Orbis最新文献

The United States’ deterrence strategy against the Islamic Republic of Iran has not yielded desired outcomes to meet mission objectives. Iranian-backed groups have taken advantage of the Israel-Hamas war and Washington’s preoccupation with both the Russia-Ukraine war and China. Iraqi groups and Yemen’s Houthis have rebranded and adapted to the new operational environmental that has unfolded in the region, due largely to the war in Israel. Policymakers should consider a strategy that goes beyond deterrence that includes partnerships, greater interagency coordination, and imposing costs with offensive measures.

This article examines a potential, and increasingly aggressive satellite posture in outer space by way of increased presence of adversary satellites, unilateral technological advancements by the adversary, and an increase of cyber-attacks on autonomous space systems; including an inquiry into “salami tactics” in outer space. First, it considers the proposed category of inferential ASAT and distinguishes it from traditional categorizations of counterspace threats. It then delves into the theoretical construct of deterrence theory by considering two tenets most implicated by inferential capabilities: signaling and credibility. Finally, the essay expands upon Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Aerospace Security Project’s 2021 Report, wherein a US military satellite is compromised by an allegedly rouge Chinese satellite. It concludes by offering options for successful deterrence in outer space given the scenario.

The rapid pace of novel technological change, referred to as “emerging technologies,” is challenging our ability to devise policy and governance apace. This is particularly true in the life sciences and biotechnology, where the current tools used for promoting biosecurity via policy and governance are becoming outdated.

The ongoing crisis in the Middle East can be understood as the intersection of three developments. The first is Iran’s strategy of forward defense, a style of warfighting that effectively combines material, psychological, and physical elements and has been enabled by regional political developments. The second is Israel’s ongoing political crisis—long in the making—which handicapped Israel’s ability to maintain credibility in the face of the growing threats on all its borders. The third is the uncertainty of US strategy in the Middle East, which has been unable to find a formula for even its medium-term engagement with the region. This article uses these three trends to create a frame of reference for the current crisis.

This article explores the relationship between masculinity and national security. There may be a reluctance to view the values, attitudes, and beliefs associated with a particular version of masculinity as a driver for violence. Yet, the “real man” version of masculinity is consistently correlated with those who in engage in mass violence, mobilized violence, and violent extremism—which present a threat to national security. The “real man” identity is also correlated with significant gender disparities in quality of life including income, health, happiness, and mortality for men. Such grievances represent yet another driver of discontent and violence. National security requires that we recognize and understand potential threats and subsequently work to mitigate those threats. Men in the US military have traditionally been viewed as prototypical of masculine identity and its associated values, attitudes, and beliefs. As such, this version of masculinity represents a unique institutional context to examine the “real man” version of masculinity, and to advance gender equality and overcome the harms that rigid gender roles present to national security.

The United States Embassy Harare needs to identify innovative ways to affect systems-level changes that advance US interests in Zimbabwe.¹ Domestic and foreign laws, plans, policies, programs, regulations, standards, and strategies can serve as inspiration for such innovation in its strategic planning process. This article reports the findings of a novel analysis conducted on the linkages that are declared in the Integrated Country Strategy Zimbabwe (ICS Zimbabwe) and the Integrated Country Strategy Malawi (ICS Malawi). Among other things, it finds that the US Embassy Harare declared far fewer linkages than the US. Embassy Lilongwe. These are puzzling findings. The US Embassy Harare needs to work with a large number of horizontal, vertical, and diagonal partners in order to achieve its own goals and objectives. Why then are there so few linkages declared in its country-level foreign policy plan? Is it because the U.S. foreign policy planning process is poorly designed? Or, is it because the U.S. foreign policy planning process is poorly managed? The United States Congress possesses the oversight powers to seek answers to those questions. On the basis of this exploratory study, the author recommends that it makes use of them.

The United States no longer constitutes a monolith in determining Africa’s future. In fact, no single country does—not Russia, not China. Africa has options, well noted in welcome statements by Department of State Secretary Antony Blinken: “Africa does not need to pick sides.” Africans see double standards in US policy (“do as we say, not as we do”). Understandably, they turn to other options in seeking better outcomes for their countries. Partners such as the Russian Federation may seem unsavory to the United States, but rhetoric alone will not persuade Africans to drop them. High-level VIP visits leave them largely indifferent. Private sector investment could succeed where public efforts leave a dubious record. If US investors can overcome risk aversion, they may supplant or complement a public sector that Africans find unresponsive to their needs and wishes. Encouraged and energized, US investors could meet Africa’s challenges, and mutually benefit from its rewards.