Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a912746
Yao Wen
Abstract:China's party diplomacy—the Communist Party of China's own international outreach—has become an important component of China's foreign relations. Given Southeast Asia's strategic importance, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been proactively engaging political elites in the region. What are the immediate changes party diplomacy brings about for Southeast Asian actors, and how do they translate into long-term consequences? I propose a three-pronged framework to explore the local effects of China's party diplomacy, respectively, concerning exposure to ideas, the pursuit of interests, and the emergence of controversies. Drawing on a novel dataset and using illustrative cases of Vietnam, Singapore, Myanmar, and Malaysia, I show how the effects are contingent on the agency of Southeast Asian actors and domestic dynamics in each country. From the standpoint of Southeast Asian elites, engagement with the CPC could bring about ideational and material benefits, while domestic pushback, if any, is easy to deflect and tends to fade away over time. China's party diplomacy is best described as a moderate status quo multiplier that leads to noticeable changes without triggering structural shifts.
{"title":"Assessing Effects of China's Party Diplomacy vis-à-vis Southeast Asia: Ideas, Interests, and Controversies","authors":"Yao Wen","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a912746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a912746","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:China's party diplomacy—the Communist Party of China's own international outreach—has become an important component of China's foreign relations. Given Southeast Asia's strategic importance, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been proactively engaging political elites in the region. What are the immediate changes party diplomacy brings about for Southeast Asian actors, and how do they translate into long-term consequences? I propose a three-pronged framework to explore the local effects of China's party diplomacy, respectively, concerning exposure to ideas, the pursuit of interests, and the emergence of controversies. Drawing on a novel dataset and using illustrative cases of Vietnam, Singapore, Myanmar, and Malaysia, I show how the effects are contingent on the agency of Southeast Asian actors and domestic dynamics in each country. From the standpoint of Southeast Asian elites, engagement with the CPC could bring about ideational and material benefits, while domestic pushback, if any, is easy to deflect and tends to fade away over time. China's party diplomacy is best described as a moderate status quo multiplier that leads to noticeable changes without triggering structural shifts.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"75 1","pages":"579 - 602"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139344623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a912751
Shin Ae Hong
Abstract:This study analyzes the framing of protests against the Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), arguably one of the most significant and contentious contemporary movement events that occurred in South Korea. The anti-KORUS FTA protests have drawn the largest public, committed to challenging the hegemonic rhetoric of the Korean government's neoliberal policy initiatives, by asserting the trade deal as posing various social and economic ills to human life. Drawing on the combined framework of Gramscian analysis and the framing perspective, this study highlights the ways in which the anti-KORUS FTA protest activism exercises power by disseminating alternative discourse against the existing political condition. By examining a broad range of data, the study identifies three specific counter-hegemonic framings of collective action used by local civil society organizations to delegitimize the official discourse—'neoliberalism as the problem,' 'public accountability,' and 'national independence.'
