Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2018.1516388
Hummera Saleem, Wen Jiandong, Muhammad Bilal Khan
Abstract The main objective of this study is to investigate the major determinants for corruptions in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) using provincial panel data from 1998 to 2012 through the fixed effects and Instrumental Variables (IV) method. This paper uniquely considers the impacts of economic policy uncertainty on corruption in China. The study identified that the level of corruption has a positive relationship with the factors such as Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), uncertainty, economic development, public sector employees, size of provincial population and income inequality. And it was found that corruption has no correlation with salaries of public employees, women’s enrollment, anticorruption efforts, technological development, media and education. The study suggests that women’s enrollment is pretty unique, which depresses corruption in China. Further, it reveals the impact of technological development to reduce the rent-seeking activities. This study shows that there is a positive relationship between uncertainty and the level of corruption. The increase of uncertainty would lead to distract economic agents and economic drivers. The study suggests initiating serious economic and political reforms, since the level of corruption marginally decreases the economic growth of the country. Further, it emphasizes that the necessity of a regular framework to know how and why corruption saturates on the pillars of the state to succeed in anti-corruption policies.
{"title":"Determinants of corruption in China: a policy perspective","authors":"Hummera Saleem, Wen Jiandong, Muhammad Bilal Khan","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2018.1516388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2018.1516388","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The main objective of this study is to investigate the major determinants for corruptions in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) using provincial panel data from 1998 to 2012 through the fixed effects and Instrumental Variables (IV) method. This paper uniquely considers the impacts of economic policy uncertainty on corruption in China. The study identified that the level of corruption has a positive relationship with the factors such as Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), uncertainty, economic development, public sector employees, size of provincial population and income inequality. And it was found that corruption has no correlation with salaries of public employees, women’s enrollment, anticorruption efforts, technological development, media and education. The study suggests that women’s enrollment is pretty unique, which depresses corruption in China. Further, it reveals the impact of technological development to reduce the rent-seeking activities. This study shows that there is a positive relationship between uncertainty and the level of corruption. The increase of uncertainty would lead to distract economic agents and economic drivers. The study suggests initiating serious economic and political reforms, since the level of corruption marginally decreases the economic growth of the country. Further, it emphasizes that the necessity of a regular framework to know how and why corruption saturates on the pillars of the state to succeed in anti-corruption policies.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"297 - 321"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2018.1516388","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41407461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2018.1554737
B. Adhikary, K. Kutsuna, Jiakang Xu
Abstract This paper extended the works of Wruck in 1989, and Hertzel and Smith in 1993 by incorporating the effects of corporate reputation on shareholders’ gains and market discounts in private equity placements (PEPs) taking data from the Chinese markets. Results demonstrate that corporate reputation significantly influences the shareholder’s gains in PEPs. Besides, factors such as market discounts, offering percentage, and connected transactions are positively related to the announcement effects whereas changes in ownership concentration negate the shareholders’ returns. By contrast, market discounts show a negative association with reputation status, indicating that reputation serves as a mitigating factor for resolving a firm’s undervaluation problem. These findings expect to help greatly to the managerial decision of PEP issuers in an emerging market.
{"title":"Corporate reputation, shareholders’ gains, and market discounts: evidence from the private equity placement in China","authors":"B. Adhikary, K. Kutsuna, Jiakang Xu","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2018.1554737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2018.1554737","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extended the works of Wruck in 1989, and Hertzel and Smith in 1993 by incorporating the effects of corporate reputation on shareholders’ gains and market discounts in private equity placements (PEPs) taking data from the Chinese markets. Results demonstrate that corporate reputation significantly influences the shareholder’s gains in PEPs. Besides, factors such as market discounts, offering percentage, and connected transactions are positively related to the announcement effects whereas changes in ownership concentration negate the shareholders’ returns. By contrast, market discounts show a negative association with reputation status, indicating that reputation serves as a mitigating factor for resolving a firm’s undervaluation problem. These findings expect to help greatly to the managerial decision of PEP issuers in an emerging market.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"273 - 296"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2018.1554737","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45893108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-26DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1783824
Shuqin Xu, Zhonghua Guo
Abstract With reference to the heads of departments of moral education (HDMEs) in Shanghai’s junior secondary schools, this paper explores middle leaders’ logics for leading school-organized extra-curricular activities (SEAs). This qualitative study, guided by Woulfin’s lived logic framework, found that the interviewed HDMEs actively reinterpreted the institutional logics with three logics—expressive, instrumental, and hierarchical—by manipulating policy circulation, responding to the performative accountability and micropolitics in the hierarchy, and using correlative thinking. The lived logics of leading SEAs reveal that, as heads of a marginalized department in schools, the HDMEs struggled to seek visibility by using correlative thinking, promoting the importance of their work, and aligning with more helpful senior leaders. The study responds to theories on school middle leadership and implementation logic. It could deepen our understanding of the paradoxes in China’s development and governance, especially in areas concerning both measurable performance and unmeasurable issues (e.g. ideology and sustainable development).
