Asia Europe Journal最新文献

This paper highlights the strategic importance of integrating subnational governments into the European Union’s de-risking policy towards China, focusing on their unique contributions to mitigating dependencies and enhancing resilience. While the EU has shifted from a decoupling strategy to de-risking—emphasising diversification and safeguarding critical sectors—the role of subnational entities such as cities and regions remains underutilised. Often at the forefront of international partnerships, these actors engage in sectors vulnerable to geopolitical, economic, and reputational risks, but also present opportunities to support the EU’s strategic objectives. The paper demonstrates how subnational governments can be instrumental in diversifying partnerships across Asia, advancing the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, and contributing to industrial policy, all within the de-risking framework. It proposes a structured, three-step model—recognition, mechanisms for input, and best-practice sharing—to enhance the engagement of subnational actors in EU policies. By leveraging their expertise and local networks, cities and regions can play an essential role in strengthening the EU’s resilience, reducing over-reliance on China, and linking local initiatives with the Union’s broader strategic goals. Through a comprehensive analysis of risks, opportunities, and actionable recommendations, this paper underlines the critical need for multilevel governance in addressing the complexities of EU-China relations, positioning subnational actors as essential contributors to the Union’s de-risking strategy.

The European Union’s policy on China provided the foundation for Germany’s ‘Strategy on China’, published in 2023. By framing China as ‘partner, competitor, and systemic rival’, the EU’s 2019 policy signalled flexibility. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the attempt to weaponise energy imports in 2022 shifted the EU’s focus towards economic security and a ‘de-risking’ approach to China. Germany’s strategy revealed open dissension on two levels: within the ‘traffic light’ coalition government, and between government policy and the interests of German business. Business representatives, pointing to a weakening domestic economy and structural challenges in major industries, questioned the de-risking approach. This internal dissent hindered the development of a consistent China policy and obstructed effective responses to mounting economic and geopolitical challenges. Following the February 2025 election, a new coalition government was formed with the stated aim of reviving the domestic economy and pursuing a more assertive foreign policy. It announced a revision of the China strategy, continuing to follow the principle of de-risking. The first section of this paper examines the formation of Germany’s China strategy. The second section explores geopolitical and industrial factors. The third section analyses the response from German businesses. The fourth section discusses the current government’s approach to China.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made solid progress in pursuing the high-quality development it urgently seeks, placing innovation at the core of its economic strategy. However, much like its initial technological leap during the reform and opening-up era—which was heavily reliant on technology imports—China continues to depend significantly on the West for (certain) advanced innovations and high-end technologies. This reliance helps explain why China remains committed to staying open to the global economy: as a source of raw materials, energy, and technology, and as a vital market for its manufactured goods. At the same time, Beijing is determined to avoid overdependence on foreign countries. This dual aim is reflected in the earlier ‘Dual Circulation Strategy’ (DCS), as well as in more recent concepts such as ‘new qualitative productive forces’ and ‘the country’s innovation system,’ highlighted in the ‘Resolution of the Third Plenum of the Twentieth Party Congress’ of July 2024. In light of this, the European Union (EU) has to contend with a PRC that is deeply nationalistic, proud of its economic achievements, yet also burdened by a faltering economy and a growing sense of strategic encirclement. Recognizing that both the EU and China have substantial stakes in each other’s sustainable growth and prosperity, this policy brief recommends that Brussels seize opportunities to renew dialogue and revitalize bilateral relations. Doing so could persuade Beijing that greater benefits lie in alignment with the EU than with alternative partners. Moreover, in a context of intensifying US-China tensions, reengagement with China may help preserve the functioning of global governance institutions and maintain the EU’s influence on the international stage.

There is a growing scholarly attention to mega cross-border infrastructural projects in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through collaborative Special Economic Zones (SEZs). While existing literature has explored relationships between special zones, usually produced through preferential economic policies, and the outside region, few studies take a view beyond the static demarcation of SEZs. This paper utilizes network power framework through the lens of infrastructuralization to investigate the changing and diversified emphasis of China’s application of the SEZ model. It delves into the development processes of the China-invested Sihanoukville SEZ in Cambodia and the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park in Malaysia. The introduction of the Shenzhen model in the Sihanoukville SEZ brings in the idea and practice of administrative reconfiguration, and the zone becomes a constitutive part of the infrastructure that channels the planning codes into Cambodia. In comparison, with limited space for overseas developers, the zone in Malaysia serves as the infrastructure to secure logistics alternatives in the transnational production network. By investigating the SEZs' multi-faceted process of infrastructuralization, we argue that the SEZs constitute a key hub of the interactive networks and simultaneously an integral part of the channel for cross-border circulation of capital, people, ideas, technical standards, and practices. By transcending conventional territorial boundaries and integrating zoning codes with logistical infrastructures, China has effectively turned SEZs into nodes of both domestic urbanization and transnational power network entanglements. The Chinese model demonstrates the potential of zones to operate beyond enclave logics and instead function as strategic assemblage that rewrite state-market relations.

