Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000205
D. Holland
This paper traces the evolution of mining law in Mexico, including the most recent round of reform, and discusses the social and environmental impacts of mining in the region of Soconusco in the state of Chiapas. A set of mining reforms that passed between 2013 and 2014 provided the necessary impetus for a rise in mining investments in Mexico. These reforms have been couched in the language of “new extractivism.” In this approach favored by the left, extractivism is embraced as a development strategy along with the goal of redistributing some of the revenues to rural areas where these activities take place. In addition, these communities are to be consulted on how the funds will be spent. As fortunes have been made, however, the results have fallen short where environmental protection and community support are concerned.
{"title":"“New Extractivism” in Mexico: Hope and Deception","authors":"D. Holland","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000205","url":null,"abstract":"This paper traces the evolution of mining law in Mexico, including the most recent round of reform, and discusses the social and environmental impacts of mining in the region of Soconusco in the state of Chiapas. A set of mining reforms that passed between 2013 and 2014 provided the necessary impetus for a rise in mining investments in Mexico. These reforms have been couched in the language of “new extractivism.” In this approach favored by the left, extractivism is embraced as a development strategy along with the goal of redistributing some of the revenues to rural areas where these activities take place. In addition, these communities are to be consulted on how the funds will be spent. As fortunes have been made, however, the results have fallen short where environmental protection and community support are concerned.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"10 1","pages":"123 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000205","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45102379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000204
Eleonora Dávalos, L. Morales, J. Holmes, L. Dávalos
What factors led to the surprise defeat of the Colombian peace referendum? Initial analyses suggested a link between support for peace and the experience of violence, but economic conditions and political support for incumbent parties also affect electoral outcomes. We use Bayesian hierarchical models to test links between referendum result and previous violence victimization, economic conditions, and support for Centro Democrático (the main party opposed to the peace agreement). There was less support for peace in the Andean region than in other regions, and departments with lower support had higher unemployment and growth in GDP. Support for the opposition was the dominant covariate of decreasing support for the peace accords, while previous violence victimization increased the proportion of votes for peace. In light of these results, regional variation in baseline support for the agreements – a complex variable governed by partisan engagement but also influenced by structural economic factors – will be critical during implementation of the newly revised accords.
{"title":"Opposition Support and the Experience of Violence Explain Colombian Peace Referendum Results","authors":"Eleonora Dávalos, L. Morales, J. Holmes, L. Dávalos","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000204","url":null,"abstract":"What factors led to the surprise defeat of the Colombian peace referendum? Initial analyses suggested a link between support for peace and the experience of violence, but economic conditions and political support for incumbent parties also affect electoral outcomes. We use Bayesian hierarchical models to test links between referendum result and previous violence victimization, economic conditions, and support for Centro Democrático (the main party opposed to the peace agreement). There was less support for peace in the Andean region than in other regions, and departments with lower support had higher unemployment and growth in GDP. Support for the opposition was the dominant covariate of decreasing support for the peace accords, while previous violence victimization increased the proportion of votes for peace. In light of these results, regional variation in baseline support for the agreements – a complex variable governed by partisan engagement but also influenced by structural economic factors – will be critical during implementation of the newly revised accords.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"10 1","pages":"122 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000204","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45083138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000201
F. Lacerda
Since the 1980s, the number of Pentecostal candidates elected to the Brazilian legislatures has grown remarkably. Literature has argued that the phenomenon is related to Pentecostal churches’ support for particular candidates. To date, however, this claim has been based only on ethnographies or studies relying on a few cases of elected candidates. Drawing from a new data set of Evangelical (Protestant) candidates for the Federal Chamber of Deputies and state legislative assemblies, I try to answer the following questions: Do Pentecostal candidates raise fewer campaign resources than other candidates? What is the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate on the vote in Brazilian legislative elections? Is the structure of the church relevant to this effect? Using OLS regression models, I show that being a Pentecostal has a negative, though not significant effect on campaign spending. Additionally, there is a positive statistical relationship between being a Pentecostal and receiving votes, and between having the support of more centralized churches and receiving votes. Qualitative evidence of six Pentecostal politicians who lost their churches’ support at some point between elections, attempted reelection, and performed considerably worse than before reinforces the importance of having the support of a Pentecostal church.
