Pub Date : 2019-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X19840465
Lucas González, María Belén Cáceres
Violence is unequally distributed across provinces. In Argentina, the least violent provinces have a murder rate similar to Sweden’s. The most violent ones have a murder rate comparable to South Sudan’s. What explains this unequal distribution of violence? This article claims that political turnover at the provincial level reduces the partisan control over police forces and challenges previous informal pacts, while being in the opposition to the president decreases the likelihood of receiving federal assistance to fight violence. When both conditions are met at the same time, crime is more likely to increase. The study examines these claims using difference-in-difference and regression analysis for panel data of the Argentine provinces between 2002 and 2015 and a case study of the province of Santa Fe (the most violent in the country). In the conclusions, it also explores the comparative implications for the discussion on the unequal distribution of violence in federal democracies.
{"title":"Federal Distributive Politics and the Unequal Distribution of Violence: Argentine Provinces in Comparative Perspective","authors":"Lucas González, María Belén Cáceres","doi":"10.1177/1866802X19840465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X19840465","url":null,"abstract":"Violence is unequally distributed across provinces. In Argentina, the least violent provinces have a murder rate similar to Sweden’s. The most violent ones have a murder rate comparable to South Sudan’s. What explains this unequal distribution of violence? This article claims that political turnover at the provincial level reduces the partisan control over police forces and challenges previous informal pacts, while being in the opposition to the president decreases the likelihood of receiving federal assistance to fight violence. When both conditions are met at the same time, crime is more likely to increase. The study examines these claims using difference-in-difference and regression analysis for panel data of the Argentine provinces between 2002 and 2015 and a case study of the province of Santa Fe (the most violent in the country). In the conclusions, it also explores the comparative implications for the discussion on the unequal distribution of violence in federal democracies.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X19840465","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45393186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000302
Gisela Zaremberg, Marcela Torres Wong
Violent conflicts between indigenous groups, multinational companies, and governments over the control of lands potentially containing valuable minerals and hydrocarbons are proliferating in Latin America, as well as elsewhere around the world too. In 1989 the International Labor Organization (ILO) approved ILO Convention 169, which mandates the implementation of prior consultation (PC) with indigenous peoples about any project that could potentially affect their territory. Many interpretations regarding the aims and scopes of PC exist. Some environmental sectors see PC as a mechanism to prevent the implementation of ecologically unsustainable projects in indigenous territories. Part of the indigenous rights sector, however, sees PC as a platform via which to negotiate financial resources for indigenous communities. On the side of governments and multinational companies, PC represents a means to diminish violence and advance projects under more stable political conditions. By examining mining and hydrocarbon projects in Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico, the authors compare cases in which PC takes place and ones where it is not applied. A typology of the outcomes in relation to 1) the prevention of industrialized resource extraction on indigenous lands, 2) redistribution of economic benefits produced by extractive projects, and 3) diminishment of the state repression associated with extractive projects is offered. Findings show that in many cases all three of these results are not simultaneously achieved; the authors explain why some outcomes might be obtained in certain instances and not in others. Finally, the article offers an overall assessment of PC results in light of participation theories.
{"title":"Participation on the Edge: Prior Consultation and Extractivism in Latin America","authors":"Gisela Zaremberg, Marcela Torres Wong","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000302","url":null,"abstract":"Violent conflicts between indigenous groups, multinational companies, and governments over the control of lands potentially containing valuable minerals and hydrocarbons are proliferating in Latin America, as well as elsewhere around the world too. In 1989 the International Labor Organization (ILO) approved ILO Convention 169, which mandates the implementation of prior consultation (PC) with indigenous peoples about any project that could potentially affect their territory. Many interpretations regarding the aims and scopes of PC exist. Some environmental sectors see PC as a mechanism to prevent the implementation of ecologically unsustainable projects in indigenous territories. Part of the indigenous rights sector, however, sees PC as a platform via which to negotiate financial resources for indigenous communities. On the side of governments and multinational companies, PC represents a means to diminish violence and advance projects under more stable political conditions. By examining mining and hydrocarbon projects in Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico, the authors compare cases in which PC takes place and ones where it is not applied. A typology of the outcomes in relation to 1) the prevention of industrialized resource extraction on indigenous lands, 2) redistribution of economic benefits produced by extractive projects, and 3) diminishment of the state repression associated with extractive projects is offered. Findings show that in many cases all three of these results are not simultaneously achieved; the authors explain why some outcomes might be obtained in certain instances and not in others. Finally, the article offers an overall assessment of PC results in light of participation theories.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000302","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47600093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000304
Mariana Batista
Who gets what in portfolio allocation, and how does it matter to coalition partners’ legislative support in presidential systems? I propose that portfolios are not all alike, and that their allocation as well as the support for the president's agenda depends on the particular distribution of assets within the executive. The portfolio share allocated to coalition parties is weighted by a measure of importance based on the assets controlled by the ministry in question, such as policies, offices, and budgets. Once the weighted allocation of ministries has been identified, the results show that: 1) the president concentrates the most important ministries in their own party, mainly considering the policy dimension; 2) the positive relationship between portfolio allocation and legislative support remains, with the importance of specific dimensions being considered; and, 3) coalition partners do not respond differently in terms of legislative support in light of the different assets’ distribution within the portfolio allocation.
