{"title":"Chapitre V. Cogito, ergo sum","authors":"M. Meyer","doi":"10.3917/rip.298.0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.298.0055","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44339473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapitre VII. Les passions de l’âme","authors":"M. Meyer","doi":"10.3917/rip.298.0083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.298.0083","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42836847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On essaie ici de defendre l’idee que la production de foutaise est responsable en grande partie, et peut etre centrale pour ce que nous appelons la post-verite. La production de foutaise est basee sur l’attitude qui consiste a ignorer les normes de l‘assertion. Les consequences de l’extension de cette attitude peuvent expliquer le defiance et le mepris pour la verite et a connaissance qui envahissent nos societes, quand bien meme on les appelle des « societes de connaissance ».
{"title":"Post-Truth is an Assertion Crisis","authors":"P. Engel","doi":"10.3917/rip.297.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.297.0027","url":null,"abstract":"On essaie ici de defendre l’idee que la production de foutaise est responsable en grande partie, et peut etre centrale pour ce que nous appelons la post-verite. La production de foutaise est basee sur l’attitude qui consiste a ignorer les normes de l‘assertion. Les consequences de l’extension de cette attitude peuvent expliquer le defiance et le mepris pour la verite et a connaissance qui envahissent nos societes, quand bien meme on les appelle des « societes de connaissance ».","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41721105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bald-faced lies are on the uptick by political leaders in democracies worldwide. In the United States, for example, we are becoming numb not only to outrageous falsehoods, but to the bizarre self-assurance with which they are pronounced. We were told crowds were bigger than they were, that the sun shined when it didn’t, that Trump won in a landslide—and that was just in the first few days after his election. What has shocked so many is the fearlessness in the face of the facts, the willingness to simply deny reality outright, and the apparent toleration—even joy—with which Trump’s followers greet the practice. Bald-faced lying by political leaders is an important phenomenon, but it is easy to misunderstand in ways that undermine our ability to combat its strange effectiveness. In this paper, I aim to first analyze political bald-faced lies and then examine the threat they pose to the norms of democratic discourse. My goal is not to answer the empirical question of how frequently denials of obvious facts occur in politics; it is the normative question of understanding what harms they cause — particularly when they are made by those — in political power. Nonetheless, I think it is important to resist the temptation to think that what we are talking about here are a few isolated and extreme examples. As Hannah Arendt noted, there are times in political life when truth, “if it happens to oppose a given group’s profit or pleasure, is greeted with greater hostility.” Arguably we are living in one of those times.
{"title":"Power, Bald-Faced Lies and Contempt for Truth","authors":"M. Lynch","doi":"10.3917/rip.297.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.297.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Bald-faced lies are on the uptick by political leaders in democracies worldwide. In the United States, for example, we are becoming numb not only to outrageous falsehoods, but to the bizarre self-assurance with which they are pronounced. We were told crowds were bigger than they were, that the sun shined when it didn’t, that Trump won in a landslide—and that was just in the first few days after his election. What has shocked so many is the fearlessness in the face of the facts, the willingness to simply deny reality outright, and the apparent toleration—even joy—with which Trump’s followers greet the practice. Bald-faced lying by political leaders is an important phenomenon, but it is easy to misunderstand in ways that undermine our ability to combat its strange effectiveness. In this paper, I aim to first analyze political bald-faced lies and then examine the threat they pose to the norms of democratic discourse. My goal is not to answer the empirical question of how frequently denials of obvious facts occur in politics; it is the normative question of understanding what harms they cause — particularly when they are made by those — in political power. Nonetheless, I think it is important to resist the temptation to think that what we are talking about here are a few isolated and extreme examples. As Hannah Arendt noted, there are times in political life when truth, “if it happens to oppose a given group’s profit or pleasure, is greeted with greater hostility.” Arguably we are living in one of those times.","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42106027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After recalling the progress made in the diagnosis of the post-truth phenomenon, thanks to recent experimental findings (from cognitive and social psychology) and theoretical work (post-truth versus half-lies and propaganda, degrees in epistemic vice and scale of responsibility), we indicate four other ways to improve our awareness of the scope and mechanisms of post-truth: we introduce some qualifications so as to distinguish between a post-truth world and an Orwellian universe, the negative and positive sides of emotions, an utter contempt for facts, and the sharp dichotomy between facts and values, and between science denialism and blind scientism. Finally, objective truth being taken for granted, we make some suggestions for a “way out”: we should be aware of our cognitive biases and of possible sources of manipulation, cultivate our epistemic virtues, and keep evidence as a prior demand. We should also work in a “scientific spirit,” i.e., refuse any compromise with society, morality, or practice so as to ensure freedom of conscience within an academic and democratic “space of reasons.” But even more urgently, we should avoid some still too frequent misunderstandings about truth itself and about knowledge (which we identify), and remember that post-truth is serious because it is a threat to reality itself: hence we should also take care of our metaphysical prejudices and work to find better ways of ensuring metaphysical knowledge.
