Asia Europe Journal最新文献

This paper aims to explore various possibilities in the evolving global gas market by constructing game-theoretical models involving the major players: Russia and Qatar exporting gas to the Asia-Pacific and Europe, respectively. We explore a series of hypothetical scenarios based on competitive and collusive settings for the Asia-Pacific LNG market and based on Qatar’s export route to the European gas market. The scenarios that are examined are (1) Russia as the follower and Qatar as the leader in a Stackelberg game; (2) Russia and Qatar as Cournot competitors; (3) collaboration between Russia and Qatar as bilateral monopolies; (4) Qatar exporting gas to European borders; (5) Qatar exporting gas to the last transit country; and (6) Qatar transporting gas to the Turkish border under a multi-pricing scheme. Demand is estimated under each scenario to simulate the respective export volumes, prices and quantities, and profit in each scenario. By exploring these market interactions, we find that it is essential for Russia to strike a deal with Qatar in the Asian market and accelerate their gas production in order to compete as an LNG market leader. Russia is likely to benefit more if it can link with Qatar to act as a monopoly on their segmental demand curve. On the other hand, Qatar’s profit is expected to be higher under the scenario when Qatar sells all the gas to the last transit country as the sole demand point instead of passing through transit countries.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of infrastructure on trade in Central Asia based on the data of three countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Empirical estimations are based on panel data for the period 2010–2018. Infrastructure is measured by quality and quantity indicators. Trade flows are measured by the export and import volumes of each of these countries with their main trade partner countries. The results show that both the quality and quantity of infrastructure in Central Asia have a positive impact on trade flows. However, the positive impact of infrastructure over trade demonstrates a diminishing trend. Given the general remote geographical location of Central Asian countries, the findings of this study indicate that a regional approach to the development of infrastructure is important and that policy towards infrastructure development should be associated with a government policy that facilitates international trade.

How did the financial and trade ties between China and the Eurozone develop in the aftermath of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis? We analyze these trends until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we examine the financial and trade dynamics between the two currency areas and analyze the related risks and opportunities. The data point to several patterns. We find that financial volatility in China has been substantially greater than in the Eurozone. Even so, the largest and strongest Eurozone economies—France and Germany—have largely kept their investments in Chinese assets after a four- to sixfold expansion that started in the mid-2000s. In contrast, the financially weakest countries have accounted for the largest increases in trade volumes between China and the Eurozone. We also find that trade volumes are correlated with holdings of Chinese financial assets but assets rose at a substantially smaller rate than trade. These results show that China and the Eurozone continue to be asymmetrically integrated, whereby Eurozone countries still invest more timidly in Chinese financial assets compared to the aggressive trade and infrastructure partnerships initiated by China. We discuss the implications for future financial and trade integration between the two currency areas, which is bound to deepen in light of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.

The EU and China are both partners and competitors. They share certain common interests but have disagreements on some other issues. Both sides have published a number of policy papers in the past three decades: six by the EU and three by China. This paper will first examine the EU’s policy papers one by one to find how the EU’s China policy evolves and then look at China’s EU policy papers to understand its objectives in relationship with the EU and compare the convergences and divergences between the EU and China revealed by these policy papers. In doing so, some keywords are selected from these documents. Some of them demonstrate how the relationship evolves and some others reveal the rising differences between the two. As the policy papers are important official documents to understand the objectives and actions of both the EU and China, a study of these policy papers would help highlight from where the relationship came and to where it is going.

In 2008, the European Commission perceived the European Union (EU) in an excellent position to collaborate with the five Euro-Arctic states and its strategic partners Canada, Russia, and the USA to shape Arctic governance in the fast-changing environment. However, the Arctic coastal states rejected the EU’s multilateral governance approach, while China has emerged as a significant factor in the Arctic. In 2018, China announced the Polar Silk Road to connect East Asia with Europe via Arctic shipping and other connectivity projects. In 2019, the EU started to perceive China as a systemic rival concerning the Belt and Road Initiative. What is the impact of China on the EU’s Arctic policies in the Euro-Arctic environment? What are the prospects for collaboration between the EU and China on joint issues? This paper applies process tracing to analyse China’s and the EU’s Arctic socialization in the early twenty-first century at three critical junctures of Arctic politics. At these junctures, the paper introduces the Arctic situation and the emerging problems, development in agenda setting, the policy processes, and the outcomes of the EU’s and China’s Arctic approaches. It argues that China’s rise as a maritime and Arctic power and its close relations with Russia along the Northern Sea Route shaped the EU’s Arctic policies and their shift towards the Barents sub-Arctic region. Implications are more interaction among both there, as China’s Polar Silk Road might also challenge the EU’s regulatory approach in the Euro-Arctic.

