Abstract:This paper demonstrates that when a superpower within a bipolar system fights against a small rival either that is located beyond its sphere of influence or that has geostrategic importance to the other acting superpower, other forces matter more than the distribution of capabilities between the belligerents. Within the study I review two primary explanations for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite the strong resistance of local forces to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, mainly by the Afghan Mujahedeen, Moscow failed to predict the political outcomes of the war. It was in fact a series of negative feedbacks that caused Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan after a decade-long intervention that did not achieve any political goals. One such example was the direct strike against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, launched and coordinated by the United States as the other acting superpower under the bipolar system of that time.
{"title":"The Roundabout Outcomes of the Soviet-Afghan War","authors":"O. Israeli","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0000","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This paper demonstrates that when a superpower within a bipolar system fights against a small rival either that is located beyond its sphere of influence or that has geostrategic importance to the other acting superpower, other forces matter more than the distribution of capabilities between the belligerents. Within the study I review two primary explanations for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite the strong resistance of local forces to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, mainly by the Afghan Mujahedeen, Moscow failed to predict the political outcomes of the war. It was in fact a series of negative feedbacks that caused Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan after a decade-long intervention that did not achieve any political goals. One such example was the direct strike against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, launched and coordinated by the United States as the other acting superpower under the bipolar system of that time.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"1 - 20"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45733130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:In recent years, China and Japan have increasingly competed against each other over infrastructure provision in Southeast Asia, their near abroad. Through an analysis of energy infrastructure provision in Indonesia, this article argues that Indonesia has benefited from Chinese and Japanese financial resources in providing energy to otherwise remote and isolated communities. However, Indonesia’s domestic interest groups and its political economic structure have promoted nonrenewable energy adoption at the expense of renewable sources. Indeed, Indonesia’s demand for nonrenewable energy has opened up opportunities for both Chinese and Japanese firms. While Chinese firms have definitively grown their market share in nonrenewable energy infrastructure, especially coal-fired power plants, so too have their Japanese counterparts. The emphasis on coal-fired power has not only hindered renewable energy expansion, but also led to ecological damage. Furthermore, several Indonesian private firms with long-standing interests in coal mining and processing have forged collaborative ties with the Chinese and Japanese firms to enter the business of operating coal-fired power plants, while securing a captive market for their coal supplies. These findings illustrate that China-Japan competition is more complex than commonly portrayed, in addition to raising questions about Chinese and Japanese claims of a “green” Belt and Road Initiative and Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, respectively.
{"title":"China-Japan Rivalry and Southeast Asian Renewable Energy Development: Who Is Winning What in Indonesia?","authors":"G. Lim","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In recent years, China and Japan have increasingly competed against each other over infrastructure provision in Southeast Asia, their near abroad. Through an analysis of energy infrastructure provision in Indonesia, this article argues that Indonesia has benefited from Chinese and Japanese financial resources in providing energy to otherwise remote and isolated communities. However, Indonesia’s domestic interest groups and its political economic structure have promoted nonrenewable energy adoption at the expense of renewable sources. Indeed, Indonesia’s demand for nonrenewable energy has opened up opportunities for both Chinese and Japanese firms. While Chinese firms have definitively grown their market share in nonrenewable energy infrastructure, especially coal-fired power plants, so too have their Japanese counterparts. The emphasis on coal-fired power has not only hindered renewable energy expansion, but also led to ecological damage. Furthermore, several Indonesian private firms with long-standing interests in coal mining and processing have forged collaborative ties with the Chinese and Japanese firms to enter the business of operating coal-fired power plants, while securing a captive market for their coal supplies. These findings illustrate that China-Japan competition is more complex than commonly portrayed, in addition to raising questions about Chinese and Japanese claims of a “green” Belt and Road Initiative and Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, respectively.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"105 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49637885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:To secure an oil and gas supply, China has built several types of energy infrastructure near its borders and developed energy cooperation with regional partners based on this infrastructure. However, not all energy cooperation projects develop at an equal pace or are equally successful. This study employs the neofunctionalist spillover hypothesis—one of several key discourses applied to explaining European integration—to account for the difference in regional cooperation between two China-driven energy megaprojects in Asia: the China–Central Asia Pipelines and the China–Southeast Asia Pipelines. After investigation into the so-called spillover hypothesis, including “functional spillover,” “political spill-over,” and “cultivated spillover,” the more successful of the two projects was also found to be more significant in terms of its spillover effect. Thus, this article finds that regional cooperation in the Chinese context also supports the spill-over hypothesis, which has conventionally been regarded as a Europe-based discourse.
