{"title":"KGB Man: The Cold War's Most Notorious Soviet Agent and the First to Be Exchanged at the Bridge of Spies by Cecil Kuhne","authors":"Harvey E. Klehr","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01151","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"257-259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41518164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The split between the Soviet Union and China had a great impact on other Communist countries, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, or North Vietnam), under the leadership of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP). As the rift between the PRC and the Soviet Union intensified, the VWP tried hard to balance between the two Communist powers so that it could focus on the war against the United States and the conquest of the South. Interactions between the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union highlighted the frequently complex nature of relations within the Communist world during the Cold War.
{"title":"Hanoi's Balancing Act: The Vietnamese Communists and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1960–1965","authors":"L. You","doi":"10.1162/jcws_a_01142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01142","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The split between the Soviet Union and China had a great impact on other Communist countries, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, or North Vietnam), under the leadership of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP). As the rift between the PRC and the Soviet Union intensified, the VWP tried hard to balance between the two Communist powers so that it could focus on the war against the United States and the conquest of the South. Interactions between the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union highlighted the frequently complex nature of relations within the Communist world during the Cold War.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"64-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41788260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite problems with archival access and numerous other obstacles, the field of Cold War studies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has expanded greatly in recent years. Scholars of the Cold War have received generous research funding and have increasingly traveled abroad to do research in other countries’ archives and to participate in international conferences. Since 2010, several new Chinese centers dealing with the history of the Cold War have been established. To familiarize Western scholars with some of the best Cold War scholarship now being produced by Chinese scholars, I have worked with the Journal of Cold War Studies to put out this special issue on “China and the Cold War.” It features six articles from junior and mid-career scholars whose work is representative of the most innovative and illuminating research on the topic by scholars from China.
{"title":"China and the Cold War: Introduction","authors":"Ya-Feng Xia, Zhiyong Liang","doi":"10.1162/jcws_e_01139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_e_01139","url":null,"abstract":"Despite problems with archival access and numerous other obstacles, the field of Cold War studies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has expanded greatly in recent years. Scholars of the Cold War have received generous research funding and have increasingly traveled abroad to do research in other countries’ archives and to participate in international conferences. Since 2010, several new Chinese centers dealing with the history of the Cold War have been established. To familiarize Western scholars with some of the best Cold War scholarship now being produced by Chinese scholars, I have worked with the Journal of Cold War Studies to put out this special issue on “China and the Cold War.” It features six articles from junior and mid-career scholars whose work is representative of the most innovative and illuminating research on the topic by scholars from China.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"5-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42342259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
divided the junta’s leadership and veered sharply toward action after Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides overthrew Papadopoulos in the wake of the crushing of the Polytechnic student uprising in November 1973. When the ultranationalists in the junta plotted a coup for the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios and possible enosis on 15 July 1974, events spiraled out of their control. Turkey invaded the island five days later, the Greek dictatorship collapsed, and Greeks enthusiastically welcomed the restoration of civilian government on 23 July. The U.S. government’s failure to act during the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus inflamed Greek public opinion against Washington for well over a decade. In the concluding chapter the coeditors succinctly highlight the volume’s major contributions and then comment on the shortand longer-term legacies of the authoritarian interlude. Greece left its illiberal period behind and transitioned to a functioning democracy that qualified it for entry into the European Economic Community in 1981. Yet relations with NATO and the United States over the Cyprus imbroglio and Turkey’s challenges to Greek sovereignty in the Aegean remained strained. Overall, the Anastasakis-Lagos volume is a welcome addition to existing scholarship on this dark interlude in Greece’s history. Although all edited volumes face limits and constraints, a more comprehensive profile of the junta could have been constructed with added attention placed on the regime’s attempts to restructure institutions (e.g., elections, plebiscites, constitutions), on the cruelty of the secret police and on the impact of domestic and international resistance organizations.
