Pub Date : 2021-02-04DOI: 10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.05
M. Davies, M. Coltheart
Abstract:The concept of abduction was extensively analyzed by the pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce more than a century ago. Modern philosophers typically treat abduction as being the same as “inference to the best explanation” and often even attribute this position to Peirce. But this was not his position. For him, abduction involved inference to any possible explanation. He was particularly concerned with how people respond to experiences they were not expecting by acquiring new beliefs which would make such experiences expected. We spell out the eight cognitive steps from unexpected experience to new belief that are implicit in Peirce’s work on abduction, and using a particular historical example we show how promising this theory of belief acquisition is. We identify two lacunae in this theory that will need to be filled in if we are to have a complete theory of how unexpected experiences (“surprising facts”) give rise to new beliefs.
{"title":"A Peircean Pathway from Surprising Facts to New Beliefs","authors":"M. Davies, M. Coltheart","doi":"10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.05","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The concept of abduction was extensively analyzed by the pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce more than a century ago. Modern philosophers typically treat abduction as being the same as “inference to the best explanation” and often even attribute this position to Peirce. But this was not his position. For him, abduction involved inference to any possible explanation. He was particularly concerned with how people respond to experiences they were not expecting by acquiring new beliefs which would make such experiences expected. We spell out the eight cognitive steps from unexpected experience to new belief that are implicit in Peirce’s work on abduction, and using a particular historical example we show how promising this theory of belief acquisition is. We identify two lacunae in this theory that will need to be filled in if we are to have a complete theory of how unexpected experiences (“surprising facts”) give rise to new beliefs.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89869120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-04DOI: 10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.02
Mark L. Johnson, J. Schulkin
Abstract:Our aesthetic sensibilities are the common currency that shapes every aspect of our experience. The term “aesthetic” does not refer merely to a particular type of experience, or even less to a specific type of mental judgment, but rather to all of the ongoing bodily and social processes by which we make and experience meaning. The aesthetic dimensions of the basic processes of life maintenance and enhancement are also operative in our higher activities of meaning-making, culminating in our most noteworthy artistic achievements. We develop a Deweyan aesthetics, supported by contemporary neuroscience, showing that aesthetics emerges from the organic processes of search for satisfaction and fulfillment, which are present in mundane experience as much as in high art. The profound truth of an aesthetics of everyday life is that appetitive search for consummatory moments of satisfaction characterizes our most basic life-sustaining activities, and these processes are equally present in extraordinary labor ripe with effort and consummation.
{"title":"The Common Currency of Our Aesthetic Sensibility","authors":"Mark L. Johnson, J. Schulkin","doi":"10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.02","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Our aesthetic sensibilities are the common currency that shapes every aspect of our experience. The term “aesthetic” does not refer merely to a particular type of experience, or even less to a specific type of mental judgment, but rather to all of the ongoing bodily and social processes by which we make and experience meaning. The aesthetic dimensions of the basic processes of life maintenance and enhancement are also operative in our higher activities of meaning-making, culminating in our most noteworthy artistic achievements. We develop a Deweyan aesthetics, supported by contemporary neuroscience, showing that aesthetics emerges from the organic processes of search for satisfaction and fulfillment, which are present in mundane experience as much as in high art. The profound truth of an aesthetics of everyday life is that appetitive search for consummatory moments of satisfaction characterizes our most basic life-sustaining activities, and these processes are equally present in extraordinary labor ripe with effort and consummation.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91211976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-04DOI: 10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.04
V. Colapietro
Abstract:What would happen to Peirce’s study of signs if we did not focus to such a great extent on such phenomena as a sunflower turning toward the sun, or a person knocking on a door, or the formation of a fossil, or even a string of sentences woven into a text such as a literary essay or scientific memoir, but rather preoccupied ourselves with such complex and open-ended phenomena as the history of a science (say, the science of biology)? Would this make any difference for how we (for example) conceive the object of semiosis? Moreover, do not the paradigmatic instances of the experimental sciences in which Peirce was most interested display their vitality as much as anywhere in the continual refashioning (at least, rethinking) of their most basic concepts? These are the questions with which the author of this essay concerns himself.