{"title":"Who Gets what and how Does it Matter? Importance-Weighted Portfolio Allocation and Coalition Support in Brazil","authors":"Mariana Batista","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000304","url":null,"abstract":"Who gets what in portfolio allocation, and how does it matter to coalition partners’ legislative support in presidential systems? I propose that portfolios are not all alike, and that their allocation as well as the support for the president's agenda depends on the particular distribution of assets within the executive. The portfolio share allocated to coalition parties is weighted by a measure of importance based on the assets controlled by the ministry in question, such as policies, offices, and budgets. Once the weighted allocation of ministries has been identified, the results show that: 1) the president concentrates the most important ministries in their own party, mainly considering the policy dimension; 2) the positive relationship between portfolio allocation and legislative support remains, with the importance of specific dimensions being considered; and, 3) coalition partners do not respond differently in terms of legislative support in light of the different assets’ distribution within the portfolio allocation.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000304","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42780492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000301
Mariela Szwarcberg
This paper examines the persistent gender gap in electoral politics at the local level in Buenos Aires, Argentina. I argue that the combination of the division of political work and existing social norms regarding the separation of domestic chores contributes to women's political underrepresentation at the local level. Studying everyday politics in Buenos Aires, a clear division of political work between men and women was found. Only women were in charge of finding solutions to issues of domestic abuse and violence, and of taking care of children, the pregnant, and senior citizens. Using information from Buenos Aires municipalities, I document the gender gap in elected legislative and executive offices at the local level – as well as in non-elected offices within municipal cabinets. It was also found that the types of political work assigned to female activists and candidates reinforce existing stereotypes of women as mothers of the poor.
{"title":"Gender and Politics in Buenos Aires","authors":"Mariela Szwarcberg","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000301","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the persistent gender gap in electoral politics at the local level in Buenos Aires, Argentina. I argue that the combination of the division of political work and existing social norms regarding the separation of domestic chores contributes to women's political underrepresentation at the local level. Studying everyday politics in Buenos Aires, a clear division of political work between men and women was found. Only women were in charge of finding solutions to issues of domestic abuse and violence, and of taking care of children, the pregnant, and senior citizens. Using information from Buenos Aires municipalities, I document the gender gap in elected legislative and executive offices at the local level – as well as in non-elected offices within municipal cabinets. It was also found that the types of political work assigned to female activists and candidates reinforce existing stereotypes of women as mothers of the poor.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000301","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47930625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000305
Kurt Weyland
Scholars often assume that as a global superpower, the United States has had great influence and impact on political regime developments in the world. This article critically examines these claims, focusing on Latin America; by investigating the region most directly dominated by the US, it employs a most-likely-case design. The experiences of countries such as Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela show that US influence has been fairly limited for many years and has diminished over time. The Northern superpower has been less involved and has had less impact on regime developments than often postulated, as the analysis of the coups in Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973 demonstrates. Moreover, nations to which the US has maintained close, comprehensive linkages, such as Venezuela, have slid into “competitive authoritarianism” while a country such as Haiti, over which the US holds great leverage, has failed to establish a functioning democracy. Thus, even in its direct sphere of interest, the most powerful nation in the contemporary world seems to be limited in its capacity to promote or prevent political regime change.
