Abstract:Leaders inside the United States have long tried to maintain favorable external conditions, especially in Eurasia, to protect or advance their domestic agendas. In recent decades, this connection between domestic politics and geopolitical conditions in the “Old World” has incentivized US leaders to pursue a pattern of never-ending military interventions. In turn, the material reality of perpetual engagement in Eurasian affairs has given rise to the pervasive idea that the United States is and must remain an indispensable guarantor of international order. However, these contemporary ideas of American Exceptionalism are dangerously mismatched with the emerging reality of a multipolar world system in which the United States has fewer opportunities to militarily intervene across Eurasia without risking significant repercussions.
{"title":"The Geopolitics of American Exceptionalism","authors":"P. Harris","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Leaders inside the United States have long tried to maintain favorable external conditions, especially in Eurasia, to protect or advance their domestic agendas. In recent decades, this connection between domestic politics and geopolitical conditions in the “Old World” has incentivized US leaders to pursue a pattern of never-ending military interventions. In turn, the material reality of perpetual engagement in Eurasian affairs has given rise to the pervasive idea that the United States is and must remain an indispensable guarantor of international order. However, these contemporary ideas of American Exceptionalism are dangerously mismatched with the emerging reality of a multipolar world system in which the United States has fewer opportunities to militarily intervene across Eurasia without risking significant repercussions.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"583 - 603"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46908097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:In this article we examine the ways in which middle power diplomacy (MPD) knowledge is produced in the South Korean IR community, specifically in the context of critical IR studies. In doing so, we attempt to address the questions of who produces MPD knowledge, why, for whom, and for what purposes, while also identifying the meta-theoretical underpinnings of MPD knowledge. Our critical review of the literature suggests that current South Korean MPD knowledge is a Korean version of hegemonic stability theory, which aims to secure the US liberal hegemony in world politics. We therefore argue that South Korean MPD knowledge may limit South Korea’s agency in IR as well as its scholarly thinking space for discerning novel ways of peacefully coexisting with others and sensing possible systemic transformations of global politics.
{"title":"Middle Power Diplomacy Knowledge Production in South Korea: A Critical Interpretation","authors":"I. Yoo, Y. Cho","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this article we examine the ways in which middle power diplomacy (MPD) knowledge is produced in the South Korean IR community, specifically in the context of critical IR studies. In doing so, we attempt to address the questions of who produces MPD knowledge, why, for whom, and for what purposes, while also identifying the meta-theoretical underpinnings of MPD knowledge. Our critical review of the literature suggests that current South Korean MPD knowledge is a Korean version of hegemonic stability theory, which aims to secure the US liberal hegemony in world politics. We therefore argue that South Korean MPD knowledge may limit South Korea’s agency in IR as well as its scholarly thinking space for discerning novel ways of peacefully coexisting with others and sensing possible systemic transformations of global politics.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"627 - 653"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41488424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:This article examines the realpolitik calculations behind China’s responses to General Min Aung Hlaing’s February 2021 coup d’etat in Myanmar. By seeking to play both sides of the unrest in Myanmar, Beijing hopes to ensure that it can count on a set of regional allies to serve China’s interests. By simultaneously strengthening friendly relations with the Tatmadaw regime and the ethnic minority communities and pro-reformist movements in the country, Beijing can maintain a façade of friendship with the junta, while concurrently strengthening Beijing’s influence over Myanmar’s internal political forces. This enables Beijing to signal that it would be unwise for the Tatmadaw to step out of line away from China’s interests.
{"title":"Sino-Myanmar Relations in the Aftermath of the February 2021 Coup in Naypyidaw: Continuation and Change in China’s Myanmar Policy","authors":"E. Tan, H. Yoo","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article examines the realpolitik calculations behind China’s responses to General Min Aung Hlaing’s February 2021 coup d’etat in Myanmar. By seeking to play both sides of the unrest in Myanmar, Beijing hopes to ensure that it can count on a set of regional allies to serve China’s interests. By simultaneously strengthening friendly relations with the Tatmadaw regime and the ethnic minority communities and pro-reformist movements in the country, Beijing can maintain a façade of friendship with the junta, while concurrently strengthening Beijing’s influence over Myanmar’s internal political forces. This enables Beijing to signal that it would be unwise for the Tatmadaw to step out of line away from China’s interests.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"681 - 706"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41650728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:China has been a proponent of global governance reform, but its reform strategy does not remain constant. In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, its political opportunities were depleting when dominant states, especially the United States, were recovering from the crisis. As a result, the promised 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform package failed to materialize under Beijing’s old reform strategy of making overt proposals. We argue that Beijing’s goal of the IMF reform was achieved through the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. To advance reform, the newly-created institution needs to have sufficient governance capacity to ensure its effectiveness, produce policy outcomes close to Beijing’s preferences, and operate in an issue area competing for resources with the established institution, the IMF, but not necessarily in the same issue area as is required by the literature of contested multilateralism.
