Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20963282
Miguel García-Sánchez, Juan Camilo Plata-Caviedes
Political participation of former combatants is a central component of peace agreements. Similarly, people’s acceptance of political parties derived from such agreements is a crucial element towards peace building. Considering the peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), we ask “What factors shape popular support for the FARC’s political involvement?” We argue that attitudes towards the political integration of the former guerrilla are influenced by conflict experiences and partisan identities. Relying on survey data, our results indicate that conflict experiences and political identities alone are not correlated with attitudes towards the political integration of former insurgents. However, public support for former combatants having a political party is associated with conflict experiences only for those who feel close to parties that took a hawkish stance towards the agreement.
{"title":"Between Conflict and Politics: Understanding Popular Support for the FARC’s Political Involvement","authors":"Miguel García-Sánchez, Juan Camilo Plata-Caviedes","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20963282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20963282","url":null,"abstract":"Political participation of former combatants is a central component of peace agreements. Similarly, people’s acceptance of political parties derived from such agreements is a crucial element towards peace building. Considering the peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), we ask “What factors shape popular support for the FARC’s political involvement?” We argue that attitudes towards the political integration of the former guerrilla are influenced by conflict experiences and partisan identities. Relying on survey data, our results indicate that conflict experiences and political identities alone are not correlated with attitudes towards the political integration of former insurgents. However, public support for former combatants having a political party is associated with conflict experiences only for those who feel close to parties that took a hawkish stance towards the agreement.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20963282","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43536694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20970805
Miguel García-Sánchez, Ryan E. Carlin
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BYNC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 License (https:// creativecommons. org/ licenses/ bync/ 4. 0/) which permits noncommercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https:// us. sagepub. com/ enus/ nam/ openaccessatsage). The FARC in the Public Eye: Negotiation, Integration, and Political Participation
{"title":"The FARC in the Public Eye: Negotiation, Integration, and Political Participation","authors":"Miguel García-Sánchez, Ryan E. Carlin","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20970805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20970805","url":null,"abstract":"Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BYNC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 License (https:// creativecommons. org/ licenses/ bync/ 4. 0/) which permits noncommercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https:// us. sagepub. com/ enus/ nam/ openaccessatsage). The FARC in the Public Eye: Negotiation, Integration, and Political Participation","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20970805","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41885292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20965585
Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, J. Mccoy, Jelena Subotić
Transforming armed groups into legitimate political actors is often considered an ideal way to settle armed internal conflicts. In democracies, the efficacy of such approaches depends on the public legitimacy that the citizenry grants them. How does the prospect of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC’s) political participation influence citizens’ support for the peace process? This study addresses this question by triangulating evidence from three separate studies: (1) regression analysis using face-to-face nationally representative survey data, as well as (2) a vignette experiment and (3) a conjoint analysis, both conducted online with national samples of Colombians. Though methodologically distinct, each analysis converges on a singular conclusion: mass support for the integration of ex-FARC guerrillas into democratic politics damaged support for negotiated peace, often to similar or greater degrees than mass support for transitional justice mechanisms. We suspect this reflects citizens’ fear of undermining democratic representation, the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and electoral integrity.
{"title":"Pitfall to Peace: FARC’s Political Participation and Mass Support for Peace Talks in Colombia","authors":"Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, J. Mccoy, Jelena Subotić","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20965585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20965585","url":null,"abstract":"Transforming armed groups into legitimate political actors is often considered an ideal way to settle armed internal conflicts. In democracies, the efficacy of such approaches depends on the public legitimacy that the citizenry grants them. How does the prospect of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC’s) political participation influence citizens’ support for the peace process? This study addresses this question by triangulating evidence from three separate studies: (1) regression analysis using face-to-face nationally representative survey data, as well as (2) a vignette experiment and (3) a conjoint analysis, both conducted online with national samples of Colombians. Though methodologically distinct, each analysis converges on a singular conclusion: mass support for the integration of ex-FARC guerrillas into democratic politics damaged support for negotiated peace, often to similar or greater degrees than mass support for transitional justice mechanisms. We suspect this reflects citizens’ fear of undermining democratic representation, the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and electoral integrity.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20965585","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46266317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20959509
Sandra Botero
Research on the determinants of institutional trust in courts that are part of transitional justice frameworks is scarce. This article relies on experimental evidence to explore whether features of the case and the ruling play a role in citizens’ attitudes towards the Justicia Especial para la Paz, Colombia’s transitional justice tribunal. I evaluate whether the profile of the accused and whether or not he is sentenced to the most lenient of restorative justice measures have an effect on trust. I find that support for the decision is lower for restorative sentences than for more punitive sentences, and that whether or not the acussed was a former guerrilla combatant or a member of the military does not influence evaluations. This research contributes to our understanding of how citizens in countries dealing with the aftermath of violence perceive the institutions devised to adjudicate on the atrocities of conflict.
