Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2239638
Daniel W. B. Lomas, Christopher J. Murphy
ABSTRACT The protection of diplomats, embassies and sensitive information has always been an important aspect of diplomacy. Today, security is an accepted norm of day-to-day diplomatic work, yet the importance of security in the UK Foreign Office was not always appreciated, with the department witnessing embarrassing security lapses and scandals during the first half of the Twentieth Century. This article highlights the importance of security to diplomacy, offering the first significant study of the origins and early development of the Foreign Office’s Security Department, established in 1946. It also explores the tensions between security officials and the wider Foreign Office, which indicate the extent to which organisational and internal cultural issues stymied good diplomatic security, issues that were laid bare in the aftermath of the defection of Foreign Office officials Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in 1951.
{"title":"The Foreign Office ‘Thought Police’: Foreign Office Security, the Security Department and the ‘Missing Diplomats’, 1940 – 1952","authors":"Daniel W. B. Lomas, Christopher J. Murphy","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2239638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2239638","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The protection of diplomats, embassies and sensitive information has always been an important aspect of diplomacy. Today, security is an accepted norm of day-to-day diplomatic work, yet the importance of security in the UK Foreign Office was not always appreciated, with the department witnessing embarrassing security lapses and scandals during the first half of the Twentieth Century. This article highlights the importance of security to diplomacy, offering the first significant study of the origins and early development of the Foreign Office’s Security Department, established in 1946. It also explores the tensions between security officials and the wider Foreign Office, which indicate the extent to which organisational and internal cultural issues stymied good diplomatic security, issues that were laid bare in the aftermath of the defection of Foreign Office officials Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in 1951.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"34 1","pages":"433 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47895989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2239640
M. Wyss
ABSTRACT This article studies the Anglo-Nigerian negotiations for a Royal Navy training team during the Nigerian Civil War against the background of Africa’s ‘phoney’ Cold War and Britain’s global strategic withdrawal. This allows it to show Britain’s diplomatic manoeuvres to simultaneously prevent provoking debilitating opposition against its tightrope policy of supporting Federal Nigeria against Biafra and safeguard its significant, predominantly economic – particularly oil – interests in Nigeria. Initially inconvenienced by the Nigerian request for a naval training team, British policymakers gradually agreed to send one after the war, then promised to do so already before, and, after the foreign policy establishment had overcome the Ministry of Defence’s resistance, finally sent out Royal Navy officers to Nigeria before the end of hostilities. In this process, the Nigerians had allies in the British High Commission in Lagos and the Foreign (and Commonwealth) Office, as well as substantial leverage as a result of Indian and Soviet competition in the Nigerian market for military assistance. Yet this leverage was mitigated by the Federals’ preference for British over Indian military assistance, and fear of becoming too reliant on Moscow. Not only in the British, but also in the Nigerian case, diplomatic concerns thus outweighed the military rationale for the naval training team, and this ‘diplomacy of military assistance’ contrasts with the basic tenor of the theoretical literature on military assistance in civil wars.
{"title":"The Diplomacy of Military Assistance: The Royal Navy Training Team and the Nigerian Civil War","authors":"M. Wyss","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2239640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2239640","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article studies the Anglo-Nigerian negotiations for a Royal Navy training team during the Nigerian Civil War against the background of Africa’s ‘phoney’ Cold War and Britain’s global strategic withdrawal. This allows it to show Britain’s diplomatic manoeuvres to simultaneously prevent provoking debilitating opposition against its tightrope policy of supporting Federal Nigeria against Biafra and safeguard its significant, predominantly economic – particularly oil – interests in Nigeria. Initially inconvenienced by the Nigerian request for a naval training team, British policymakers gradually agreed to send one after the war, then promised to do so already before, and, after the foreign policy establishment had overcome the Ministry of Defence’s resistance, finally sent out Royal Navy officers to Nigeria before the end of hostilities. In this process, the Nigerians had allies in the British High Commission in Lagos and the Foreign (and Commonwealth) Office, as well as substantial leverage as a result of Indian and Soviet competition in the Nigerian market for military assistance. Yet this leverage was mitigated by the Federals’ preference for British over Indian military assistance, and fear of becoming too reliant on Moscow. Not only in the British, but also in the Nigerian case, diplomatic concerns thus outweighed the military rationale for the naval training team, and this ‘diplomacy of military assistance’ contrasts with the basic tenor of the theoretical literature on military assistance in civil wars.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"34 1","pages":"491 - 515"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41928535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2239641
M. Broad, R. Griffiths
ABSTRACT Few scholars would dispute that negotiations for the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which formally commenced near Stockholm in June 1959, moved at breakneck speed. Generally acknowledged too are the reasons behind this haste: the need swiftly to find another route to working with the European Economic Community (EEC) following the collapse of the wider Free Trade Area (FTA) proposal, the degree of consensus already achieved by the Association’s founder members during the FTA talks, and the fact that few felt EFTA was a permanent alternative to an arrangement with the Six. But none of this negated the very real obstacles faced by negotiators. Each indeed obliged the Seven collectively – and, as by far the single largest economic actor, Britain specifically – to reconsider the scope of the agreement under discussion and the sorts of concessions required to reach a deal. And yet this is a moment in EFTA’s founding often glossed over in extant literature. This article consequently provides a long-overdue detailed study of the build-up to, and evolution of, the Stockholm negotiations, examining the topics on which negotiators focused and the conditions under which compromises eventually emerged. In so doing, it points to the agency of smaller EFTA states in being able to exercise maximum influence at critical junctures in the process and explains why the timing of their demands as well as the nature of the negotiations themselves ultimately influenced their success.