{"title":"Limits of US Influence: The Promotion of Regime Change in Latin America","authors":"Kurt Weyland","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000305","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars often assume that as a global superpower, the United States has had great influence and impact on political regime developments in the world. This article critically examines these claims, focusing on Latin America; by investigating the region most directly dominated by the US, it employs a most-likely-case design. The experiences of countries such as Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela show that US influence has been fairly limited for many years and has diminished over time. The Northern superpower has been less involved and has had less impact on regime developments than often postulated, as the analysis of the coups in Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973 demonstrates. Moreover, nations to which the US has maintained close, comprehensive linkages, such as Venezuela, have slid into “competitive authoritarianism” while a country such as Haiti, over which the US holds great leverage, has failed to establish a functioning democracy. Thus, even in its direct sphere of interest, the most powerful nation in the contemporary world seems to be limited in its capacity to promote or prevent political regime change.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000305","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48585527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000303
F. Panizza, Conrado Ricardo Ramos Larraburu, Gerardo Scherlis
This study makes the following contributions to the study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America: Conceptually it adopts Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova's (2008) distinction between clientelistic and nonclientelistic types of patronage politics and widens these authors classification of patrons’ motivations for making appointments, specifically as a lens for the study of patronage practices within Latin America's presidentialist regimes. Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments based on the roles that appointees’ play vis-à- vis the executive, the ruling party, and the public administration – one that can be used for the comparative study of the politics of patronage. Empirically, it applies this taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in Argentina and Uruguay under two left-of-center administrations. Theoretically, it contributes to theory-building by relating the findings of our research to the differences in party systems and presidential powers within the two countries under study, and to agency factors associated with the respective governments’ own political projects. The article concludes that differences in patronage practices are a manifestation of two variant forms of exercising governmental power: a hyper-presidentialist, populist one in Argentina and a party-centered, social-democratic one in Uruguay.
{"title":"Unpacking Patronage: The Politics of Patronage Appointments in Argentina's and Uruguay's Central Public Administrations","authors":"F. Panizza, Conrado Ricardo Ramos Larraburu, Gerardo Scherlis","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000303","url":null,"abstract":"This study makes the following contributions to the study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America: Conceptually it adopts Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova's (2008) distinction between clientelistic and nonclientelistic types of patronage politics and widens these authors classification of patrons’ motivations for making appointments, specifically as a lens for the study of patronage practices within Latin America's presidentialist regimes. Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments based on the roles that appointees’ play vis-à- vis the executive, the ruling party, and the public administration – one that can be used for the comparative study of the politics of patronage. Empirically, it applies this taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in Argentina and Uruguay under two left-of-center administrations. Theoretically, it contributes to theory-building by relating the findings of our research to the differences in party systems and presidential powers within the two countries under study, and to agency factors associated with the respective governments’ own political projects. The article concludes that differences in patronage practices are a manifestation of two variant forms of exercising governmental power: a hyper-presidentialist, populist one in Argentina and a party-centered, social-democratic one in Uruguay.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000303","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45451695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000202
H. Bahamonde
Do parties target individuals or groups? Although this question is fundamental to understanding clientelism, the literature does not offer an answer. This paper argues that, depending on certain conditions, brokers target individuals when they are identifiable, and groups when brokers need to rely on the spillover effects of clientelism. Both identifiability and spillovers depend on individual poverty, group poverty, and political competition. Though the theory I outline focuses on targeting, I also argue that structural factors, such as the density of the poor, should be considered in the vote-buying literature. Structural factors are one of the few observables upon which brokers can base their decision regarding investing in clientelism. Using survey and census data from Brazil, the paper exploits variations in personal incomes within contexts of differing levels of municipal poverty. I find that political parties engage in segmented or ad-hoc strategies, targeting individuals when identifiability is high, and groups when there are economies of scale. Importantly, non-poor individuals can also be offered clientelism.
{"title":"Aiming Right at You: Group versus Individual Clientelistic Targeting in Brazil","authors":"H. Bahamonde","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000202","url":null,"abstract":"Do parties target individuals or groups? Although this question is fundamental to understanding clientelism, the literature does not offer an answer. This paper argues that, depending on certain conditions, brokers target individuals when they are identifiable, and groups when brokers need to rely on the spillover effects of clientelism. Both identifiability and spillovers depend on individual poverty, group poverty, and political competition. Though the theory I outline focuses on targeting, I also argue that structural factors, such as the density of the poor, should be considered in the vote-buying literature. Structural factors are one of the few observables upon which brokers can base their decision regarding investing in clientelism. Using survey and census data from Brazil, the paper exploits variations in personal incomes within contexts of differing levels of municipal poverty. I find that political parties engage in segmented or ad-hoc strategies, targeting individuals when identifiability is high, and groups when there are economies of scale. Importantly, non-poor individuals can also be offered clientelism.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000202","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42518801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000203
Antonio Ugues
This study explores how citizens in a newly democratized country with a legacy of electoral fraud and manipulation evaluate the cleanliness of the elections that have taken place since democratization. I argue that citizens in these contexts are more likely to express confidence in the credibility of elections when their electoral preferences are realized, due to the competitiveness of contemporary elections, but more importantly due to the legacy of electoral malpractice. Using panel data collected during the 2000, 2006, and 2012 Mexican elections, the evidence indicates that support for electoral winners is indeed associated with greater confidence in the cleanliness of election-day proceedings, whereas support for electoral losers is associated with less confidence.
