Abstract As politics and policymaking appear to increasingly benefit “special interests” rather than the mass public, reformers, politicians, and the public have often embraced campaign finance reform. Nationally, this was most visible in the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (2002), but a number of states have undertaken major overhauls of their campaign finance systems in recent decades. In this article we discuss these changes to state campaign finance law since the early 1990s. In the process, we update and validate Witko's (2005) measure of state campaign finance stringency for the period of 1992 to 2012. In the last part of the article, we discuss what effect recent U.S. Supreme Court and state court rulings will have on future reform efforts.
{"title":"Reform Interrupted? State Innovation, Court Decisions, and the Past and Future of Campaign Finance Reform in the States","authors":"KuleszaChristopher, WitkoChristopher, WaltenburgEric","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0320","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0320","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As politics and policymaking appear to increasingly benefit “special interests” rather than the mass public, reformers, politicians, and the public have often embraced campaign finance reform. Nationally, this was most visible in the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (2002), but a number of states have undertaken major overhauls of their campaign finance systems in recent decades. In this article we discuss these changes to state campaign finance law since the early 1990s. In the process, we update and validate Witko's (2005) measure of state campaign finance stringency for the period of 1992 to 2012. In the last part of the article, we discuss what effect recent U.S. Supreme Court and state court rulings will have on future reform efforts.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0320","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Over the past couple of decades a number of new democracies have adopted anti-defection laws that penalize individual parliamentary deputies for changing their partisan affiliation during the inter-election period. The adoption of these measures seems reasonable in new democracies, where political parties are still weak and are not yet “parliamentary fit” (Sartori 1997), which is an important prerequisite for the proper functioning of parliamentary government. However, it is much more puzzling to find that alone among the more established democracies, India and Israel have also chosen to do so. In this article, we argue that anti-defection laws are adopted in rare circumstances in established democracies: freely elected legislators do not easily choose to give up their freedom of movement in the legislature. In order to uncover the conditions that may lead to such reforms we compare the experience of three democracies: India and Israel, where such reforms were successfully adopted, as well as Can...
{"title":"The Adoption of Anti-Defection Laws in Parliamentary Democracies","authors":"NikolenyiCsaba","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0345","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Over the past couple of decades a number of new democracies have adopted anti-defection laws that penalize individual parliamentary deputies for changing their partisan affiliation during the inter-election period. The adoption of these measures seems reasonable in new democracies, where political parties are still weak and are not yet “parliamentary fit” (Sartori 1997), which is an important prerequisite for the proper functioning of parliamentary government. However, it is much more puzzling to find that alone among the more established democracies, India and Israel have also chosen to do so. In this article, we argue that anti-defection laws are adopted in rare circumstances in established democracies: freely elected legislators do not easily choose to give up their freedom of movement in the legislature. In order to uncover the conditions that may lead to such reforms we compare the experience of three democracies: India and Israel, where such reforms were successfully adopted, as well as Can...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0345","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Minimum membership thresholds are commonly used in democracies as a criterion for political party registration. These thresholds can have the empowering quality of showing a specified level of popular support for a party and/or its ideology, policies, or leader, but are often a simple mathematical test for a new party, without requirements for political activism or internal party democracy. Thresholds for registration, and/or for access to state resources, impact on the style and scope of political discourse in a democracy, and can also be used as a mechanism to limit political competition. This article provides an international focus centering on three countries. Two countries, Australia and New Zealand, are developed democracies with well-established regulatory regimes. The third country, Papua New Guinea, provides a contrast as a developing democracy attempting to strengthen its party system through regulation. The article provides a comparative analysis of the mechanical nature of membership ...