{"title":"The Power of Building Parallel Institutions: How China’s New Strategy Advances Global Governance Reform","authors":"Yue Xu, Hongsong Liu","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:China has been a proponent of global governance reform, but its reform strategy does not remain constant. In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, its political opportunities were depleting when dominant states, especially the United States, were recovering from the crisis. As a result, the promised 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform package failed to materialize under Beijing’s old reform strategy of making overt proposals. We argue that Beijing’s goal of the IMF reform was achieved through the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. To advance reform, the newly-created institution needs to have sufficient governance capacity to ensure its effectiveness, produce policy outcomes close to Beijing’s preferences, and operate in an issue area competing for resources with the established institution, the IMF, but not necessarily in the same issue area as is required by the literature of contested multilateralism.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"707 - 731"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48166781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:This article examines the sources of corruption in authoritarian regimes, focusing on the effect of time variance on the level of corruption, personalist concentration of power, and the regime stability (ruler’s expectations for remaining in power). The Personalism Index developed by J. Wright and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Corruption Index were used in order to construct the panel data covering 2001–2010 for fifty-eight authoritarian states. The empirical findings show that authoritarian regimes with a higher personalist concentration are more prone to corruption, and that short sighted and vulnerable authoritarian regimes are more corrupt. From a policy perspective, the results suggest that reinforcing institutions which can impose political restrictions on top leaders from arbitrarily allocating resources via rent-seeking can be effective in curbing corruption in authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the results also indicate that an authoritarian leader with longer time horizon can implement the institutions which can improve economic performance, thus leading to lower levels of corruption.
{"title":"Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes: A Cross-Country Panel Data Analysis","authors":"Suehyun Jung","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article examines the sources of corruption in authoritarian regimes, focusing on the effect of time variance on the level of corruption, personalist concentration of power, and the regime stability (ruler’s expectations for remaining in power). The Personalism Index developed by J. Wright and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Corruption Index were used in order to construct the panel data covering 2001–2010 for fifty-eight authoritarian states. The empirical findings show that authoritarian regimes with a higher personalist concentration are more prone to corruption, and that short sighted and vulnerable authoritarian regimes are more corrupt. From a policy perspective, the results suggest that reinforcing institutions which can impose political restrictions on top leaders from arbitrarily allocating resources via rent-seeking can be effective in curbing corruption in authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the results also indicate that an authoritarian leader with longer time horizon can implement the institutions which can improve economic performance, thus leading to lower levels of corruption.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"733 - 753"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47581949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has remained stable despite frequent popular protests. Focusing on environmental protests, we attempt to explain how the CCP has utilized domestic news media to deal with protests and ensure regime stability. We chose five major protests against Para-Xylene (PX) and analyzed all of the People's Daily Online (PDO) articles thereon since 2007. From the Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping governments, PDO's collective portrayal of the anti-PX protests has dramatically changed from a symbol of democratic progress to an impediment to national industrialization and social stability. The systematically orchestrated media framing demonstrates that, instead of indiscriminately suppressing information on protests, the party has deliberately chosen when and what to permit and what images to project onto the protests. This article provides new insights into the CCP's media strategy for popular protest and sheds light on how China's authoritarian regime has maintained political legitimacy and social stability despite a considerable level of public discontent and deepening political oppression.