{"title":"Public Perceptions of Clean Elections in Mexico: An Analysis of the 2000, 2006, and 2012 Elections","authors":"Antonio Ugues","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000203","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores how citizens in a newly democratized country with a legacy of electoral fraud and manipulation evaluate the cleanliness of the elections that have taken place since democratization. I argue that citizens in these contexts are more likely to express confidence in the credibility of elections when their electoral preferences are realized, due to the competitiveness of contemporary elections, but more importantly due to the legacy of electoral malpractice. Using panel data collected during the 2000, 2006, and 2012 Mexican elections, the evidence indicates that support for electoral winners is indeed associated with greater confidence in the cleanliness of election-day proceedings, whereas support for electoral losers is associated with less confidence.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000203","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43969045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000205
D. Holland
This paper traces the evolution of mining law in Mexico, including the most recent round of reform, and discusses the social and environmental impacts of mining in the region of Soconusco in the state of Chiapas. A set of mining reforms that passed between 2013 and 2014 provided the necessary impetus for a rise in mining investments in Mexico. These reforms have been couched in the language of “new extractivism.” In this approach favored by the left, extractivism is embraced as a development strategy along with the goal of redistributing some of the revenues to rural areas where these activities take place. In addition, these communities are to be consulted on how the funds will be spent. As fortunes have been made, however, the results have fallen short where environmental protection and community support are concerned.
{"title":"“New Extractivism” in Mexico: Hope and Deception","authors":"D. Holland","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000205","url":null,"abstract":"This paper traces the evolution of mining law in Mexico, including the most recent round of reform, and discusses the social and environmental impacts of mining in the region of Soconusco in the state of Chiapas. A set of mining reforms that passed between 2013 and 2014 provided the necessary impetus for a rise in mining investments in Mexico. These reforms have been couched in the language of “new extractivism.” In this approach favored by the left, extractivism is embraced as a development strategy along with the goal of redistributing some of the revenues to rural areas where these activities take place. In addition, these communities are to be consulted on how the funds will be spent. As fortunes have been made, however, the results have fallen short where environmental protection and community support are concerned.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000205","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45102379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000204
Eleonora Dávalos, L. Morales, J. Holmes, L. Dávalos
What factors led to the surprise defeat of the Colombian peace referendum? Initial analyses suggested a link between support for peace and the experience of violence, but economic conditions and political support for incumbent parties also affect electoral outcomes. We use Bayesian hierarchical models to test links between referendum result and previous violence victimization, economic conditions, and support for Centro Democrático (the main party opposed to the peace agreement). There was less support for peace in the Andean region than in other regions, and departments with lower support had higher unemployment and growth in GDP. Support for the opposition was the dominant covariate of decreasing support for the peace accords, while previous violence victimization increased the proportion of votes for peace. In light of these results, regional variation in baseline support for the agreements – a complex variable governed by partisan engagement but also influenced by structural economic factors – will be critical during implementation of the newly revised accords.
{"title":"Opposition Support and the Experience of Violence Explain Colombian Peace Referendum Results","authors":"Eleonora Dávalos, L. Morales, J. Holmes, L. Dávalos","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000204","url":null,"abstract":"What factors led to the surprise defeat of the Colombian peace referendum? Initial analyses suggested a link between support for peace and the experience of violence, but economic conditions and political support for incumbent parties also affect electoral outcomes. We use Bayesian hierarchical models to test links between referendum result and previous violence victimization, economic conditions, and support for Centro Democrático (the main party opposed to the peace agreement). There was less support for peace in the Andean region than in other regions, and departments with lower support had higher unemployment and growth in GDP. Support for the opposition was the dominant covariate of decreasing support for the peace accords, while previous violence victimization increased the proportion of votes for peace. In light of these results, regional variation in baseline support for the agreements – a complex variable governed by partisan engagement but also influenced by structural economic factors – will be critical during implementation of the newly revised accords.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000204","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45083138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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