Asia Europe Journal最新文献

This paper explores the impact of infrastructure on trade connectivity among ASEAN and three Asian countries—India, China, and Japan. Our study is mainly motivated by the increased infrastructure investment and trade among these countries in recent years. The main results of trade network analysis include high trade density and interconnectedness among ASEAN, India, China, and Japan. There are specific “trade intensive paths” among the few countries in the group. It highlights the “export hubs” or main “suppliers of intermediate goods” in the region. Further, the paper analyzed the nexus between trade connectivity and infrastructure by applying the panel fixed effects method and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. Moreover, the robustness of the results is tested by estimating two-stage least square. Hard infrastructure, foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in bringing the nexus to trade connectivity. Reducing trade barriers and improving infrastructure quality are essential for deepening regional trade integration.

The European Union-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) is an ambitious regional trade agreement, signed by both parties in 2019 and ratified by the European Parliament in February 2020. Like many other ‘new-generation’ RTAs, this agreement is well known for its WTO + and WTO-X provisions. This paper analyzes typical WTO + and WTO-X provisions of the EVFTA, focusing on their concepts, contents and legal enforceability. This paper argues that environmental and human rights protection provisions, which are ‘grafted’ into the regional trade legal system under the form of WTO-X provisions, do not have the same legal value as WTO + provisions. As a result, the EVFTA remains mainly a trade agreement and cannot be counted upon as the sufficient condition to establish harmonization between pillars of sustainable development.

The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) that was borne but not formally blessed by China and the European Union in late December 2020 is unlikely to survive in its current form, if it survives at all. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the CAI is DOA – dead on arrival – due to EU sanctions and Chinese countersanctions related to China’s persecution of its Uyghur minority; criticism of the negotiated agreement; and changing political calculations by Beijing and among EU member states.

Abstract

As the EU officials and their Chinese counterparts emphasised the end of 2020 as the date for a successful conclusion of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI, the Agreement), the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were sceptical. However, after discussions, with Lithuania appearing to be the most visible opponent of CAI among the Baltic nations, all three eventually upheld the proposal. Understanding that the ratification of CAI is unlikely after the mutual exchange of sanctions between the EU and PRC in March, 2021, the report nevertheless examines the roots of the Baltic position as a case study of inter-EU bargains, inspects what factors contributed to the Baltic position on the issue of CAI, presents the national pro- and counter-arguments to CAI along the domains of geo-politics, values, and economy, and brings up the dilemmas that remain unsolved.

This paper aims to explore various possibilities in the evolving global gas market by constructing game-theoretical models involving the major players: Russia and Qatar exporting gas to the Asia-Pacific and Europe, respectively. We explore a series of hypothetical scenarios based on competitive and collusive settings for the Asia-Pacific LNG market and based on Qatar’s export route to the European gas market. The scenarios that are examined are (1) Russia as the follower and Qatar as the leader in a Stackelberg game; (2) Russia and Qatar as Cournot competitors; (3) collaboration between Russia and Qatar as bilateral monopolies; (4) Qatar exporting gas to European borders; (5) Qatar exporting gas to the last transit country; and (6) Qatar transporting gas to the Turkish border under a multi-pricing scheme. Demand is estimated under each scenario to simulate the respective export volumes, prices and quantities, and profit in each scenario. By exploring these market interactions, we find that it is essential for Russia to strike a deal with Qatar in the Asian market and accelerate their gas production in order to compete as an LNG market leader. Russia is likely to benefit more if it can link with Qatar to act as a monopoly on their segmental demand curve. On the other hand, Qatar’s profit is expected to be higher under the scenario when Qatar sells all the gas to the last transit country as the sole demand point instead of passing through transit countries.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of infrastructure on trade in Central Asia based on the data of three countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Empirical estimations are based on panel data for the period 2010–2018. Infrastructure is measured by quality and quantity indicators. Trade flows are measured by the export and import volumes of each of these countries with their main trade partner countries. The results show that both the quality and quantity of infrastructure in Central Asia have a positive impact on trade flows. However, the positive impact of infrastructure over trade demonstrates a diminishing trend. Given the general remote geographical location of Central Asian countries, the findings of this study indicate that a regional approach to the development of infrastructure is important and that policy towards infrastructure development should be associated with a government policy that facilitates international trade.

How did the financial and trade ties between China and the Eurozone develop in the aftermath of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis? We analyze these trends until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we examine the financial and trade dynamics between the two currency areas and analyze the related risks and opportunities. The data point to several patterns. We find that financial volatility in China has been substantially greater than in the Eurozone. Even so, the largest and strongest Eurozone economies—France and Germany—have largely kept their investments in Chinese assets after a four- to sixfold expansion that started in the mid-2000s. In contrast, the financially weakest countries have accounted for the largest increases in trade volumes between China and the Eurozone. We also find that trade volumes are correlated with holdings of Chinese financial assets but assets rose at a substantially smaller rate than trade. These results show that China and the Eurozone continue to be asymmetrically integrated, whereby Eurozone countries still invest more timidly in Chinese financial assets compared to the aggressive trade and infrastructure partnerships initiated by China. We discuss the implications for future financial and trade integration between the two currency areas, which is bound to deepen in light of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.

The EU and China are both partners and competitors. They share certain common interests but have disagreements on some other issues. Both sides have published a number of policy papers in the past three decades: six by the EU and three by China. This paper will first examine the EU’s policy papers one by one to find how the EU’s China policy evolves and then look at China’s EU policy papers to understand its objectives in relationship with the EU and compare the convergences and divergences between the EU and China revealed by these policy papers. In doing so, some keywords are selected from these documents. Some of them demonstrate how the relationship evolves and some others reveal the rising differences between the two. As the policy papers are important official documents to understand the objectives and actions of both the EU and China, a study of these policy papers would help highlight from where the relationship came and to where it is going.

In 2008, the European Commission perceived the European Union (EU) in an excellent position to collaborate with the five Euro-Arctic states and its strategic partners Canada, Russia, and the USA to shape Arctic governance in the fast-changing environment. However, the Arctic coastal states rejected the EU’s multilateral governance approach, while China has emerged as a significant factor in the Arctic. In 2018, China announced the Polar Silk Road to connect East Asia with Europe via Arctic shipping and other connectivity projects. In 2019, the EU started to perceive China as a systemic rival concerning the Belt and Road Initiative. What is the impact of China on the EU’s Arctic policies in the Euro-Arctic environment? What are the prospects for collaboration between the EU and China on joint issues? This paper applies process tracing to analyse China’s and the EU’s Arctic socialization in the early twenty-first century at three critical junctures of Arctic politics. At these junctures, the paper introduces the Arctic situation and the emerging problems, development in agenda setting, the policy processes, and the outcomes of the EU’s and China’s Arctic approaches. It argues that China’s rise as a maritime and Arctic power and its close relations with Russia along the Northern Sea Route shaped the EU’s Arctic policies and their shift towards the Barents sub-Arctic region. Implications are more interaction among both there, as China’s Polar Silk Road might also challenge the EU’s regulatory approach in the Euro-Arctic.