Asia Europe Journal最新文献

Chinese outward foreign direct investment (COFDI) in the European Union (EU) has recently attracted much attention. However, we cannot thoroughly understand the case of COFDI in the EU unless we compare it with other countries’ foreign direct investment (FDI). Japanese and Korean firms, including the keiretsu, and chaebol, are also quite active worldwide, including in the EU. The East Asian countries mirror the global power shift to the Asia Pacific and the challenges the EU faces concerning this development. This article examines the home state’s role in each of the three East Asian countries by focusing on how the Japanese, Korean and Chinese states supported their respective firms’ investments into the EU. It shows that COFDI in the EU substantially differs from its Asian counterparts due to its state-firm link, including ownership, policy support, and subsidies. Beijing also differs from Tokyo and Seoul because of its economic statecraft.

In March 2015, the UK applied to become a founder member of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) despite objections from the Foreign Office and Washington, DC, and ahead of other major western countries although they were to follow quickly. What explains the British decision? The paper argues that the underlying long-run reasons included shifting perceptions of American and Chinese power, economic imperatives, the institutional opportunities offered to pursue “venue-shopping” strategies within the British state, and widespread ambivalence about UK policy towards China. Furthermore, although analyses often eschew “snapshot” perspectives, short-run perceptions that the UK could, by joining the AIIB at that point, gain a first mover advantage that would provide greater access to Chinese markets, secure contracts across Asia for British firms, and enable the City of London to win an even greater share of the offshore renminbi trade proved decisive.

Security cooperation has increasingly come to prominence in the realm of relations between the European Union (EU) and China as a policy area primed for fostering deeper bilateral strategic convergence. Where leaders on both sides have talked up security cooperation particularly by pointing to recent successes (on counter-piracy, Iran), EU-China scholars have largely qualified these as exceptions to the rule. The rule being that the gulf between Brussels and Beijing continues to be too wide on norms, geopolitics and trust for them to live up to their ambitious rhetoric on security cooperation. Taking this into consideration, this paper sets out to examine whether the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) — given its magnitude and high stakes — can change the dynamics of bilateral security cooperation. Looking at this through the lens of three distinct theories applicable to the study of EU-China relations, it would appear that even bilateral security overlap pertaining to the BRI cannot reverse these deeply entrenched behavioural patterns.

The European refugee issue has become one of the major topics in Europe’s media narratives, its public discourses, and political debates, particularly in the peak period from late summer 2015 to the migration worries driving the Brexit referendum vote in June 2016. This study examines what image Chinese newspapers projects of the EU as a global actor against the backdrop of the refugee issue. The focus is on the coverage of the political and civil responses in European societies toward the issue and the actors and factors behind these responses. Based on a content analysis of 536 news articles from four Chinese newspapers spanning from 2015 to 2017, this study found that Chinese media portrayed a fairly unwelcoming attitude from both political and civil society actors in Europe towards refugees, though civil society actors tend to be more welcoming than political actors. The place of the event, reference to religion, i.e., Muslims, non-Muslims, and Christian, and threat themes, i.e., economic threat, security threat, cultural threat, and health threat, affect Chinese media representation of the European refugee issue, and these factors showed a different concern pattern from political and civil societies. However, the portrayed unwelcoming responses toward the refugee issue do not seem to harm the images of the EU as a Union of integrity and a global actor in Chinese news media. The study concludes with a discussion on the image of the EU as a global actor in Chinese news as well as limitations and directions for future research.

Since the 2008 Beijing Olympic and Global Financial Crisis, the rise of China has been a key topic in the international arena. Capitals in the USA and Western Europe, as leaders of the West, have explicitly expressed their concerns, labelling China as a sharp power, a strategic competitor and a systemic rival. One concern repeatedly raised by Brussels, in recent years, is the potential of deepening the East–West division inside the Union by China’s effort in reinvigorating its relation with countries in Central and Eastern Europe via the 16 + 1 cooperation mechanism. This paper devotes to map the impacts on China perception in the EU member states who are participants in the 16 + 1. Subsequently, it examines whether 16 + 1 has widened the East–West divergence in the EU. Applying public opinion survey data, it is found that the additional communication and cooperation provided by 16 + 1 have not constructed a united identity in Central and Eastern Europe. Basing on the identified differences among Central and Eastern European countries, this paper divides them into four categories: China-friendly, China-neutral, China-polarised and China-sceptic.

Both the EU and China agree on the importance of their bilateral economic relationship, but there are differences in how the relationship is perceived. The gap is reflected in statements from officials, policymakers, business leaders and in the media as well as in policy documents from both the EU and China. While trade and investment flows that are central to the economic relationship generally occur through exchanges between economic actors, the state or polities such as the EU remain an important element in the relationship. This paper analyses the perceptions by the EU of China, the EU itself, the relationship between them, and also its wider global context, and the changes which occur in all of these. The analysis of the development of perceptions in the EU is based on official policy documents. In trade and investment policy, such documents may be considered to represent the positions of the EU based on its domestic policy process and its perceptions of the relationship based on an aggregation of interests. The paper argues that these perceptions have changed in significant ways reflecting developments in the EU and China, the relationship between them and its global context, as well as the interests and goals of the EU.