{"title":"Counter-Hegemonic Resistance and Framing of the Anti–KORUS FTA Protests in South Korea","authors":"Shin Ae Hong","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a912751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a912751","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This study analyzes the framing of protests against the Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), arguably one of the most significant and contentious contemporary movement events that occurred in South Korea. The anti-KORUS FTA protests have drawn the largest public, committed to challenging the hegemonic rhetoric of the Korean government's neoliberal policy initiatives, by asserting the trade deal as posing various social and economic ills to human life. Drawing on the combined framework of Gramscian analysis and the framing perspective, this study highlights the ways in which the anti-KORUS FTA protest activism exercises power by disseminating alternative discourse against the existing political condition. By examining a broad range of data, the study identifies three specific counter-hegemonic framings of collective action used by local civil society organizations to delegitimize the official discourse—'neoliberalism as the problem,' 'public accountability,' and 'national independence.'","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"32 1","pages":"707 - 725"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139345111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905228
S. Radchenko
On February 4, 2022, during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brief visit to Beijing, he and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping gave their blessing to a joint statement. Even against the backdrop of increasingly close Sino-Russian relations, this statement raised eyebrows among seasoned experts. With its ideological underpinning—an emphasis on shared values, however vaguely construed, as well as shared interests— the statement suggested that the relationship was evolving toward something resembling an outright alliance, a scenario previously deemed improbable. China and Russia, with their divergent interests and ambitions, and potential areas of conflict in Central Asia and the Arctic, seemed best placed to maintain an alignment, with each side retaining considerable room for maneuver. Was this pragmatic alignment coming to an end, giving place to a new kind of partnership with much more tightly coordinated global postures, a partnership that, as the statement bravely proclaimed, was “without limits”? Before observers had a chance to fully digest the implications of the statement, Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine. We know today that he had not shared his plans with Xi Jinping, certainly not in any concrete form. Nevertheless, Putin’s very trip to China before the start of the invasion suggested, however wrongly, a degree of coordination or at least a meeting of minds between two ruthless authoritarians who had each made their relationship a lynchpin of China’s and Russia’s foreign policies. Russia soon became mired in a conflict Putin got badly wrong while Beijing struggled to accommodate Russia’s failings and extend a helping hand to Putin without triggering Western secondary sanctions that could have a very harmful impact on China’s economic interests. When Xi Jinping turned up in Moscow in March 2023—his first visit since the invasion—the language about the partnership “without limits” conspicuously disappeared from the joint documents: reality itself seemed to be dictating limits and constraining Putin’s and Xi’s ambitions. Xi’s visit only served to highlight Russia’s deepening international isolation. Having defiantly and purposefully burned all bridges with the West, the Russian leadership appeared direly in need of friends. China—
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"S. Radchenko","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905228","url":null,"abstract":"On February 4, 2022, during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brief visit to Beijing, he and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping gave their blessing to a joint statement. Even against the backdrop of increasingly close Sino-Russian relations, this statement raised eyebrows among seasoned experts. With its ideological underpinning—an emphasis on shared values, however vaguely construed, as well as shared interests— the statement suggested that the relationship was evolving toward something resembling an outright alliance, a scenario previously deemed improbable. China and Russia, with their divergent interests and ambitions, and potential areas of conflict in Central Asia and the Arctic, seemed best placed to maintain an alignment, with each side retaining considerable room for maneuver. Was this pragmatic alignment coming to an end, giving place to a new kind of partnership with much more tightly coordinated global postures, a partnership that, as the statement bravely proclaimed, was “without limits”? Before observers had a chance to fully digest the implications of the statement, Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine. We know today that he had not shared his plans with Xi Jinping, certainly not in any concrete form. Nevertheless, Putin’s very trip to China before the start of the invasion suggested, however wrongly, a degree of coordination or at least a meeting of minds between two ruthless authoritarians who had each made their relationship a lynchpin of China’s and Russia’s foreign policies. Russia soon became mired in a conflict Putin got badly wrong while Beijing struggled to accommodate Russia’s failings and extend a helping hand to Putin without triggering Western secondary sanctions that could have a very harmful impact on China’s economic interests. When Xi Jinping turned up in Moscow in March 2023—his first visit since the invasion—the language about the partnership “without limits” conspicuously disappeared from the joint documents: reality itself seemed to be dictating limits and constraining Putin’s and Xi’s ambitions. Xi’s visit only served to highlight Russia’s deepening international isolation. Having defiantly and purposefully burned all bridges with the West, the Russian leadership appeared direly in need of friends. China—","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"341 - 347"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47939458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905235
Muhui Zhang
Abstract:In this article, I investigate Korea's prudential environmental diplomacy with China regarding transboundary fine dust pollution from the perspective of Korea's disadvantageous position vis-à-vis China due to the ambiguity of pollution responsibilities and geopolitical constraints. Against this backdrop, Korea has tactically exercised prudential environmental diplomacy toward China in dual tracks. First, it has taken a "high-profile" stance in engaging with and socializing China into bilateral and multilateral frameworks and endeavors to align its environmental interests with those of China via scientific and technological cooperation. Second, Korea has undertaken a cautious procedure and is not pressuring China by pursuing legal-binding approaches immediately. I see a "mixed success" of Korea's environmental engagement with China and appraise Korea's policy flexibility and pragmatism.
