<p>The Berlin and Lewis epigraphs draw out the moral psychology of paternalism. The paternalist, enlightened as he is, sees past your empirical shell and into the true essence of your being. Setting aside the protestations of the shell that you mistake for yourself, he steers you towards the good. The steering might involve violence, but that is a small price to pay in the grand scheme of things. Nobody enjoys being flogged for heresy; but eliciting conversion is worth the pain. The convicted paternalist persists in his drive to serve the good with the approval of his own conscience.</p><p>The liberal tradition rejects paternalism and exalts the dignity and freedom of the individual person. We have been gifted by our Creator with the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, Thomas Jefferson asserted. Each should be free, Adam Smith said, to pursue his interest in his own way. The question of the good is too discursive, in most cases, to warrant violence against those with differing opinions. And in any event, we ought to presumptively respect human freedom and agency per se, regardless of whether someone follows a life path that we approve.</p><p>The liberal rejection of paternalism notwithstanding, a new species of paternalism has in recent decades reared its head in the West. This new paternalism has come forth on the wings of inferences from laboratory experiments and surveys, in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, about the extent of human rationality. Evidence, it is claimed, has accumulated that we human beings are consistently poor reasoners: we are “predictably irrational” (Ariely, <span>2010</span>). Instead of properly calculating probabilities when assessing risks and making decisions, it has been discovered that we rely on a range of mental short cuts or heuristics. The heuristics work sometimes, but they systematically lead us to make avoidable mistakes in, for example, financial decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, <span>1974</span>). We “think fast” when apparently we should be “thinking slow” (Kahneman, <span>2011</span>). Irrationalities are said to abound in other areas, too. The salience of the present, for example, leads us to overestimate the benefits of present pleasures and underestimate the pain of future costs (Laibson, <span>1997</span>; Read & van Leeuwen, <span>1998</span>). Our ‘present bias’ erodes our self-control and subverts our goals. We save too little, smoke too much, and repeatedly renege on our New Year's resolutions.</p><p>Each of us predictably fails to pursue the good <i>as we ourselves understand it</i>. And we do so across a wide set of domains.</p><p>The new paternalism proposes to use knowledge of our decision-making processes to steer us towards what we ourselves judge to be good. Part of the steering involves the regulation of ‘choice architecture’. This refers to the framing of choice options in a situation to render certain options salient to the chooser, and
柏林和刘易斯的书信引出了家长制的道德心理。开明的家长式人物会透过你的经验外壳,看到你的真正本质。撇开你误以为是自己的外壳的抗议,他引导你向善。这种引导可能会涉及暴力,但从大局来看,这只是很小的代价。没有人喜欢因异端邪说而被鞭打,但促使人皈依是值得的。自由主义传统反对家长制,推崇个人的尊严和自由。托马斯-杰斐逊断言,造物主赋予我们不可剥夺的生命权、自由权和追求幸福的权利。亚当-斯密说,每个人都应该自由地以自己的方式追求自己的利益。在大多数情况下,"善 "的问题太具争议性,没有理由对持不同意见的人使用暴力。而且,无论如何,我们都应该假定性地尊重人的自由和能动性本身,无论某人走的人生道路是否得到我们的认可。尽管自由主义反对家长制,但近几十年来,一种新的家长制在西方抬头。在认知心理学和行为经济学的实验室实验和调查中,人们对人类的理性程度进行了推断。有证据表明,我们人类的推理能力一直很差:我们是 "可预见的非理性"(Ariely,2010 年)。人们发现,在评估风险和做出决策时,我们不是正确地计算概率,而是依赖一系列思维捷径或启发式方法。这些启发式方法有时会奏效,但在财务决策等方面却会系统性地导致我们犯下本可避免的错误(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)。我们 "思考得很快",而我们显然应该 "思考得很慢"(Kahneman,2011 年)。据说在其他领域也充斥着非理性。例如,当下的显著性导致我们高估当下快乐的好处,低估未来代价的痛苦(Laibson, 1997; Read & van Leeuwen, 1998)。我们的 "当下偏见 "侵蚀了我们的自制力,颠覆了我们的目标。我们存钱太少,抽烟太多,一再违背我们的新年愿望。新家长主义建议利用我们决策过程中的知识,引导我们追求我们自己认为是好的东西。引导的一部分涉及对 "选择架构 "的管理。这指的是在某种情况下对选择方案进行构架,使某些方案对选择者来说更突出,从而更有可能被选择。选择架构的一个典型例子是产品摆放决策--实体企业更迫切希望销售的产品被摆放在显眼的位置,目的是吸引消费者的注意。选择架构在生活中无处不在,因为每一种选择情况,无论是杂货店的产品摆放决策,还是退休储蓄注册流程的设计,都必然有一个架构或安排。在杂货店的结账通道上摆放糖果,在某些情况下几乎肯定会增加顾客购买糖果的可能性。然而,某些选择结构的长期效应却不那么明显。很明显,人们会习惯于自己所处的环境,并发展出相应的策略来应对每次购物时购买糖果的诱惑。人类在 "自我指挥的亲密较量"(谢林,1980 年)中具有非凡的创造力。自 21 世纪初以来,尤其是理查德-塔勒(Richard Thaler)和卡斯-桑斯坦(Cass Sunstein)在其 2008 年的开创性著作《推力》(Nudge:新家长主义者认为,在人们容易自我颠覆的领域,如烟草、糖和酒精消费、金融风险评估以及退休账户缴费决策等领域,他们提出了改变现有私人选择架构的法规。新家长主义者强调了这些监管建议的非强制性甚至 "自由主义"(解读为:保留选择权)特征(卡默尔等人,2003;孙斯坦与amp;泰勒,2003a)。严格说来,许多法规建议并没有限制消费者的选择范围--尽管它们肯定会提高自诩为选择设计师的人所不喜欢的选择的交易成本。 行为科学家可以为有关美好生活的讨论做出有价值的贡献,但她绝不能声称自己对什么符合每个人的利益拥有特权知识。休谟抱怨说,哲学家们 "过于拘泥于自己的原则,而没有考虑到大自然在其所有活动中影响巨大的多样性"(1994 年,第 159 页)。今天,行为科学家和家长式决策者也会受到同样的指责。当我们反思斯密和休谟的论述时,我们得出了一个许多新家长制批评者都得出过的结论。这个结论就是,新家长式监管不是--也不可能是--帮助个人实现其主观目标的简单问题。辨别个人想要什么并非易事,即使对个人本身来说也是如此。新的家长式政策法规只是在努力催促、鼓励或推搡公民按照监管者自己持有的民间善理论(Hausman,2018)生活(Rizzo & Whitman, 2020, p.400)。监管者很少将他们的行为发现和非理性主张应用于自身(Berggren, 2012; Rizzo & Whitman, 2020, pp.329-47)。"我们应该少吃糖、少抽烟、多储蓄等等,这当然是一种非正式的民间共识。但是,我们是否应该引导人们实现这些目标,即使他们可能并不希望被引导?也许在某些情况下,这种家长式的教育是有道理的,但我们应该非常谨慎。在这些问题上,我们最好坚持大卫-休谟和亚当-斯密的著作为我们提供的自由假定、自愿结社假定和反对胁迫的假定。