{"title":"Middle leaders’ triple logics for leading school-organized extra-curriculum activities: evidence from Shanghai’s junior secondary schools","authors":"Shuqin Xu, Zhonghua Guo","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2020.1783824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1783824","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With reference to the heads of departments of moral education (HDMEs) in Shanghai’s junior secondary schools, this paper explores middle leaders’ logics for leading school-organized extra-curricular activities (SEAs). This qualitative study, guided by Woulfin’s lived logic framework, found that the interviewed HDMEs actively reinterpreted the institutional logics with three logics—expressive, instrumental, and hierarchical—by manipulating policy circulation, responding to the performative accountability and micropolitics in the hierarchy, and using correlative thinking. The lived logics of leading SEAs reveal that, as heads of a marginalized department in schools, the HDMEs struggled to seek visibility by using correlative thinking, promoting the importance of their work, and aligning with more helpful senior leaders. The study responds to theories on school middle leadership and implementation logic. It could deepen our understanding of the paradoxes in China’s development and governance, especially in areas concerning both measurable performance and unmeasurable issues (e.g. ideology and sustainable development).","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"8 1","pages":"399 - 417"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2020.1783824","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60123585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-25DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1765453
Shengyu Fan, Tianyu Zhang, Mengyao Li
Abstract The truncated decision-making of China’s public policy process will inevitably lead to palpable bargaining during implementation. However, there are few concerns and researches at present focus on bargaining intensity between government and social actors. Therefore, the Credibility Thesis is introduced to the policy process in this paper, and the differences of credibility perceived by the public, grassroots government and intermediate government are supposed to reflect the bargaining intensity among them. Based on the adjustability of policy targets and credibility differences, policy implementation is divided into eight types to explain diverse situations more systemically and effectively during policy implementation. Besides, taking prohibition of open burning of crop straw policy (POBSP) as an example, this paper measures the changes of credibility at three points of time during policy implementation and analyzes the bargaining situation among farmers and multi-level governments. The case study proves the applicability of the theoretical framework of the policy implementation based on credibility thesis. It can show the feedback procedure and mechanism of policy implementation, and provide a new perspective for the policy analysis and improving policy performance.
{"title":"The credibility and bargaining during the process of policy implementation—a case study of China’s prohibition of open burning of crop straw policy","authors":"Shengyu Fan, Tianyu Zhang, Mengyao Li","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2020.1765453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1765453","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The truncated decision-making of China’s public policy process will inevitably lead to palpable bargaining during implementation. However, there are few concerns and researches at present focus on bargaining intensity between government and social actors. Therefore, the Credibility Thesis is introduced to the policy process in this paper, and the differences of credibility perceived by the public, grassroots government and intermediate government are supposed to reflect the bargaining intensity among them. Based on the adjustability of policy targets and credibility differences, policy implementation is divided into eight types to explain diverse situations more systemically and effectively during policy implementation. Besides, taking prohibition of open burning of crop straw policy (POBSP) as an example, this paper measures the changes of credibility at three points of time during policy implementation and analyzes the bargaining situation among farmers and multi-level governments. The case study proves the applicability of the theoretical framework of the policy implementation based on credibility thesis. It can show the feedback procedure and mechanism of policy implementation, and provide a new perspective for the policy analysis and improving policy performance.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"6 1","pages":"283 - 306"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2020.1765453","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48343157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-03DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1772537
Godfrey Yeung
Abstract After the initial public offerings of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) in 2005–2010, the transformation of the property structure blurred the conventional boundaries between public and private property in China while the state continued to play an important role in the regulation and operation of this ‘hybrid property’: the mixed public-private ownership structure adopted for previously wholly SOCBs. It is could be that the perceived lending bias against private enterprises was a rational decision made by SOCBs in China, partly due to the high transaction costs of risk evaluation and the lack of any formal channels to mitigate the credit risks of such loans. The hybrid nature of SOCBs property rights makes them a credible and convenient channel for the state to provide counter-cyclical lending to contain any exogenous (economic) shocks that might occur as well as long-term financial support for development purposes in the transitional economy and thus contribute to socio-economic and political stability in China. Instead of a stumbling block for economic reforms in China, as posited by the conventional institutional analysts, the ambiguous property rights of SOCBs and their practice of offering favourable loan conditions to state-owned enterprises could actually contribute to their profitability and thus the continuity of hybrid property banking systems and their credibility in China.
