Abstract:A foreign policy dilemma often occurs when a country is caught in the middle of two or more conflicting countries. States that have no conflict of interest would normally choose neutral positions or maintain good relations with all parties. In the case of Indonesia's foreign policy toward the China-US rivalry, free and active policy is the fundamental principle to preserve its national interests. Both China and the United States are Indonesia's strategic partners, especially in terms of economic cooperation. Although conventional wisdom tends to argue that Indonesia's current foreign policy has been increasingly dependent on China rather than the United States, it is also clear that a free and active principle sustains. This article aims to analyze how Indonesia could manage its relations amid international rivalries. Most scholars argue that the principle is feasible due to rationalist calculations that put a strong emphasis on economic interest. Using the balance of identity theory, this article argues that in dealing with the dilemma of dependence amid the ongoing China-US rivalry, Indonesia could employ its identity to preserve its strategic position between the two conflicting parties. Unlike the rationalist argument, which emphasizes materialist incentives, balance of identity puts more emphasis on the social feature of interstate relations.
{"title":"Playing Identities, Preserving Interests: Balance of Identity and Indonesia's Foreign Policy Dilemma Amid the China-US Rivalry","authors":"Mohamad Rosyidin","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:A foreign policy dilemma often occurs when a country is caught in the middle of two or more conflicting countries. States that have no conflict of interest would normally choose neutral positions or maintain good relations with all parties. In the case of Indonesia's foreign policy toward the China-US rivalry, free and active policy is the fundamental principle to preserve its national interests. Both China and the United States are Indonesia's strategic partners, especially in terms of economic cooperation. Although conventional wisdom tends to argue that Indonesia's current foreign policy has been increasingly dependent on China rather than the United States, it is also clear that a free and active principle sustains. This article aims to analyze how Indonesia could manage its relations amid international rivalries. Most scholars argue that the principle is feasible due to rationalist calculations that put a strong emphasis on economic interest. Using the balance of identity theory, this article argues that in dealing with the dilemma of dependence amid the ongoing China-US rivalry, Indonesia could employ its identity to preserve its strategic position between the two conflicting parties. Unlike the rationalist argument, which emphasizes materialist incentives, balance of identity puts more emphasis on the social feature of interstate relations.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"267 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44844868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:China has developed space capabilities with astonishing speed and scope, inviting both admiration and concern. China’s space development spans scientific exploration, business applications, and humanitarian, military, and diplomatic purposes. The existing studies on China’s space capabilities tend to focus on just one of these areas and do not provide a comprehensive understanding of how and why China has been determined in its pursuit of space. This study addresses China’s motivation by analyzing Chinese official documents and other supporting documents and information. At its crux, this study argues that China is driven to develop its space capabilities because they support the Chinese Communist Party’s longevity in power by strengthening its legitimacy to rule the nation.
{"title":"China’s Rising Space Power and the CCP’s Survival in the Indo-Pacific Era","authors":"Fumiko Sasaki","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:China has developed space capabilities with astonishing speed and scope, inviting both admiration and concern. China’s space development spans scientific exploration, business applications, and humanitarian, military, and diplomatic purposes. The existing studies on China’s space capabilities tend to focus on just one of these areas and do not provide a comprehensive understanding of how and why China has been determined in its pursuit of space. This study addresses China’s motivation by analyzing Chinese official documents and other supporting documents and information. At its crux, this study argues that China is driven to develop its space capabilities because they support the Chinese Communist Party’s longevity in power by strengthening its legitimacy to rule the nation.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"49 - 74"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46926996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Innovations in technologies coupled with evolving military thinking have led to advanced emerging military technologies ranging from artificial intelligence, lethal autonomous weapons, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology. These technologies not only open new domains in warfighting capabilities and strategy by changing the size and speed of destructions but may also bring challenges in curbing arms race, managing networks, and achieving peace and security. This study examines the rising significance of emerging technologies in Indo-Pacific security and further explores US strategies for building, dominating, and managing the different networks of technologies, domains, command and control (C2), alliances, and partners. As advanced technologies play a critical role in supporting national strategic goals, as in the case of China, it seems clear that the future of strategic competition will be dictated by who builds, dominates, and manages these networks and how one does it most effectively with clear strategic vision. In this paper I argue that networks are crucial in understanding emerging technologies and Indo-Pacific strategy for the unfolding era of strategic competition.