This paper offers a comparative perspective on a specific issue of the indigenous peoples of the Saami and the Karen. The groups being compared are from Europe and Asia, selected on the basis of their particular circumstances of living in more than one State. However, while the Saami are a relatively well-treated people that enjoy a form of cultural autonomy; the Karen are in a far worse situation with regard to their legal position as well as actual living conditions. The authors examine the cultural, political, and legal aspects of the Saami and the Karen situations and compare their common experience and aspirations. The article attempts to answer the question as to what the similarities and differences between the two indigenous peoples are and what lessons can be learned by those peoples that may be helpful in realizing their aspirations.

This paper presents a comparative approach that discusses whether British newspapers with different political agendas report China differently, in the post-Brexit referendum UK. As UK still remains as a member country of the EU 3 years after the vote, the relationship between China and the UK is still a source that impacts China–EU relations. Specifically, political agendas of British newspapers heavily impact their reports of domestic political issues and of the EU; this research questions whether such a difference can be observed in reports of China or not. The research selects four popular newspapers in the UK, The Sun, The Times, The Guardian and The Mirror, and analyses their coverage of China between 01/01/2017 and 31/12/2018. Among them, The Sun and The Times are right-wing/leaning newspapers and support the Conservative Party, while The Guardian and The Mirror are left-wing/leaning and the Labour Party supporters. This study applies content analysis and compares three perspectives in these four newspapers’ reports of China: the number of reports, the topics of reports and the associations (threats or cooperate) with China. By comparing the similarity and difference in those four newspapers’ coverages, this paper aims to understand what image of China those popular British newspapers were creating for their readers, what impressions of China were generated and whether and how the coverage reflects the changing Sino–UK relations in the post-Brexit era. If so, how the right-leaning and left-leaning newspapers frame China differently.

Chinese outward foreign direct investment (COFDI) in the European Union (EU) has recently attracted much attention. However, we cannot thoroughly understand the case of COFDI in the EU unless we compare it with other countries’ foreign direct investment (FDI). Japanese and Korean firms, including the keiretsu, and chaebol, are also quite active worldwide, including in the EU. The East Asian countries mirror the global power shift to the Asia Pacific and the challenges the EU faces concerning this development. This article examines the home state’s role in each of the three East Asian countries by focusing on how the Japanese, Korean and Chinese states supported their respective firms’ investments into the EU. It shows that COFDI in the EU substantially differs from its Asian counterparts due to its state-firm link, including ownership, policy support, and subsidies. Beijing also differs from Tokyo and Seoul because of its economic statecraft.

In March 2015, the UK applied to become a founder member of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) despite objections from the Foreign Office and Washington, DC, and ahead of other major western countries although they were to follow quickly. What explains the British decision? The paper argues that the underlying long-run reasons included shifting perceptions of American and Chinese power, economic imperatives, the institutional opportunities offered to pursue “venue-shopping” strategies within the British state, and widespread ambivalence about UK policy towards China. Furthermore, although analyses often eschew “snapshot” perspectives, short-run perceptions that the UK could, by joining the AIIB at that point, gain a first mover advantage that would provide greater access to Chinese markets, secure contracts across Asia for British firms, and enable the City of London to win an even greater share of the offshore renminbi trade proved decisive.

Security cooperation has increasingly come to prominence in the realm of relations between the European Union (EU) and China as a policy area primed for fostering deeper bilateral strategic convergence. Where leaders on both sides have talked up security cooperation particularly by pointing to recent successes (on counter-piracy, Iran), EU-China scholars have largely qualified these as exceptions to the rule. The rule being that the gulf between Brussels and Beijing continues to be too wide on norms, geopolitics and trust for them to live up to their ambitious rhetoric on security cooperation. Taking this into consideration, this paper sets out to examine whether the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) — given its magnitude and high stakes — can change the dynamics of bilateral security cooperation. Looking at this through the lens of three distinct theories applicable to the study of EU-China relations, it would appear that even bilateral security overlap pertaining to the BRI cannot reverse these deeply entrenched behavioural patterns.