{"title":"Cold War Social Science: Transnational Entanglements by Mark Solovey and Christian Dayé, eds.","authors":"N. Gilman","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01130","url":null,"abstract":"divided the junta’s leadership and veered sharply toward action after Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides overthrew Papadopoulos in the wake of the crushing of the Polytechnic student uprising in November 1973. When the ultranationalists in the junta plotted a coup for the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios and possible enosis on 15 July 1974, events spiraled out of their control. Turkey invaded the island five days later, the Greek dictatorship collapsed, and Greeks enthusiastically welcomed the restoration of civilian government on 23 July. The U.S. government’s failure to act during the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus inflamed Greek public opinion against Washington for well over a decade. In the concluding chapter the coeditors succinctly highlight the volume’s major contributions and then comment on the shortand longer-term legacies of the authoritarian interlude. Greece left its illiberal period behind and transitioned to a functioning democracy that qualified it for entry into the European Economic Community in 1981. Yet relations with NATO and the United States over the Cyprus imbroglio and Turkey’s challenges to Greek sovereignty in the Aegean remained strained. Overall, the Anastasakis-Lagos volume is a welcome addition to existing scholarship on this dark interlude in Greece’s history. Although all edited volumes face limits and constraints, a more comprehensive profile of the junta could have been constructed with added attention placed on the regime’s attempts to restructure institutions (e.g., elections, plebiscites, constitutions), on the cruelty of the secret police and on the impact of domestic and international resistance organizations.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"217-219"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46713282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article analyzes the aid provided by U.S. and multilateral institutions to Brazilian states during the government of João Goulart in Brazil (1961–1964). Although scholars have long emphasized that John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress employed state-by-state shaped by Cold War goals that helped to destabilize Brazil's political system and to facilitate the advent of a military regime that lasted 21 years, little has been known until now about the amount, characteristics, and impact of these loans. This article presents the first comprehensive list of U.S. dollar loans and cruzeiro grants to Brazilian states during this crucial period of Brazil's history and demonstrates that U.S. aid was strongly guided by political objectives, particularly boosting anti-Communist and pro-U.S. governors for the forthcoming Brazilian presidential elections. Officials in Washington were hoping to keep strategic Brazilian states under U.S. influence in case a military move against Goulart proved necessary.
本文分析了1961-1964年jo奥·古拉特(jo o Goulart)执政期间美国和多边机构对巴西各州的援助。尽管学者们长期以来一直强调，约翰·f·肯尼迪(John F. Kennedy)的“进步联盟”(Alliance for Progress)采用了冷战目标形成的逐国政策，帮助破坏了巴西政治体系的稳定，并促成了一个持续了21年的军事政权的出现，但迄今为止，人们对这些贷款的数量、特征和影响知之甚少。本文首次介绍了在巴西历史上这一关键时期向巴西各州提供的美元贷款和克鲁塞罗赠款的综合清单，并表明美国的援助受到政治目标的强烈指导，特别是促进反共和亲美。为即将到来的巴西总统选举做准备。华盛顿的官员们希望，如果有必要对古拉特采取军事行动，将巴西的战略州置于美国的影响之下。
{"title":"Making the Alliance for Progress Serve the Few: U.S. Economic Aid to Cold War Brazil (1961–1964)","authors":"F. Loureiro","doi":"10.1162/jcws_a_01125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01125","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article analyzes the aid provided by U.S. and multilateral institutions to Brazilian states during the government of João Goulart in Brazil (1961–1964). Although scholars have long emphasized that John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress employed state-by-state shaped by Cold War goals that helped to destabilize Brazil's political system and to facilitate the advent of a military regime that lasted 21 years, little has been known until now about the amount, characteristics, and impact of these loans. This article presents the first comprehensive list of U.S. dollar loans and cruzeiro grants to Brazilian states during this crucial period of Brazil's history and demonstrates that U.S. aid was strongly guided by political objectives, particularly boosting anti-Communist and pro-U.S. governors for the forthcoming Brazilian presidential elections. Officials in Washington were hoping to keep strategic Brazilian states under U.S. influence in case a military move against Goulart proved necessary.