{"title":"Post “Post-Truth”: Still a Long Way to Go","authors":"C. Tiercelin","doi":"10.3917/rip.297.0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.297.0043","url":null,"abstract":"After recalling the progress made in the diagnosis of the post-truth phenomenon, thanks to recent experimental findings (from cognitive and social psychology) and theoretical work (post-truth versus half-lies and propaganda, degrees in epistemic vice and scale of responsibility), we indicate four other ways to improve our awareness of the scope and mechanisms of post-truth: we introduce some qualifications so as to distinguish between a post-truth world and an Orwellian universe, the negative and positive sides of emotions, an utter contempt for facts, and the sharp dichotomy between facts and values, and between science denialism and blind scientism. Finally, objective truth being taken for granted, we make some suggestions for a “way out”: we should be aware of our cognitive biases and of possible sources of manipulation, cultivate our epistemic virtues, and keep evidence as a prior demand. We should also work in a “scientific spirit,” i.e., refuse any compromise with society, morality, or practice so as to ensure freedom of conscience within an academic and democratic “space of reasons.” But even more urgently, we should avoid some still too frequent misunderstandings about truth itself and about knowledge (which we identify), and remember that post-truth is serious because it is a threat to reality itself: hence we should also take care of our metaphysical prejudices and work to find better ways of ensuring metaphysical knowledge.","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49489581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a post-truth era, taking seriously the assertions of political figures and what other people say on the internet strikes many as irrational and gullible. Let us call this reaction the “incredulous reaction.” In this paper, I consider a common response to the targets of the incredulous reaction: excluding them from activities like debate and discounting their beliefs as relevant to our own. This exclusion is motivated by the assumption that those who continue to place epistemic trust in a post-truth society are acting irrationally. I begin with an argument that we can justifiably exclude irrational persons from our epistemic activities. I then present a conflict that emerges when we take the wellbeing of our epistemic community to be an end in and of itself, and not merely a means for pursuing other epistemic goods. I propose that healthy epistemic communities depend on networks of epistemic trust and on ensuring their members are treated with the epistemic respect they deserve. If we were to adopt the development of a healthy epistemic community as a goal, then excluding others may no longer be a justifiable choice.
{"title":"Exclusion and Epistemic Community","authors":"H. Gunn","doi":"10.3917/RIP.297.0073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RIP.297.0073","url":null,"abstract":"In a post-truth era, taking seriously the assertions of political figures and what other people say on the internet strikes many as irrational and gullible. Let us call this reaction the “incredulous reaction.” In this paper, I consider a common response to the targets of the incredulous reaction: excluding them from activities like debate and discounting their beliefs as relevant to our own. This exclusion is motivated by the assumption that those who continue to place epistemic trust in a post-truth society are acting irrationally. I begin with an argument that we can justifiably exclude irrational persons from our epistemic activities. I then present a conflict that emerges when we take the wellbeing of our epistemic community to be an end in and of itself, and not merely a means for pursuing other epistemic goods. I propose that healthy epistemic communities depend on networks of epistemic trust and on ensuring their members are treated with the epistemic respect they deserve. If we were to adopt the development of a healthy epistemic community as a goal, then excluding others may no longer be a justifiable choice.","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"1 1","pages":"73-96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44343479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay, I approach issues of post-truth and fake news from the perspective of “ignorance studies,” a fairly recent multidisciplinary area of scholarship. It looks at epistemology from the opposite direction adopted by traditional theorists of knowledge, seeing if analyzing ignorance can shed light on knowledge and truth in new ways. After looking at examples of ignorance from a common-sense standpoint informed by my dual careers as a philosopher and a journalist, I argue in the first half that journalists, like philosophical pragmatists and scientists, make the best knowledge judgments they can at a particular time, conscious that future context and circumstances may alter their judgments. Journalists, I note, also often choose to be ignorant of less important facts, part of the inevitable selectivity required when covering news. In the second half of the essay, I seek to address a fresh, traditionally philosophical issue in journalism—the widespread use by reporters of casual generalizations not backed up by rigorous empirical investigation. I suggest that readers may tolerate such generalizations because they recognize them to function rhetorically as something other than strict truth claims. At the same time, many thinkers, from Machiavelli to William Blake, have heavily criticized generalization, and most people repudiate insulting generalizations, such as racial slurs. I end by strongly advising greater scrutiny of journalistic generalizations by both philosophers and media professionals.