{"title":"The new paternalism does not replace older wisdom","authors":"Erik W Matson","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12648","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecaf.12648","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Berlin and Lewis epigraphs draw out the moral psychology of paternalism. The paternalist, enlightened as he is, sees past your empirical shell and into the true essence of your being. Setting aside the protestations of the shell that you mistake for yourself, he steers you towards the good. The steering might involve violence, but that is a small price to pay in the grand scheme of things. Nobody enjoys being flogged for heresy; but eliciting conversion is worth the pain. The convicted paternalist persists in his drive to serve the good with the approval of his own conscience.</p><p>The liberal tradition rejects paternalism and exalts the dignity and freedom of the individual person. We have been gifted by our Creator with the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, Thomas Jefferson asserted. Each should be free, Adam Smith said, to pursue his interest in his own way. The question of the good is too discursive, in most cases, to warrant violence against those with differing opinions. And in any event, we ought to presumptively respect human freedom and agency per se, regardless of whether someone follows a life path that we approve.</p><p>The liberal rejection of paternalism notwithstanding, a new species of paternalism has in recent decades reared its head in the West. This new paternalism has come forth on the wings of inferences from laboratory experiments and surveys, in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, about the extent of human rationality. Evidence, it is claimed, has accumulated that we human beings are consistently poor reasoners: we are “predictably irrational” (Ariely, <span>2010</span>). Instead of properly calculating probabilities when assessing risks and making decisions, it has been discovered that we rely on a range of mental short cuts or heuristics. The heuristics work sometimes, but they systematically lead us to make avoidable mistakes in, for example, financial decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, <span>1974</span>). We “think fast” when apparently we should be “thinking slow” (Kahneman, <span>2011</span>). Irrationalities are said to abound in other areas, too. The salience of the present, for example, leads us to overestimate the benefits of present pleasures and underestimate the pain of future costs (Laibson, <span>1997</span>; Read & van Leeuwen, <span>1998</span>). Our ‘present bias’ erodes our self-control and subverts our goals. We save too little, smoke too much, and repeatedly renege on our New Year's resolutions.</p><p>Each of us predictably fails to pursue the good <i>as we ourselves understand it</i>. And we do so across a wide set of domains.</p><p>The new paternalism proposes to use knowledge of our decision-making processes to steer us towards what we ourselves judge to be good. Part of the steering involves the regulation of ‘choice architecture’. This refers to the framing of choice options in a situation to render certain options salient to the chooser, and ","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 2","pages":"386-393"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecaf.12648","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141367517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefan Kirkegaard Sløk-Madsen, Henrik Mogensen Nielsen
<p>Why do some societies go from poverty to prosperity? This question should occupy all socially conscious social scientists, particularly as we have seen successful societies experience unprecedented growth in living standards all over the world, beginning in the West roughly around 1750 (McCloskey, <span>2010</span>, <span>2021</span>; Mokyr, <span>2008</span>, <span>2016</span>). This development has been called the ‘great enrichment’ and Denmark is a prime example of this (McCloskey, <span>2021</span>). GDP per capita grew from $2,031 in 1820 to $52,133 in 2022 (in 2011 dollars; Bolt & van Zanden, <span>2020</span>).</p><p>Why did the great enrichment occur when and where it did? Several explanations exist. Institutionalists such as Nobel laureate Douglass North (<span>1990</span>) hold good institutions to be the main explanation. Other theories emphasise exploitation of people and resources, both domestic and foreign. Modern trade theorists argue that free trade can create wealth, which can lead to liberty which again leads to further innovation. In Denmark, population homogeneity has been argued to explain it too. Recently, though, a new explanation, that of ‘innovism’, has gained momentum. This concept, coined by the economic historian Deirdre McCloskey, suggests that the root cause of the wealth of nations is creativity fostered by classical liberal ideas about dignity and liberty, rather than simply accumulation of capital.