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"168-207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45364342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Destination Elsewhere: Displaced Persons and Their Quest to Leave Postwar Europe by Ruth Balint","authors":"Antoine Burgard","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01126","url":null,"abstract":"all stem","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"208-210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46782914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars interested in the role of sports in the Cold War will be intrigued by Degrees of Difficulty, Georgia Cervin’s book about women’s artistic gymnastics. Cervin is herself a former “international gymnast.” Much of the book deals with issues of greater interest to sport historians, ranging from the origins of the sport and its adaptation for women, to the heartbreaking and infuriating details about the abuse of gymnasts that caused the sport such scandal and agony in recent years. Yet Degrees of Difficulty also addresses the intersection of gymnastics and politics in the Cold War, with Cervin promising to challenge “what we know about the Cold War and international relations throughout this period” (p. 4). Among the stars here are Czechoslovakia’s Věra Čáslavská, who became an international celebrity in the 1960s with her gold medal performances and her beauty, to say nothing of her wedding to a fellow Czechoslovak Olympian during the Olympics in October 1968, two months after the Prague Spring had been crushed by Soviet troops. The USSR’s own Olga Korbut became the pig-tailed darling of the 1972 Olympics in part because of her effusive, emotional approach, which was so unlike the robotic demeanor common in elite East-bloc athletes. In 1976, the young Romanian Nadia Comaneci achieved fame across the Cold War divide, despite her robotic demeanor, when she posted the sport’s first perfect score at the Montreal Olympics. Gymnastics diplomacy sometimes served the purposes of the Soviet Union, which generally dominated the sport, but often the story was more complicated. On the medal stand in Mexico City, Čáslavská turned her head down and away during the playing of the USSR’s national anthem to protest the Soviet invasion of her homeland. The Soviet-Romanian rivalry in the 1970s and 1980s saw many outbursts of protest, especially from Romanian coach Bela Karolyi, often stemming from his unhappiness over the judging, which suffered from pro-Soviet bias and corruption. Cervin skillfully shows how all of this went beyond simple division along Cold War ideological lines. Even the Soviet star Korbut sometimes caused problems for Kremlin officials. In the afterglow of Munich, she and her Soviet gymnastics teammates toured the United States, including a White House visit with President Richard Nixon. Cervin credits this trip for helping to create the favorable diplomatic environment for the summit meeting between Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in Washington in June 1973. More troubling for Soviet officials, Korbut’s emotionalism made her popular in the West but
{"title":"Degrees of Difficulty: How Women's Gymnastics Rose to Prominence and Fell from Grace by Georgia Cervin","authors":"John A. Soares","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01137","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars interested in the role of sports in the Cold War will be intrigued by Degrees of Difficulty, Georgia Cervin’s book about women’s artistic gymnastics. Cervin is herself a former “international gymnast.” Much of the book deals with issues of greater interest to sport historians, ranging from the origins of the sport and its adaptation for women, to the heartbreaking and infuriating details about the abuse of gymnasts that caused the sport such scandal and agony in recent years. Yet Degrees of Difficulty also addresses the intersection of gymnastics and politics in the Cold War, with Cervin promising to challenge “what we know about the Cold War and international relations throughout this period” (p. 4). Among the stars here are Czechoslovakia’s Věra Čáslavská, who became an international celebrity in the 1960s with her gold medal performances and her beauty, to say nothing of her wedding to a fellow Czechoslovak Olympian during the Olympics in October 1968, two months after the Prague Spring had been crushed by Soviet troops. The USSR’s own Olga Korbut became the pig-tailed darling of the 1972 Olympics in part because of her effusive, emotional approach, which was so unlike the robotic demeanor common in elite East-bloc athletes. In 1976, the young Romanian Nadia Comaneci achieved fame across the Cold War divide, despite her robotic demeanor, when she posted the sport’s first perfect score at the Montreal Olympics. Gymnastics diplomacy sometimes served the purposes of the Soviet Union, which generally dominated the sport, but often the story was more complicated. On the medal stand in Mexico City, Čáslavská turned her head down and away during the playing of the USSR’s national anthem to protest the Soviet invasion of her