Pub Date : 2020-12-15DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20975036
Nordin Lazreg, A. Angel, Denis Saint-martin
Conventional wisdom indicates that politicians in Latin America are all wealthy. However, the literature on both political elites and social origins of political parties indicates that we should expect differences in the capital accumulation of politicians depending on their ideological position. This study seeks to explore that question using financial disclosure forms made available in six Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. We calculate the median wealth of the main political parties in each country and compared them according to their ideological position on the left–right continuum. We consistently find that the most right-leaning party in each country had a higher median wealth than the most left-leaning one. This relation is non-linear since centrist parties often represent anomalies in the distribution of wealth. When there are no ideological differences, we do not observe significant wealth differences either.
{"title":"Are They All the Same? The Distribution of Personal Wealth Between the Left and the Right in Latin America","authors":"Nordin Lazreg, A. Angel, Denis Saint-martin","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20975036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20975036","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom indicates that politicians in Latin America are all wealthy. However, the literature on both political elites and social origins of political parties indicates that we should expect differences in the capital accumulation of politicians depending on their ideological position. This study seeks to explore that question using financial disclosure forms made available in six Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. We calculate the median wealth of the main political parties in each country and compared them according to their ideological position on the left–right continuum. We consistently find that the most right-leaning party in each country had a higher median wealth than the most left-leaning one. This relation is non-linear since centrist parties often represent anomalies in the distribution of wealth. When there are no ideological differences, we do not observe significant wealth differences either.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"13 1","pages":"67 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20975036","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47051600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-02DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20967733
Lucas Perelló, Patricio D. Navia
Studies on party system change in Latin America commonly label similar processes as constituting dealignment or realignment. To clarify the boundaries between both concepts, we distinguish between abrupt and gradual realignments. While both imply change, they differ in the number of election cycles involved. Abrupt realignments occur in a single election cycle, while gradual realignments take place in two or more. We apply this conceptualisation to Costa Rica, Latin America’s longest-running democracy, and a country where the party system has decayed without collapsing. To better identify the type of change that has taken place, we use canton-level election data from 1958 to 2018 and public opinion surveys from 1978 to 2018. The evidence contests the notion of electoral dealignment. Instead, we show that the party system experienced an abrupt realignment in the 2002 election and gradual realignment in more recent election cycles.
{"title":"Abrupt and Gradual Realignments: The Case of Costa Rica, 1958–2018","authors":"Lucas Perelló, Patricio D. Navia","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20967733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20967733","url":null,"abstract":"Studies on party system change in Latin America commonly label similar processes as constituting dealignment or realignment. To clarify the boundaries between both concepts, we distinguish between abrupt and gradual realignments. While both imply change, they differ in the number of election cycles involved. Abrupt realignments occur in a single election cycle, while gradual realignments take place in two or more. We apply this conceptualisation to Costa Rica, Latin America’s longest-running democracy, and a country where the party system has decayed without collapsing. To better identify the type of change that has taken place, we use canton-level election data from 1958 to 2018 and public opinion surveys from 1978 to 2018. The evidence contests the notion of electoral dealignment. Instead, we show that the party system experienced an abrupt realignment in the 2002 election and gradual realignment in more recent election cycles.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"13 1","pages":"86 - 113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20967733","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43024359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20965585
Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, J. Mccoy, Jelena Subotić
Transforming armed groups into legitimate political actors is often considered an ideal way to settle armed internal conflicts. In democracies, the efficacy of such approaches depends on the public legitimacy that the citizenry grants them. How does the prospect of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC’s) political participation influence citizens’ support for the peace process? This study addresses this question by triangulating evidence from three separate studies: (1) regression analysis using face-to-face nationally representative survey data, as well as (2) a vignette experiment and (3) a conjoint analysis, both conducted online with national samples of Colombians. Though methodologically distinct, each analysis converges on a singular conclusion: mass support for the integration of ex-FARC guerrillas into democratic politics damaged support for negotiated peace, often to similar or greater degrees than mass support for transitional justice mechanisms. We suspect this reflects citizens’ fear of undermining democratic representation, the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and electoral integrity.