{"title":"Trust in Colombia’s Justicia Especial Para La Paz: Experimental Evidence","authors":"Sandra Botero","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20959509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20959509","url":null,"abstract":"Research on the determinants of institutional trust in courts that are part of transitional justice frameworks is scarce. This article relies on experimental evidence to explore whether features of the case and the ruling play a role in citizens’ attitudes towards the Justicia Especial para la Paz, Colombia’s transitional justice tribunal. I evaluate whether the profile of the accused and whether or not he is sentenced to the most lenient of restorative justice measures have an effect on trust. I find that support for the decision is lower for restorative sentences than for more punitive sentences, and that whether or not the acussed was a former guerrilla combatant or a member of the military does not influence evaluations. This research contributes to our understanding of how citizens in countries dealing with the aftermath of violence perceive the institutions devised to adjudicate on the atrocities of conflict.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20959509","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45862899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20960281
Ana María Montoya, J. Tellez
Efforts to end civil wars via negotiations often generate sharp divisions in public opinion. A large, quantitative literature has found evidence for numerous variables serving as potential drivers of public support of and opposition to conflict negotiations. Yet the formation of policy preferences is a complex process, and while many factors might make small contributions to an individual’s conflict termination preferences, we lack a sense of which factors matter most or how to adjudicate among competing explanations. In this article, we leverage a large amount of nationally representative survey data from Colombia (2004–2015) and use machine learning tools to systematically explore which variables are the strongest predictors of public support for negotiations with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). We find that certain aspects of conflict exposure, individual values bearing on justice and punishment, and belief in the efficacy of the state are among the strongest predictors of negotiation preferences, while many conventionally important variables in the literature have little predictive power. The results have implications for scholars seeking to understand broad drivers of (dis)satisfaction with negotiations and shed light on the polarising Colombian peace process.
{"title":"Who Wants Peace? Predicting Civilian Preferences in Conflict Negotiations","authors":"Ana María Montoya, J. Tellez","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20960281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20960281","url":null,"abstract":"Efforts to end civil wars via negotiations often generate sharp divisions in public opinion. A large, quantitative literature has found evidence for numerous variables serving as potential drivers of public support of and opposition to conflict negotiations. Yet the formation of policy preferences is a complex process, and while many factors might make small contributions to an individual’s conflict termination preferences, we lack a sense of which factors matter most or how to adjudicate among competing explanations. In this article, we leverage a large amount of nationally representative survey data from Colombia (2004–2015) and use machine learning tools to systematically explore which variables are the strongest predictors of public support for negotiations with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). We find that certain aspects of conflict exposure, individual values bearing on justice and punishment, and belief in the efficacy of the state are among the strongest predictors of negotiation preferences, while many conventionally important variables in the literature have little predictive power. The results have implications for scholars seeking to understand broad drivers of (dis)satisfaction with negotiations and shed light on the polarising Colombian peace process.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20960281","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45628001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20959501
B. Ames, Ignacio Mamone
Transitions from authoritarianism and breakdowns of democracy have long been central puzzles for scholars of Latin American politics. Because structural explanations have proved to be weak, recent work has emphasised political agency. This strand of research is promising, but major questions remain unanswered: Who are the key actors driving regime change? How do their individual preferences affect transitions and breakdowns? This article focuses on three central members of the political elite: presidents, opposition leaders, and military commanders. These actors develop unique preferences about regimes and unique degrees of radicalism regarding their preferred policies; in turn, these preferences and radicalism affect the probabilities of regime change. Testing the argument in 20 nations between 1945 and 2010, we find that an average measure of preferences masks crucial distinctions in the chain of regime change. Transitions to a competitive regime are more likely when autocrats have low intrinsic commitments to dictatorship. The survival of democracies hinges on whether top military officials develop pro-democratic preferences. The role of executive preferences, by contrast, is moderated by the attachments and radicalism of opposition leaders. Next, we examine how structural contexts shape both preferences and political outcomes, finding that economic development shapes both the emergence of preferences and radicalism and their impacts on regime change. Our findings improve the validity of political agency theories and reconcile the roles of actors with the environments in which regimes emerge and fall.