homeland. The Soviet-Romanian rivalry in the 1970s and 1980s saw many outbursts of protest, especially from Romanian coach Bela Karolyi, often stemming from his unhappiness over the judging, which suffered from pro-Soviet bias and corruption. Cervin skillfully shows how all of this went beyond simple division along Cold War ideological lines. Even the Soviet star Korbut sometimes caused problems for Kremlin officials. In the afterglow of Munich, she and her Soviet gymnastics teammates toured the United States, including a White House visit with President Richard Nixon. Cervin credits this trip for helping to create the favorable diplomatic environment for the summit meeting between Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in Washington in June 1973. More troubling for Soviet officials, Korbut’s emotionalism made her popular in the West but","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"237-239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41528415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
of time when Truman and Stalin found themselves helping to midwife Israel’s longawaited moment. In mid-1949, however, as the Cold War came into full bloom and Stalin pursued a murderously anti-Semitic campaign in the USSR, the Soviet regime turned vehemently against Israel. That dismal turn of events stood in notable contrast to the remarkable story that preceded it. This is a first-rate book and deserves a wide readership.
{"title":"Eisenhower & Cambodia: Diplomacy, Covert Action and the Origins of the Second Indochina War by William J. Rust","authors":"Radoslav Yordanov","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01135","url":null,"abstract":"of time when Truman and Stalin found themselves helping to midwife Israel’s longawaited moment. In mid-1949, however, as the Cold War came into full bloom and Stalin pursued a murderously anti-Semitic campaign in the USSR, the Soviet regime turned vehemently against Israel. That dismal turn of events stood in notable contrast to the remarkable story that preceded it. This is a first-rate book and deserves a wide readership.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"35 ","pages":"230-233"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41282582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rust argues that the United States overplayed the salience of Communist ideology in international relations while downplaying the history, people, and politics of individual states. U.S. officials in the 1950s tended to reduce the complexity of relations within and among foreign countries to a zero-sum game in which a country was either lost to or won from an international Communist conspiracy efficiently directed by the Soviet Union (p. 18). This challenged Phnom Penh’s overarching security concerns, which had developed independent of global Cold War imperatives and were instead focused on the local rivalry with Saigon and Bangkok. The Eisenhower administration’s reluctance to oppose South Vietnam’s plotting against Sihanouk, whose neutralist tint was deemed less pertinent to U.S. interests, was in agreement with Washington’s desire to maintain Saigon as “a strong anti-Communist bastion in Southeast Asia” (p. 200). Therefore, Cambodia and United States seemed to have reached an impasse in which visions of neutrality and independence from below clashed with the seemingly all-engulfing zero-sum calculus from above. Rust’s book is a valuable, well-researched, and lucidly written case study demonstrating the pitfalls that can develop in diplomatic relations between a superpower and a small state when local imperatives and global interests are mismatched. The added value Rust provides to our understanding of the Cold War’s spread into locales hitherto thought of as insignificant is that it puts similar experiences in perspective. As I read Rust’s findings with rapt interest, I could not help but draw parallels with my earlier study of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union, like the United States, had to deal with rival local actors that almost invariably put their own narrowly defined interests above and before vague and broadly drawn global prerogatives, more often than not managing to elevate the status of their localized cleavages into international crises. Although Rust’s new book may not add much in the way of novel interpretations of the studied period—for that, see Kenton Clymer’s The United States and Cambodia 1870– 1969: From Curiosity to Confrontation (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) and The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000: A Troubled Relationship (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004)—it undoubtedly enriches our knowledge by offering clear and concise analysis of primary material that will interest not only students of Indochina but also those who seek to develop a wider understanding of center-periphery relations during the Cold War.