{"title":"The US-China Strategic Competition and Emerging Technologies in the Indo-Pacific Region: Strategies for Building, Dominating, and Managing Networks","authors":"H. Rim","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0000","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Innovations in technologies coupled with evolving military thinking have led to advanced emerging military technologies ranging from artificial intelligence, lethal autonomous weapons, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology. These technologies not only open new domains in warfighting capabilities and strategy by changing the size and speed of destructions but may also bring challenges in curbing arms race, managing networks, and achieving peace and security. This study examines the rising significance of emerging technologies in Indo-Pacific security and further explores US strategies for building, dominating, and managing the different networks of technologies, domains, command and control (C2), alliances, and partners. As advanced technologies play a critical role in supporting national strategic goals, as in the case of China, it seems clear that the future of strategic competition will be dictated by who builds, dominates, and manages these networks and how one does it most effectively with clear strategic vision. In this paper I argue that networks are crucial in understanding emerging technologies and Indo-Pacific strategy for the unfolding era of strategic competition.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"1 - 25"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41408437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Chinese scholars’ research on “Indo-Pacific Strategy” has undergone two shifts. Firstly, they began to pay limited attention to the Indo-Pacific concept and the US Indo-Pacific regional strategy in 2013. With 2017 and 2018 as the turning point, the attention to the Indo-Pacific strategy shows a significant increase. Secondly, regarding the scholars’ judgment of the Indo-Pacific strategy, since the end of 2019, they reach a consensus on their assessment of the strategy, especially on its threat to China. The two main reasons that drove the above shifts were the enrichment of the Indo-Pacific Strategy by the United States and China’s perception of India’s attitudes. China’s official responses to the strategy have shown a co-moving rhythm with scholars’ research, shifting from a more open and neutral attitude toward the concept to a critical one. Against the background of America’s continuing effort to implement the Indo-Pacific strategy, China’s policy responses can focus on three aspects: do a good job of itself, handle China-US relations peacefully and cooperatively, and break down the group politics.
{"title":"From Conceptual Idea to Strategic Reality: ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from the Perspective of Chinese Scholars","authors":"Li Li, Tianjiao Jiang","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Chinese scholars’ research on “Indo-Pacific Strategy” has undergone two shifts. Firstly, they began to pay limited attention to the Indo-Pacific concept and the US Indo-Pacific regional strategy in 2013. With 2017 and 2018 as the turning point, the attention to the Indo-Pacific strategy shows a significant increase. Secondly, regarding the scholars’ judgment of the Indo-Pacific strategy, since the end of 2019, they reach a consensus on their assessment of the strategy, especially on its threat to China. The two main reasons that drove the above shifts were the enrichment of the Indo-Pacific Strategy by the United States and China’s perception of India’s attitudes. China’s official responses to the strategy have shown a co-moving rhythm with scholars’ research, shifting from a more open and neutral attitude toward the concept to a critical one. Against the background of America’s continuing effort to implement the Indo-Pacific strategy, China’s policy responses can focus on three aspects: do a good job of itself, handle China-US relations peacefully and cooperatively, and break down the group politics.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"101 - 119"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48283135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:How is the future of the Indo-Pacific institutional arrangements envisioned by the Quad and ASEAN? Are they mutually exclusive or compatible? How can the institutional competition between the Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific be avoided? I argue that the institutional competition between the Quad and ASEAN can be provisionally alleviated through strategic ambiguities about the institutional division of labor in the Indo-Pacific. However, such strategic ambiguities do not resolve normative inconsistencies between the Quad and ASEAN, which would probably trigger institutional competition in the future. To resolve such difficulties, both the Quad and ASEAN need to create a mechanism that clarifies their regional institutional division of labor.
{"title":"Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"K. Koga","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:How is the future of the Indo-Pacific institutional arrangements envisioned by the Quad and ASEAN? Are they mutually exclusive or compatible? How can the institutional competition between the Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific be avoided? I argue that the institutional competition between the Quad and ASEAN can be provisionally alleviated through strategic ambiguities about the institutional division of labor in the Indo-Pacific. However, such strategic ambiguities do not resolve normative inconsistencies between the Quad and ASEAN, which would probably trigger institutional competition in the future. To resolve such difficulties, both the Quad and ASEAN need to create a mechanism that clarifies their regional institutional division of labor.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"27 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41774613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:In this article we elucidate the evolution of Hanoi’s foreign policy proactivism which has been understudied in the contemporary literature. In selective areas, why has Vietnam adopted a more proactive foreign policy than before? By means of ‘two-level game’ theory, official documents and research papers, and expert interviews, we analyze the foreign policy of Vietnam and compare it with that of Indonesia, ASEAN’s de facto leader, by examining the former’s role in the South China Sea issue and international economic integration strategy. In these aspects which Vietnam today has evinced its sectoral leadership, compared to Indonesia, the country has faced fewer constraints in domestic and international strategic environments to exert its diplomatic proactivism.