</p><p>McCloskey claims that while institutional arrangements similar to what can be described as capitalistic can be observed through time, the sheer magnitude of improvement observed in the period from approximately 1750 onwards, and particularly, in north-western Europe, calls for a new explanation: innovism. She highlights the implementation of ideals fostering human action with incentives for idea dissemination and entrepreneurship as the key explainer of the great enrichment, more so than materialism or state design. As she concludes: “Innovism, that is, is a matter of creativity, which depends on liberty” (McCloskey, <span>2023</span>, p. 29). In other words, the accumulation of ideas, rather than capital, becomes the key factor. This article investigates whether Denmark's impressive enrichment is indeed best explained by innovism, especially when coupled with Paul Romer-style thinking about technological ideas as infinite resources (Jones, <span>2019</span>), or by competing theories such as exploitation or institutional design.</p><p>Our article is based mainly on the research behind the book <i>Danish Capitalism in the 20th Century: A Business History of an Innovistic Mixed Economy</i> (Sløk-Madsen, <span>2022</span>). We think that this piece is a necessary add-on to help better understand Denmark's narrative of economic development, but it is necessary for another reason too. If, as we argue, Denmark's remarkable success is indeed explained by policy choices supporting innovism, with very few pre-exist
{"title":"Denmark: The epitome of ‘innovism’?","authors":"Stefan Kirkegaard Sløk-Madsen, Henrik Mogensen Nielsen","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12652","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecaf.12652","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Why do some societies go from poverty to prosperity? This question should occupy all socially conscious social scientists, particularly as we have seen successful societies experience unprecedented growth in living standards all over the world, beginning in the West roughly around 1750 (McCloskey, <span>2010</span>, <span>2021</span>; Mokyr, <span>2008</span>, <span>2016</span>). This development has been called the ‘great enrichment’ and Denmark is a prime example of this (McCloskey, <span>2021</span>). GDP per capita grew from $2,031 in 1820 to $52,133 in 2022 (in 2011 dollars; Bolt & van Zanden, <span>2020</span>).</p><p>Why did the great enrichment occur when and where it did? Several explanations exist. Institutionalists such as Nobel laureate Douglass North (<span>1990</span>) hold good institutions to be the main explanation. Other theories emphasise exploitation of people and resources, both domestic and foreign. Modern trade theorists argue that free trade can create wealth, which can lead to liberty which again leads to further innovation. In Denmark, population homogeneity has been argued to explain it too. Recently, though, a new explanation, that of ‘innovism’, has gained momentum. This concept, coined by the economic historian Deirdre McCloskey, suggests that the root cause of the wealth of nations is creativity fostered by classical liberal ideas about dignity and liberty, rather than simply accumulation of capital.</p><p>McCloskey claims that while institutional arrangements similar to what can be described as capitalistic can be observed through time, the sheer magnitude of improvement observed in the period from approximately 1750 onwards, and particularly, in north-western Europe, calls for a new explanation: innovism. She highlights the implementation of ideals fostering human action with incentives for idea dissemination and entrepreneurship as the key explainer of the great enrichment, more so than materialism or state design. As she concludes: “Innovism, that is, is a matter of creativity, which depends on liberty” (McCloskey, <span>2023</span>, p. 29). In other words, the accumulation of ideas, rather than capital, becomes the key factor. This article investigates whether Denmark's impressive enrichment is indeed best explained by innovism, especially when coupled with Paul Romer-style thinking about technological ideas as infinite resources (Jones, <span>2019</span>), or by competing theories such as exploitation or institutional design.</p><p>Our article is based mainly on the research behind the book <i>Danish Capitalism in the 20th Century: A Business History of an Innovistic Mixed Economy</i> (Sløk-Madsen, <span>2022</span>). We think that this piece is a necessary add-on to help better understand Denmark's narrative of economic development, but it is necessary for another reason too. If, as we argue, Denmark's remarkable success is indeed explained by policy choices supporting innovism, with very few pre-exist","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 2","pages":"394-401"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecaf.12652","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141368217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Green bonds and the broad category of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) debt are market initiatives designed to tie environmental goals to the funding mechanism of the firm. Although there is an evolving certification process for green and social bonds, it does not currently include monetary consequences for a deviation from the proposed green uses of the funding. This article provides an overview of the green/social bond market to highlight these shortcomings. After a review of the green bond literature, we note the shortcomings of the existing debt market and illustrate the benefits of sustainability-linked bonds (SLB), which reward incremental improvements in relevant performance indicators.