{"title":"Assessing the Strength of Pentecostal Churches’ Electoral Support: Evidence from Brazil","authors":"F. Lacerda","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000201","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 1980s, the number of Pentecostal candidates elected to the Brazilian legislatures has grown remarkably. Literature has argued that the phenomenon is related to Pentecostal churches’ support for particular candidates. To date, however, this claim has been based only on ethnographies or studies relying on a few cases of elected candidates. Drawing from a new data set of Evangelical (Protestant) candidates for the Federal Chamber of Deputies and state legislative assemblies, I try to answer the following questions: Do Pentecostal candidates raise fewer campaign resources than other candidates? What is the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate on the vote in Brazilian legislative elections? Is the structure of the church relevant to this effect? Using OLS regression models, I show that being a Pentecostal has a negative, though not significant effect on campaign spending. Additionally, there is a positive statistical relationship between being a Pentecostal and receiving votes, and between having the support of more centralized churches and receiving votes. Qualitative evidence of six Pentecostal politicians who lost their churches’ support at some point between elections, attempted reelection, and performed considerably worse than before reinforces the importance of having the support of a Pentecostal church.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"10 1","pages":"3 - 40"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000201","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43210618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000102
Matías Bargsted, Luis Maldonado
Since the return of democracy, party identification has been declining sharply among the Chilean public. We seek to understand this process by applying an age-period-cohort analysis to survey data from 1994 to 2014. In light of the elite-driven and socially uprooted character, or what we call the encapsulated nature, of the Chilean party system, we hypothesize that cumulative electoral experience has had a negative effect on party identification and not the positive effect that Converse's (1969) social-learning model would predict. Our findings support these expectations but also reveal large period effects that have shrunk the overall level of partisan identification and significant cohort effects whereby generations born after the 1950s have become less partisan. We also uncover important nuances that occur across the various mainstream political parties. We conclude that all three sources of social change are leading toward the extinction of mass partisanship from Chilean society.
{"title":"Party Identification in an Encapsulated Party System: The Case of Postauthoritarian Chile","authors":"Matías Bargsted, Luis Maldonado","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000102","url":null,"abstract":"Since the return of democracy, party identification has been declining sharply among the Chilean public. We seek to understand this process by applying an age-period-cohort analysis to survey data from 1994 to 2014. In light of the elite-driven and socially uprooted character, or what we call the encapsulated nature, of the Chilean party system, we hypothesize that cumulative electoral experience has had a negative effect on party identification and not the positive effect that Converse's (1969) social-learning model would predict. Our findings support these expectations but also reveal large period effects that have shrunk the overall level of partisan identification and significant cohort effects whereby generations born after the 1950s have become less partisan. We also uncover important nuances that occur across the various mainstream political parties. We conclude that all three sources of social change are leading toward the extinction of mass partisanship from Chilean society.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"10 1","pages":"29 - 68"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000102","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47593153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000105
Carlos M. Lisoni
How do political parties guarantee enforcement of a clientelistic exchange? This research note empirically supports a catalog of clientelism compliance enforcement tactics. It also suggests that by focusing on the personalization of tactics and the constraints they place on individual voters, we can evaluate how intrusive these tactics are and further help to bridge existing instrumentalist and reciprocity theories of client compliance. The supporting evidence comes from interviews carried out with 73 elected Argentine local and provincial officials. How persuasive or coercive the tactics need to be to make clients comply with their part of the bargain has implications for our understanding of the legitimacy of the clientelistic bondage and our assessment of the roles of patrons and brokers in such exchanges.
{"title":"Persuasion and Coercion in the Clientelistic Exchange: A Survey of Four Argentine Provinces","authors":"Carlos M. Lisoni","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000105","url":null,"abstract":"How do political parties guarantee enforcement of a clientelistic exchange? This research note empirically supports a catalog of clientelism compliance enforcement tactics. It also suggests that by focusing on the personalization of tactics and the constraints they place on individual voters, we can evaluate how intrusive these tactics are and further help to bridge existing instrumentalist and reciprocity theories of client compliance. The supporting evidence comes from interviews carried out with 73 elected Argentine local and provincial officials. How persuasive or coercive the tactics need to be to make clients comply with their part of the bargain has implications for our understanding of the legitimacy of the clientelistic bondage and our assessment of the roles of patrons and brokers in such exchanges.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"10 1","pages":"133 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000105","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47936653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000103
Catherine Reyes-Housholder
Latin America has elected more female presidents than any other region in the world, yet dominant theories on campaigning tend to ignore gender. In addressing this lacuna, this article argues that the widespread belief that women are better at mobilizing women means that female candidates tend to invest more significant effort into cultivating a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity. In contrast, male candidates tend to delegate women-mobilization tasks to female surrogates. An analysis of approximately 1,000 newspaper articles reveals that the “most different” female candidates in Chile and Brazil consistently met with female voters early in their campaigns, evoked gender identities and promised pro-women change. The “most different” male candidates enlisted their wives and female politicians to target women, defend their pro-women promises, and deflect accusations of sexism. The theory illuminates multiple ways in which viable female candidates’ entry into the political arena can improve women's representation.