{"title":"A Two-level Game Approach to Hanoi’s Foreign Policy Proactivism","authors":"Vu Thi Thu Ngan, Le Dinh Tinh","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this article we elucidate the evolution of Hanoi’s foreign policy proactivism which has been understudied in the contemporary literature. In selective areas, why has Vietnam adopted a more proactive foreign policy than before? By means of ‘two-level game’ theory, official documents and research papers, and expert interviews, we analyze the foreign policy of Vietnam and compare it with that of Indonesia, ASEAN’s de facto leader, by examining the former’s role in the South China Sea issue and international economic integration strategy. In these aspects which Vietnam today has evinced its sectoral leadership, compared to Indonesia, the country has faced fewer constraints in domestic and international strategic environments to exert its diplomatic proactivism.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"121 - 144"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44034522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The Pew Research Center survey reports an increasing unfavorable view of China worldwide. In the Soft Power 30 index, China fares at a rank of 27th, far behind its aim of global leadership. The world’s leading economic power (in terms of purchasing power parity), a military power second only to the United States, a nation with a formidable global presence, a robust civilization and culture, however, still struggles to generate international affinity and credibility one might expect of the great middle kingdom. Acknowledging the benefits of soft power, China has continuously been engaged in the competitive politics of attraction, legitimacy, and credibility; however, Beijing’s charm offensive still has limited appeal in the outside world. The popular assessments point toward China’s authoritarian political model or poor state of civil liberties for the limited effectiveness of its soft power push. However, in this article we argue that besides the political and ideological factors limiting its soft power, China’s absolute or relative soft power gains are majorly undercut because of its coercive diplomacy exercised with the unbridled pursuit of its core national interests and hyper-nationalism. The article provides an interpretive illustration of how China’s disposition to rely on hard power instruments of carrot (inducement) and stick (threat, coercion, or intimidation) to get desired outcomes undermines the quest and effect of its soft power.
{"title":"The Yin and Yang of China’s Power: How the Force of Chinese Hard Power Limits the Quest and Effect of Its Soft Power","authors":"Shree Jain, S. Chakrabarti","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The Pew Research Center survey reports an increasing unfavorable view of China worldwide. In the Soft Power 30 index, China fares at a rank of 27th, far behind its aim of global leadership. The world’s leading economic power (in terms of purchasing power parity), a military power second only to the United States, a nation with a formidable global presence, a robust civilization and culture, however, still struggles to generate international affinity and credibility one might expect of the great middle kingdom. Acknowledging the benefits of soft power, China has continuously been engaged in the competitive politics of attraction, legitimacy, and credibility; however, Beijing’s charm offensive still has limited appeal in the outside world. The popular assessments point toward China’s authoritarian political model or poor state of civil liberties for the limited effectiveness of its soft power push. However, in this article we argue that besides the political and ideological factors limiting its soft power, China’s absolute or relative soft power gains are majorly undercut because of its coercive diplomacy exercised with the unbridled pursuit of its core national interests and hyper-nationalism. The article provides an interpretive illustration of how China’s disposition to rely on hard power instruments of carrot (inducement) and stick (threat, coercion, or intimidation) to get desired outcomes undermines the quest and effect of its soft power.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"145 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48609156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:During the Cold War, US extended deterrence commitments mostly focused on deterring nuclear or strategic conventional attacks against allies in Europe and Asia. In the decades following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the emergence of new technologies and domains for conflict, particularly the cyber domain, prompted new thinking for alliance management and extended deterrence. In this article I explore how the system of US bilateral alliances and informal strategic groupings in the Indo-Pacific affects the crafting of allied cyber deterrence strategies in the region. Based on deterrence and alliance theory, I survey cyber threats faced by US allies and partners in the region and views of cyber deterrence to form a general framework of allied cyber deterrence strategy. The US-South Korea alliance is used as a case study for allied cyber deterrence strategy, with a special focus on the impact that South Korea assuming wartime operational control of allied military forces could have on cyber deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Just as concepts of extended deterrence had to evolve, the cyber domain will force the United States and allies to reconceptualize peacetime and wartime operational control.
