Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905231
M. Kaczmarski
Abstract:Observers tend to interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship in terms of strategic, purposeful cooperation driven by national interests and power-political considerations. The search for power and security, as well as balancing against the United States, have increasingly been pushing China and Russia closer together. The energy realm offers a distinct picture of the Sino-Russian relationship. The pace of cooperation has varied and depended on key domestic players in particular sectors. As a consequence, success stories have been accompanied by major setbacks. Energy cooperation encompasses both a meteoric rise of oil cooperation and the muddling through of gas cooperation. The foundations for close ties in the energy realm were laid well before the post-Crimean acceleration of Sino-Russian cooperation. More often than not, however, parochial interests of dominant state-owned and private enterprises rather than strategic considerations have driven this cooperation. Looking through the prism of energy cooperation, I emphasize the complexity of Russia and China as actors in international politics instead of approaching them as rational and unitary players.
{"title":"Fragmented Cooperation: The Role of State-Owned and Private Companies in Sino-Russian Energy Collaboration","authors":"M. Kaczmarski","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905231","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Observers tend to interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship in terms of strategic, purposeful cooperation driven by national interests and power-political considerations. The search for power and security, as well as balancing against the United States, have increasingly been pushing China and Russia closer together. The energy realm offers a distinct picture of the Sino-Russian relationship. The pace of cooperation has varied and depended on key domestic players in particular sectors. As a consequence, success stories have been accompanied by major setbacks. Energy cooperation encompasses both a meteoric rise of oil cooperation and the muddling through of gas cooperation. The foundations for close ties in the energy realm were laid well before the post-Crimean acceleration of Sino-Russian cooperation. More often than not, however, parochial interests of dominant state-owned and private enterprises rather than strategic considerations have driven this cooperation. Looking through the prism of energy cooperation, I emphasize the complexity of Russia and China as actors in international politics instead of approaching them as rational and unitary players.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47821947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1353/apr.2023.a905232
Natasha Kuhrt
Abstract:The Sino-Russian strategic partnership, among its many facets, includes broad alignment in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on issues of intervention, and their similar (if not identical) stances on the controversial Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in regard to Darfur, Libya, or Syria are well known—but the Libyan R2P-inspired enforcement action (intervention absent the consent of the host state) is relatively rare. Less work has been carried out on Russian and Chinese discourse on UN peacekeeping, viz consent-based operations. We fill a gap by examining and comparing their discourse on UN peacekeeping in UN Security Council meetings, demonstrating that their converging views have begun to seep into the previously 'safe space' of peacekeeping. The controversy surrounding the 'protection of civilians' encapsulated in the Libyan resolution 1973, which was used for regime change, caused concern for Russia and China. New directions in UN peacekeeping—in particular, stabilization missions—which emphasize the protection of civilians, are testing UN peacekeeping doctrine. A comparison of Chinese and Russian voting patterns in the UNSC reveals a fairly similar line taken on voting to extend peacekeeping mandates, yet upon examining the discourse in UNSC meetings regarding three UN stabilization missions between 2011 and 2022, as well as more generic meetings on peacekeeping, subtle differences emerge, which reflect differences in Russian and Chinese narrated global identities and status concerns. These differences show that alignment is based more on converging interests than converging values.