{"title":"An “Historicist” Reading of Peirce’s Pragmatist Semeiotic: A Pivotal Maxim and Evolving Practices","authors":"V. Colapietro","doi":"10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.04","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:What would happen to Peirce’s study of signs if we did not focus to such a great extent on such phenomena as a sunflower turning toward the sun, or a person knocking on a door, or the formation of a fossil, or even a string of sentences woven into a text such as a literary essay or scientific memoir, but rather preoccupied ourselves with such complex and open-ended phenomena as the history of a science (say, the science of biology)? Would this make any difference for how we (for example) conceive the object of semiosis? Moreover, do not the paradigmatic instances of the experimental sciences in which Peirce was most interested display their vitality as much as anywhere in the continual refashioning (at least, rethinking) of their most basic concepts? These are the questions with which the author of this essay concerns himself.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90788193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-04DOI: 10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.01
Rory Misiewicz
Abstract:This paper explores Peirce’s concept of analogy. I begin by arguing that he understands it along two main lines: (1) as a natural cognitive operation that discerns the resemblance of structural relations, pivotally signified by the diagram sign-class, and (2) as a “mixed” form of argument employing abduction, deduction, and induction. After exploring these two aspects, along with their interpenetration, I compare Peirce’s account of analogous reasoning with the highly influential view of the late-Medieval scholastic Thomas Cajetan. I argue that Peirce presents a superior approach because his diagrammatic logic renders a view that is methodologically open to further inquiry, explains that openness in terms of inference through sampling, and capaciously accepts a variety of potential determinations for any one analogy due to the objective vagueness of signs. Cajetan’s appeal to the irreducible proportionality of analogous thinking, on the other hand, excludes further explanation of analogy’s workings.
{"title":"Peirce on Analogy","authors":"Rory Misiewicz","doi":"10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.01","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This paper explores Peirce’s concept of analogy. I begin by arguing that he understands it along two main lines: (1) as a natural cognitive operation that discerns the resemblance of structural relations, pivotally signified by the diagram sign-class, and (2) as a “mixed” form of argument employing abduction, deduction, and induction. After exploring these two aspects, along with their interpenetration, I compare Peirce’s account of analogous reasoning with the highly influential view of the late-Medieval scholastic Thomas Cajetan. I argue that Peirce presents a superior approach because his diagrammatic logic renders a view that is methodologically open to further inquiry, explains that openness in terms of inference through sampling, and capaciously accepts a variety of potential determinations for any one analogy due to the objective vagueness of signs. Cajetan’s appeal to the irreducible proportionality of analogous thinking, on the other hand, excludes further explanation of analogy’s workings.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86275144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-04DOI: 10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.03
A. Wilson
Abstract:Most specialists agree that Peirce upholds his abstract definitions of reality and truth simultaneously and consistently with his pragmatic clarifications of those concepts. But some might assume that his pragmatic clarifications (the third grade of clearness) restrict the extensions of abstract definitions (the second grade of clearness), such that anything real must both be independent of what anyone thinks about it, per the abstract definition, and be an object of the would-be “final opinion”, per the pragmatic clarification. I call this reading Interpretive Dependence of the second grade of clearness on the third grade. In contrast, on Interpretive Independence, which I defend here, a concept can have a different extension on the second grade than it has on the third grade, such that it could be true, in a purely abstract sense, that there are realities that can never be known (metaphysical realism). “True” here must also be interpreted only according to an abstract definition, namely, one which Peirce endorses in 1906 and which, I argue, is a deflationary definition. Interpretive Independence not only allows Peirce to explain the intuitive appeal of metaphysical realism, while at the same time rejecting it, it also allows him to explain how there can be truths about fictional objects and truths in pure mathematics.
