In this paper a critique to philosophical approaches that presuppose invariant knowledge for policy purposes is carried out. It is shown that socioeconomic processes do not fit to the logic of stable causal factors, but they are more suited to the logic of "open-ended results". On the basis of this ontological variation it is argued that ex -ante interventions are not appropriate in the socioeconomic realm. On the contrary, they must be understood in a “dynamic” sense. Finally, derivational robustness analysis is proposed as a useful tool for overcoming the problem of “overconstraint”, a typical problem of economic models.
{"title":"Socioeconomic processes as open-ended results: Beyond invariance knowledge for interventionist purposes","authors":"Leonardo Ivarola","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16184","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper a critique to philosophical approaches that presuppose invariant knowledge for policy purposes is carried out. It is shown that socioeconomic processes do not fit to the logic of stable causal factors, but they are more suited to the logic of \"open-ended results\". On the basis of this ontological variation it is argued that ex -ante interventions are not appropriate in the socioeconomic realm. On the contrary, they must be understood in a “dynamic” sense. Finally, derivational robustness analysis is proposed as a useful tool for overcoming the problem of “overconstraint”, a typical problem of economic models.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"152 1","pages":"211-229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85528552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is a naturalistic account of reference possible? Here is a simple argument to the effect that it is not: Let R be the relation that allegedly naturalizes reference, and consider the predicate "being an object that does not stand in the relation R to this expression". Call this predicate "P". On the face of it, P is a counterexample to the alleged naturalization, since it appears to refer to all and only those objects that do not stand in the relation R to it. Actually, an argument like this was advanced more than twenty years ago by the late Paolo Casalegno. Although for various reasons it has not been given due attention by the philosophical community, the argument is interesting in its structure and remarkable in its conclusion. In this paper I shall reconstruct it in detail and discuss it. Then, I shall show that the argument fails, since, contrary to what Casalegno claimed, under certain conditions P is paradoxical, hence not a referring expression. My rejection builds on the fundamental distinction between simple and compound expressions, namely on the compositional structure of natural languages. If I am right, whether any attempt at naturalizing reference that takes care of this distinction will succeed remains an open empirical question.
{"title":"On a logical argument against the naturalizability of reference","authors":"A. Bianchi","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16803","url":null,"abstract":"Is a naturalistic account of reference possible? Here is a simple argument to the effect that it is not: Let R be the relation that allegedly naturalizes reference, and consider the predicate \"being an object that does not stand in the relation R to this expression\". Call this predicate \"P\". On the face of it, P is a counterexample to the alleged naturalization, since it appears to refer to all and only those objects that do not stand in the relation R to it. Actually, an argument like this was advanced more than twenty years ago by the late Paolo Casalegno. Although for various reasons it has not been given due attention by the philosophical community, the argument is interesting in its structure and remarkable in its conclusion. In this paper I shall reconstruct it in detail and discuss it. Then, I shall show that the argument fails, since, contrary to what Casalegno claimed, under certain conditions P is paradoxical, hence not a referring expression. My rejection builds on the fundamental distinction between simple and compound expressions, namely on the compositional structure of natural languages. If I am right, whether any attempt at naturalizing reference that takes care of this distinction will succeed remains an open empirical question.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"67 1","pages":"145-160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84713298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En este articulo se analiza el caso del descubrimiento del megaterio (el primer animal extinto reconstruido) desde una perspectiva abductiva, prestando atencion al proceso de generacion y seleccion de hipotesis de algunos de los actores involucrados en este singular acontecimiento. El analisis muestra la importancia de ciertos puntos metodologicos relacionados con la practica y el rigor cientifico para proponer hipotesis plausibles.
{"title":"La metodología de la abducción en el caso del descubrimiento del megaterio","authors":"Antonio Jaime Duarte Calvo","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16162","url":null,"abstract":"En este articulo se analiza el caso del descubrimiento del megaterio (el primer animal extinto reconstruido) desde una perspectiva abductiva, prestando atencion al proceso de generacion y seleccion de hipotesis de algunos de los actores involucrados en este singular acontecimiento. El analisis muestra la importancia de ciertos puntos metodologicos relacionados con la practica y el rigor cientifico para proponer hipotesis plausibles.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"74 1","pages":"191-209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85977001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in the NTV; (ii) that Strong Heterogeneity is the basis of Berkeley's theory; and (iii) that Molyneux-type questions act as illustrations of Strong Heterogeneity.
我建议阅读伯克利的《论视觉新理论》(Essay towards a New Theory of Vision)，其中molyneux式的问题是思想实验，而不是争论。首先，我提出了NTV的一般辩论策略，并为传统阅读提供了依据。其次，我将思考实验的某些角色，并将NTV中的molyneux类型问题归类为建设性猜想性思维实验。第三，我认为(I)在NTV中没有弱异质性和强异质性的区别;(ii)强异质性是伯克利理论的基础;(3) molyneux类型的问题是强异质性的例证。
{"title":"Molyneux's Question in Berkeley's Theory of Vision","authors":"Juan R. Loaiza","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.15984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.15984","url":null,"abstract":"I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in the NTV; (ii) that Strong Heterogeneity is the basis of Berkeley's theory; and (iii) that Molyneux-type questions act as illustrations of Strong Heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"11 1","pages":"231-247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75180596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016. Relatar lo ocurrido como invención. Una introducción a la filosofía de la ficción contemporánea","authors":"F. Carreño","doi":"10.1387/theoria.17819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17819","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"1 1","pages":"257-261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84353947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Luis Fernández Moreno. 2016. The Reference of Natural Kind Terms","authors":"Ainhoa Fernández","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17850","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"69 1 1","pages":"262-264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88482752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"León Olivé Morett: filósofo pluralista","authors":"Ambrosio Velasco Gômez","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17828","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"64 1","pages":"251-254"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73833281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While Einstein considered that sub specie astern the correct philosophical position regarding geometry was that of the conventionality of geometry, he felt that provisionally it was necessary to adopt a non-conventional stance that he called practical geometry. here we will make the case that even when adopting Einstein’s views we must conclude that practical geometry is conventional after all. Einstein missed the fact that the conventionality of simultaneity leads to a conventional element in the chrono-geometry, since it corresponds to the possibility of different space-time metrics (which, when changing, accordingly, the “physical part” of the theory, are observationally equivalent).
{"title":"The conventionality of simultaneity in Einstein’s practical chrono-geometry","authors":"M. Valente","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17183","url":null,"abstract":"While Einstein considered that sub specie astern the correct philosophical position regarding geometry was that of the conventionality of geometry, he felt that provisionally it was necessary to adopt a non-conventional stance that he called practical geometry. here we will make the case that even when adopting Einstein’s views we must conclude that practical geometry is conventional after all. Einstein missed the fact that the conventionality of simultaneity leads to a conventional element in the chrono-geometry, since it corresponds to the possibility of different space-time metrics (which, when changing, accordingly, the “physical part” of the theory, are observationally equivalent).","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"1 1","pages":"177-190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75266249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Referees for THEORIA (2015-2016)","authors":"Theoria","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17570","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"12 1","pages":"139-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83473468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Review of: Jose Ferreiros. 2016. Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices. Princeton: Princeton University Press
回顾:何塞·费雷罗斯2016年。数学知识与实践的相互作用。普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社
{"title":"José Ferreirós. 2016. Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices. Princeton: Princeton University Press","authors":"Manuel J. García-Pérez","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17562","url":null,"abstract":"Review of: Jose Ferreiros. 2016. Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices. Princeton: Princeton University Press","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81096374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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