the ?dustbin task?, where subjects invest real attention to reduce uncertainty in a discrimination task. We compare three different incentivized environments where the subject?s accuracy: do not impact on thier or other subjects? payoffs (T0), impact their payoff only (Self-Interested treatment T1) and impact other subjects? payoff only (Prosocial treatment T2). Our results show that both incentives (T1?and T2) increase the amount of allocated attention, regardless of the subject?s intrinsic motivation. We elicited subject social preferences and find that they cannot explain attentional contribution in pro-social environments (T2). This latter result, in contradiction with economic theory, provides new insight about social-preferences and attention allocation.
{"title":"Willingness to Pay Attention for Others: Do Social Preferences Predict Attentional Contribution?","authors":"Ismaël Rafaï, M. Toumi","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0849","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the relation between elicited social preferences and attentional contribution in a pro-social environment. For this purpose, we propose a new experiment, namely the ?dustbin task?, where subjects invest real attention to reduce uncertainty in a discrimination task. We compare three different incentivized environments where the subject?s accuracy: do not impact on thier or other subjects? payoffs (T0), impact their payoff only (Self-Interested treatment T1) and impact other subjects? payoff only (Prosocial treatment T2). Our results show that both incentives (T1?and T2) increase the amount of allocated attention, regardless of the subject?s intrinsic motivation. We elicited subject social preferences and find that they cannot explain attentional contribution in pro-social environments (T2). This latter result, in contradiction with economic theory, provides new insight about social-preferences and attention allocation.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"1 1","pages":"849-881"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89682843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the late eighties, governments have designed telecommunication policies aiming at introducing competition. This implies new regulation framework and privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This paper empirically assesses the effect of reforms sequences in the telecommunications sector on the sector performance, by using a sample of?17?Middle East North African (MENA) countries for the period?1995-2010. Countries are free to choose how to proceed notably whether to establish an Independent Regulatory Authority (IRA) before or after privatizing the SOEs, as well as they can create an IRA before introducing competition rather than after. We assume that the choices of reforms sequences are affected by institutional, political and economic variables. We use IV-2SLS estimation to analyze the outcome of reforms sequences in terms of telecom performance (access, prices, productivity and quality). We find that an IRA established before privatizing the incumbent operator improves the sector access but with an increase in fixed prices. However, the effect of an IRA before introducing competition differs between the fixed and the mobile sector. Regulation still works as an imperfect substitute for competition in the fixed market, which is no more the case for the mobile market.
{"title":"Do Reforms Sequences Matter for Telecom Sector Performance? Evidence from MENA Countries","authors":"C. Cambini, Riham A. Ezzat, Carine Staropoli","doi":"10.3917/redp.285.0713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.285.0713","url":null,"abstract":"Since the late eighties, governments have designed telecommunication policies aiming at introducing competition. This implies new regulation framework and privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This paper empirically assesses the effect of reforms sequences in the telecommunications sector on the sector performance, by using a sample of?17?Middle East North African (MENA) countries for the period?1995-2010. Countries are free to choose how to proceed notably whether to establish an Independent Regulatory Authority (IRA) before or after privatizing the SOEs, as well as they can create an IRA before introducing competition rather than after. We assume that the choices of reforms sequences are affected by institutional, political and economic variables. We use IV-2SLS estimation to analyze the outcome of reforms sequences in terms of telecom performance (access, prices, productivity and quality). We find that an IRA established before privatizing the incumbent operator improves the sector access but with an increase in fixed prices. However, the effect of an IRA before introducing competition differs between the fixed and the mobile sector. Regulation still works as an imperfect substitute for competition in the fixed market, which is no more the case for the mobile market.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"25 1","pages":"713-743"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89482731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate, within a Schumpeterian growth model, how intellectual property (IP) law and public sponsorship of research and development (R?&?D) activities may provide appropriate incentives simultaneously to fundamental (or basic) research and to applied R&D. In order to consider and to distinguish between these two types of research, we merge the seminal models of Romer [1990] and Aghion and Howitt [1992]?: knowledge accumulation stems from a series of inventions (horizontal / fundamental knowledge accumulation) and from a succession of innovations (vertical / applied knowledge accumulation) building upon each of these inventions. Then, we study a decentralized economy in which the creative destruction mechanism does not deter investments in fundamental research through an IP law design that induces profit-division between an inventor and his following innovators. We show that providing optimal incentives to fundamental research requires, not only a design of IP law that ensures a sufficient positive transfer from innovators to inventors, but also public policies in form of subsidies supporting both fundamental research and applied R?&?D activities.
在熊彼特增长模型中，我们研究了知识产权法和公众对研发活动的赞助如何同时为基础研究和应用研发提供适当的激励。为了考虑并区分这两种类型的研究，我们合并了Romer[1990]和Aghion and Howitt[1992]的开创性模型。知识积累源于一系列的发明(横向的/基础的知识积累)和建立在这些发明之上的一系列创新(纵向的/应用的知识积累)。然后，我们研究了一个分散的经济，在这个经济中，创造性破坏机制不会通过知识产权法的设计来阻止对基础研究的投资，这种设计会在发明家和他的追随者之间引起利润分配。我们表明，为基础研究提供最优激励，不仅需要设计知识产权法，确保创新者向发明者充分的正转移，还需要以补贴形式支持基础研究和应用研发的公共政策。D活动。
{"title":"Intellectual Property Law and Public Sponsorship of R & D in a Schumpeterian Growth Model with Fundamental and Applied R & D","authors":"Elie Gray","doi":"10.3917/redp.285.0807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.285.0807","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate, within a Schumpeterian growth model, how intellectual property (IP) law and public sponsorship of research and development (R?&?D) activities may provide appropriate incentives simultaneously to fundamental (or basic) research and to applied R&D. In order to consider and to distinguish between these two types of research, we merge the seminal models of Romer [1990] and Aghion and Howitt [1992]?: knowledge accumulation stems from a series of inventions (horizontal / fundamental knowledge accumulation) and from a succession of innovations (vertical / applied knowledge accumulation) building upon each of these inventions. Then, we study a decentralized economy in which the creative destruction mechanism does not deter investments in fundamental research through an IP law design that induces profit-division between an inventor and his following innovators. We show that providing optimal incentives to fundamental research requires, not only a design of IP law that ensures a sufficient positive transfer from innovators to inventors, but also public policies in form of subsidies supporting both fundamental research and applied R?&?D activities.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"142 1","pages":"807-848"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86241060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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