{"title":"Is the Spillover Hypothesis of Neofunctionalism Functional in an Asian Context? The China–Central Asia and China–Southeast Asia Pipelines in Comparative Perspective","authors":"Xiaoguang Wang","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:To secure an oil and gas supply, China has built several types of energy infrastructure near its borders and developed energy cooperation with regional partners based on this infrastructure. However, not all energy cooperation projects develop at an equal pace or are equally successful. This study employs the neofunctionalist spillover hypothesis—one of several key discourses applied to explaining European integration—to account for the difference in regional cooperation between two China-driven energy megaprojects in Asia: the China–Central Asia Pipelines and the China–Southeast Asia Pipelines. After investigation into the so-called spillover hypothesis, including “functional spillover,” “political spill-over,” and “cultivated spillover,” the more successful of the two projects was also found to be more significant in terms of its spillover effect. Thus, this article finds that regional cooperation in the Chinese context also supports the spill-over hypothesis, which has conventionally been regarded as a Europe-based discourse.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"133 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41453026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The contemporary US/Japan-Chinese rivalry and tension around dam building in the Mekong region is often mistakenly seen as the US and Japan’s reactive response to recently growing Chinese diplomatic and economic influence in the region. In fact, the United States and Japan have been critical architects of institutional and financial engineering for hydropower development in the Mekong region, which predates involvement by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The factors and dynamics involved in significant lending regime shifts away from a liberal hydropower finance regime to an export credit driven model premised on Asian economic statecraft is an understudied topic. This article fills part of this gap through a case study of evolving hydro-financing regimes in Lao PDR from the 1970s to the present. The study draws on extensive ethnographic work in Laos, Japan, Thailand, and the United States with local and external political elites, hydro-financing technocrats, and business actors and gains additional insights from analysis of primary firm, institutional, and government documents. The article finds that the role of economic crises and their impact on the relative economic power of hydropower financing regimes as well as their ideational impact on borrower regimes are significant in explaining shifting patterns in lending regime dominance.
{"title":"Liquidated: US/Japan-Chinese Rivalry, Financial Crises, and Explaining Shifts in Hydropower Finance Regimes in the Mekong","authors":"Pon Souvannaseng","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The contemporary US/Japan-Chinese rivalry and tension around dam building in the Mekong region is often mistakenly seen as the US and Japan’s reactive response to recently growing Chinese diplomatic and economic influence in the region. In fact, the United States and Japan have been critical architects of institutional and financial engineering for hydropower development in the Mekong region, which predates involvement by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The factors and dynamics involved in significant lending regime shifts away from a liberal hydropower finance regime to an export credit driven model premised on Asian economic statecraft is an understudied topic. This article fills part of this gap through a case study of evolving hydro-financing regimes in Lao PDR from the 1970s to the present. The study draws on extensive ethnographic work in Laos, Japan, Thailand, and the United States with local and external political elites, hydro-financing technocrats, and business actors and gains additional insights from analysis of primary firm, institutional, and government documents. The article finds that the role of economic crises and their impact on the relative economic power of hydropower financing regimes as well as their ideational impact on borrower regimes are significant in explaining shifting patterns in lending regime dominance.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"49 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66280392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Despite growing concerns about the impacts of climate change, Japanese public financial institutions continued to build on long-standing partnerships in Southeast Asia through the expansion of thermal power generation. Recent Japanese investments include coal-fired power plants in Indonesia and Vietnam and natural gas supply chains in Indonesia and Bangladesh. Japan was one of the last developed countries globally to champion coal development that, even if highly efficient, comes at a cost to the environment. Overseas energy investment is at the nexus of two significant challenges of this century: the threat of climate change and great power competition. Japan, regionally proximate to China and burdened with a shrinking economy and limited energy supplies, shapes its regional foreign policy to enhance energy security, expand overseas market share, and uphold a rules-based international order. This paper discusses these primary drivers of Japan’s policy approach and highlights examples of Japan’s overseas energy investment strategies starting to shift to maintain a competitive edge as public opinion and market forces react to the increased risk perception of climate change.
{"title":"A Persistent Fossil Fuel Agenda? Japan’s Overseas Energy Development in Southeast Asia","authors":"Margaret M. Jackson","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Despite growing concerns about the impacts of climate change, Japanese public financial institutions continued to build on long-standing partnerships in Southeast Asia through the expansion of thermal power generation. Recent Japanese investments include coal-fired power plants in Indonesia and Vietnam and natural gas supply chains in Indonesia and Bangladesh. Japan was one of the last developed countries globally to champion coal development that, even if highly efficient, comes at a cost to the environment. Overseas energy investment is at the nexus of two significant challenges of this century: the threat of climate change and great power competition. Japan, regionally proximate to China and burdened with a shrinking economy and limited energy supplies, shapes its regional foreign policy to enhance energy security, expand overseas market share, and uphold a rules-based international order. This paper discusses these primary drivers of Japan’s policy approach and highlights examples of Japan’s overseas energy investment strategies starting to shift to maintain a competitive edge as public opinion and market forces react to the increased risk perception of climate change.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"103 - 77"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45904097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:This article explores the correlation between media effects and political trust, as well as the moderating factor in the equation. Specifically, the authors measured political trust within two categories: institutional trust and system trust. Analyses were based on two waves of surveys conducted among Internet users (2014: N = 2,970; 2017: N = 2,379) in China. Results indicated that (1) exposure to official media was positively correlated with political trust, whereas exposure to individual media and overseas media were negatively correlated with political trust, and exposure to commercial media was a nonsignificant factor; (2) correlation was higher for institutional trust than system trust; and (3) political values were a significant moderating factor. Implications are discussed.