{"title":"Rewarding performance through sustainability-linked bonds","authors":"Anne-Marie Anderson, Richard Kish","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12636","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecaf.12636","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Green bonds and the broad category of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) debt are market initiatives designed to tie environmental goals to the funding mechanism of the firm. Although there is an evolving certification process for green and social bonds, it does not currently include monetary consequences for a deviation from the proposed green uses of the funding. This article provides an overview of the green/social bond market to highlight these shortcomings. After a review of the green bond literature, we note the shortcomings of the existing debt market and illustrate the benefits of sustainability-linked bonds (SLB), which reward incremental improvements in relevant performance indicators.</p>","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 2","pages":"294-319"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecaf.12636","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141110268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Why are popular perceptions of the rich important for a society? The simple answer: because the first sparks of economic growth are often kindled when a society starts to view the rich in a positive light. This has been true throughout the history of the United States, and it has also been true in China since the early 1980s when Deng Xiaoping declared: “Let some people get rich first!” (Naughton, <span>1993</span>, p. 501). It is also true today in Vietnam, where the rich are viewed more positively than in almost any other country – and where GDP per capita has increased sixfold since a far-reaching programme of economic reforms was launched in 1986.</p><p>In China, the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen from 88 per cent in 1981 to less than 1 per cent today, while at the same time the number of billionaires has increased more than in any other country; today, more billionaires live in China than anywhere except the USA (Hyatt, <span>2023</span>).</p><p>In Vietnam, 80 per cent of the population were living in poverty in 1993; today that figure is less than 5 per cent (World Bank, <span>2022</span>, p. 2, figure 0.1 m; Zitelmann, <span>2024a</span>). Conversely, many societies started on the road to suffering and decay when they launched policies directed against the rich, as in China during the Cultural Revolution, or in Venezuela after the election of the socialist President Hugo Chávez. As the recent example of Venezuela has shown, it is not only the rich who suffer from anti-rich policies, but also the poor.</p><p>The Russian Revolution began with the struggle against the bourgeoisie, against the rich. In December 1917, Lenin demanded that extreme force be used against “this offal of humanity, these hopelessly decayed and atrophied limbs, this contagion, this plague, this ulcer”, specifically “the rich and their hangers-on”, and the bourgeois intellectuals (Lenin, <span>1947</span>, pp. 259–60). His aim was “to <i>purge</i> the land of Russia of all vermin”, the rich and other rogues. How this should be done, he explained in drastic words: “In one place half a score of rich, a dozen rogues, half a dozen workers who shirk their work … will be put in prison. In another place they will be put to cleaning latrines … In a fourth place, one out of every ten idlers will be shot on the spot” (Lenin, <span>1947</span>, p. 262).</p><p>Martin Ivanovich Latsis, one of the first leaders of the Soviet political police, instructed his subordinates on 1 November 1918:</p><p>Resentment against the rich has often even led to negative economic outcomes in democratic states, as the examples of Sweden and Great Britain in the 1970s show, where over-zealous high-tax policies and nationalisations led to massive declines in wealth (see Zitelmann, <span>2024b</span>, pp. 127–48, 171–88). So there are very good reasons for learning more about how a society perceives the rich.</p><p>Hatred of the rich is an extreme manifestation and mobilisation o
希望偏见研究也能越来越多地关注迄今为止在这方面很少受到关注的少数群体:富人。