How does the European Union export its rules and regulations to its partners during free trade negotiations? While the research fields on EU foreign policy promotion abroad and external perceptions seem to have settled on the notion that the success of EU rule export increases with the internalization of the negotiation partner’s wants, this article challenges this academic consensus. Scrutinizing the EU-India free trade negotiations (2007–2013) where the perception of EU norms turned from positive to inherently negative, the article shows that the Commission successfully constructed the notion of congruence between European and Indian standards on multiple (international, bilateral, regional) fronts during an initial “honeymoon phase” (2007–2011). Yet, once the negotiations’ focus shifted to hard bargaining over core interests, the notion of congruence gave way to tensions and discrepancies, so that perceptions turned negative over the “cooldown” (2011–2013). Analysing claims made by EU and Indian policy officials in four Indian English-speaking quality newspapers—Times of India, Hindustan Times, Hindu Business Line and the Business Standard—the article suggests that the discursive construction of congruence with the local context, however successful, cannot prevail against battles over core interests. Hence, this article provides starting points for new academic junctures in that it introduces a more nuanced understanding of the EU’s approach to rule promotion abroad.

In January 2019, the South Korean president Moon Jae In announced his plans for the transformation of the South Korean economy into a “hydrogen economy.” This involves the replacement of fossil fuels for the production of energy on a large scale. The government’s plan supports the use of hydrogen fuel cells (HFCs) for industrial and residential energy production and promotes the replacement of vehicles with internal combustion engines that burn fossil fuel by cars that are powered by HFCs. This study is primarily interested in the plans of the South Korean government to facilitate the production of hydrogen for mobile purposes and to promote fuel cell vehicles (FCVs); and it investigates whether this South Korean policy can be considered a case of ecological modernization. Ecological modernization is a concept that has been developed in a European context and was adopted by the European Union as its main principle in environmental policy making. The new South Korean policy is outlined in the government’s Hydrogen Economy Roadmap which specifies the measures that have to be taken to initiate the transformation of the South Korean transport system based on hydrogen and announces several ambitious goals which the government wants to achieve with this program until 2022, 2030, and 2040, respectively. At its center is an effort to build a nationwide network of hydrogen gas stations, to reduce the price of hydrogen by more than half, and to facilitate the purchase of FCVs. It was found that the overall environmental benefits of this program would be meager in the medium-term, but in the long term it could contribute to a considerable reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and of fine dust, depending on the technology that is used to produce hydrogen.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is one of the greatest challenges of our lifetime. Quite appropriately, the pandemic has been declared a non-traditional security (NTS) threat in many countries in Europe and Asia. Beyond its detrimental effect on public health, COVID-19 is testing the international resolve to cooperate and represents a particularly tricky challenge to regionalism. Due to the nature of pandemics, regional pandemic management is imperative. However, the two most successful regional organisations, the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have not been able to match the resolve of their individual member states, and there is a substantial gap between timely and robust national pandemic management and inadequacy at the regional level. This is a paradox that merits further investigation. To what extent and why diverged early national and early regional responses to COVID-19? This article identifies a causal relationship between robust national pandemic management as a result of early securitisation and ensuing paralysis on regional level, a process which I call the ‘selffulfilling prophecy of realism’—a vicious cycle of national self-help responses paralysing regional cooperation. This article contributes early to the impact of COVID-19 on regionalism by analysing EU and ASEAN pandemic management efforts, investigating what has hindered or facilitated successful regional cooperation and identifying room for meaningful interregionalism.

Taiwan has gained popularity among European university students as an ideal destination in exchange programs. This study aims to compare European students’ perceived Chinese cultural values with those of Taiwanese students and to provide a deeper understanding of the cultural and social interactions of European students in Taiwan. A personal survey and in-depth interviews were administered in five major universities in northern, central, and southern part of Taiwan to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data. European students consider few Chinese cultural values like knowledge, kindness, tolerance of others, and harmony with others higher than those of local Taiwanese students. In few traditional Chinese cultural values like gift giving, courtesy, prudence, Taiwanese students value them with higher scores than European students do. With reference to the Chinese culture in particular, European students have to deal with different teaching styles and different norms while communicating with instructors and local students in Taiwan. Five themes were formalized to describe European students’ experiences in Taiwan focusing on lifestyles, acculturative stress, learning, language issues, and social interactions with local people. The learning adaptation, individually distinctive, converges to positive experiences through socio-cultural interactions, which makes the experiences valuable and precious. European students do not overlook European ways of engaging with instructors, but they perceived, internalized and demonstrated their learning process in Taiwanese higher education. Cultural interactions enrich teaching and learning environment which benefits European students and Taiwanese students to a great extent.