Energy is the driving force of modern civilization. This paper introduces a global energy governance index (GEGI) based on the pressure-state-response (PSR) model to evaluate and compare Global Energy Governance (GEG) performance among 48 Eurasian nations. The GEGI elucidates the disparities among nations in governance outcomes, closely linked to national income levels and the availability of energy resources. The highest rankings are predominantly held by affluent, resource-rich countries, succeeded by prosperous nations with limited energy assets. Following these are middle-income countries that possess a moderate supply of resources, whereas low- and middle-income nations are relegated to the lower tiers due to their inadequate resource endowments. The international community should focus on eliminating energy poverty, fostering energy security among importers and exporters, and maintaining strong relations among major powers in Eurasia, particularly between China and the EU, to effectively address the global energy and climate crisis.

Southeast Asia’s primary foreign policy challenge amid the intensifying US-China rivalry is commonly framed as a pursuit of neutrality, which is premised on the region’s economic dependence on China and its security reliance on the USA. While widely accepted, the economic side of this framing largely rests on the assumption that China’s economic dominance in the region is indisputable. This article challenges this assumption by reassessing China’s role in Southeast Asia’s manufacturing sector during the 2010s. Empirical evidence shows that, while China was the region’s dominant supplier at the time, its role as an investor with key decision-making power in production networks remained limited. In this article, to better make sense of these results, a typology of sourcing relations centered on the alignment between foreign assemblers and their suppliers was developed, drawn from the FDI and GVC approaches. Two case studies illustrate key outcome categories involving Thailand and Vietnam. The findings suggest that China's economic position in SE Asia during the 2010s was more limited than commonly assumed, though this may be changing with the emergence of new technologies.

The goal of this article is to trace the evolution of Japan’s role in Southeast and South Asian political economy in the 2000s–2010s to understand how Japan’s previously established network power in Asian supply chains has changed amid much-discussed power shifts in the region. The increasing number of emerging and rising regional powers induces Japan to search for new approaches to support strong economic ties with the partners. Some of Japan’s approaches may seek to reflect the needs of the country’s partners, to maintain an image of a responsible stakeholder, while others include trade-offs regarding participation in emerging blocs and continuation of foreign economic policy based on national interests, as formulated by different domestic policy constituencies. The importance of network connections with Southeast Asia (SEA) and adjacent countries such as Bangladesh is determined by the region’s sustained growth potential, Japan’s continuing export-oriented economy and its attempts to stay relevant, while remaining a core node of regional value chains. Domestically, Japan’s reliance on export-led development has implications for debates on neoliberal policies and state capitalism inside Japan proper. Internationally, we seek to elucidate how Japan keeps pursuing its national interests in regional economic policy, while maintaining its existing geopolitical alignments amid increasingly networked regional security. We examine Japan’s policy initiatives and contextualise them within our analysis of trade and investment flows to clarify cooperation priorities and to identify shifts in Japan’s network power in the region.

Research on international students’ study experience has predominantly focused on host countries in Western contexts. This study addresses the need for qualitative research on international students’ experience in the Asian context. Using the U-curve model and psychological contract theory, this study examined the adjustment challenges and cognitive schema of international master’s degree students at two universities in Taiwan. The results showed that psychological contract theory is important in explaining the socio-emotional shifts across the U-curve. We present a five-stage model of adjustment with psychological contract embedded as an intraphase mental framework that guides how students interpret their experiences. Additionally, evidence indicated that the pre-arrival stage plays a critical role in the adjustment process. Furthermore, this study found differences in adjustment between Asian and non-Asian international students. While Asian students encounter social adjustment challenges, non-Asian students encounter challenges with academic adjustment and communication etiquette.

How difficult is the EU to speak in one voice, especially in this digital age? This study uses social network analysis to explore the digital public diplomacy of the EU and its Member States (MS) through their social media activities on Chinese Weibo. It finds that the EU Delegation’s identity as a group leader is recognized by most member states, but generally, it has a weak coordinating role and lacks conversation with the third-country entities. Social identity theory and its extended model are employed to interpret the community formation of the EU and its MS’s communication network, especially how they interchange between an individual country, an EU membership identity, an intragroup identity, and a group identity. The study reveals that most EU MS play a more independent role in their digital public diplomacy activities in China rather than as a member of the Union, and the status of key members, such as France and Germany, is not inferior to that of the EU Delegation at all in the European intragroup in terms of as an information hub. This potentially would weaken the EU actorness at the global level once their voices are different from that of the EU.

Bangladesh, strategically positioned at the crossroads of South Asia and Southeast Asia, has emerged as a focal point for major global powers such as China, India, Japan, and the USA. The interaction of these nations with Bangladesh not only signifies the region’s economic potential but also unveils the complex geopolitical dynamics in action. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has notably expanded its influence in Bangladesh, while India, with historical ties and geographical proximity, plays a critical role in trade, security, and regional stability. Japan and Bangladesh elevated their previous comprehensive partnership to a strategic partnership in 2023. Simultaneously, the USA maintains a longstanding status as the country’s largest export market and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) source. Drawing from the literature on middle power and economic statecraft, this paper sheds light on how Bangladesh navigates the complex dynamics of global geopolitics as a middle power in South Asia. Applying trade, FDI, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) data from 2010 to 2022, our findings suggest that Bangladesh strategically balances the presence of these major powers to safeguard its interests, with their engagements showing more complementarity than competition.