{"title":"Popular perceptions of the rich in 13 countries","authors":"Rainer Zitelmann","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12633","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecaf.12633","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Why are popular perceptions of the rich important for a society? The simple answer: because the first sparks of economic growth are often kindled when a society starts to view the rich in a positive light. This has been true throughout the history of the United States, and it has also been true in China since the early 1980s when Deng Xiaoping declared: “Let some people get rich first!” (Naughton, <span>1993</span>, p. 501). It is also true today in Vietnam, where the rich are viewed more positively than in almost any other country – and where GDP per capita has increased sixfold since a far-reaching programme of economic reforms was launched in 1986.</p><p>In China, the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen from 88 per cent in 1981 to less than 1 per cent today, while at the same time the number of billionaires has increased more than in any other country; today, more billionaires live in China than anywhere except the USA (Hyatt, <span>2023</span>).</p><p>In Vietnam, 80 per cent of the population were living in poverty in 1993; today that figure is less than 5 per cent (World Bank, <span>2022</span>, p. 2, figure 0.1 m; Zitelmann, <span>2024a</span>). Conversely, many societies started on the road to suffering and decay when they launched policies directed against the rich, as in China during the Cultural Revolution, or in Venezuela after the election of the socialist President Hugo Chávez. As the recent example of Venezuela has shown, it is not only the rich who suffer from anti-rich policies, but also the poor.</p><p>The Russian Revolution began with the struggle against the bourgeoisie, against the rich. In December 1917, Lenin demanded that extreme force be used against “this offal of humanity, these hopelessly decayed and atrophied limbs, this contagion, this plague, this ulcer”, specifically “the rich and their hangers-on”, and the bourgeois intellectuals (Lenin, <span>1947</span>, pp. 259–60). His aim was “to <i>purge</i> the land of Russia of all vermin”, the rich and other rogues. How this should be done, he explained in drastic words: “In one place half a score of rich, a dozen rogues, half a dozen workers who shirk their work … will be put in prison. In another place they will be put to cleaning latrines … In a fourth place, one out of every ten idlers will be shot on the spot” (Lenin, <span>1947</span>, p. 262).</p><p>Martin Ivanovich Latsis, one of the first leaders of the Soviet political police, instructed his subordinates on 1 November 1918:</p><p>Resentment against the rich has often even led to negative economic outcomes in democratic states, as the examples of Sweden and Great Britain in the 1970s show, where over-zealous high-tax policies and nationalisations led to massive declines in wealth (see Zitelmann, <span>2024b</span>, pp. 127–48, 171–88). So there are very good reasons for learning more about how a society perceives the rich.</p><p>Hatred of the rich is an extreme manifestation and mobilisation o","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 2","pages":"363-373"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecaf.12633","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141014839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The response by David Goldsmith to our recently published <i>Economic Affairs</i> article (Andersson & Jonung, <span>2024</span>) is puzzling. Most prominently, Goldsmith stresses that the correlation between the stringency of lockdowns and excess death rates is close to zero. This is exactly the main point in our article.</p><p>If lockdowns were a clear success, there should be a significant correlation between the extent of lockdowns and excess deaths. But there is none. The least one should expect from lockdown supporters is that they would be able to show how the non-existing significant correlation we find can be turned into the significant negative relationship they claim to exist. Goldsmith has arguments but no analysis on this point.</p><p>With this insight, we hope that he shares our message that Sweden was a success story in the sense that the use of more far-reaching lockdowns in other countries than in Sweden had no apparent benefits.</p><p>Goldsmith raises the question: what constitute a successful pandemic policy? Many argue that the only way to success is to arrest the spread of the virus by the use of lockdowns, ignoring all other social, political and economic consequences. We do not share this limited view. When evaluating public policies we must consider their full impact on society. Nevertheless, even if one adopts a limited approach, draconian lockdowns were obviously not a success as they had no significant effect on excess mortality.