{"title":"Pitfall to Peace: FARC’s Political Participation and Mass Support for Peace Talks in Colombia","authors":"Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, J. Mccoy, Jelena Subotić","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20965585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20965585","url":null,"abstract":"Transforming armed groups into legitimate political actors is often considered an ideal way to settle armed internal conflicts. In democracies, the efficacy of such approaches depends on the public legitimacy that the citizenry grants them. How does the prospect of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC’s) political participation influence citizens’ support for the peace process? This study addresses this question by triangulating evidence from three separate studies: (1) regression analysis using face-to-face nationally representative survey data, as well as (2) a vignette experiment and (3) a conjoint analysis, both conducted online with national samples of Colombians. Though methodologically distinct, each analysis converges on a singular conclusion: mass support for the integration of ex-FARC guerrillas into democratic politics damaged support for negotiated peace, often to similar or greater degrees than mass support for transitional justice mechanisms. We suspect this reflects citizens’ fear of undermining democratic representation, the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and electoral integrity.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"12 1","pages":"323 - 344"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20965585","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46266317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20970805
Miguel García-Sánchez, Ryan E. Carlin
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BYNC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 License (https:// creativecommons. org/ licenses/ bync/ 4. 0/) which permits noncommercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https:// us. sagepub. com/ enus/ nam/ openaccessatsage). The FARC in the Public Eye: Negotiation, Integration, and Political Participation
{"title":"The FARC in the Public Eye: Negotiation, Integration, and Political Participation","authors":"Miguel García-Sánchez, Ryan E. Carlin","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20970805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20970805","url":null,"abstract":"Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BYNC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 License (https:// creativecommons. org/ licenses/ bync/ 4. 0/) which permits noncommercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https:// us. sagepub. com/ enus/ nam/ openaccessatsage). The FARC in the Public Eye: Negotiation, Integration, and Political Participation","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"12 1","pages":"239 - 251"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20970805","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41885292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20963282
Miguel García-Sánchez, Juan Camilo Plata-Caviedes
Political participation of former combatants is a central component of peace agreements. Similarly, people’s acceptance of political parties derived from such agreements is a crucial element towards peace building. Considering the peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), we ask “What factors shape popular support for the FARC’s political involvement?” We argue that attitudes towards the political integration of the former guerrilla are influenced by conflict experiences and partisan identities. Relying on survey data, our results indicate that conflict experiences and political identities alone are not correlated with attitudes towards the political integration of former insurgents. However, public support for former combatants having a political party is associated with conflict experiences only for those who feel close to parties that took a hawkish stance towards the agreement.
{"title":"Between Conflict and Politics: Understanding Popular Support for the FARC’s Political Involvement","authors":"Miguel García-Sánchez, Juan Camilo Plata-Caviedes","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20963282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20963282","url":null,"abstract":"Political participation of former combatants is a central component of peace agreements. Similarly, people’s acceptance of political parties derived from such agreements is a crucial element towards peace building. Considering the peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), we ask “What factors shape popular support for the FARC’s political involvement?” We argue that attitudes towards the political integration of the former guerrilla are influenced by conflict experiences and partisan identities. Relying on survey data, our results indicate that conflict experiences and political identities alone are not correlated with attitudes towards the political integration of former insurgents. However, public support for former combatants having a political party is associated with conflict experiences only for those who feel close to parties that took a hawkish stance towards the agreement.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"12 1","pages":"277 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20963282","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43536694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20959509
Sandra Botero
Research on the determinants of institutional trust in courts that are part of transitional justice frameworks is scarce. This article relies on experimental evidence to explore whether features of the case and the ruling play a role in citizens’ attitudes towards the Justicia Especial para la Paz, Colombia’s transitional justice tribunal. I evaluate whether the profile of the accused and whether or not he is sentenced to the most lenient of restorative justice measures have an effect on trust. I find that support for the decision is lower for restorative sentences than for more punitive sentences, and that whether or not the acussed was a former guerrilla combatant or a member of the military does not influence evaluations. This research contributes to our understanding of how citizens in countries dealing with the aftermath of violence perceive the institutions devised to adjudicate on the atrocities of conflict.