{"title":"Russian and Chinese Approaches to UN Peacekeeping in an Era of Stabilization","authors":"Natasha Kuhrt","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.a905232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905232","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The Sino-Russian strategic partnership, among its many facets, includes broad alignment in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on issues of intervention, and their similar (if not identical) stances on the controversial Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in regard to Darfur, Libya, or Syria are well known—but the Libyan R2P-inspired enforcement action (intervention absent the consent of the host state) is relatively rare. Less work has been carried out on Russian and Chinese discourse on UN peacekeeping, viz consent-based operations. We fill a gap by examining and comparing their discourse on UN peacekeeping in UN Security Council meetings, demonstrating that their converging views have begun to seep into the previously 'safe space' of peacekeeping. The controversy surrounding the 'protection of civilians' encapsulated in the Libyan resolution 1973, which was used for regime change, caused concern for Russia and China. New directions in UN peacekeeping—in particular, stabilization missions—which emphasize the protection of civilians, are testing UN peacekeeping doctrine. A comparison of Chinese and Russian voting patterns in the UNSC reveals a fairly similar line taken on voting to extend peacekeeping mandates, yet upon examining the discourse in UNSC meetings regarding three UN stabilization missions between 2011 and 2022, as well as more generic meetings on peacekeeping, subtle differences emerge, which reflect differences in Russian and Chinese narrated global identities and status concerns. These differences show that alignment is based more on converging interests than converging values.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46529444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Xi's Global Campaign for Chinese Security","authors":"Carla P. Freeman","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42876222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Taiwan's security is inextricably linked to the strategic stability and preservation of the regional order in the Indo-Pacific region. For the leading Indo-Pacific powers, particularly the United States, maintaining the status quo ante in the Taiwan Strait is an integral part of the rules-based order. The United States and Japan have linked it to their own security. Even though Taiwan has no formal diplomatic relations with the majority of the nations in the Indo-Pacific region, it is an intrinsic part of the regional dynamics, particularly in trade, investment, and regional supply chain contexts. Taiwan has been trying to regain its political and diplomatic position in recent years, especially under the Tsai Ing-wen administration. In that context, the Taiwan government has been reiterating the need to collaborate with the Indo-Pacific countries to safeguard a rules-based order and secure a more resilient and peaceful Indo-Pacific community. Taiwan's advocacy for an open, transparent, inclusive, rules-based order is backed by its good governance practices domestically and non-confrontational approaches externally. A region as diverse as the Indo-Pacific, where like-minded countries face a range of shared and divergent concerns and interests, needs to be truly inclusive to find solutions to traditional and non-traditional security challenges. Furthermore, the China-US rivalry, with Taiwan as a major factor between the two, is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse. This article discusses Taiwan's centrality in the Indo-Pacific dynamics, particularly regarding the region's major power politics.
{"title":"Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region: Prospects and Challenges","authors":"Sana Hashmi","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Taiwan's security is inextricably linked to the strategic stability and preservation of the regional order in the Indo-Pacific region. For the leading Indo-Pacific powers, particularly the United States, maintaining the status quo ante in the Taiwan Strait is an integral part of the rules-based order. The United States and Japan have linked it to their own security. Even though Taiwan has no formal diplomatic relations with the majority of the nations in the Indo-Pacific region, it is an intrinsic part of the regional dynamics, particularly in trade, investment, and regional supply chain contexts. Taiwan has been trying to regain its political and diplomatic position in recent years, especially under the Tsai Ing-wen administration. In that context, the Taiwan government has been reiterating the need to collaborate with the Indo-Pacific countries to safeguard a rules-based order and secure a more resilient and peaceful Indo-Pacific community. Taiwan's advocacy for an open, transparent, inclusive, rules-based order is backed by its good governance practices domestically and non-confrontational approaches externally. A region as diverse as the Indo-Pacific, where like-minded countries face a range of shared and divergent concerns and interests, needs to be truly inclusive to find solutions to traditional and non-traditional security challenges. Furthermore, the China-US rivalry, with Taiwan as a major factor between the two, is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse. This article discusses Taiwan's centrality in the Indo-Pacific dynamics, particularly regarding the region's major power politics.