</p><p>In our analysis we adopt a broader approach by looking at the effects of lockdowns on the macroeconomy as well. Here we find a significant negative impact of lockdowns. For example, real GDP in the United Kingdom fell by 20 per cent in the second quarter of 2020, compared with 9 per cent in Sweden. In the United Kingdom, public finances and budget deficits are now a matter of general concern as a result of the fiscal expansion during the lockdown period. In Sweden, the public debt accumulated during the pandemic has been paid off. Instead, there is a fear that the public debt may have become too low, the contrary case to the UK.</p><p>Finally, perhaps the biggest weakness in Goldsmith's argument is his failure to recognise the role of voluntary behaviour. There are two alternative ways for a government to respond to a pandemic. It can either advise the public on how to adjust its behaviour and trust citizens to act responsibly, or mistrust citizens by enforcing mandatory restrictions backed up by law-enforcement agencies. The latter approach assumes people are ignorant and incapable of making independent decisions.</p><p>If the next pandemic has a case fatality rate of 10–20 per cent, as Goldsmith speculates, people will go out of their way to avoid contact with others. This is a key point from the Swedish experience, where the authorities relied to a large extent on voluntary adjustment. It is a crucial factor in explaining why Sweden could display low excess mortality and low cos
{"title":"Rejoinder","authors":"Fredrik N G Andersson, Lars Jonung","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12638","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The response by David Goldsmith to our recently published <i>Economic Affairs</i> article (Andersson & Jonung, <span>2024</span>) is puzzling. Most prominently, Goldsmith stresses that the correlation between the stringency of lockdowns and excess death rates is close to zero. This is exactly the main point in our article.</p><p>If lockdowns were a clear success, there should be a significant correlation between the extent of lockdowns and excess deaths. But there is none. The least one should expect from lockdown supporters is that they would be able to show how the non-existing significant correlation we find can be turned into the significant negative relationship they claim to exist. Goldsmith has arguments but no analysis on this point.</p><p>With this insight, we hope that he shares our message that Sweden was a success story in the sense that the use of more far-reaching lockdowns in other countries than in Sweden had no apparent benefits.</p><p>Goldsmith raises the question: what constitute a successful pandemic policy? Many argue that the only way to success is to arrest the spread of the virus by the use of lockdowns, ignoring all other social, political and economic consequences. We do not share this limited view. When evaluating public policies we must consider their full impact on society. Nevertheless, even if one adopts a limited approach, draconian lockdowns were obviously not a success as they had no significant effect on excess mortality.</p><p>In our analysis we adopt a broader approach by looking at the effects of lockdowns on the macroeconomy as well. Here we find a significant negative impact of lockdowns. For example, real GDP in the United Kingdom fell by 20 per cent in the second quarter of 2020, compared with 9 per cent in Sweden. In the United Kingdom, public finances and budget deficits are now a matter of general concern as a result of the fiscal expansion during the lockdown period. In Sweden, the public debt accumulated during the pandemic has been paid off. Instead, there is a fear that the public debt may have become too low, the contrary case to the UK.</p><p>Finally, perhaps the biggest weakness in Goldsmith's argument is his failure to recognise the role of voluntary behaviour. There are two alternative ways for a government to respond to a pandemic. It can either advise the public on how to adjust its behaviour and trust citizens to act responsibly, or mistrust citizens by enforcing mandatory restrictions backed up by law-enforcement agencies. The latter approach assumes people are ignorant and incapable of making independent decisions.</p><p>If the next pandemic has a case fatality rate of 10–20 per cent, as Goldsmith speculates, people will go out of their way to avoid contact with others. This is a key point from the Swedish experience, where the authorities relied to a large extent on voluntary adjustment. It is a crucial factor in explaining why Sweden could display low excess mortality and low cos","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 2","pages":"376-377"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecaf.12638","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141488261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Anton Eberhard and Wikus Kruger (Eds.), <i>Renewable Energy Auctions: Lessons from the Global South</i>. Oxford University Press. 2023. 512 pp. £100.00 (hbk). ISBN: 978-0192871701. £66.66 (ebk). ISBN: 978-0191967931.</p><p>Pablo Del Río and Mario Ragwitz (Eds.), <i>Handbook on the Economics of Renewable Energy</i>. Edward Elgar. 2023. 496 pp. £215.00 (hbk). ISBN: 978-1800379015. From £48.00 (ebk). ISBN: 978-1800379022.