Asia Europe Journal最新文献

Negotiations between the European Union (EU) and India regarding a free trade agreement (FTA) have been hindered by numerous difficulties and disagreements since they began in 2007. A few studies have pointed at various key points of contention, including inter alia tariffs on sensitive products, intellectual property rights, trade in services, and chapters on non-trade issues. Despite a long-standing body of research into the ways in which interest groups, particularly business interests groups, influence economic policymaking and the outcomes of trade negotiations, the preferences of interest groups — especially on the Indian side — have been largely overlooked in the context of the FTA negotiations. This is reflective of a general lack of research on preferences toward trade agreements of interests groups in the Global South. In this paper, I analyse the preferences toward the agreement of India’s most influential chamber of commerce: the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The analysis shows that, since the start of negotiations, FICCI’s perception of the FTA has been deeply ambivalent and the policy preferences of the chamber are not likely to be met by an FTA between the EU and India. Additionally, the chamber’s preferences toward certain chapters of the agreement, particularly toward the key issues, may limit Indian negotiators’ ability to compromise, with several potential implications for the final agreement.

Pushed by structural transformations of geopolitics and world economy, China had to adjust its policy toward the European Union (EU) continuously during the period of 2014–2019, in pace with the dramatic changes in the European political landscape and the European Union’s policy orientations. During this process, the role of Chinese foreign policy think tanks has become more prominent and complex. This article conducts a comparative case study of the central-level China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and the provincial-level Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), analyzing mechanisms of their influence over China’s EU policy. Based on a theoretical paradigm that interprets think tanks as the “central space” in a “field of power,” this article establishes an analytical framework regarding the policy influence of CIIS and SIIS as being determined by their differentiated positions within China’s foreign policy-making structure. It compares the flows of CIIS and SIIS publications on EU policy issues and the issuing of EU policy documents by the Chinese government, with a particular focus on the economic dimension of the relationship. It reveals patterns of synchronization and succession between think tank advice and official policy endorsements. Also, it analyzes the structural characteristics of meetings on EU policy sponsored by CIIS and SIIS, disclosing their varied connections with central and provincial policymakers, as well as other political actors. Generally speaking, the CIIS is in a more advantageous position than the SIIS. The findings also confirm the trend of a new round of centralization in China’s policy process.

In recent times, the European Commission has shown to have increasing difficulty keeping up its central position in trade diplomacy towards China, in the face of a growing wariness and assertiveness of the member states. In this article, we observe a changing balance, a development from EU diplomacy towards European diplomacy, meaning a growing influence of EU member states in the process. We call this the “Europeanisation” of EU economic diplomacy. This is not limited to China and reflects a broader development, as is visible in the politicisation of the negotiation processes towards the (failed) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the (provisionally applied) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, and also in the trend towards mixed agreements that require member state ratification. However, it was particularly in the relations with China that such trends became visible for the first time and have continued to manifest themselves throughout the years. Apart from the member states assembled in the Council, also the European Parliament has strengthened its position in the process at the expense of the Commission.

China’s rise, along with deepening Sino-European economic relations, seems to have a strong impact on the diplomatic outlook of actors in Europe. An interesting phenomenon is that, while several major European states have become strategic partners of China, they remain US allies at the same time. In the context of trade tensions and a possible decoupling between China and the USA, what are the diplomatic effects of the close economic relations between Europe and China? To find the answer, this study builds models on the functions of trade and partnerships with China with respect to voting choice of China’s partners, including those in Europe, in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). After making a statistical analysis and presenting detailed analysis on France, Germany, the UK, and Poland, this paper finds that the close economic and trade ties do indeed enhance voting similarity between China and major states in Europe in the UNGA.

In the period between 2015 and 2020, we have witnessed an increase in ‘system friction’ in the trade and investment relations between the EU and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This paper focuses on the meaning of this notion of ‘system friction’, originally coined by Sylvia Ostry and on how the EU and especially the European Commission reacted to this friction. This notion might present an alternative to the notion of ‘system rivalry’. The result of system friction in the relation between the EU and the PRC had been a convergence towards more trade defensive moves. A form of managed trade with help of a ratified Investment treaty between the two sides might be a potential outcome.