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41653237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is the InclusIon of “IndIvIsIble securIty” In chInese presIdent XI Jinping’s address at the 2022 Boao Forum for Asia a coincidence of timing with Russian military action against Ukraine or a new expression of Chinese thinking on international security? Regarding timing, the speech was made on February 21, three days before Russia initiated what it called a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Also, the vocabulary “indivisible security” is generally associated with Russian perspectives on international affairs. In terms of substance, the following statements are value-loaded: “we humanity are living in an indivisible security community” and “it is important that we . . . uphold the principle of indivisible security” caught particular international attention (MFA 2022). They seem to be a general set of principles. Answers to this and extended questions are therefore significant for appraising Chinese positions on the ongoing conflict and potentially consequential for predicting China’s security actions in the future. American and other Western reactions to the Chinese utterance range from rebuttal by diplomats to calls for dialogue toward the shaping of a common understanding “in a way that prevents it from becoming a pretext for armed conflict” (Freeman and Stephenson 2022). We deem it meaningful to approach the question by reviewing the phrase’s usage in the Chinese language, as international projection of security discourses is country-specific. In Xi’s speech, the expression is anquan buke fenge (安全不可分割), put forward as a principle (yuanze, 原则). The core elements therein are anquan (security, 安全) and buke fenge (not to be divided or separated in conceptualization, 不可分割). When used for discussing topics pertaining to national security and/or international affairs, buke fenge can be translated into English as “inalienable,” “inseparable” or “indivisible.” It is useful and
{"title":"A Chinese Notion of Indivisibility of Security?","authors":"D. Zha, Ting Dong","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0012","url":null,"abstract":"Is the InclusIon of “IndIvIsIble securIty” In chInese presIdent XI Jinping’s address at the 2022 Boao Forum for Asia a coincidence of timing with Russian military action against Ukraine or a new expression of Chinese thinking on international security? Regarding timing, the speech was made on February 21, three days before Russia initiated what it called a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Also, the vocabulary “indivisible security” is generally associated with Russian perspectives on international affairs. In terms of substance, the following statements are value-loaded: “we humanity are living in an indivisible security community” and “it is important that we . . . uphold the principle of indivisible security” caught particular international attention (MFA 2022). They seem to be a general set of principles. Answers to this and extended questions are therefore significant for appraising Chinese positions on the ongoing conflict and potentially consequential for predicting China’s security actions in the future. American and other Western reactions to the Chinese utterance range from rebuttal by diplomats to calls for dialogue toward the shaping of a common understanding “in a way that prevents it from becoming a pretext for armed conflict” (Freeman and Stephenson 2022). We deem it meaningful to approach the question by reviewing the phrase’s usage in the Chinese language, as international projection of security discourses is country-specific. In Xi’s speech, the expression is anquan buke fenge (安全不可分割), put forward as a principle (yuanze, 原则). The core elements therein are anquan (security, 安全) and buke fenge (not to be divided or separated in conceptualization, 不可分割). When used for discussing topics pertaining to national security and/or international affairs, buke fenge can be translated into English as “inalienable,” “inseparable” or “indivisible.” It is useful and","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45251230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:As a leading financial hub, it is long assumed that Hong Kong plays a limited role in the region's geopolitics. However, its unique status as a semi-autonomous and open city under the otherwise authoritarian rule of Beijing means that it has always been ripe for contention, influence, and subversion not only from the West but also from a China that increasingly seeks to project its power beyond its shores. Unlike its fortified neighbors situated at the fault line in the ongoing US-China rivalry, we argue that Hong Kong is no less consequential to the rivalry. We discuss how Hong Kong has been used as a leverage in the two superpowers' competition in other non-military issue-areas, as a resource to promote their respective mode of governance (authoritarianism versus liberal democracy), and as an exemplar for countries contemplating between the choice of a Chineseversus American-led international order.
{"title":"Perils of the Orient: Hong Kong as a Battleground in the US-China Rivalry","authors":"C. Fung, Seanon S. Wong","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:As a leading financial hub, it is long assumed that Hong Kong plays a limited role in the region's geopolitics. However, its unique status as a semi-autonomous and open city under the otherwise authoritarian rule of Beijing means that it has always been ripe for contention, influence, and subversion not only from the West but also from a China that increasingly seeks to project its power beyond its shores. Unlike its fortified neighbors situated at the fault line in the ongoing US-China rivalry, we argue that Hong Kong is no less consequential to the rivalry. We discuss how Hong Kong has been used as a leverage in the two superpowers' competition in other non-military issue-areas, as a resource to promote their respective mode of governance (authoritarianism versus liberal democracy), and as an exemplar for countries contemplating between the choice of a Chineseversus American-led international order.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48745775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Assessing its coercive diplomacy in retrospect, the United States should deal with the North Korean nuclear issue with a more sophisticated combination of coercive measures and positive inducements to overcome past failures. Simultaneously, based on an analysis of current challenges and opportunities, the United States should consider this nuclear agenda within its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) with a long-term regional vision. The active engagement of the United States in the North Korean nuclear issue can create opportunities for cooperation with China or provide the United States with the strategic means to influence China. In addition, the US–ROK alliance and US–ROK–Japan trilateral cooperation could be a driving force in resolving the nuclear agenda of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and support the IPS of the United States. Ultimately, the linkage between the US' coercive approach to the DPRK and its IPS could help prevent regional tension and the possible demise of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which is threatened by North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