{"title":"Trust in Colombia’s Justicia Especial Para La Paz: Experimental Evidence","authors":"Sandra Botero","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20959509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20959509","url":null,"abstract":"Research on the determinants of institutional trust in courts that are part of transitional justice frameworks is scarce. This article relies on experimental evidence to explore whether features of the case and the ruling play a role in citizens’ attitudes towards the Justicia Especial para la Paz, Colombia’s transitional justice tribunal. I evaluate whether the profile of the accused and whether or not he is sentenced to the most lenient of restorative justice measures have an effect on trust. I find that support for the decision is lower for restorative sentences than for more punitive sentences, and that whether or not the acussed was a former guerrilla combatant or a member of the military does not influence evaluations. This research contributes to our understanding of how citizens in countries dealing with the aftermath of violence perceive the institutions devised to adjudicate on the atrocities of conflict.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"12 1","pages":"300 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20959509","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45862899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20960281
Ana María Montoya, J. Tellez
Efforts to end civil wars via negotiations often generate sharp divisions in public opinion. A large, quantitative literature has found evidence for numerous variables serving as potential drivers of public support of and opposition to conflict negotiations. Yet the formation of policy preferences is a complex process, and while many factors might make small contributions to an individual’s conflict termination preferences, we lack a sense of which factors matter most or how to adjudicate among competing explanations. In this article, we leverage a large amount of nationally representative survey data from Colombia (2004–2015) and use machine learning tools to systematically explore which variables are the strongest predictors of public support for negotiations with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). We find that certain aspects of conflict exposure, individual values bearing on justice and punishment, and belief in the efficacy of the state are among the strongest predictors of negotiation preferences, while many conventionally important variables in the literature have little predictive power. The results have implications for scholars seeking to understand broad drivers of (dis)satisfaction with negotiations and shed light on the polarising Colombian peace process.
{"title":"Who Wants Peace? Predicting Civilian Preferences in Conflict Negotiations","authors":"Ana María Montoya, J. Tellez","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20960281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20960281","url":null,"abstract":"Efforts to end civil wars via negotiations often generate sharp divisions in public opinion. A large, quantitative literature has found evidence for numerous variables serving as potential drivers of public support of and opposition to conflict negotiations. Yet the formation of policy preferences is a complex process, and while many factors might make small contributions to an individual’s conflict termination preferences, we lack a sense of which factors matter most or how to adjudicate among competing explanations. In this article, we leverage a large amount of nationally representative survey data from Colombia (2004–2015) and use machine learning tools to systematically explore which variables are the strongest predictors of public support for negotiations with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). We find that certain aspects of conflict exposure, individual values bearing on justice and punishment, and belief in the efficacy of the state are among the strongest predictors of negotiation preferences, while many conventionally important variables in the literature have little predictive power. The results have implications for scholars seeking to understand broad drivers of (dis)satisfaction with negotiations and shed light on the polarising Colombian peace process.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"12 1","pages":"252 - 276"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20960281","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45628001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20959501
B. Ames, Ignacio Mamone
Transitions from authoritarianism and breakdowns of democracy have long been central puzzles for scholars of Latin American politics. Because structural explanations have proved to be weak, recent work has emphasised political agency. This strand of research is promising, but major questions remain unanswered: Who are the key actors driving regime change? How do their individual preferences affect transitions and breakdowns? This article focuses on three central members of the political elite: presidents, opposition leaders, and military commanders. These actors develop unique preferences about regimes and unique degrees of radicalism regarding their preferred policies; in turn, these preferences and radicalism affect the probabilities of regime change. Testing the argument in 20 nations between 1945 and 2010, we find that an average measure of preferences masks crucial distinctions in the chain of regime change. Transitions to a competitive regime are more likely when autocrats have low intrinsic commitments to dictatorship. The survival of democracies hinges on whether top military officials develop pro-democratic preferences. The role of executive preferences, by contrast, is moderated by the attachments and radicalism of opposition leaders. Next, we examine how structural contexts shape both preferences and political outcomes, finding that economic development shapes both the emergence of preferences and radicalism and their impacts on regime change. Our findings improve the validity of political agency theories and reconcile the roles of actors with the environments in which regimes emerge and fall.