{"title":"Women Mobilizing Women: Candidates’ Strategies for Winning the Presidency","authors":"Catherine Reyes-Housholder","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000103","url":null,"abstract":"Latin America has elected more female presidents than any other region in the world, yet dominant theories on campaigning tend to ignore gender. In addressing this lacuna, this article argues that the widespread belief that women are better at mobilizing women means that female candidates tend to invest more significant effort into cultivating a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity. In contrast, male candidates tend to delegate women-mobilization tasks to female surrogates. An analysis of approximately 1,000 newspaper articles reveals that the “most different” female candidates in Chile and Brazil consistently met with female voters early in their campaigns, evoked gender identities and promised pro-women change. The “most different” male candidates enlisted their wives and female politicians to target women, defend their pro-women promises, and deflect accusations of sexism. The theory illuminates multiple ways in which viable female candidates’ entry into the political arena can improve women's representation.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"10 1","pages":"69 - 97"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000103","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49044637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000101
Pablo Argote, Patricio D. Navia
It has been argued that close elections lead to policy convergence, as legislators elected by a small margin are more likely to adopt moderate policy positions (Downs 1957). However, Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) find that electoral competition does not affect legislators’ policy preferences in the United States, questioning the median voter paradigm. To help to discern this paradox, we estimate the effect of close elections on legislators’ subsequent policy positions under different electoral rules. With Chile's two-seat open-list proportional representation system, we exploit the dynamics of within-coalition competition to test both hypotheses. Using the margin of victory in 383 races in four different parliamentary elections and 3,741 roll-call votes for the 120-seat Chamber of Deputies from 1998 to 2014, we find that electoral competition did not lead to policy convergence under either the center-left Concertación coalition or the rightist Alianza coalition. We contend that policy convergence responds to electoral incentives but is also conditioned by the nature of the political regime (presidential or parliamentary) and government–opposition dynamics.
有人认为，接近的选举会导致政策趋同，因为以微弱优势当选的立法者更有可能采取温和的政策立场(Downs 1957)。然而，Lee, Moretti, and Butler(2004)发现选举竞争并不影响美国立法者的政策偏好，对中间选民范式提出了质疑。为了帮助辨别这一悖论，我们估计了在不同的选举规则下，接近的选举对立法者随后的政策立场的影响。以智利的两个席位开放名单比例代表制为例，我们利用联盟内部竞争的动态来检验这两个假设。利用1998年至2014年4次不同议会选举383个席位的胜差和众议院120个席位的3741张唱名票，我们发现无论是在中左翼的Concertación联盟还是右翼的Alianza联盟下，选举竞争都没有导致政策趋同。我们认为，政策趋同对选举激励作出反应，但也受到政治制度(总统或议会)和政府-反对派动态的性质的制约。
{"title":"Do Voters Affect Policies? Within-Coalition Competition in the Chilean Electoral System","authors":"Pablo Argote, Patricio D. Navia","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000101","url":null,"abstract":"It has been argued that close elections lead to policy convergence, as legislators elected by a small margin are more likely to adopt moderate policy positions (Downs 1957). However, Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) find that electoral competition does not affect legislators’ policy preferences in the United States, questioning the median voter paradigm. To help to discern this paradox, we estimate the effect of close elections on legislators’ subsequent policy positions under different electoral rules. With Chile's two-seat open-list proportional representation system, we exploit the dynamics of within-coalition competition to test both hypotheses. Using the margin of victory in 383 races in four different parliamentary elections and 3,741 roll-call votes for the 120-seat Chamber of Deputies from 1998 to 2014, we find that electoral competition did not lead to policy convergence under either the center-left Concertación coalition or the rightist Alianza coalition. We contend that policy convergence responds to electoral incentives but is also conditioned by the nature of the political regime (presidential or parliamentary) and government–opposition dynamics.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"10 1","pages":"28 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000101","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46531554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1801000104
J. Alves
One of the most significant recent changes in Brazilian politics is the inroads made by the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) and other leftist parties into state and municipal governments in the country's most conservative region, the Northeast. An important strand of literature argues that this is due to a transformative strategy anchored in institutional growth, which is based on opening local party directorates. In contrast, this analysis shows that the PT has made gains in the region by segmenting its strategy – that is, by focusing on two well-established political practices. First, the PT has leveraged executive office at higher levels of government (e.g., federal and state) in order to advance at lower levels (e.g., state and municipal). Second, it has constructed pragmatic alliances with opportunistic parties, thus revealing how the migration of opportunist politicians into allied parties allowed entrenched elites to remain in power. This suggests that the Left's subnational advances are less transformative than they seem and could potentially harm democratic consolidation.
