Orbis最新文献

In 2017, the Chinese government launched the State Council’s Program for Developing the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence (AI), which aimed to build China’s first-mover advantage by fully mobilizing and tapping its national R&D resources in both the public and private sectors. This article argues that the AI example illustrates how China resorts to a new “whole-state” approach to keep pace with the United States in key high-tech development. Such economic statecraft in advancing AI has allowed Beijing to generate faster effects in economic, social, and security dimensions. Beijing has made the application of AI in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) war preparation a state policy in order to compete with Washington in developing emerging technologies on an even footing. Particularly, the PLA regards the development of unmanned combat aerial vehicle equipment as the point of entry into the AI race against other top powers. Amid the US policy to restrict China’s advancement in AI, China’s new whole-state-system approach in AI R&D will continue to mobilize all available human and material resources to sustain the long and fierce competition with the United States.

Developing an effective security architecture for the Middle East region is a complex problem that is facilitated by the production of pertinent scholarly research. Homegrown research is especially important, as it is more likely to feature the requisite nuanced understanding of local issues than is external research. Based on a small dataset, this paper makes the suggestive argument that at present, the academic literature on Middle East security is dominated by external research, and the limited volume of homegrown research is of lower quality than that produced externally. This state of affairs constitutes an obstacle to the formulation of a sustainable and effective Middle East security architecture. Consequently, policymakers should consider ways of boosting homegrown research on Middle East security.

Saudi Arabia’s turn to regionalism during the past three years, principally in partnership with Egypt, is an expression of both its weakness and its power. Its role as the world’s swing producer in the global oil markets makes it an international power. This economic power, in turn, has allowed the Kingdom to help stabilize weaker economies in the region, like Egypt, that have been hard hit by global recession, inflation, and food insecurity. On the other hand, its military failure in Yemen and the US’s attenuating security commitment have forced it to build regional and inter-regional partnerships for protection and defense. Under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), Saudi Arabia would prefer to impose its will on the region without having to build a regional consensus for its initiatives. But its lack of independent military power has constrained the Kingdom. The Saudi-Egyptian partnership therefore represents a mutual recognition of the limits of their respective power. It also raises the question not merely about who leads whom, but whether the carefully cultivated interdependency between them will hold.

Recent US security policy failures in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect a flawed National Security Council (NSC) process and capacity to identify and prioritize security interests and goals. Failure to recognize and adjust NSC analytical procedures is particularly problematic given growing security challenges, disturbing trends in America, and the fragile state of our Republic. President Joe Biden’s long-awaited national security strategy fails to correct this and is predictably flawed in the same fundamental ways as past NSC efforts. The document voices broad, aspirational goals describing what the administration wants to achieve, but is very ambiguous on the fundamental purpose of a strategy, describing how their goals will be achieved. Specifically, the document’s lofty yet ambiguous language articulates more policy than strategy, reemphasizing a fundamental NSC misunderstanding of strategy. This disconnect has direct implications to successful implementation. Ambiguous goals mean defining intent and formulation of supporting objectives are left to departmental and interagency interpretation. This invariably assures poor implementation towards disparate ends, and recently in abject failure.

The conventional wisdom of US foreign policy has at its core a set of widely held yet underexamined beliefs. Together, these notions constitute the essence of what has become tendentiously known as “the blob,” or the official mind of US national security. Debates and analyses can proceed more productively if foreign policy beliefs, rather than the people who hold them, are moved to the center of analysis. The blob is a mindset, not a group of individuals—one that is based on a few basic assumptions about the world and the United States’ place in it. This article describes what those beliefs are and how they influence US foreign policy.

Italy was the most affected European country at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the European Union was struggling to get its act together and provide assistance to an ally in need, Russia and China used the opportunity to promote their own agendas. The focus of this article is on the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Italy, China’s disinformation campaign, and the uncertain future of the relations between the two countries.

The Middle East has undergone significant changes in the past two decades. Most significantly, the region has experienced the dissolution of the post-1991 America-centric regional security complex as the United States reduces its forces and retools its center of effort toward the Indo-Pacific, and the creation of a new gas-centered sub-regional security complex in the Eastern Mediterranean. These changes have impacted Israel’s stature in its region and have led to significant changes in Israel’s foreign and national security policy. While in the past, Israel viewed itself as a “villa in the jungle”—not as an integral part of the region—it now sees itself as part of its surroundings and is pursuing a much more regional-centric policy. This change is clear in issue-specific alliances and collective security arrangements, as well as in long-range economic relationships. This article analyzes the regional changes and their impact in Israeli strategic thinking and policy.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently reiterated US support for the expansion of the Abraham Accords and called for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. As highlighted by this volume’s authors, the Accords are the most significant regional peacemaking achievement in decades, having already reduced Arab-Israeli tensions—particularly at the government level—and provided opportunities for Arab states to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians. The changing regional security architecture can only be welcomed by the United States. Yet, due to political authoritarianism in the region, the Accords may fall short of their potential if the economic gains fail to reach marginalized populations. This essay contends that trade relations that support job creation and access to water and energy may increase public support. Just as a return to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is important, political reform in the Arab countries is needed to make the Accords successful by bringing more economic benefits to the Arab streets and ensuring that there will not be a “Cold Peace.”

Over the past two decades, a trend has emerged where US partners and allies look outside of their bilateral relationship with the United States and pre-existing multilateral bodies to join ad-hoc networks. They are joining these networks to both obtain their own security goods and to provide regional public goods. Yet, these ad-hoc networks, or “minilaterals,” often include multiple US allies or shared partners of the United States. For example, the revived Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) includes Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, encompassing two separate US treaty alliances. Similarly, the tripartite pact AUKUS connects the US-UK transatlantic alliance relationship to the US-Australia alliance in the Indo-Pacific. The newest addition to this growing trend in minilateralism, the I2U2, which redefine the Middle East as West Asia by bringing together the United States, India, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), provides additional insight into the benefits of minilaterals as mechanisms for organizing interstate cooperation.

COVID-19 and the subsequent global response have had a profound impact on the public health, economic health, and political health in nearly every country. This article examines the biopolitics of power and pandemics in war. Three case studies are presented: the Spanish influenza outbreak of 1918–1920 and responses to the COVID-19 outbreak in both Syria and in eastern Ukraine. The pandemic’s impact has been particularly acute in active warzones, undermining the ability of governments and organizations to enforce public health recommendations, provide for the care of patients, secure supplies, and transmit information.