{"title":"Agency and Structure in Latin American Regime Change","authors":"B. Ames, Ignacio Mamone","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20959501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20959501","url":null,"abstract":"Transitions from authoritarianism and breakdowns of democracy have long been central puzzles for scholars of Latin American politics. Because structural explanations have proved to be weak, recent work has emphasised political agency. This strand of research is promising, but major questions remain unanswered: Who are the key actors driving regime change? How do their individual preferences affect transitions and breakdowns? This article focuses on three central members of the political elite: presidents, opposition leaders, and military commanders. These actors develop unique preferences about regimes and unique degrees of radicalism regarding their preferred policies; in turn, these preferences and radicalism affect the probabilities of regime change. Testing the argument in 20 nations between 1945 and 2010, we find that an average measure of preferences masks crucial distinctions in the chain of regime change. Transitions to a competitive regime are more likely when autocrats have low intrinsic commitments to dictatorship. The survival of democracies hinges on whether top military officials develop pro-democratic preferences. The role of executive preferences, by contrast, is moderated by the attachments and radicalism of opposition leaders. Next, we examine how structural contexts shape both preferences and political outcomes, finding that economic development shapes both the emergence of preferences and radicalism and their impacts on regime change. Our findings improve the validity of political agency theories and reconcile the roles of actors with the environments in which regimes emerge and fall.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20959501","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48730314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20942780
Rodrigo M. Nunes
Latin American democracies have developed institutions to empower citizens against the state. This article brings attention to an often overlooked, but key, actor in these processes: the legal complex. I argue that the content of reforms designed to strengthen the rule of law partially reflects the interests of politically influential collective legal actors. Political influence is defined as a function of alliances with civil society and embeddedness within decision-making arenas of the state. To develop this argument, the article analyses the slow building of Brazil’s Public Defenders’ Office (PDO). I argue that the office’s initial institutional weakness resulted from defenders’ fragile political position relative to that of prosecutors and the bar during Brazil’s constitutional transition. Its eventual strengthening sixteen years later resulted from changes to the legal complex alliance in its favour, the formation of connections between defenders and civil society, and increased PDO access to policymaking spaces.
{"title":"Access to Justice and the Legal Complex: Building a Public Defenders’ Office in Brazil","authors":"Rodrigo M. Nunes","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20942780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20942780","url":null,"abstract":"Latin American democracies have developed institutions to empower citizens against the state. This article brings attention to an often overlooked, but key, actor in these processes: the legal complex. I argue that the content of reforms designed to strengthen the rule of law partially reflects the interests of politically influential collective legal actors. Political influence is defined as a function of alliances with civil society and embeddedness within decision-making arenas of the state. To develop this argument, the article analyses the slow building of Brazil’s Public Defenders’ Office (PDO). I argue that the office’s initial institutional weakness resulted from defenders’ fragile political position relative to that of prosecutors and the bar during Brazil’s constitutional transition. Its eventual strengthening sixteen years later resulted from changes to the legal complex alliance in its favour, the formation of connections between defenders and civil society, and increased PDO access to policymaking spaces.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20942780","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48986102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20939233
Juvenal J. Cortés
Direct democracy (DD) – including initiatives and referendums – is increasingly used by citizens and governments to establish new policies around the world. Although framed as a tool that benefits citizens, it is also common for government actors, including parties, to utilise DD in initiating and pushing through new policies. To explain this puzzling development, existing research examines the regulative design of DD. Going a step further, this article explains how the design of DD originates. Using process tracing methodology, I examine the case of Mexico – the most recent adopter of DD in 2014 – and illustrate how, when, and how DD can be used and modified. I argue that DD is endogenous: we cannot conceive of it independently of the political forces that generated it. Other prominent cases, such as Uruguay, suggest that DD was adopted to pursue party goals or to shape a particular government structure. Legislatures certainly provide the masses the option of engaging in DD but they do so on their own terms.