{"title":"Paying the Price for Allies: Britain, the Seven and the EFTA Stockholm Negotiations","authors":"M. Broad, R. Griffiths","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2239641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2239641","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Few scholars would dispute that negotiations for the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which formally commenced near Stockholm in June 1959, moved at breakneck speed. Generally acknowledged too are the reasons behind this haste: the need swiftly to find another route to working with the European Economic Community (EEC) following the collapse of the wider Free Trade Area (FTA) proposal, the degree of consensus already achieved by the Association’s founder members during the FTA talks, and the fact that few felt EFTA was a permanent alternative to an arrangement with the Six. But none of this negated the very real obstacles faced by negotiators. Each indeed obliged the Seven collectively – and, as by far the single largest economic actor, Britain specifically – to reconsider the scope of the agreement under discussion and the sorts of concessions required to reach a deal. And yet this is a moment in EFTA’s founding often glossed over in extant literature. This article consequently provides a long-overdue detailed study of the build-up to, and evolution of, the Stockholm negotiations, examining the topics on which negotiators focused and the conditions under which compromises eventually emerged. In so doing, it points to the agency of smaller EFTA states in being able to exercise maximum influence at critical junctures in the process and explains why the timing of their demands as well as the nature of the negotiations themselves ultimately influenced their success.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"34 1","pages":"516 - 542"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48453771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2239642
M. Claar, D. Kovačević
ABSTRACT What catalysed the changing status of riot control agents (RCAs hereafter) use in wartime? Is that the same catalyst causing domestic policy change for RCAs today? The relationship between war and technology is dynamic, with regular advances to make militaries and police more effective. Some emergent chemical-based technologies are quickly restricted as chemical weapons; others are deemed permissible in perpetuity. However, there may be a third option where classification can change from permissible to restricted over time. We use a structured, focused comparative case study of the United States to understand the INUS causes of this shift at both the domestic and international level of policymaking, particularly where RCAs like tear gas are concerned. To determine this, we ask (1) what processes led to policy change; (2) which factors or forces motivated policy change; and (3) were the same factors present at both the domestic and international level of policy change? By investigating these questions, we find that normative logics are necessary but not sufficient for causing RCA’s changing status. Factors like social pressure and issue saliency, among others, create the necessary environment for norms to impact the RCAs’ status.