{"title":"Cooperation on Transboundary Fine Dust: Revisiting Korea's Prudential Environmental Diplomacy Toward China and Its Policy Effectiveness","authors":"Muhui Zhang","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905235","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this article, I investigate Korea's prudential environmental diplomacy with China regarding transboundary fine dust pollution from the perspective of Korea's disadvantageous position vis-à-vis China due to the ambiguity of pollution responsibilities and geopolitical constraints. Against this backdrop, Korea has tactically exercised prudential environmental diplomacy toward China in dual tracks. First, it has taken a \"high-profile\" stance in engaging with and socializing China into bilateral and multilateral frameworks and endeavors to align its environmental interests with those of China via scientific and technological cooperation. Second, Korea has undertaken a cautious procedure and is not pressuring China by pursuing legal-binding approaches immediately. I see a \"mixed success\" of Korea's environmental engagement with China and appraise Korea's policy flexibility and pragmatism.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"489 - 511"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42796201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905236
Stephan Sonnenberg, Patricia Goedde
Abstract:This article explores how claims alleging serious human rights violations or breaches of international criminal law that occurred in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) might unfold in the courts of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) under various differing jurisdictional theories. South Korea has legislation allowing for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, an increasingly widespread judicial mechanism for a national court to hold alleged perpetrators of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations accountable for their actions regardless of where the crime was committed and regardless of the victim's or the perpetrator's nationality. In South Korea, domestic criminal and civil jurisdiction can conceivably be "stretched" to encompass crimes perpetrated on the northern half of the Korean peninsula due to a constitutional provision that denies the existence of a separate North Korean sovereign nation. This article introduces and compares the feasibility and challenges of various jurisdictional approaches in South Korea that could address human rights crimes in North Korea, specifically (a) universal jurisdiction prosecution based on domestic law, (b) domestic criminal prosecution, and (c) civil cases in tort.
{"title":"Accountability for Human Rights Crimes in North Korea: Jurisdictional Dilemmas in South Korea","authors":"Stephan Sonnenberg, Patricia Goedde","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905236","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article explores how claims alleging serious human rights violations or breaches of international criminal law that occurred in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) might unfold in the courts of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) under various differing jurisdictional theories. South Korea has legislation allowing for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, an increasingly widespread judicial mechanism for a national court to hold alleged perpetrators of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations accountable for their actions regardless of where the crime was committed and regardless of the victim's or the perpetrator's nationality. In South Korea, domestic criminal and civil jurisdiction can conceivably be \"stretched\" to encompass crimes perpetrated on the northern half of the Korean peninsula due to a constitutional provision that denies the existence of a separate North Korean sovereign nation. This article introduces and compares the feasibility and challenges of various jurisdictional approaches in South Korea that could address human rights crimes in North Korea, specifically (a) universal jurisdiction prosecution based on domestic law, (b) domestic criminal prosecution, and (c) civil cases in tort.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"513 - 541"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47606216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905230
A. Tagirova
Abstract:The Russian and Soviet governments believed the border to be a social and political construct. They often described and considered it as a foreign policy issue and a point of military vulnerability. In the course of 70 years of Sino-Russian relations since 1949, the border turned from a porous imperial fringe to a line of defense, a zone of economic growth, and a zone of economic anxiety. Throughout this evolution process, the Russian central government failed to grant agency to the local authorities and indigenous communities. The article argues that the current Russian federal government entrusts the local government with two conflicting goals in the borderlands: building strong cross-border ties and maintaining a "strong vertical of power" with top-down management and absolute supremacy of national security matters.
