The failure to anticipate Hamas’s brutal attack on October 7 is multilayered and will be investigated for years to come. However, the preliminary consensus has blamed the konceptcia, the Hebrew word for paradigm, that guided the intelligence and security forces. With the advent of AI and its complex search algorithms, the resultant paradigm was shaped by an input imbalance that depicted Hamas transitioning from its jihadist past to a rational governance player. The politicization of the academic and lay Middle East discourse legitimized resistance to Israel, feeding the bias. Equally, the virtual absence of understanding of the military wing of Hamas and its role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance deepened the imbalance.
The energy transition is initiating long-term oil market trends that look likely to undermine the strategic importance of oil-producing countries for the US government. The trends suggest US voters and future US administrations will be less exposed to price swings and other risks in the global oil market. Diminishing risk exposure, in turn, reduces imperatives for US policymakers to spend so heavily on security provision in the Persian Gulf, or to resolve diplomatic rifts with major producers such as Saudi Arabia. Saudi policy changes since 2016, and the reduced willingness to use spare production capacity in ways that benefit Washington, may have amplified a pre-existing appetite for such a downgrade.
While rising geopolitical competition poses significant political challenges for future arms control negotiations, it also complicates national arms control verification by making on-site inspections unlikely. One way to verify future arms control agreements without on-site inspections would be to rely on counting rules verified by national technical intelligence. American policymakers should consider how they might combine on-site inspections and counting rules in future arms control agreements. By allowing each party to choose its verification modality, future arms control agreements could cater to different security preferences while also preserving areas of American military advantage.
This essay is written as an open letter to whomever the 47th President may be and whenever he or she may take office. It proposes several different approaches to a presidential transition to allow an incoming President to have a strategy and other plans in place sooner than has been the norm over the past several transitions to direct the national security system more effectively. While the 2024 presidential election may feature the reelection of the current incumbent or the return of the previous president to the Oval Office, either may wish to consider new approaches to how they will organize their national security strategy and the personnel and processes that will manage it from the way they did in their first administrations.