{"title":"Bilateral Alliances in an Interconnected Cyber World: Cyber Deterrence and Operational Control in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy","authors":"James E. Platte","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:During the Cold War, US extended deterrence commitments mostly focused on deterring nuclear or strategic conventional attacks against allies in Europe and Asia. In the decades following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the emergence of new technologies and domains for conflict, particularly the cyber domain, prompted new thinking for alliance management and extended deterrence. In this article I explore how the system of US bilateral alliances and informal strategic groupings in the Indo-Pacific affects the crafting of allied cyber deterrence strategies in the region. Based on deterrence and alliance theory, I survey cyber threats faced by US allies and partners in the region and views of cyber deterrence to form a general framework of allied cyber deterrence strategy. The US-South Korea alliance is used as a case study for allied cyber deterrence strategy, with a special focus on the impact that South Korea assuming wartime operational control of allied military forces could have on cyber deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Just as concepts of extended deterrence had to evolve, the cyber domain will force the United States and allies to reconceptualize peacetime and wartime operational control.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"47 1","pages":"75 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48738298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Germany, and China have become close partners, especially in terms of trade and capital flows. The establishment of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) has proved to be an indispensable element that will provide the framework for future trade and investment cooperation. Unfortunately, the ratification of the agreement is hampered by the low protection level of the economic interests of the Central and Eastern Europe countries. They had little influence on the final shape of the agreement. Hence there are many doubts about their role in EU-China relations, especially in high-tech production connections. This type of link turns out to be important in the era of introducing economies into the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). Thus, to understand the role, interdependencies, and flows of added value between the closely related economies—that is, China, Germany, and the CEE region—this study asks, “With the intensification of CEE-China relations, have CEE economies become more involved in technological production links with China at the expense of withdrawing from regional linkages?”
{"title":"The Role, Interdependencies, and Flows of Added Value Between Central and Eastern Europe, Germany, and China","authors":"E. Cieślik","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Germany, and China have become close partners, especially in terms of trade and capital flows. The establishment of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) has proved to be an indispensable element that will provide the framework for future trade and investment cooperation. Unfortunately, the ratification of the agreement is hampered by the low protection level of the economic interests of the Central and Eastern Europe countries. They had little influence on the final shape of the agreement. Hence there are many doubts about their role in EU-China relations, especially in high-tech production connections. This type of link turns out to be important in the era of introducing economies into the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). Thus, to understand the role, interdependencies, and flows of added value between the closely related economies—that is, China, Germany, and the CEE region—this study asks, “With the intensification of CEE-China relations, have CEE economies become more involved in technological production links with China at the expense of withdrawing from regional linkages?”","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"655 - 679"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48750738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The US government has shifted strategic focus from war on terror to great power contest with China and Russia. But there has not been corresponding thinking about the role of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of war (LOW) in the United States or China. Both IHL and human rights law (HRL) originated from Western legal traditions and advantage the United States and the West. China had to adapt and is now challenging the West-dominated international order, a major source of its tension with the United States. Both China and the United States invoked the Geneva Conventions against each other during the Korean War. The war took place seven decades ago, and much has changed since then. But it is the only precedent between the two great powers. LOW provides a structure for managing conflict between the great powers. In turn, a rivalry between the two greatest powers would make IHL narrowly based on national interests and weaken its linkage to human rights.
{"title":"International Humanitarian Law and the US-China Rivalry: National Interests and Human Rights Linkage","authors":"M. Wan","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The US government has shifted strategic focus from war on terror to great power contest with China and Russia. But there has not been corresponding thinking about the role of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of war (LOW) in the United States or China. Both IHL and human rights law (HRL) originated from Western legal traditions and advantage the United States and the West. China had to adapt and is now challenging the West-dominated international order, a major source of its tension with the United States. Both China and the United States invoked the Geneva Conventions against each other during the Korean War. The war took place seven decades ago, and much has changed since then. But it is the only precedent between the two great powers. LOW provides a structure for managing conflict between the great powers. In turn, a rivalry between the two greatest powers would make IHL narrowly based on national interests and weaken its linkage to human rights.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"605 - 625"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46518029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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