{"title":"Chinese state-owned commercial banks in reform: inefficient and yet credible and functional?","authors":"Godfrey Yeung","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2020.1772537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1772537","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After the initial public offerings of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) in 2005–2010, the transformation of the property structure blurred the conventional boundaries between public and private property in China while the state continued to play an important role in the regulation and operation of this ‘hybrid property’: the mixed public-private ownership structure adopted for previously wholly SOCBs. It is could be that the perceived lending bias against private enterprises was a rational decision made by SOCBs in China, partly due to the high transaction costs of risk evaluation and the lack of any formal channels to mitigate the credit risks of such loans. The hybrid nature of SOCBs property rights makes them a credible and convenient channel for the state to provide counter-cyclical lending to contain any exogenous (economic) shocks that might occur as well as long-term financial support for development purposes in the transitional economy and thus contribute to socio-economic and political stability in China. Instead of a stumbling block for economic reforms in China, as posited by the conventional institutional analysts, the ambiguous property rights of SOCBs and their practice of offering favourable loan conditions to state-owned enterprises could actually contribute to their profitability and thus the continuity of hybrid property banking systems and their credibility in China.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"6 1","pages":"198 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2020.1772537","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46791847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-03DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1769539
S. J. Balla, Zhoudan Xie
Abstract This article compares government transparency and public participation in policymaking across China and the United States. The analysis specifically focuses on the notice and comment process—government announcement of proposed policies and solicitation of public feedback—at the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The MOC and EPA are leading organizations in the implementation of such consultation in their respective countries. Information is collected and coded for hundreds of draft regulations and thousands of public comments that occurred during the 2002–2016 period. Statistical analysis of levels of, and variation in, transparency and participation demonstrates both similarities and differences in the operation of the notice and comment process at the MOC and EPA. Transparency and participation are generally lower at the MOC than in EPA consultations. Within such constraints, however, there is evidence of standardization in the administration of consultation by the MOC. These findings suggest that differences in the Chinese and U.S. political systems, rather than issues of administrative capacity, are the primary limitations of consultation as a policymaking innovation in contemporary China.
{"title":"Consultation as policymaking innovation: comparing government transparency and public participation in China and the United States","authors":"S. J. Balla, Zhoudan Xie","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2020.1769539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1769539","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article compares government transparency and public participation in policymaking across China and the United States. The analysis specifically focuses on the notice and comment process—government announcement of proposed policies and solicitation of public feedback—at the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The MOC and EPA are leading organizations in the implementation of such consultation in their respective countries. Information is collected and coded for hundreds of draft regulations and thousands of public comments that occurred during the 2002–2016 period. Statistical analysis of levels of, and variation in, transparency and participation demonstrates both similarities and differences in the operation of the notice and comment process at the MOC and EPA. Transparency and participation are generally lower at the MOC than in EPA consultations. Within such constraints, however, there is evidence of standardization in the administration of consultation by the MOC. These findings suggest that differences in the Chinese and U.S. political systems, rather than issues of administrative capacity, are the primary limitations of consultation as a policymaking innovation in contemporary China.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"525 - 545"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2020.1769539","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48488244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-18DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1762466
Nele Noesselt
Abstract Starting from the officially proclaimed readjustment of the People’s Republic of China’s national development road map, this article engages in a theory-guided evaluation of the country’s artificial intelligence (AI) strategy in connection with its smart city initiatives. The government’s official quest to steer China toward a ‘new mode of urbanization’ has, as this article argues, facilitated the rise of the country’s ‘sharing economy’/’platform economy’, with the mushrooming of a private AI economy offering ‘smart’ algorithm-optimized solutions to complex urban governance dilemmas. To (re)strengthen control and to cement central authority, the Chinese government has set out to regulate and standardize this emerging private platform economy sector—while also attempting not to interrupt the innovation drive of the Chinese AI landscape as such. This article argues that these regulation efforts, contrary to conventional top-down steering approaches, rely on central-local collaboration and network coordination that involves a number of multiple actors operating under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ of the central party-state.
