Asia Europe Journal最新文献

In this article, we explore the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a case of “Contingent Power Extension” (CPE) towards the European Union (EU), assessing its implications for regional (dis)integration in the latter. CPE is a conceptual prism that interprets the BRI as a polymorphous, dynamic, and context-specific mechanism through which Chinese foreign policy elites intend to convey, amplify, and legitimize the regime’s power-reach into other regions, including the EU. Along two examples—the 14 + 1 Cooperation Forum and the Port of Genoa in Italy—we examine the power dynamics of the BRI by tracing (a) the processual impact of power extension towards the EU and (b) the (un)intended consequences for the EU in terms of (dis)integration. The findings of our analysis provide an insight into the multicausal relations between the BRI and European (dis)integration not as a static outcome but rather as a contested process of struggle. The article concludes by discussing whether and how the EU can strengthen its own institutional foundations and use its systemic leverage to respond to the BRI while enhancing regional integration in the process.

Amid rising uncertainty in the global economy and unprecedented economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the concept of supply chain resilience has gained increasing popularity in ASEAN and the EU. However, by comparing their paths to resilient supply chains, this article argues that while both organizations regard resilience as a departure from past doctrines of pure economic efficiency, each has a different understanding of and approach to supply chain resilience. While for ASEAN, supply chain resilience is meant to reconcile inward- and outward-looking dimensions to support ASEAN competitiveness, within the EU, resilience is associated with the search for strategic autonomy with an internal focus. Despite these differences, both groups regard sustainability and digital transformation as crucial components of supply chain resilience, which they see as a way to enhance their economic cooperation and strategic partnership.

Chinese universities are undergoing a decentralization reform that academic schools take the responsibility for its own running. Under the framework of the financial management system of “Unified Leadership, Two-level Management, and Centralized Accounting,” this decentralization reform primarily targets to establish a cost accounting and settlement system for various undertakings with schools as the main body; build a multi-level economic responsibility system centered at the school; and establish and improve efficient system restraint mechanism, supervision and management mechanism, accountability mechanism, and performance evaluation mechanism. The main purpose of this study is to introduce a case of a Chinese university concentrating on this reform. The primary contents of the reform will be introduced, followed by a discussion about some responses and introspections to the reform.

Abstract

Abstract

This study analyses the effects of the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) on Japan and the EU’s 28 countries since it was enforced in 2019. The Japan-EU EPA has positive beneficial effects on the two participating economies, Japan and the EU. The removal of trade barriers and NTMs leads to more competition, more trade efficiency improvements, and ultimately more benefits to the participating countries/regions. Japan and the EU can benefit from the Japan-EU EPA by removing tariffs as a part of a trade liberalisation policy. The reduction of NTMs is important to liberalise international trade and get more benefits from the Japan-EU EPA. The Japan-EU EPA and trade liberalisation deal can contribute to not only Japan and the EU’s bilateral trade but also mutual GDPs and welfare levels. However, while non-participating countries, such as South Korea, may be negatively affected by the Japan-EU EPA, it produces positive overall welfare effects for the rest of the world.

The China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) is a balanced, high-level, and mutually beneficial investment agreement. It not only sets up a new legal framework for China-EU economic and trade relations, but also provides stability for China-EU bilateral relations in an uncertain world experiencing major changes.

The major objective of the China-EU CAI was to facilitate a rebalancing of the bilateral relationship by improving access for European companies to the Chinese market and leveling the playing field for them in China. While progress on the former is hard to deny, the situation is less rosy on the latter, and whether China will expeditiously implement its commitments remains an open question. France—one of the driving forces behind the deal—shares the European Commission’s optimism and considers that the agreement represents a step forward and a sign of China’s willingness to open up further.

This article offers a novel understanding of China’s changing engagement in global climate governance over the past decade. This article argues that China has embedded the construction of its international identity, which has been transforming towards what this article conceptualizes to be a ‘Yinling leading power’, in promoting and leading global climate governance. China’s transforming identity construction has contributed to changing its construction of climate justice and led China to proactively undertake more responsibilities, provide international public goods and promote international climate cooperation. Global climate governance has become one of China’s prototypical discursive frames in constructing its new international identity, an important platform where China seeks to share leadership with other major powers and the climate leadership in turn constitutes China’s new identity. However, China’s inadequate response to international expectations and lack of self-reflection in its climate policy have influenced international recognition on its climate leadership and new identity. In general, China’s transforming identity construction and its reconstruction of climate justice have far-reaching implications for China and Europe to cooperate and coordinate in strengthening global climate justice and promoting global climate governance.

Climate justice is a concept with many different and competing interpretations. It has salience at intra-country, inter-country and intergenerational levels of climate politics. While inter-country climate justice has long been on the agenda of United Nations climate negotiations, the intra-country and intergenerational aspects of climate justice have assumed new prominence in many countries in recent years, as the economic consequences of mitigation became felt and transnational activism highlighted youth concerns. The diverse elements of and approaches to climate justice have this in common: realising them requires massive financial interventions and reforms. This article examines the still emerging frameworks to finance climate justice in two of the jurisdictions most important to the global response to climate change: the European Union and the People’s Republic of China. The EU and China have in common that they are both on the front line of financial innovation to respond to climate change. They are utilising similar tools of systemic financial intervention in order to transition financing to climate-friendly investment, in the first case domestically, but with clear implications for global financial markets. However, the EU and China are utilising climate financing mechanisms in the context of very different prevailing perspectives on climate justice. This article interrogates the relationship between these different perspectives on climate justice and the distribution, scale and pace of climate finance. The article also observes that while the EU incorporated climate justice considerations in its economic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic with a recovery package prioritising climate action, China did not take the opportunity to foster a ‘green recovery’.