{"title":"Agency and Structure in Latin American Regime Change","authors":"B. Ames, Ignacio Mamone","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20959501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20959501","url":null,"abstract":"Transitions from authoritarianism and breakdowns of democracy have long been central puzzles for scholars of Latin American politics. Because structural explanations have proved to be weak, recent work has emphasised political agency. This strand of research is promising, but major questions remain unanswered: Who are the key actors driving regime change? How do their individual preferences affect transitions and breakdowns? This article focuses on three central members of the political elite: presidents, opposition leaders, and military commanders. These actors develop unique preferences about regimes and unique degrees of radicalism regarding their preferred policies; in turn, these preferences and radicalism affect the probabilities of regime change. Testing the argument in 20 nations between 1945 and 2010, we find that an average measure of preferences masks crucial distinctions in the chain of regime change. Transitions to a competitive regime are more likely when autocrats have low intrinsic commitments to dictatorship. The survival of democracies hinges on whether top military officials develop pro-democratic preferences. The role of executive preferences, by contrast, is moderated by the attachments and radicalism of opposition leaders. Next, we examine how structural contexts shape both preferences and political outcomes, finding that economic development shapes both the emergence of preferences and radicalism and their impacts on regime change. Our findings improve the validity of political agency theories and reconcile the roles of actors with the environments in which regimes emerge and fall.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"13 1","pages":"5 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20959501","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48730314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20942780
Rodrigo M. Nunes
Latin American democracies have developed institutions to empower citizens against the state. This article brings attention to an often overlooked, but key, actor in these processes: the legal complex. I argue that the content of reforms designed to strengthen the rule of law partially reflects the interests of politically influential collective legal actors. Political influence is defined as a function of alliances with civil society and embeddedness within decision-making arenas of the state. To develop this argument, the article analyses the slow building of Brazil’s Public Defenders’ Office (PDO). I argue that the office’s initial institutional weakness resulted from defenders’ fragile political position relative to that of prosecutors and the bar during Brazil’s constitutional transition. Its eventual strengthening sixteen years later resulted from changes to the legal complex alliance in its favour, the formation of connections between defenders and civil society, and increased PDO access to policymaking spaces.
{"title":"Access to Justice and the Legal Complex: Building a Public Defenders’ Office in Brazil","authors":"Rodrigo M. Nunes","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20942780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20942780","url":null,"abstract":"Latin American democracies have developed institutions to empower citizens against the state. This article brings attention to an often overlooked, but key, actor in these processes: the legal complex. I argue that the content of reforms designed to strengthen the rule of law partially reflects the interests of politically influential collective legal actors. Political influence is defined as a function of alliances with civil society and embeddedness within decision-making arenas of the state. To develop this argument, the article analyses the slow building of Brazil’s Public Defenders’ Office (PDO). I argue that the office’s initial institutional weakness resulted from defenders’ fragile political position relative to that of prosecutors and the bar during Brazil’s constitutional transition. Its eventual strengthening sixteen years later resulted from changes to the legal complex alliance in its favour, the formation of connections between defenders and civil society, and increased PDO access to policymaking spaces.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"12 1","pages":"155 - 176"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20942780","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48986102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20939233
Juvenal J. Cortés
Direct democracy (DD) – including initiatives and referendums – is increasingly used by citizens and governments to establish new policies around the world. Although framed as a tool that benefits citizens, it is also common for government actors, including parties, to utilise DD in initiating and pushing through new policies. To explain this puzzling development, existing research examines the regulative design of DD. Going a step further, this article explains how the design of DD originates. Using process tracing methodology, I examine the case of Mexico – the most recent adopter of DD in 2014 – and illustrate how, when, and how DD can be used and modified. I argue that DD is endogenous: we cannot conceive of it independently of the political forces that generated it. Other prominent cases, such as Uruguay, suggest that DD was adopted to pursue party goals or to shape a particular government structure. Legislatures certainly provide the masses the option of engaging in DD but they do so on their own terms.
{"title":"Endogenous Direct Democracy: The Case of Mexico","authors":"Juvenal J. Cortés","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20939233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20939233","url":null,"abstract":"Direct democracy (DD) – including initiatives and referendums – is increasingly used by citizens and governments to establish new policies around the world. Although framed as a tool that benefits citizens, it is also common for government actors, including parties, to utilise DD in initiating and pushing through new policies. To explain this puzzling development, existing research examines the regulative design of DD. Going a step further, this article explains how the design of DD originates. Using process tracing methodology, I examine the case of Mexico – the most recent adopter of DD in 2014 – and illustrate how, when, and how DD can be used and modified. I argue that DD is endogenous: we cannot conceive of it independently of the political forces that generated it. Other prominent cases, such as Uruguay, suggest that DD was adopted to pursue party goals or to shape a particular government structure. Legislatures certainly provide the masses the option of engaging in DD but they do so on their own terms.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":"12 1","pages":"200 - 218"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20939233","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44089439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}