{"title":"City brains and smart urbanization: regulating ‘sharing economy’ innovation in China","authors":"Nele Noesselt","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2020.1762466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1762466","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Starting from the officially proclaimed readjustment of the People’s Republic of China’s national development road map, this article engages in a theory-guided evaluation of the country’s artificial intelligence (AI) strategy in connection with its smart city initiatives. The government’s official quest to steer China toward a ‘new mode of urbanization’ has, as this article argues, facilitated the rise of the country’s ‘sharing economy’/’platform economy’, with the mushrooming of a private AI economy offering ‘smart’ algorithm-optimized solutions to complex urban governance dilemmas. To (re)strengthen control and to cement central authority, the Chinese government has set out to regulate and standardize this emerging private platform economy sector—while also attempting not to interrupt the innovation drive of the Chinese AI landscape as such. This article argues that these regulation efforts, contrary to conventional top-down steering approaches, rely on central-local collaboration and network coordination that involves a number of multiple actors operating under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ of the central party-state.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"546 - 567"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2020.1762466","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49665725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-13DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1760069
Jieling Liu, F. Gatzweiler
Abstract We aim to investigate the governance challenges of many Chinese urban governments to co-deliver migrant integration and urban green space provision. In specific, we examine the existing institutional arrangements applied in the Haizhu Wetland Park Project in Guangzhou and the consequential marginality. Why is it challenging for many urban governments to take social marginality into account in the conservation of urban green spaces? We approach this research question with the concepts of marginality, complex social-ecological systems, and institutional fit. We construct a conceptual framework to identify and explain the types of marginality emerged and to analyze the institutional fit in the case study. Our analysis reveals a segregative effect in the current institutional arrangements. On the one hand, they are cost-efficient in ecological restoration and urban green space conservation; on the other, not effective in addressing migrant integration and wellbeing. Current institutional arrangements segregate these two interconnected issues, leading to the marginalization of urban migrants. The current institutional segregativity reveals the degree of challenge to balance the pursuits between social equity and ecological benefits. For more collaborative and inclusive urban governance, future research is needed to understand whether the lacking integration of urban migrants is an institutional blind spot.