{"title":"The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History by Austin Jersild","authors":"Ya-Feng Xia","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01136","url":null,"abstract":"Rust argues that the United States overplayed the salience of Communist ideology in international relations while downplaying the history, people, and politics of individual states. U.S. officials in the 1950s tended to reduce the complexity of relations within and among foreign countries to a zero-sum game in which a country was either lost to or won from an international Communist conspiracy efficiently directed by the Soviet Union (p. 18). This challenged Phnom Penh’s overarching security concerns, which had developed independent of global Cold War imperatives and were instead focused on the local rivalry with Saigon and Bangkok. The Eisenhower administration’s reluctance to oppose South Vietnam’s plotting against Sihanouk, whose neutralist tint was deemed less pertinent to U.S. interests, was in agreement with Washington’s desire to maintain Saigon as “a strong anti-Communist bastion in Southeast Asia” (p. 200). Therefore, Cambodia and United States seemed to have reached an impasse in which visions of neutrality and independence from below clashed with the seemingly all-engulfing zero-sum calculus from above. Rust’s book is a valuable, well-researched, and lucidly written case study demonstrating the pitfalls that can develop in diplomatic relations between a superpower and a small state when local imperatives and global interests are mismatched. The added value Rust provides to our understanding of the Cold War’s spread into locales hitherto thought of as insignificant is that it puts similar experiences in perspective. As I read Rust’s findings with rapt interest, I could not help but draw parallels with my earlier study of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union, like the United States, had to deal with rival local actors that almost invariably put their own narrowly defined interests above and before vague and broadly drawn global prerogatives, more often than not managing to elevate the status of their localized cleavages into international crises. Although Rust’s new book may not add much in the way of novel interpretations of the studied period—for that, see Kenton Clymer’s The United States and Cambodia 1870– 1969: From Curiosity to Confrontation (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) and The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000: A Troubled Relationship (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004)—it undoubtedly enriches our knowledge by offering clear and concise analysis of primary material that will interest not only students of Indochina but also those who seek to develop a wider understanding of center-periphery relations during the Cold War.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"233-237"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49233738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article examines the genesis and outcomes of the so-called August Revolution undertaken by the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1945. Drawing on Vietnamese archival materials and ICP resolutions, instructions, and assessments, the article shows that the revolution did not culminate in ICP dominance of Vietnamese politics and that Chinese Nationalist occupation authorities in northern Vietnam were neither cordial nor obliging toward the government established by Ho Chi Minh after he declared Vietnam's independence on 2 September 1945. The so-called bourgeois revolution Ho and the ICP instigated that summer faced insurmountable challenges, including domestic fracturing and contestation, that precluded its swift completion. The August Revolution that inspired Ho's declaration of independence marked the beginning of a bloody internal struggle for power in Vietnam, not its culmination.
{"title":"The Indochinese Communist Party's Unfinished Revolution of 1945 and the Origins of Vietnam's 30-Year Civil War","authors":"Pierre Asselin","doi":"10.1162/jcws_a_01120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01120","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the genesis and outcomes of the so-called August Revolution undertaken by the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1945. Drawing on Vietnamese archival materials and ICP resolutions, instructions, and assessments, the article shows that the revolution did not culminate in ICP dominance of Vietnamese politics and that Chinese Nationalist occupation authorities in northern Vietnam were neither cordial nor obliging toward the government established by Ho Chi Minh after he declared Vietnam's independence on 2 September 1945. The so-called bourgeois revolution Ho and the ICP instigated that summer faced insurmountable challenges, including domestic fracturing and contestation, that precluded its swift completion. The August Revolution that inspired Ho's declaration of independence marked the beginning of a bloody internal struggle for power in Vietnam, not its culmination.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"4-45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44088638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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