{"title":"Party Thresholds for Registration and Resources—Mechanical Hurdles or Promoting Genuine Political Discourse","authors":"KellyNorm","doi":"10.1089/elj.2015.0339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2015.0339","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Minimum membership thresholds are commonly used in democracies as a criterion for political party registration. These thresholds can have the empowering quality of showing a specified level of popular support for a party and/or its ideology, policies, or leader, but are often a simple mathematical test for a new party, without requirements for political activism or internal party democracy. Thresholds for registration, and/or for access to state resources, impact on the style and scope of political discourse in a democracy, and can also be used as a mechanism to limit political competition. This article provides an international focus centering on three countries. Two countries, Australia and New Zealand, are developed democracies with well-established regulatory regimes. The third country, Papua New Guinea, provides a contrast as a developing democracy attempting to strengthen its party system through regulation. The article provides a comparative analysis of the mechanical nature of membership ...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/elj.2015.0339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Manipulating Elections Across the World","authors":"KerrNicholas","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0355","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0355","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Legal Regulation of Political Parties: Promoting Integrity?","authors":"GaujaAnika","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0354","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0354","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract How does electoral governance affect the quality of elections? This article compares legislative elections in Latin America since re-democratization to verify the relationship between the models of electoral governance and the quality of elections. The logit panel analysis runs on an original dataset on electoral institutions to find that among other features of electoral governance, the delegation to non-partisan actors plays a critical role, being associated with institutional environments with no concerns about the fairness of elections. On the other hand, when political parties manage electoral competition, there is a greater likelihood of concerns about the fairness of the elections.
{"title":"The Role of Political Parties in Electoral Governance: Delegation and the Quality of Elections in Latin America","authors":"T. D. Silva","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0338","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How does electoral governance affect the quality of elections? This article compares legislative elections in Latin America since re-democratization to verify the relationship between the models of electoral governance and the quality of elections. The logit panel analysis runs on an original dataset on electoral institutions to find that among other features of electoral governance, the delegation to non-partisan actors plays a critical role, being associated with institutional environments with no concerns about the fairness of elections. On the other hand, when political parties manage electoral competition, there is a greater likelihood of concerns about the fairness of the elections.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0338","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Political parties are more than key players of democratic politics under the law of democracy. In addition to acting behind the scenes of election lawmaking, political parties regulate themselves in the name of “party autonomy,” and the extra-legal self-regulations they make often have external effects on the democratic political process as a whole. The most important function political parties perform is to select candidates for electoral competition, and how parties regulate candidate selection in general and candidacy in particular exemplifies their role as co-regulators of electoral democracy. Using Taiwan as a case study, this article explores how partisan self-regulation of legislative candidacies has diversified and complicated the qualifications for representatives. It also attempts to grasp the normative significance and implications of partisan rules by theorizing a pluralistic account of democratic authorities and election lawmaking: the pluralism of the law of democracy. By taking plu...
{"title":"The Partisan Ordering of Candidacies and the Pluralism of the Law of Democracy: The Case of Taiwan","authors":"SuYen-tu","doi":"10.1089/elj.2015.0334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2015.0334","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Political parties are more than key players of democratic politics under the law of democracy. In addition to acting behind the scenes of election lawmaking, political parties regulate themselves in the name of “party autonomy,” and the extra-legal self-regulations they make often have external effects on the democratic political process as a whole. The most important function political parties perform is to select candidates for electoral competition, and how parties regulate candidate selection in general and candidacy in particular exemplifies their role as co-regulators of electoral democracy. Using Taiwan as a case study, this article explores how partisan self-regulation of legislative candidacies has diversified and complicated the qualifications for representatives. It also attempts to grasp the normative significance and implications of partisan rules by theorizing a pluralistic account of democratic authorities and election lawmaking: the pluralism of the law of democracy. By taking plu...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/elj.2015.0334","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A global comparison of the laws governing political parties reveals a significant degree of diversity—in the sources from which these laws derive, the specific functions they target, and the extent to which they regulate parties as political organizations and electoral actors. Previous studies have provided accounts of this diversity as the product of institutional arrangements, historical circumstances, and partisan politics, but little research has been done to establish whether international norms and standards play any role. Is there a set of universally accepted principles that govern the regulation of political parties? If not, what are the opposing principles and competing rights that are at play? Although international conventions and other instruments establish a set of basic principles that recognize the qualified right of parties to exist and to contest elections, significant normative disagreements exist surrounding the desirability of parties as electoral actors, qualifications upon ...