巴西政治最近最重大的变化之一是工人党（PT，Partido dos Trabalhadores）和其他左翼政党进入该国最保守的东北部地区的州和市政府。一系列重要的文献认为，这是由于一种以制度发展为基础的变革战略，该战略以开放地方政党董事会为基础。相比之下，这一分析表明，PT通过细分其战略，即专注于两种公认的政治实践，在该地区取得了进展。首先，PT利用了政府高层（如联邦和州）的行政办公室，以在较低级别（如州和市）取得进展。其次，它与机会主义政党建立了务实的联盟，从而揭示了机会主义政客向联盟政党的迁移是如何让根深蒂固的精英继续掌权的。这表明，左派在国家以下各级的进步并不像看上去那么具有变革性，可能会损害民主巩固。
{"title":"Transformation or Substitution? The Workers’ Party and the Right in Northeast Brazil","authors":"J. Alves","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1801000104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000104","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most significant recent changes in Brazilian politics is the inroads made by the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) and other leftist parties into state and municipal governments in the country's most conservative region, the Northeast. An important strand of literature argues that this is due to a transformative strategy anchored in institutional growth, which is based on opening local party directorates. In contrast, this analysis shows that the PT has made gains in the region by segmenting its strategy – that is, by focusing on two well-established political practices. First, the PT has leveraged executive office at higher levels of government (e.g., federal and state) in order to advance at lower levels (e.g., state and municipal). Second, it has constructed pragmatic alliances with opportunistic parties, thus revealing how the migration of opportunist politicians into allied parties allowed entrenched elites to remain in power. This suggests that the Left's subnational advances are less transformative than they seem and could potentially harm democratic consolidation.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"10 1","pages":"132 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1801000104","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44793260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1700900305
Omar Sánchez-Sibony
This article presents the case for steering clear of electoral outcome-based regime classifications. It advocates focusing instead on the systemic character of the formal and informal institutions that govern access to power as a more appropriate way to draw electoral regime boundaries. The case study of Ecuador under the presidency of Rafael Correa is offered as an example of this approach. Both electoral outcomes under Correísmo (2006–2017) as well as the procedural context in which elections occurred are examined. But the regime is here analyzed and categorized on a procedural-centered basis. The analysis of the slope of the playing field in the electoral arena reveals that political competition was fundamentally unfair, placing the regime in the competitive authoritarian category. This conclusion is reached on grounds of the incumbent's capture of the electoral management body, as well as highly discriminatory electoral laws drawn by the incumbent, among many other factors that rendered Ecuadorean electoral contests unfair.
{"title":"Classifying Ecuador's Regime under Correa: A Procedural Approach","authors":"Omar Sánchez-Sibony","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1700900305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1700900305","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents the case for steering clear of electoral outcome-based regime classifications. It advocates focusing instead on the systemic character of the formal and informal institutions that govern access to power as a more appropriate way to draw electoral regime boundaries. The case study of Ecuador under the presidency of Rafael Correa is offered as an example of this approach. Both electoral outcomes under Correísmo (2006–2017) as well as the procedural context in which elections occurred are examined. But the regime is here analyzed and categorized on a procedural-centered basis. The analysis of the slope of the playing field in the electoral arena reveals that political competition was fundamentally unfair, placing the regime in the competitive authoritarian category. This conclusion is reached on grounds of the incumbent's capture of the electoral management body, as well as highly discriminatory electoral laws drawn by the incumbent, among many other factors that rendered Ecuadorean electoral contests unfair.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"9 1","pages":"121 - 140"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1700900305","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42068652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1700900303
Adrián Lucardi, María Gabriela Almaraz
How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform because this precludes the executive from playing a “divide-and-rule” strategy. We examine these claims with data from the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2017. In line with expectations, the results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the executive's party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform and this party expects to do well in the next executive election.
{"title":"With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017","authors":"Adrián Lucardi, María Gabriela Almaraz","doi":"10.1177/1866802X1700900303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1700900303","url":null,"abstract":"How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform because this precludes the executive from playing a “divide-and-rule” strategy. We examine these claims with data from the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2017. In line with expectations, the results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the executive's party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform and this party expects to do well in the next executive election.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"9 1","pages":"49 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X1700900303","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42130634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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