</p><p>Georges Hathry, <i>Renewable Energies: The Stakes for Your Company. What does Your Company Gain from Using Renewable Energy?</i> Our Knowledge Publishing. 2023. 76 pp. $48.00 (pbk). ISBN: 978-6206326922.</p><p>In the latest COP 28 UN Climate Change Conference held in December 2023 in United Arab Emirates, signatory countries promised a transition from carbon energy sources “in a just, orderly and equitable manner” (UNFCC, <span>2023</span>) to mitigate, accordingly, the worst effects of climate change, and reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050. In the history of COP summits, though vague with respect to <i>how</i> and <i>when</i> the transition will happen, the latest UN conference set a precedent in affirming the necessity of reducing the use of fossil fuels. (Though, notably, China and India, representing more than one-third of the world's population, did not sign the pledge to triple their output of renewable energy and committed to coal power instead.)</p><p>Researchers from policy institutes, leading academic institutions and elsewhere have devoted significant effort to explaining the economic benefits transitioning to ‘renewable’ energy and pursuing the commitments made under the auspices of the UN climate change agreements. Monographs and compendiums as well offer advice on how to navigate and benefit from the transition. Some works address legal and regulatory issues such as <i>Promoting Renewable Energy: The Mutual Supportiveness of Climate and Trade Law</i> (Monti, <span>2023</span>) or focus upon technical and engineering matters as in <i>Fundamentals and Applications of Renewable Energy</i> (Kanoglu et al., <span>2023</span>).</p><p>Looking at each of these themes in turn, we begin with the popular concept of energy security.</p><p>Energy security is a recurring theme in the design of energy policy even though there is no consensus on how it should be measured or achieved, or on the relevant time frame over which it should be assessed. Ever since petroleum became critical to modern economic life, people have been concerned about whether its supply was ‘secure’ and would be fairly priced. Of late, such perennial concerns have been used to support renewable energy, but what ‘security’ precisely involves is uncertain.</p><p>There are many interesting metrics and indices purporting to measure energy security. It may involve the ratio of domestic supply to domestic consumption, looking at resource estimates or metrics related to economic structure such as producer concentration, energy intensiveness and market con
{"title":"Selling renewable energy: A review of three new publications","authors":"Lawrence Haar","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12631","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Anton Eberhard and Wikus Kruger (Eds.), <i>Renewable Energy Auctions: Lessons from the Global South</i>. Oxford University Press. 2023. 512 pp. £100.00 (hbk). ISBN: 978-0192871701. £66.66 (ebk). ISBN: 978-0191967931.</p><p>Pablo Del Río and Mario Ragwitz (Eds.), <i>Handbook on the Economics of Renewable Energy</i>. Edward Elgar. 2023. 496 pp. £215.00 (hbk). ISBN: 978-1800379015. From £48.00 (ebk). ISBN: 978-1800379022.</p><p>Georges Hathry, <i>Renewable Energies: The Stakes for Your Company. What does Your Company Gain from Using Renewable Energy?</i> Our Knowledge Publishing. 2023. 76 pp. $48.00 (pbk). ISBN: 978-6206326922.</p><p>In the latest COP 28 UN Climate Change Conference held in December 2023 in United Arab Emirates, signatory countries promised a transition from carbon energy sources “in a just, orderly and equitable manner” (UNFCC, <span>2023</span>) to mitigate, accordingly, the worst effects of climate change, and reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050. In the history of COP summits, though vague with respect to <i>how</i> and <i>when</i> the transition will happen, the latest UN conference set a precedent in affirming the necessity of reducing the use of fossil fuels. (Though, notably, China and India, representing more than one-third of the world's population, did not sign the pledge to triple their output of renewable energy and committed to coal power instead.)</p><p>Researchers from policy institutes, leading academic institutions and elsewhere have devoted significant effort to explaining the economic benefits transitioning to ‘renewable’ energy and pursuing the commitments made under the auspices of the UN climate change agreements. Monographs and compendiums as well offer advice on how to navigate and benefit from the transition. Some works address legal and regulatory issues such as <i>Promoting Renewable Energy: The Mutual Supportiveness of Climate and Trade Law</i> (Monti, <span>2023</span>) or focus upon technical and engineering matters as in <i>Fundamentals and Applications of Renewable Energy</i> (Kanoglu et al., <span>2023</span>).</p><p>Looking at each of these themes in turn, we begin with the popular concept of energy security.