{"title":"Changing Frames: China's Media Strategy for Environmental Protests","authors":"Joo-Youn Jung, Ming Zeng","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has remained stable despite frequent popular protests. Focusing on environmental protests, we attempt to explain how the CCP has utilized domestic news media to deal with protests and ensure regime stability. We chose five major protests against Para-Xylene (PX) and analyzed all of the People's Daily Online (PDO) articles thereon since 2007. From the Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping governments, PDO's collective portrayal of the anti-PX protests has dramatically changed from a symbol of democratic progress to an impediment to national industrialization and social stability. The systematically orchestrated media framing demonstrates that, instead of indiscriminately suppressing information on protests, the party has deliberately chosen when and what to permit and what images to project onto the protests. This article provides new insights into the CCP's media strategy for popular protest and sheds light on how China's authoritarian regime has maintained political legitimacy and social stability despite a considerable level of public discontent and deepening political oppression.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"423 - 449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42801858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The purpose of this article is to explore what explains radicalization of migrant communities and their families in their home country. Contemporary scholarship on radicalization has identified a broad range of explanatory variables, such as poverty, discrimination and/or lack of social mobility, that have the capacity to push individuals toward violence and radical beliefs. Yet, there is still a significant gap in current literature over the question why entire ethnic or national migrant groups are more represented in radical groups than others despite similar experiences. Using the case of Tajik migrants in Russia this article posits that the legacy of collective grievances and cyclical, systemic injustices, rather than a specific or personal experience of discrimination or mistreatment, are more accurate in explaining radicalization. The article pays specific attention to the role of religious or social remittances and, given a shared set of experiences, the susceptibility of the migrant's own family in the home country to the same radical ideology—despite their never leaving their country's borders. The findings suggest that the home country context, the collective account of society, is a more substantial predictor of radicalization than reception alone.
{"title":"Expanding the Radicalization Framework: A Case Study of Tajik Migration to Russia","authors":"S. Vuković, India Boland","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The purpose of this article is to explore what explains radicalization of migrant communities and their families in their home country. Contemporary scholarship on radicalization has identified a broad range of explanatory variables, such as poverty, discrimination and/or lack of social mobility, that have the capacity to push individuals toward violence and radical beliefs. Yet, there is still a significant gap in current literature over the question why entire ethnic or national migrant groups are more represented in radical groups than others despite similar experiences. Using the case of Tajik migrants in Russia this article posits that the legacy of collective grievances and cyclical, systemic injustices, rather than a specific or personal experience of discrimination or mistreatment, are more accurate in explaining radicalization. The article pays specific attention to the role of religious or social remittances and, given a shared set of experiences, the susceptibility of the migrant's own family in the home country to the same radical ideology—despite their never leaving their country's borders. The findings suggest that the home country context, the collective account of society, is a more substantial predictor of radicalization than reception alone.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"473 - 500"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41844731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The architects of US strategy in Asia have advanced a bold vision for a "free and open Indo-Pacific" but have paid less attention to China's views and responses. This article surveys perceptions of Chinese strategists toward the Trump administration's regional approach, arguing that China's analytic community came to see US strategy as largely focused on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The most frequent Chinese prescription was a wedge strategy to weaken support for the United States among the other three Quad states: Japan, India, and Australia. Evidence from Chinese public diplomacy during the Trump years is consistent with such an approach. Yet the increase in assertive actions targeting the Quad partners revealed other impulses guiding policymakers and ultimately brought the four states more closely together. The Biden administration has an opportunity to leverage China's inability to successfully execute a wedge strategy to strengthen support for US influence and goals in the region.
{"title":"Chinese Perspectives on US Strategy in Asia, 2017–2021","authors":"Joel Wuthnow","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The architects of US strategy in Asia have advanced a bold vision for a \"free and open Indo-Pacific\" but have paid less attention to China's views and responses. This article surveys perceptions of Chinese strategists toward the Trump administration's regional approach, arguing that China's analytic community came to see US strategy as largely focused on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The most frequent Chinese prescription was a wedge strategy to weaken support for the United States among the other three Quad states: Japan, India, and Australia. Evidence from Chinese public diplomacy during the Trump years is consistent with such an approach. Yet the increase in assertive actions targeting the Quad partners revealed other impulses guiding policymakers and ultimately brought the four states more closely together. The Biden administration has an opportunity to leverage China's inability to successfully execute a wedge strategy to strengthen support for US influence and goals in the region.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"401 - 422"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48374900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The "rally-'round-the-flag effect" sparked by North Korea (the so-called 'Northern Wind') has been an important part of South Korean domestic politics. Despite the long history and controversy associated with politics of Northern Wind, the literature provides surprisingly little quantitative evidence on this phenomenon. In this study, we empirically investigate the relationship between North Korean-induced incidents and former President Park Geun-hye's weekly job approval ratings. Using vector autoregressions, we find that (1) President Park gained political benefits from North Korea, where negative events (e.g., armed attacks) generated a larger boost in approval than positive events (e.g., high-level talks); (2) rally effects varied across regions according to different perceptions of the North Korean regime: during security crisis, Park received the largest rallies in Gyeongnam province where the dominant image of North Korea was an 'enemy that threatens our safety'; and (3) a test of nuclear weapons or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) did not affect approval ratings even though it captured widespread media attention.