{"title":"Don’t Cry No More: A Comparative Study of U.S. Domestic and Foreign Restrictions on Riot Control Agent Use","authors":"M. Claar, D. Kovačević","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2239642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2239642","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What catalysed the changing status of riot control agents (RCAs hereafter) use in wartime? Is that the same catalyst causing domestic policy change for RCAs today? The relationship between war and technology is dynamic, with regular advances to make militaries and police more effective. Some emergent chemical-based technologies are quickly restricted as chemical weapons; others are deemed permissible in perpetuity. However, there may be a third option where classification can change from permissible to restricted over time. We use a structured, focused comparative case study of the United States to understand the INUS causes of this shift at both the domestic and international level of policymaking, particularly where RCAs like tear gas are concerned. To determine this, we ask (1) what processes led to policy change; (2) which factors or forces motivated policy change; and (3) were the same factors present at both the domestic and international level of policy change? By investigating these questions, we find that normative logics are necessary but not sufficient for causing RCA’s changing status. Factors like social pressure and issue saliency, among others, create the necessary environment for norms to impact the RCAs’ status.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"34 1","pages":"543 - 565"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44519621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2239637
Daniel Pellerin
ABSTRACT The question how and why the First World War broke out has filled entire learned libraries, but its no less salient and consequential counterpart—how it got to be so protracted when so many of the illusions that contributed to the outbreak were already shattered by Christmas 1914—has received much less attention, though recent scholarship has begun to close the gap. The aims and anxieties of the respective parties certainly played a prime part on both sides, as did their continued hopes of winning and the complications of coalition warfare. But something more insidious counted for just as much: namely how the horrendous manner in which the war began—grievously disappointing expectations on all sides and producing a staggering five million casualties within only a few months—did not induce, as the standards of textbook rationality might suggest, a readiness to recognise where things were headed and a consequent willingness to change course. Instead of prompting the belligerents to heed the sunk cost principle and cut losses by a timely settlement, the opening months had just the opposite effect, hardening positions that should have been discredited, and leaving the belligerents all the more determined to keep fighting to the bitter end at practically any cost not only to their enemies but also to themselves. How this was possible will be explained, in part, by making connections with prospect and decision theory.
{"title":"Christmas 1914 and the Peace that Could Not Be","authors":"Daniel Pellerin","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2239637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2239637","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The question how and why the First World War broke out has filled entire learned libraries, but its no less salient and consequential counterpart—how it got to be so protracted when so many of the illusions that contributed to the outbreak were already shattered by Christmas 1914—has received much less attention, though recent scholarship has begun to close the gap. The aims and anxieties of the respective parties certainly played a prime part on both sides, as did their continued hopes of winning and the complications of coalition warfare. But something more insidious counted for just as much: namely how the horrendous manner in which the war began—grievously disappointing expectations on all sides and producing a staggering five million casualties within only a few months—did not induce, as the standards of textbook rationality might suggest, a readiness to recognise where things were headed and a consequent willingness to change course. Instead of prompting the belligerents to heed the sunk cost principle and cut losses by a timely settlement, the opening months had just the opposite effect, hardening positions that should have been discredited, and leaving the belligerents all the more determined to keep fighting to the bitter end at practically any cost not only to their enemies but also to themselves. How this was possible will be explained, in part, by making connections with prospect and decision theory.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"69 1","pages":"399 - 432"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59632304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2239648
T. Petersen
{"title":"False Prophets: British Leaders’ Fateful Fascination with the Middle East from Suez to Syria","authors":"T. Petersen","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2239648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2239648","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"34 1","pages":"616 - 617"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41876239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2213078
Yunus Turhan
ABSTRACT The ability of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to modify the status quo generates heated discussions in academia. The literature on this partnership identifies many potential loopholes which the former are enabled to fill in, a situation known as retreat of state. NGOs are influential actors in pursuing public diplomacy through non-ordinary and semi-formal ways assisting to forge genuine partnership with foreign public opinions, specifically in underdeveloped countries, to achieve the goals of their parent state. Turkish civil society actors, in this regard, promote Turkey’s image and mould its identity in an exemplary fashion in order to broaden the scope of Turkish soft power in tandem with state institutions. The NGO’s competences in reaching to isolated areas, engaging with local communities through aid and voluntary-based membership free from financial burden, work hand-in-hand with the state which forms an important part of the capacity to foster and facilitate a better image of Turkey. This research undertakes an analysis of NGO-led foreign aid activities, within the framework of the public diplomacy context, that lead in a spectrum of situations by using participatory methods. In particular, it scrutinises how Turkish NGOs’ aid activities portray Turkey’s public diplomacy, putting the country in good light. Effective Turkish humanitarian campaigns are used as a case study to further develop an understanding of Turkey’s public diplomacy initiatives.