{"title":"Constructing a \"Border\" with China: The Russian Approach","authors":"A. Tagirova","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905230","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The Russian and Soviet governments believed the border to be a social and political construct. They often described and considered it as a foreign policy issue and a point of military vulnerability. In the course of 70 years of Sino-Russian relations since 1949, the border turned from a porous imperial fringe to a line of defense, a zone of economic growth, and a zone of economic anxiety. Throughout this evolution process, the Russian central government failed to grant agency to the local authorities and indigenous communities. The article argues that the current Russian federal government entrusts the local government with two conflicting goals in the borderlands: building strong cross-border ties and maintaining a \"strong vertical of power\" with top-down management and absolute supremacy of national security matters.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"371 - 392"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47459764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905233
Xin Zhang
Abstract:I examine how mutual perception and role expectation evolve over time between China and Russia on each other's position in the international system and on bilateral relations in the context of shifting perceptions of the "Big Triangle" between the United States, Russia, and China since the late 1990s. Building on Role Theory in international relations, I use official texts, and experts' opinions during a series of key policy episodes to demonstrate that constantly adjusting role expectations and role enactment has become an important part of official Sino-Russian inter-state relations. Such relations have evolved from a more conservative, mutual role expectation of "do-no-harm" to more proactive expectations of joint efforts and policy coordination. This changing role expectation comes along with mutual reassurance against role mismanagement when both seek to substantiate the role of "significant others" beyond traditional military allies. During the 2010s, Sino-Russian bilateral relations started to be increasingly shaped by a discussion about the salience of US-China-Russia "Big Triangle."
{"title":"\"Big Triangle\" No More? Role Expectation and Mutual Reassurance Between China and Russia in the Shifting US-China-Russia Relations","authors":"Xin Zhang","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905233","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:I examine how mutual perception and role expectation evolve over time between China and Russia on each other's position in the international system and on bilateral relations in the context of shifting perceptions of the \"Big Triangle\" between the United States, Russia, and China since the late 1990s. Building on Role Theory in international relations, I use official texts, and experts' opinions during a series of key policy episodes to demonstrate that constantly adjusting role expectations and role enactment has become an important part of official Sino-Russian inter-state relations. Such relations have evolved from a more conservative, mutual role expectation of \"do-no-harm\" to more proactive expectations of joint efforts and policy coordination. This changing role expectation comes along with mutual reassurance against role mismanagement when both seek to substantiate the role of \"significant others\" beyond traditional military allies. During the 2010s, Sino-Russian bilateral relations started to be increasingly shaped by a discussion about the salience of US-China-Russia \"Big Triangle.\"","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"443 - 465"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42268261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905234
Julie Babin
Abstract:After decades of international cooperative strategies based on soft power through Official Development Assistance (ODA), the environmental, socioeconomic, and political change in the circumpolar North has led Japan to develop and link its Arctic policy with its Oceanic policy. To respond to the rising influence of China in the geopolitical and geoeconomic scene, Japan's maritime policy is based on international peace and stability, freedom of navigation, and the support of the international legal framework. Beyond its regional sphere of interest and influence, the inclusion of the Arctic region in Japan's Oceanic policy is also strongly connected to the influence of think tanks, lobbies, and institutions in Japan's policies, that for decades have encouraged Tokyo to take proactive measures. This policy also illustrates the ambition to present a comprehensive panoramic strategy embracing not only seas and oceans directly surrounding Japan, but worldwide.