{"title":"Ignorance in Journalism and the Case of Generalization","authors":"Carlin Romano","doi":"10.3917/rip.297.0097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.297.0097","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I approach issues of post-truth and fake news from the perspective of “ignorance studies,” a fairly recent multidisciplinary area of scholarship. It looks at epistemology from the opposite direction adopted by traditional theorists of knowledge, seeing if analyzing ignorance can shed light on knowledge and truth in new ways. After looking at examples of ignorance from a common-sense standpoint informed by my dual careers as a philosopher and a journalist, I argue in the first half that journalists, like philosophical pragmatists and scientists, make the best knowledge judgments they can at a particular time, conscious that future context and circumstances may alter their judgments. Journalists, I note, also often choose to be ignorant of less important facts, part of the inevitable selectivity required when covering news. In the second half of the essay, I seek to address a fresh, traditionally philosophical issue in journalism—the widespread use by reporters of casual generalizations not backed up by rigorous empirical investigation. I suggest that readers may tolerate such generalizations because they recognize them to function rhetorically as something other than strict truth claims. At the same time, many thinkers, from Machiavelli to William Blake, have heavily criticized generalization, and most people repudiate insulting generalizations, such as racial slurs. I end by strongly advising greater scrutiny of journalistic generalizations by both philosophers and media professionals.","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48536371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the volume","authors":"L. McIntyre","doi":"10.3917/rip.297.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.297.0005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44313313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The problem of “fake news” is an important aspect of post-truth politics. Despite calls to abandon the term—based on fears that Trump has corrupted it through partisanship and claiming credit for its invention—there is truly such a thing as fake news, which is the creation and dissemination of news claims that are intentionally false. The obvious danger is that someone might take a fake story for real, causing us to believe a falsehood (such as that Trump’s inauguration crowd was bigger than Obama’s). But one hidden danger is that—in an environment in which fake news is prevalent—we might also begin to take real news for fake. This inability to tell the difference between fact and fiction—truth from falsehood—breeds cynicism and lack of trust in the media, which could pave the way for authoritarian rule.
{"title":"The Hidden Dangers of Fake News in Post-Truth Politics","authors":"L. McIntyre","doi":"10.3917/rip.297.0113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.297.0113","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of “fake news” is an important aspect of post-truth politics. Despite calls to abandon the term—based on fears that Trump has corrupted it through partisanship and claiming credit for its invention—there is truly such a thing as fake news, which is the creation and dissemination of news claims that are intentionally false. The obvious danger is that someone might take a fake story for real, causing us to believe a falsehood (such as that Trump’s inauguration crowd was bigger than Obama’s). But one hidden danger is that—in an environment in which fake news is prevalent—we might also begin to take real news for fake. This inability to tell the difference between fact and fiction—truth from falsehood—breeds cynicism and lack of trust in the media, which could pave the way for authoritarian rule.","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44290720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Descartes pose a la fois la question de ce que je suis (une substance pensante) et de qui je suis (l’unite de l’âme et du corps). Mais il n’est pas le premier a faire de la pensee l’attribut d’une substance : Olivi avait deja formule cette hypothese. Ainsi, malgre la nouveaute de la problematique, Descartes retrouve les difficultes et les concepts fondamentaux de la theologie scolastique. Cela le conduit meme a rehabiliter le concept de forme substantielle, et a s’engager dans le debat christologique.
{"title":"Descartes scolastique : le moi, l’âme et la forme substantielle","authors":"O. Boulnois","doi":"10.3917/rip.296.0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.296.0045","url":null,"abstract":"Descartes pose a la fois la question de ce que je suis (une substance pensante) et de qui je suis (l’unite de l’âme et du corps). Mais il n’est pas le premier a faire de la pensee l’attribut d’une substance : Olivi avait deja formule cette hypothese. Ainsi, malgre la nouveaute de la problematique, Descartes retrouve les difficultes et les concepts fondamentaux de la theologie scolastique. Cela le conduit meme a rehabiliter le concept de forme substantielle, et a s’engager dans le debat christologique.","PeriodicalId":44846,"journal":{"name":"REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49086597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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