Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion argues, against intuition, that for any world A, another world Z with higher population and minimal well-being is better. That intuition is incorrect because the argument has not considered resources that support well-being. Z must have many more resources supporting well-being than A does. Z is repugnant because it spreads those resources among too many people; another world with Z’s resources and fewer people, if available, would be far superior. But Z is still better than A; it is worth accepting its very large population to get the resources needed to support their well-being.
{"title":"Resources and the acceptability of the Repugnant Conclusion","authors":"Stephen J. Schmidt","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.20121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.20121","url":null,"abstract":"Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion argues, against intuition, that for any world A, another world Z with higher population and minimal well-being is better. That intuition is incorrect because the argument has not considered resources that support well-being. Z must have many more resources supporting well-being than A does. Z is repugnant because it spreads those resources among too many people; another world with Z’s resources and fewer people, if available, would be far superior. But Z is still better than A; it is worth accepting its very large population to get the resources needed to support their well-being.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"41 1","pages":"113-128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77247084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principles for coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider several objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected.
{"title":"Norms for pure desire","authors":"Víctor M. Verdejo","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.19624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.19624","url":null,"abstract":"According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principles for coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider several objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"19 1","pages":"95-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90693550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to clarify certain features of the systematicity arguments by a review of some of the largely underexamined background in Chomsky's and Fodor's early work on transformational grammar.
{"title":"Some theoretical and empirical background to Fodor’s systematicity arguments","authors":"K. Aizawa","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.20464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.20464","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to clarify certain features of the systematicity arguments by a review of some of the largely underexamined background in Chomsky's and Fodor's early work on transformational grammar.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"25 1","pages":"29-43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76170992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper assesses Fodor's well-known argument from multiple realizability to nonreductive physicalism. Recent work has brought out that the empirical case for cross-species multiple realizability is weak at best and so we consider whether the argument can be rebooted using a "thin" notion of intra-species multiple realizability, taking individual neural firing patterns to be the realizers of mental events. We agree that there are no prospects for reducing mental events to individual neural firing patterns. But there are more plausible candidates for the neural realizers of mental events out there, namely, global neural properties such as the average firing rates of neural populations, or the local field potential. The problem for Fodor's argument is that those global neural properties point towards reductive versions of physicalism.
{"title":"Fodor on multiple realizability and nonreductive physicalism: Why the argument does not work","authors":"J. Bermúdez, Arnon Cahen","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.20772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.20772","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses Fodor's well-known argument from multiple realizability to nonreductive physicalism. Recent work has brought out that the empirical case for cross-species multiple realizability is weak at best and so we consider whether the argument can be rebooted using a \"thin\" notion of intra-species multiple realizability, taking individual neural firing patterns to be the realizers of mental events. We agree that there are no prospects for reducing mental events to individual neural firing patterns. But there are more plausible candidates for the neural realizers of mental events out there, namely, global neural properties such as the average firing rates of neural populations, or the local field potential. The problem for Fodor's argument is that those global neural properties point towards reductive versions of physicalism.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"25 1","pages":"59-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77334503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or "rational-causal" process, but can only be a "brute-causal" process of acquisition. This position generates the "doorknob --> DOORKNOB" problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor's taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call "intelligible-causal processes." Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than Fodor's to the doorknob --> DOORKNOB problem.
Jerry Fodor认为，概念习得不可能是一个心理或“理性-因果”过程，而只能是一个“野蛮-因果”的习得过程。这个位置产生了“门把手->门把手”问题:为什么概念通常是基于对其扩展项的经验获得的?我认为福多的因果过程分类法需要补充，并描述了第三种类型:我称之为“可理解的因果过程”。有了这个新分类，我提出了一个我认为比福多更好的回答“门把手”问题的方法。
{"title":"Not rational, but not brutely causal either: A reply to Fodor on concept acquisition","authors":"L. Antony","doi":"10.1387/theoria.21031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21031","url":null,"abstract":"Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or \"rational-causal\" process, but can only be a \"brute-causal\" process of acquisition. This position generates the \"doorknob --> DOORKNOB\" problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor's taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call \"intelligible-causal processes.\" Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than Fodor's to the doorknob --> DOORKNOB problem.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"20 1","pages":"45-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75233902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.
{"title":"Fodor and demonstratives in LOT","authors":"Una Stojnić, E. Lepore","doi":"10.1387/theoria.20906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20906","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"20 1","pages":"75-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74201558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jerry Fodor's arguments for a language of thought (LOT) are largely theoretical. Is there any empirical evidence that supports the existence of LOT? There is. Research on Global Aphasia supports the existence of LOT. In this paper, I discuss this evidence and why it supports Fodor's theory that there is a language of thought.
{"title":"Global aphasia and the language of thought","authors":"F. Adams","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.20430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.20430","url":null,"abstract":"Jerry Fodor's arguments for a language of thought (LOT) are largely theoretical. Is there any empirical evidence that supports the existence of LOT? There is. Research on Global Aphasia supports the existence of LOT. In this paper, I discuss this evidence and why it supports Fodor's theory that there is a language of thought.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"225 1","pages":"9-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85997657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the 19 th century, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity, according to which methods and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important say in the social sciences. In the 20 th century, this thesis was considered unacceptable as part of the sharp separation of biology from the social sciences. Recent advances in the biological sciences suggest a way in which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated, to suggest new ways of explaining innovation in the social sciences. Key kinds of innovation can be explained in terms of the evolution of robust complex systems, interpreted as processes of path creation.
{"title":"What is innovation? New lessons from biology","authors":"Sergio F. Martínez","doi":"10.1387/theoria.18863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18863","url":null,"abstract":"During the 19 th century, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity, according to which methods and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important say in the social sciences. In the 20 th century, this thesis was considered unacceptable as part of the sharp separation of biology from the social sciences. Recent advances in the biological sciences suggest a way in which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated, to suggest new ways of explaining innovation in the social sciences. Key kinds of innovation can be explained in terms of the evolution of robust complex systems, interpreted as processes of path creation.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"28 1","pages":"343-355"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81059698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken.
{"title":"The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem","authors":"C. Hoefer, C. Viger, Daniel Viger","doi":"10.1387/theoria.20040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20040","url":null,"abstract":"We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"517 1","pages":"407-421"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77149000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper takes an organicist perspective of Jan Swammerdam's conception of metamorphis which allows us to identify a continuity betweem W. Harvey's epigenetism and G.W. Leibniz' preformationism – two historically opposed perspectives. In line with this reading, I provide a critical assessment of the different preformationist interpretations of Swammerdam. The thesis that I defend in this paper is that the idea of preformation does not imply so much a theory about the origin of the embryo but a model of ontogenetic development that cannot be catalogued as mechanistic or as vitalist.
{"title":"Jan Swammerdam and the limits of preformationism","authors":"Miguel Escribano Cabeza","doi":"10.1387/theoria.20336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20336","url":null,"abstract":"This paper takes an organicist perspective of Jan Swammerdam's conception of metamorphis which allows us to identify a continuity betweem W. Harvey's epigenetism and G.W. Leibniz' preformationism – two historically opposed perspectives. In line with this reading, I provide a critical assessment of the different preformationist interpretations of Swammerdam. The thesis that I defend in this paper is that the idea of preformation does not imply so much a theory about the origin of the embryo but a model of ontogenetic development that cannot be catalogued as mechanistic or as vitalist.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"60 1","pages":"423-439"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77174837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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