{"title":"The Arctic in Japan's Basic Plan on Ocean Policy: Toward a Comprehensive Free and Open Maritime Vision","authors":"Julie Babin","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905234","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:After decades of international cooperative strategies based on soft power through Official Development Assistance (ODA), the environmental, socioeconomic, and political change in the circumpolar North has led Japan to develop and link its Arctic policy with its Oceanic policy. To respond to the rising influence of China in the geopolitical and geoeconomic scene, Japan's maritime policy is based on international peace and stability, freedom of navigation, and the support of the international legal framework. Beyond its regional sphere of interest and influence, the inclusion of the Arctic region in Japan's Oceanic policy is also strongly connected to the influence of think tanks, lobbies, and institutions in Japan's policies, that for decades have encouraged Tokyo to take proactive measures. This policy also illustrates the ambition to present a comprehensive panoramic strategy embracing not only seas and oceans directly surrounding Japan, but worldwide.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"467 - 487"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43044763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905229
G. Rozman
Abstract:Expectations that the Ukraine war would revitalize Vladimir Putin's "Turn to the East" were not realized. He had sought to link Ukraine and Taiwan in a struggle for a new order. If Xi Jinping's "Beijing straddle" countered the Washington-led international order, it mostly complied with Western sanctions. Russia had claimed to be the coequal driver of the reordering of the East, but a war presumed to raise its stature in China had the opposite effect. The "Turn to the East" shifted further to a "turn toward China," and Xi determines the timing of the East-West confrontation. The war, coupled with anger over the victory of Yoon Suk-yeol, tilted Moscow further to North Korea over South Korea. Japan finally pulled the plug on Shinzo Abe's legacy of wooing Putin. Russia's turn to China played poorly in India, too, although it clung to cooperation in part to restrain a further shift. Even Russian hopes for ASEAN were set back. The war's impact in the East defied Putin's intentions.
{"title":"How Did the Ukraine War Change Putin's \"Turn to the East\"?","authors":"G. Rozman","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905229","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Expectations that the Ukraine war would revitalize Vladimir Putin's \"Turn to the East\" were not realized. He had sought to link Ukraine and Taiwan in a struggle for a new order. If Xi Jinping's \"Beijing straddle\" countered the Washington-led international order, it mostly complied with Western sanctions. Russia had claimed to be the coequal driver of the reordering of the East, but a war presumed to raise its stature in China had the opposite effect. The \"Turn to the East\" shifted further to a \"turn toward China,\" and Xi determines the timing of the East-West confrontation. The war, coupled with anger over the victory of Yoon Suk-yeol, tilted Moscow further to North Korea over South Korea. Japan finally pulled the plug on Shinzo Abe's legacy of wooing Putin. Russia's turn to China played poorly in India, too, although it clung to cooperation in part to restrain a further shift. Even Russian hopes for ASEAN were set back. The war's impact in the East defied Putin's intentions.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"349 - 370"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45125960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905231
M. Kaczmarski
Abstract:Observers tend to interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship in terms of strategic, purposeful cooperation driven by national interests and power-political considerations. The search for power and security, as well as balancing against the United States, have increasingly been pushing China and Russia closer together. The energy realm offers a distinct picture of the Sino-Russian relationship. The pace of cooperation has varied and depended on key domestic players in particular sectors. As a consequence, success stories have been accompanied by major setbacks. Energy cooperation encompasses both a meteoric rise of oil cooperation and the muddling through of gas cooperation. The foundations for close ties in the energy realm were laid well before the post-Crimean acceleration of Sino-Russian cooperation. More often than not, however, parochial interests of dominant state-owned and private enterprises rather than strategic considerations have driven this cooperation. Looking through the prism of energy cooperation, I emphasize the complexity of Russia and China as actors in international politics instead of approaching them as rational and unitary players.
{"title":"Fragmented Cooperation: The Role of State-Owned and Private Companies in Sino-Russian Energy Collaboration","authors":"M. Kaczmarski","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905231","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Observers tend to interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship in terms of strategic, purposeful cooperation driven by national interests and power-political considerations. The search for power and security, as well as balancing against the United States, have increasingly been pushing China and Russia closer together. The energy realm offers a distinct picture of the Sino-Russian relationship. The pace of cooperation has varied and depended on key domestic players in particular sectors. As a consequence, success stories have been accompanied by major setbacks. Energy cooperation encompasses both a meteoric rise of oil cooperation and the muddling through of gas cooperation. The foundations for close ties in the energy realm were laid well before the post-Crimean acceleration of Sino-Russian cooperation. More often than not, however, parochial interests of dominant state-owned and private enterprises rather than strategic considerations have driven this cooperation. Looking through the prism of energy cooperation, I emphasize the complexity of Russia and China as actors in international politics instead of approaching them as rational and unitary players.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"393 - 413"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47821947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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