{"title":"Interpretation, Realism, and Truth: Is Peirce’s Second Grade of Clearness Independent of the Third?","authors":"A. Wilson","doi":"10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.03","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Most specialists agree that Peirce upholds his abstract definitions of reality and truth simultaneously and consistently with his pragmatic clarifications of those concepts. But some might assume that his pragmatic clarifications (the third grade of clearness) restrict the extensions of abstract definitions (the second grade of clearness), such that anything real must both be independent of what anyone thinks about it, per the abstract definition, and be an object of the would-be “final opinion”, per the pragmatic clarification. I call this reading Interpretive Dependence of the second grade of clearness on the third grade. In contrast, on Interpretive Independence, which I defend here, a concept can have a different extension on the second grade than it has on the third grade, such that it could be true, in a purely abstract sense, that there are realities that can never be known (metaphysical realism). “True” here must also be interpreted only according to an abstract definition, namely, one which Peirce endorses in 1906 and which, I argue, is a deflationary definition. Interpretive Independence not only allows Peirce to explain the intuitive appeal of metaphysical realism, while at the same time rejecting it, it also allows him to explain how there can be truths about fictional objects and truths in pure mathematics.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75889019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-04DOI: 10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.06
Michael G. Festl
Abstract:In this article I distinguish between a monistic and a dualistic interpretation of the history of pragmatism. The former emphasizes the continuities between Peirce, James, and Dewey whereas the latter assumes that there is a chasm between the positions of James and Dewey, on the one hand, and Peirce, on the other. This article assumes the monistic position. Based on this position, I advance a novel understanding of the history of pragmatism in the middle of the 20th century. It rejects the traditional view that pragmatism suffered an eclipse in that period and argues that we should actually split that period into two periods. The first period is dominated by the logical positivist account of C. I. Lewis and its pragmatic inclinations. I call this period “the dimming period of pragmatism.” The latter period is characterized by Quine’s and Sellars’s critiques of logical positivism as critiques in the spirit of pragmatism and made with tools from pragmatism. I call it the “supposed eclipse but actual demolition” period of pragmatism.
{"title":"Dimming, Eclipse, and Demolition: The Middle of the 20th Century in a Monistic Account of Pragmatism’s History","authors":"Michael G. Festl","doi":"10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.06","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this article I distinguish between a monistic and a dualistic interpretation of the history of pragmatism. The former emphasizes the continuities between Peirce, James, and Dewey whereas the latter assumes that there is a chasm between the positions of James and Dewey, on the one hand, and Peirce, on the other. This article assumes the monistic position. Based on this position, I advance a novel understanding of the history of pragmatism in the middle of the 20th century. It rejects the traditional view that pragmatism suffered an eclipse in that period and argues that we should actually split that period into two periods. The first period is dominated by the logical positivist account of C. I. Lewis and its pragmatic inclinations. I call this period “the dimming period of pragmatism.” The latter period is characterized by Quine’s and Sellars’s critiques of logical positivism as critiques in the spirit of pragmatism and made with tools from pragmatism. I call it the “supposed eclipse but actual demolition” period of pragmatism.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90930528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.3.09
Lauri Snellman
{"title":"PEIRCE AND RELIGION, BY ROGER WARD","authors":"Lauri Snellman","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.3.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.3.09","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48905712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.3.07
W. Park
{"title":"The Abductive Structure of Scientific Creativity: An Essay on the Ecology of Cognition by Lorenzo Magnani (review)","authors":"W. Park","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.3.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.3.07","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91250033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.3.08
Justin Pack
{"title":"THE PHILOSOPHIES OF AMERICA READER: FROM THE POPOL VOH TO THE PRESENT EDITED BY KIM DÍAZ AND MATHEW A. FOUST","authors":"Justin Pack","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.3.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.3.08","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48878765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.3.01
Giacomo Guidetti
Abstract:This paper offers a non-standard perspective on Peirce's notion of the Immediate Object, according to which this notion embodies the quantificational aspect of proposition-like signs. This viewpoint is supported by collecting evidence through the chronological analysis of the 1904–1909 manuscripts, in which the dichotomy of the Dynamic and Immediate object is developed. Moreover, it is shown how, after 1907, Peirce's semiotics is enriched by a new pragmatical sensitivity that brings forth a whole new framework and, consequently, a further evolution of the concept of the Immediate Object.
{"title":"On Peirce's Immediate Object","authors":"Giacomo Guidetti","doi":"10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.3.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.3.01","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This paper offers a non-standard perspective on Peirce's notion of the Immediate Object, according to which this notion embodies the quantificational aspect of proposition-like signs. This viewpoint is supported by collecting evidence through the chronological analysis of the 1904–1909 manuscripts, in which the dichotomy of the Dynamic and Immediate object is developed. Moreover, it is shown how, after 1907, Peirce's semiotics is enriched by a new pragmatical sensitivity that brings forth a whole new framework and, consequently, a further evolution of the concept of the Immediate Object.","PeriodicalId":45325,"journal":{"name":"TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90619720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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