{"title":"News Media Effects on Political Institutional and System Trust: The Moderating Role of Political Values","authors":"Xiaoxiao Meng, Shuhua Zhou","doi":"10.1353/apr.2022.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article explores the correlation between media effects and political trust, as well as the moderating factor in the equation. Specifically, the authors measured political trust within two categories: institutional trust and system trust. Analyses were based on two waves of surveys conducted among Internet users (2014: N = 2,970; 2017: N = 2,379) in China. Results indicated that (1) exposure to official media was positively correlated with political trust, whereas exposure to individual media and overseas media were negatively correlated with political trust, and exposure to commercial media was a nonsignificant factor; (2) correlation was higher for institutional trust than system trust; and (3) political values were a significant moderating factor. Implications are discussed.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"46 1","pages":"157 - 181"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48971413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Developed in American and European contexts, public diplomacy theory has found its most receptive audiences in East Asia, expressed in heavy governmental investment in educational and cultural programs meant to foster acceptance and influence within the global community. Examining the state of public diplomacy in Japan, Korea, and China, countries with a strong developmental legacy, globalizing economies, and growing media presence, I analyze the integration of public diplomacy in each country's diplomatic efforts, the image they want to project to the world, and the institutional change this move has instigated. While public diplomacy has been taking a central position in this region, the East Asian model of public diplomacy features a mixture of state-led initiatives, an increasing investment of resources, and substantial government intervention.
{"title":"An \"East Asian\" Public Diplomacy? Lessons from Japan, South Korea, and China","authors":"N. Otmazgin","doi":"10.1353/apr.2021.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2021.0029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Developed in American and European contexts, public diplomacy theory has found its most receptive audiences in East Asia, expressed in heavy governmental investment in educational and cultural programs meant to foster acceptance and influence within the global community. Examining the state of public diplomacy in Japan, Korea, and China, countries with a strong developmental legacy, globalizing economies, and growing media presence, I analyze the integration of public diplomacy in each country's diplomatic efforts, the image they want to project to the world, and the institutional change this move has instigated. While public diplomacy has been taking a central position in this region, the East Asian model of public diplomacy features a mixture of state-led initiatives, an increasing investment of resources, and substantial government intervention.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"45 1","pages":"621 - 644"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49363812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:After the 2016 elections, cross-Strait relations have fallen to their lowest point since the Third Strait Crisis. A proliferation of state-driven strategic narratives by both sides has since emerged. Against Beijing's narratives of "national rejuvenation," peaceful reunification, and "1992 Consensus," the Tsai administration has contraposed an image of Taiwan as a "beacon" of freedom and democracy in the Indo-Pacific. By tracing the tenets and the operationalization of Beijing and Taipei's strategic communications from the late 2000s to 2020, this article shows how Chinese and Taiwanese actors' reactions to the systemic pressure of a shifting East Asian regional order have progressively shaped cross-Strait communicative dynamics, severely constraining the range of options that could overcome the current impasse.
{"title":"No Consensus Across the Strait: Chinese and Taiwanese Strategic Communications in a Contested Regional Order","authors":"A. Insisa","doi":"10.1353/apr.2021.0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2021.0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:After the 2016 elections, cross-Strait relations have fallen to their lowest point since the Third Strait Crisis. A proliferation of state-driven strategic narratives by both sides has since emerged. Against Beijing's narratives of \"national rejuvenation,\" peaceful reunification, and \"1992 Consensus,\" the Tsai administration has contraposed an image of Taiwan as a \"beacon\" of freedom and democracy in the Indo-Pacific. By tracing the tenets and the operationalization of Beijing and Taipei's strategic communications from the late 2000s to 2020, this article shows how Chinese and Taiwanese actors' reactions to the systemic pressure of a shifting East Asian regional order have progressively shaped cross-Strait communicative dynamics, severely constraining the range of options that could overcome the current impasse.","PeriodicalId":45424,"journal":{"name":"Asian Perspective","volume":"45 1","pages":"503 - 531"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48228409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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