{"title":"The institutional challenge to co-deliver migrant integration and urban greening—evidence from Haizhu Wetland Park Project in Guangzhou, China","authors":"Jieling Liu, F. Gatzweiler","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2020.1760069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1760069","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We aim to investigate the governance challenges of many Chinese urban governments to co-deliver migrant integration and urban green space provision. In specific, we examine the existing institutional arrangements applied in the Haizhu Wetland Park Project in Guangzhou and the consequential marginality. Why is it challenging for many urban governments to take social marginality into account in the conservation of urban green spaces? We approach this research question with the concepts of marginality, complex social-ecological systems, and institutional fit. We construct a conceptual framework to identify and explain the types of marginality emerged and to analyze the institutional fit in the case study. Our analysis reveals a segregative effect in the current institutional arrangements. On the one hand, they are cost-efficient in ecological restoration and urban green space conservation; on the other, not effective in addressing migrant integration and wellbeing. Current institutional arrangements segregate these two interconnected issues, leading to the marginalization of urban migrants. The current institutional segregativity reveals the degree of challenge to balance the pursuits between social equity and ecological benefits. For more collaborative and inclusive urban governance, future research is needed to understand whether the lacking integration of urban migrants is an institutional blind spot.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"6 1","pages":"396 - 416"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2020.1760069","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45281874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-06DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1751947
Zhen Wang
Abstract In the Xi Jinping era of rising central power and reduced local autonomy, is there still room for policy experimentation? If any, what is the nature of this innovative behavior? This article argues that the party state still allows much room for policy innovation, only that this space for innovation is conditioned by the Party’s concern for political control. Drawing on original field research, the article examines two cases of the Chinese Communist Party’s innovation in personnel management, with a particular focus on reforming the Performance Evaluation System (PES) to better incentivize cadres to fulfill work targets. The analyses of the systemic changes of the PES resulting from the Party’s innovation efforts as well as the nature of such changes show that despite the Party’s tireless efforts to reinvent the PES regime so as to better motivate cadres to fulfill work targets, these efforts are undermined at the same time by the Party’s pursuit of bureaucratic stability, personnel control, and grip on power. The research seeks to bring findings about the PES into more meaningful conversations with the scholarship on policy innovation and experimentation.
{"title":"Seeking performance or control? Tethered party innovation in China’s performance evaluation system","authors":"Zhen Wang","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2020.1751947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1751947","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the Xi Jinping era of rising central power and reduced local autonomy, is there still room for policy experimentation? If any, what is the nature of this innovative behavior? This article argues that the party state still allows much room for policy innovation, only that this space for innovation is conditioned by the Party’s concern for political control. Drawing on original field research, the article examines two cases of the Chinese Communist Party’s innovation in personnel management, with a particular focus on reforming the Performance Evaluation System (PES) to better incentivize cadres to fulfill work targets. The analyses of the systemic changes of the PES resulting from the Party’s innovation efforts as well as the nature of such changes show that despite the Party’s tireless efforts to reinvent the PES regime so as to better motivate cadres to fulfill work targets, these efforts are undermined at the same time by the Party’s pursuit of bureaucratic stability, personnel control, and grip on power. The research seeks to bring findings about the PES into more meaningful conversations with the scholarship on policy innovation and experimentation.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"503 - 524"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2020.1751947","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48169625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-28DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2020.1746511
Meina Cai, Pengfei Liu, Hui Wang
Abstract This article examines how land commodification has changed the dynamics of hukou policy innovations in China. The increasing demand of local governments for land to fuel industrialization and urbanization creates appreciating land values, which in turn lead villagers to update their belief about the value associated with their rural hukou. This is perhaps especially the case in economically more developed areas where rural benefits, many of which involve land, induce villagers to value their rural hukou and to be more resistant against land expropriation. This leads local governments, many of which are fiscally dependent on land, to provide more generous land-taking compensation, including an urban hukou. Drawing on an original survey experiment, we find that villagers are less willing to give up their land and change their hukou status from rural to urban when they are not provided with pension benefits and when their collective yearly dividends are discontinued. Our findings suggest the difficulties in implementing the ‘land for hukou’ policy innovations in China.
{"title":"Land commodification and hukou policy innovation in China: evidence from a survey experiment","authors":"Meina Cai, Pengfei Liu, Hui Wang","doi":"10.1080/23812346.2020.1746511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1746511","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines how land commodification has changed the dynamics of hukou policy innovations in China. The increasing demand of local governments for land to fuel industrialization and urbanization creates appreciating land values, which in turn lead villagers to update their belief about the value associated with their rural hukou. This is perhaps especially the case in economically more developed areas where rural benefits, many of which involve land, induce villagers to value their rural hukou and to be more resistant against land expropriation. This leads local governments, many of which are fiscally dependent on land, to provide more generous land-taking compensation, including an urban hukou. Drawing on an original survey experiment, we find that villagers are less willing to give up their land and change their hukou status from rural to urban when they are not provided with pension benefits and when their collective yearly dividends are discontinued. Our findings suggest the difficulties in implementing the ‘land for hukou’ policy innovations in China.","PeriodicalId":45091,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Chinese Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"419 - 438"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23812346.2020.1746511","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48023210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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