{"title":"The Benefit of the Wind: Testing the Rally Effect of North Korea Shocks during the Park Geun-hye Administration","authors":"H. Choi, Minjin Choi, D. M. Kwag","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The \"rally-'round-the-flag effect\" sparked by North Korea (the so-called 'Northern Wind') has been an important part of South Korean domestic politics. Despite the long history and controversy associated with politics of Northern Wind, the literature provides surprisingly little quantitative evidence on this phenomenon. In this study, we empirically investigate the relationship between North Korean-induced incidents and former President Park Geun-hye's weekly job approval ratings. Using vector autoregressions, we find that (1) President Park gained political benefits from North Korea, where negative events (e.g., armed attacks) generated a larger boost in approval than positive events (e.g., high-level talks); (2) rally effects varied across regions according to different perceptions of the North Korean regime: during security crisis, Park received the largest rallies in Gyeongnam province where the dominant image of North Korea was an 'enemy that threatens our safety'; and (3) a test of nuclear weapons or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) did not affect approval ratings even though it captured widespread media attention.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"523 - 548"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48881314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The article examines the European Union (EU)'s policy toward and interactions with North Korea (DPRK) in order to answer the question, "To what extent, despite prima facie ruptures in the relationship, has the EU been engaged with the DPRK, which is conventionally understood as an unreliable state." Although the EU is seemingly inactive in North Korean affairs, yet it is a powerful institution that can play a significant role in the peacemaking process in Asia including on the Korean peninsula. This article explores, firstly, how the EU's policy toward Asia has evolved historically; secondly, how far such an agenda and principles have been implemented in the North Korean context; and finally, the extent to which previous practices pave the way for the two parties to be included in the process of forming a kind of extended regional governance in future. A common view is that the EU's strategical/political motivation for getting involved in North Korean affairs is negligible due to a lack of economic interests to counterbalance high political risks. This article highlights that, contrary to the common understanding of its soft issue-focused approach to Asia, the EU has been persistently engaged in DPRK affairs, notwithstanding the significant structural barriers. This role underpins the EU's growing intention and potential to enhance interactions under the aegis of comprehensive security (third generation cooperation) covering the economic, social, cultural, and human security-focused aspects of the relationship.
{"title":"Evolution of EU-DPRK Interactions: From Engagement to Stalemate","authors":"J. Park, G. Spezza, B. Bridges","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The article examines the European Union (EU)'s policy toward and interactions with North Korea (DPRK) in order to answer the question, \"To what extent, despite prima facie ruptures in the relationship, has the EU been engaged with the DPRK, which is conventionally understood as an unreliable state.\" Although the EU is seemingly inactive in North Korean affairs, yet it is a powerful institution that can play a significant role in the peacemaking process in Asia including on the Korean peninsula. This article explores, firstly, how the EU's policy toward Asia has evolved historically; secondly, how far such an agenda and principles have been implemented in the North Korean context; and finally, the extent to which previous practices pave the way for the two parties to be included in the process of forming a kind of extended regional governance in future. A common view is that the EU's strategical/political motivation for getting involved in North Korean affairs is negligible due to a lack of economic interests to counterbalance high political risks. This article highlights that, contrary to the common understanding of its soft issue-focused approach to Asia, the EU has been persistently engaged in DPRK affairs, notwithstanding the significant structural barriers. This role underpins the EU's growing intention and potential to enhance interactions under the aegis of comprehensive security (third generation cooperation) covering the economic, social, cultural, and human security-focused aspects of the relationship.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"549 - 581"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45586905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：