Asia Europe Journal最新文献

Over 10,000 South Korean nurses were sent to West Germany in the 11-year period between 1965 and 1976. It is known that they were dispatched because of South Korea’s need for capital and expertise after the Korean War (1950–1953). To assist in this endeavor, West Germany helped South Korea through development support (educational aid). However, Korean nurses were not simply trainees since they had received a proper education and qualifications. Thus, this “educational aid” could critically be termed little more than “labor trade” because the highly educated nurses were forced to take work with lower wages than their background warranted.

In line with the global trend toward electrification, the focus of recent Chinese investment in Europe has shifted to the field of electric vehicles. The largest and most controversial investment is Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited’s (CATL) battery factory in Hungary, following its initial success in Germany. Although the Hungarian national government and local authorities unanimously supported this mega gigafactory, it has provoked heated disputes among opposition parties, experts, and local communities. Drawing on over 900 news articles related to CATL published between April 2022 and February 2024, this study examines how CATL’s investment is portrayed in the Hungarian media. Using content analysis, I analyzed the overall sentiments of the CATL project by divergent media outlets with varied political orientations. Using narrative analysis, I further investigated how narratives in the Hungarian media consolidate the support and opposition to the CATL project. The findings shed light on the controversial debate over the case of CATL in Hungary and offer significant implications for Hungary and other integrated peripheral countries competing for foreign battery-related investments. Moreover, the findings suggest the importance of implementing locally tailored corporate social responsibility initiatives to ensure the successful and long-term development of Chinese investments in the host country.

The article has two objectives. The first one is to advance the existing studies on civil wars by developing a comparative approach. It explores similarities and differences between the Finnish and Korean experiences. The broader objective of the article is to initiate a project to explore potential connections between the Nordic region and the Korean peninsula. There are various direct and indirect linkages between the Nordic countries and Korea. Finland had long been part of Sweden and then part of Russia. Finland achieved independence, but it was immediately overshadowed by the war. Korea had long been influenced heavily by China and then colonised by Japan. Independence brought sunshine on the peninsula, but it soon disappeared with the Korean War. Against this backdrop, the article investigates the civil wars in Finland and Korea. In order to go beyond the existing research, the article pays attention to popular culture (film) depicting the two wars. The article also sheds light on how Finland and Korea have tried to pave the way to reconciliation. If the war still divides Finland even after 100 years, the reconciliation process in Korea would be much more complex and difficult.

Europeanising the Western Balkans is exceptionally intricate in times of crisis. China’s growing engagement in the region has made it more complicated. The European Union (EU) would be in a better position if it learns to accommodate other external actors in the area, shifting its focus from a parochial partnership to a pragmatic one. Irrespective of the rhetorical systemic rivalry, China has brought and will continuously bring funding and expertise to the Western Balkan countries. After all, chronic underdevelopment, in no small part, has kept them away from gaining EU membership. Therefore, even though the realist idiom warns that two tigers cannot coexist in one mountain, the Western Balkans can and should accommodate more external actors if regional stakeholders, such as the EU and China, can take the region’s development seriously. Specifically, the article examines the convergence of EU-China interests in land transport infrastructure development in the Western Balkans.

China’s approach to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as a group has drawn suspicion, criticism, and competition within and beyond the region, particularly given that the economic results have failed to satisfy CEE countries. Arguably, China adopts a functional approach to China-led multilateral platforms by employing soft law to govern interaction and cooperation among participants involved, aiming to increase its capacity to adapt to changing international circumstances and lessen concerns about sovereign costs among the participating actors. Yet, it is also widely acknowledged that pragmatic thinking ineluctably yields to a realist mentality, leading to more commentaries on China’s unfulfilled influence across different regions to some extent. This article believes that soft law can still have a role to play in the context of geopolitical competition, as shown in China–CEE cooperation.

Following the 2016 vote to leave the European Union, the British government sought to construct the UK as “Global Britain” to reinvigorate its foreign policy. Subsequently, in 2019, the UK government announced a “Pacific Uplift” to facilitate greater engagement with the Pacific Island States. Alongside Australia’s “Pacific Step Up” and New Zealand’s “Pacific Reset”, this engagement is part of a wider shift in foreign relations as Western powers seek to counter perceived Chinese influence in the region. Within this article, I consider the changing relationship between the UK and the Pacific Island States. I argue that the UK’s “Pacific Uplift” was shaped by colonial legacies despite the absence of discussion of them. I contend that the UK’s re-engagement with Pacific Islanders is influenced by the announcement of the Australian-UK-US (AUKUS) security alliance and the UK’s wider military presence continues to be framed by colonial legacies. Finally, I argue that climate-ocean governance has been utilised by the UK to leverage influence as a partner rather than a former colonial power. I advocate for greater scrutiny of the UK’s changing relationship with Pacific Island States.

Term limit changes are significantly linked to political instability in Africa. Yet, it is ignored as an issue in the trilateral cooperation between European Union (EU), China and Africa. Indeed, a central question that could face both the EU and China over term limits in Africa is the extent to which it is legitimate for them to take action against attempts to violate term limits. This paper is an attempt to consider joint EU and China influence on African politics from the perspective of term limits. Why and how have/should EU and China respond to term limits? How can a trilateral cooperation between EU, China and Africa help institutionalize the respect of term limits? With the help of qualitative and quantitative data from official communiqués, events, and reports, the paper considers term limits as major political issue EU, China and Africa must care about given that it is a major factor of State fragility and political instability. It finds that a grounded trilateral policy framework on term limits is not only possible in an EU-China-Africa cooperation, but can strengthen democratic institutions in the continent and reflect the genuine commitment of the EU and China to promote sustainable democracy and political stability in Africa. If the EU and China want sustainable development of Africa, then the issue of presidential term limits must be significantly addressed within a trilateral cooperation.

China has shifted its strategy towards engaging with Europe in Africa from passive engagement to active encouragement. As China has been promoting third-party market cooperation as a new model of cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, Europe is considered a major partner, especially in African markets. This article examines how Chinese policy thinkers and businesses perceive third-party market cooperation with Europe in Africa. Through firsthand interviews, the authors find a high consensus on the Chinese side regarding the necessity of third-party market cooperation with Europe in Africa. This model is also considered a “Europe-friendly” approach to invite European governments’ participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, and an attractive proposal to European firms looking for access to more financing. Though Chinese companies see working with European companies in the African market as a normal business practice, most have been passive collaborators rather than active engagers. Drawing from secondary resources, we also briefly compare European and African views.