{"title":"Taming the Nuclear Elephant: The US Indo-Pacific Strategy on North Korea","authors":"Minsung Kim","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Assessing its coercive diplomacy in retrospect, the United States should deal with the North Korean nuclear issue with a more sophisticated combination of coercive measures and positive inducements to overcome past failures. Simultaneously, based on an analysis of current challenges and opportunities, the United States should consider this nuclear agenda within its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) with a long-term regional vision. The active engagement of the United States in the North Korean nuclear issue can create opportunities for cooperation with China or provide the United States with the strategic means to influence China. In addition, the US–ROK alliance and US–ROK–Japan trilateral cooperation could be a driving force in resolving the nuclear agenda of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and support the IPS of the United States. Ultimately, the linkage between the US' coercive approach to the DPRK and its IPS could help prevent regional tension and the possible demise of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which is threatened by North Korea's nuclear ambitions.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42730884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:What is the origin of South Korea's North Korea policy under the Moon Jae-in presidency? Are there any underlying assumptions and perspectives behind this policy? What kind of ideas and values have played out in South Korea's policy toward North Korea? By both exploring the idea of nationalism in current world politics and showing its influence on South Korea's policy discourse and orientation, in this article we argue that nationalism is still a powerful political ideology that affects state foreign policy and plays out as a strong variable in trying to make sense of South Korea's North Korea policy. To test this argument, we analyze recent inter-Korean interactions and illustrate how ethnic nationalism shaped the Moon administration's North Korea policy. As long as ethnic nationalism dominates policy debates and affects the policy orientation, the prospect of inter-Korean relations will not be promising.
{"title":"The Rise of Ethnic Nationalism in South Korea: Moon's North Korea Policy and Inter-Korean Relations","authors":"Donglin Han, Y. Lim","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:What is the origin of South Korea's North Korea policy under the Moon Jae-in presidency? Are there any underlying assumptions and perspectives behind this policy? What kind of ideas and values have played out in South Korea's policy toward North Korea? By both exploring the idea of nationalism in current world politics and showing its influence on South Korea's policy discourse and orientation, in this article we argue that nationalism is still a powerful political ideology that affects state foreign policy and plays out as a strong variable in trying to make sense of South Korea's North Korea policy. To test this argument, we analyze recent inter-Korean interactions and illustrate how ethnic nationalism shaped the Moon administration's North Korea policy. As long as ethnic nationalism dominates policy debates and affects the policy orientation, the prospect of inter-Korean relations will not be promising.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45401637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The rising tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) have mainly been affected by China's growing confidence in its ability to challenge and redefine norms that constitute the regional structure. In parallel to its continued rise, China faces inevitable pressure to either accept prevailing international norms or, if it challenges existing norms, to provide an alternative source of legitimacy for its behavior. The purpose of this article is therefore to examine China's selection process when it comes to challenging certain norms. The main argument pursued in this article states that from the Chinese perspective, when challenging norms, it is not primarily the content of the challenged norm that matters but the likelihood of successfully shaping a new norm and thus becoming the effective norm-maker in the region.
{"title":"China's Behavior and Ambitions to Become a Norm-maker in the South China Sea Dispute","authors":"S. Vuković, Paul-Jakob Fechner","doi":"10.1353/apr.2023.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The rising tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) have mainly been affected by China's growing confidence in its ability to challenge and redefine norms that constitute the regional structure. In parallel to its continued rise, China faces inevitable pressure to either accept prevailing international norms or, if it challenges existing norms, to provide an alternative source of legitimacy for its behavior. The purpose of this article is therefore to examine China's selection process when it comes to challenging certain norms. The main argument pursued in this article states that from the Chinese perspective, when challenging norms, it is not primarily the content of the challenged norm that matters but the likelihood of successfully shaping a new norm and thus becoming the effective norm-maker in the region.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41827290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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