{"title":"Turkey’s Public Diplomacy: The Role of Turkish Non-Governmental Organisations","authors":"Yunus Turhan","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2213078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2213078","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The ability of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to modify the status quo generates heated discussions in academia. The literature on this partnership identifies many potential loopholes which the former are enabled to fill in, a situation known as retreat of state. NGOs are influential actors in pursuing public diplomacy through non-ordinary and semi-formal ways assisting to forge genuine partnership with foreign public opinions, specifically in underdeveloped countries, to achieve the goals of their parent state. Turkish civil society actors, in this regard, promote Turkey’s image and mould its identity in an exemplary fashion in order to broaden the scope of Turkish soft power in tandem with state institutions. The NGO’s competences in reaching to isolated areas, engaging with local communities through aid and voluntary-based membership free from financial burden, work hand-in-hand with the state which forms an important part of the capacity to foster and facilitate a better image of Turkey. This research undertakes an analysis of NGO-led foreign aid activities, within the framework of the public diplomacy context, that lead in a spectrum of situations by using participatory methods. In particular, it scrutinises how Turkish NGOs’ aid activities portray Turkey’s public diplomacy, putting the country in good light. Effective Turkish humanitarian campaigns are used as a case study to further develop an understanding of Turkey’s public diplomacy initiatives.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"34 1","pages":"325 - 342"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45818661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2216493
Andrew Ehrhardt
ABSTRACT This essay examines in detail the early years of British planning for a post-war security policy. The first years of the war saw British statesmen and officials consumed by concerns over the military conflict and hesitant to commit the government to specific war aims. This tendency changed by 1940 and 1941, due largely to fears that a failure to counter German propaganda about a ‘new order’ for Europe would lead European populations to accept Nazi designs for future economic and political order on the continent. Though there was an active, if amorphous, debate taking place within Britain about the future international order and Britain’s place within, there remained a lack of concrete policy development. The Atlantic Charter, while a profound moment in hindsight, was not exactly viewed as such by British officials at that time. The true strategic re-direction came in the summer of 1942, when the Foreign Office produced its ‘Four Power Plan’. Though the subject of heated debate in the autumn of 1942, the policy recommendation was eventually accepted in principle by the British Cabinet and would go on to define Britain's grand strategy for the remainder of the war.
{"title":"Concert of the World: Early British Efforts to Articulate a Post-War Grand Strategy, 1939-1942","authors":"Andrew Ehrhardt","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2216493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2216493","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay examines in detail the early years of British planning for a post-war security policy. The first years of the war saw British statesmen and officials consumed by concerns over the military conflict and hesitant to commit the government to specific war aims. This tendency changed by 1940 and 1941, due largely to fears that a failure to counter German propaganda about a ‘new order’ for Europe would lead European populations to accept Nazi designs for future economic and political order on the continent. Though there was an active, if amorphous, debate taking place within Britain about the future international order and Britain’s place within, there remained a lack of concrete policy development. The Atlantic Charter, while a profound moment in hindsight, was not exactly viewed as such by British officials at that time. The true strategic re-direction came in the summer of 1942, when the Foreign Office produced its ‘Four Power Plan’. Though the subject of heated debate in the autumn of 1942, the policy recommendation was eventually accepted in principle by the British Cabinet and would go on to define Britain's grand strategy for the remainder of the war.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"34 1","pages":"221 - 255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47089557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2023.2213073
A. Klapsis
ABSTRACT The year 1930 was a turning point for Greek-Turkish relations. It was the year that the two neighbouring countries set the foundations for their close diplomatic cooperation that lasted throughout the 1930s. This paper seeks to explain the reasons why Greece decided to pursue such a policy. It is argued that Athens was eager to form a pro-status quo front with Ankara in order to deter the revisionist tendencies of powers in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean (namely Bulgaria and Italy). This was a strategic choice on the part of Greece which explains why it was followed by all the Greek governments (irrespectively of their ideological and/or partisan association) from 1930 until the outbreak of the Second World War.
{"title":"Greek Foreign Policy and the Rapprochement with Turkey in the 1930s","authors":"A. Klapsis","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2023.2213073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2213073","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The year 1930 was a turning point for Greek-Turkish relations. It was the year that the two neighbouring countries set the foundations for their close diplomatic cooperation that lasted throughout the 1930s. This paper seeks to explain the reasons why Greece decided to pursue such a policy. It is argued that Athens was eager to form a pro-status quo front with Ankara in order to deter the revisionist tendencies of powers in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean (namely Bulgaria and Italy). This was a strategic choice on the part of Greece which explains why it was followed by all the Greek governments (irrespectively of their ideological and/or partisan association) from 1930 until the outbreak of the Second World War.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"34 1","pages":"208 - 220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47389421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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