The Visegrad Group format — coordinated policy forum for Czechia, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary — has been dubbed as a significant policy tool that advocates the interests and builds synergies among the four partners. The “Visegrad Four + ” format, which coordinates foreign relations of these four countries, has been narrated as the key foreign policy venue of the V4, and the V4 + Japan is often understood as the key partnership within this format. Due to the recently growing Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and the impacts of the war in Ukraine in 2022, many have come to expect the coordination to strengthen and ramify. This article argues, however, that the V4 + Japan platform represents only a marginal policy forum and is unlikely to gain any significant political momentum in the foreseeable future. Basing the analysis on a set of interviews with the V4 and Japanese policymakers, the paper posits three reasons that have prevented the deepening of the V4 + Japan coordination: (i) there are significant limits to socialization in the group, (ii) there are diverse threat perceptions among V4 members, and (iii) there is little interest in deepening economic coordination vis-a-vis third parties. These findings question the viability of foreign policy coordination among the Visegrad Group members, and highlight the impediments for the expansion of V4 + Japan cooperation.

As two major powers that are willing to lead the design and evolution of the global climate regime, the EU and China have maintained a dialogue on climate change and biodiversity while clashing over other economic and political issues. This paper investigates EU-China relations in the global climate regime by briefly analysing three main areas that are key for the global green transition: standardization, green taxonomy, and the renewables sector. The paper claims that EU-China relations in the global climate regime develop within the dialectical collaboration-competition nexus, showing moments of consensus as well as contention between the two major powers in the three selected cases.

Abstract

To address environmental problems, efforts to green financial systems are proliferating across the globe. However, green finance policy approaches differ substantially and in ways left unexplained in current literature. Focusing on the EU and China as the most active and influential in green finance, the paper provides a comparative analysis and conceptualization of their approaches. The analysis is based on the dissection of policy documents, a review of stakeholder statements and articles, and insights from semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The paper finds that in terms of similar characteristics, both parties seek inclusive expertise input, establish thematic committees, and initiate green finance efforts through financial system-wide guidelines. In terms of different characteristics, the paper finds that through a consultation-based, transparent, and limited mandate approach, the EU is characterized by longer time horizons and organic growth. This can be contrasted with the Chinese technocratic, closed-door, and non-limited mandate approach, characterized by rapid rollout and command-and-control growth. These findings can be conceptualized as a bottom-up market-facilitating approach in the EU and a top-down market-steering approach in China. The different approaches help explain current difficulties in coordination between the EU and China and imply that cooperation is only possible through compatibility rather than harmonization. The findings show that different governance models can actively use the state to pursue sustainable development, and second that such an active state can function in very different ways towards the same goals.

After the introduction of the 16 + 1 cooperation platform in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 2012, bilateral relations between China and Czechia warmed up in the period 2015–2017, most notably when they became strategic partners in 2016. However, relations declined thereafter due to factors such as China’s underwhelming investment programme, the Czech focus on security and human rights, and some Czech politicians’ engagement with Taiwan. This article analyses the shortcomings inherent in Chinese and Czech interpretations of their partner’s approaches to the relationship. The analysis demonstrates that several factors have undermined China’s efforts to build solid bilateral relations. Above all, China’s misunderstanding of the ways in which the Czech political system and culture influence the formulation of Czech policy towards China, combined with underwhelming economic results, have undermined China’s diplomatic efforts. At the same time, the fragmentation of Czech political power structures means that it is difficult for Czechia to form a stable consensus on China policy. In addition, lack of understanding of China’s history and the contemporary context of its foreign policy means that Czech views on China have become politicised and polarised. These problems have seriously affected the mutual trust and development of relations between the two countries, in the same way as they have impacted relations between China and other CEE countries, most notably Lithuania.