</p><p>Energy security is a recurring theme in the design of energy policy even though there is no consensus on how it should be measured or achieved, or on the relevant time frame over which it should be assessed. Ever since petroleum became critical to modern economic life, people have been concerned about whether its supply was ‘secure’ and would be fairly priced. Of late, such perennial concerns have been used to support renewable energy, but what ‘security’ precisely involves is uncertain.</p><p>There are many interesting metrics and indices purporting to measure energy security. It may involve the ratio of domestic supply to domestic consumption, looking at resource estimates or metrics related to economic structure such as producer concentration, energy intensiveness and market con","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 2","pages":"403-413"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecaf.12631","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141489015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The individualists: Radicals, reactionaries and the struggle for the soul of libertarianism By Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi. Princeton University Press. 2023. 416 pp. £30 (hbk). ISBN: 978-0691155548. £21.00 (ebk). ISBN: 978-0691241043","authors":"Charles Amos","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12617","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 1","pages":"188-191"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Bengal famine of 1943 has received significant attention from academia, politicians and the public. This is the result both of its considerable death toll and the range of factors held responsible, including politicians. However, despite the quantity of discussion and controversy that it has generated, three areas have thus far been insufficiently addressed: the results of the Bengal Food Drive, the geographic link between famine and the ‘denial policy’, and the economic Balkanisation of India. This article addresses these areas to draw a more rounded conclusion on the debate around the famine.
{"title":"Reassessing the Bengal Famine of 1943","authors":"Hira Jungkow, Herbert Anderson","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12619","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Bengal famine of 1943 has received significant attention from academia, politicians and the public. This is the result both of its considerable death toll and the range of factors held responsible, including politicians. However, despite the quantity of discussion and controversy that it has generated, three areas have thus far been insufficiently addressed: the results of the Bengal Food Drive, the geographic link between famine and the ‘denial policy’, and the economic Balkanisation of India. This article addresses these areas to draw a more rounded conclusion on the debate around the famine.</p>","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 1","pages":"31-56"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the political economy of fiscal dominance during the Chilean government (1970–73) of Salvador Allende. Fiscal dominance appears when the monetary authority complies with the fiscal authority's demand to buy treasury bonds and monetise the deficit. It is argued that persistent fiscal dominance is inflationary, especially without robust fiscal and monetary rules. The Allende government financed the deficit with present taxes, debt (future taxes) and monetary issuance (inflation tax), causing the crowding-out effect and, together with other policies such as expropriation and price controls, collapsed the demand for money, triggering hyperinflation. The lessons of Chile clarify the fiscal trigger of the inflation, stagnation, and widespread poverty that has affected Latin American countries in recent decades.
{"title":"The political economy of fiscal dominance: Evidence from the Chilean government of Salvador Allende","authors":"Víctor I Espinosa, David O Cueva","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12618","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article examines the political economy of fiscal dominance during the Chilean government (1970–73) of Salvador Allende. Fiscal dominance appears when the monetary authority complies with the fiscal authority's demand to buy treasury bonds and monetise the deficit. It is argued that persistent fiscal dominance is inflationary, especially without robust fiscal and monetary rules. The Allende government financed the deficit with present taxes, debt (future taxes) and monetary issuance (inflation tax), causing the crowding-out effect and, together with other policies such as expropriation and price controls, collapsed the demand for money, triggering hyperinflation. The lessons of Chile clarify the fiscal trigger of the inflation, stagnation, and widespread poverty that has affected Latin American countries in recent decades.</p>","PeriodicalId":44825,"journal":{"name":"ECONOMIC AFFAIRS","volume":"44 1","pages":"118-138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}