{"title":"Endogenous Direct Democracy: The Case of Mexico","authors":"Juvenal J. Cortés","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20939233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20939233","url":null,"abstract":"Direct democracy (DD) – including initiatives and referendums – is increasingly used by citizens and governments to establish new policies around the world. Although framed as a tool that benefits citizens, it is also common for government actors, including parties, to utilise DD in initiating and pushing through new policies. To explain this puzzling development, existing research examines the regulative design of DD. Going a step further, this article explains how the design of DD originates. Using process tracing methodology, I examine the case of Mexico – the most recent adopter of DD in 2014 – and illustrate how, when, and how DD can be used and modified. I argue that DD is endogenous: we cannot conceive of it independently of the political forces that generated it. Other prominent cases, such as Uruguay, suggest that DD was adopted to pursue party goals or to shape a particular government structure. Legislatures certainly provide the masses the option of engaging in DD but they do so on their own terms.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20939233","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44089439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20944184
Octavio Amorim Neto, A. Malamud
When do presidents delegate policy-making authority to their foreign ministries? And is foreign policy unique in this respect? We posit that six international, national, and personal factors determine the opportunity and motivation of presidents to delegate, and then analyse the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in 1946–2015. By applying fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, we find that four combinations of factors are sufficient paths to delegation: (1) international stability and elite consensus on foreign policy; (2) international stability, right-wing president, and low diplomatic professionalisation; (3) international stability, right-wing president, and low presidential expertise on foreign policy; or (4) absence of authoritarianism combined with elite consensus on foreign policy and right-wing president. Our study of foreign ministries reinforces some of the main findings of the scholarly literature on other ministries, thus challenging the view of foreign policy-making as different from domestic policy areas.
{"title":"Presidential Delegation to Foreign Ministries: A Study of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (1946–2015)","authors":"Octavio Amorim Neto, A. Malamud","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20944184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20944184","url":null,"abstract":"When do presidents delegate policy-making authority to their foreign ministries? And is foreign policy unique in this respect? We posit that six international, national, and personal factors determine the opportunity and motivation of presidents to delegate, and then analyse the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in 1946–2015. By applying fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, we find that four combinations of factors are sufficient paths to delegation: (1) international stability and elite consensus on foreign policy; (2) international stability, right-wing president, and low diplomatic professionalisation; (3) international stability, right-wing president, and low presidential expertise on foreign policy; or (4) absence of authoritarianism combined with elite consensus on foreign policy and right-wing president. Our study of foreign ministries reinforces some of the main findings of the scholarly literature on other ministries, thus challenging the view of foreign policy-making as different from domestic policy areas.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20944184","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47673783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1866802X20937713
Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, Ulises Beltrán
This research conducted list experiments to estimate the percentage of respondents who received electoral gifts during the 2015 legislative and the 2015 and 2017 subnational campaigns in Mexico. Consistent with recent studies on sensitive survey techniques, our research finds that list experiments seem to methodologically work better among more sophisticated voters (e.g. those with higher levels of education). Such findings suggest that previous studies that rely on list experiments tend to underestimate the percentage of voters who receive electoral gifts since this technique tends to work better among respondents who are, in fact, least likely to be targeted by clientelistic strategies. Given levels of education in the region, we suggest that research solely relying on list experiments approach its empirical findings with caution.
{"title":"List Experiments, Political Sophistication, and Vote Buying: Experimental Evidence from Mexico","authors":"Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, Ulises Beltrán","doi":"10.1177/1866802X20937713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20937713","url":null,"abstract":"This research conducted list experiments to estimate the percentage of respondents who received electoral gifts during the 2015 legislative and the 2015 and 2017 subnational campaigns in Mexico. Consistent with recent studies on sensitive survey techniques, our research finds that list experiments seem to methodologically work better among more sophisticated voters (e.g. those with higher levels of education). Such findings suggest that previous studies that rely on list experiments tend to underestimate the percentage of voters who receive electoral gifts since this technique tends to work better among respondents who are, in fact, least likely to be targeted by clientelistic strategies. Given levels of education in the region, we suggest that research solely relying on list experiments approach its empirical findings with caution.","PeriodicalId":44885,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Politics in Latin America","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1866802X20937713","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46784431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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