{"title":"The Legal Regulation of Political Parties: Is There a Global Normative Standard?","authors":"GaujaAnika","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0332","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A global comparison of the laws governing political parties reveals a significant degree of diversity—in the sources from which these laws derive, the specific functions they target, and the extent to which they regulate parties as political organizations and electoral actors. Previous studies have provided accounts of this diversity as the product of institutional arrangements, historical circumstances, and partisan politics, but little research has been done to establish whether international norms and standards play any role. Is there a set of universally accepted principles that govern the regulation of political parties? If not, what are the opposing principles and competing rights that are at play? Although international conventions and other instruments establish a set of basic principles that recognize the qualified right of parties to exist and to contest elections, significant normative disagreements exist surrounding the desirability of parties as electoral actors, qualifications upon ...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0332","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article considers the appropriateness of state regulation of the internal decision-making processes and organizational structures of political parties. After reviewing the most common arguments made in support of state regulation, the article takes a political science perspective in examining both the practical and democratic implications of such regulation with a focus on parties' internal decision making. While state mandates are often an impulsive response to identified shortcomings in the ways parties operate, I argue here that regulation potentially comes with significant costs to the democratic operation of parties and the role they play in state-wide democracy more broadly. Regulation of the internal functions of parties challenges their role as civil society organizations operating independent of the state. It also dampens opportunity for diversity and experimentation in democratic practice and prioritizes some democratic values over others. State regulation also potentially deprives...
{"title":"Considering the Appropriateness of State Regulation of Intra-Party Democracy: A Comparative Politics Perspective","authors":"P. CrossWilliam","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0337","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article considers the appropriateness of state regulation of the internal decision-making processes and organizational structures of political parties. After reviewing the most common arguments made in support of state regulation, the article takes a political science perspective in examining both the practical and democratic implications of such regulation with a focus on parties' internal decision making. While state mandates are often an impulsive response to identified shortcomings in the ways parties operate, I argue here that regulation potentially comes with significant costs to the democratic operation of parties and the role they play in state-wide democracy more broadly. Regulation of the internal functions of parties challenges their role as civil society organizations operating independent of the state. It also dampens opportunity for diversity and experimentation in democratic practice and prioritizes some democratic values over others. State regulation also potentially deprives...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0337","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The major objective of party finance laws is to create equitable, free, and fair party competition in which the true popularity of policy proposals matter most for electoral outcomes. But to what extent have party finance laws encouraged homogenous financial conditions for fair party competition? This article draws on the level playing field conception prominent in theories of egalitarianism and tests the assumption that party finance regulation eliminates or reduces inequalities arising from unequal starting points. It analyzes data on the party finances of 47 parties in six European countries between 1960 and 2010. The findings indicate that party finance law has been effective in some countries. Specifically, despite significant legislative differences, the introduction of party finance law in Denmark and the Netherlands was most effective in encouraging financial convergence amongst parties and thus more similar financial conditions. The findings suggest that party finance regulation has not ...
{"title":"Does Party Finance Regulation Create a Level Playing Field","authors":"KöllnAnn-Kristin","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0335","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The major objective of party finance laws is to create equitable, free, and fair party competition in which the true popularity of policy proposals matter most for electoral outcomes. But to what extent have party finance laws encouraged homogenous financial conditions for fair party competition? This article draws on the level playing field conception prominent in theories of egalitarianism and tests the assumption that party finance regulation eliminates or reduces inequalities arising from unequal starting points. It analyzes data on the party finances of 47 parties in six European countries between 1960 and 2010. The findings indicate that party finance law has been effective in some countries. Specifically, despite significant legislative differences, the introduction of party finance law in Denmark and the Netherlands was most effective in encouraging financial convergence amongst parties and thus more similar financial conditions. The findings suggest that party finance regulation has not ...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0335","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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