Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or "rational-causal" process, but can only be a "brute-causal" process of acquisition. This position generates the "doorknob --> DOORKNOB" problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor's taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call "intelligible-causal processes." Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than Fodor's to the doorknob --> DOORKNOB problem.
Jerry Fodor认为，概念习得不可能是一个心理或“理性-因果”过程，而只能是一个“野蛮-因果”的习得过程。这个位置产生了“门把手->门把手”问题:为什么概念通常是基于对其扩展项的经验获得的?我认为福多的因果过程分类法需要补充，并描述了第三种类型:我称之为“可理解的因果过程”。有了这个新分类，我提出了一个我认为比福多更好的回答“门把手”问题的方法。
{"title":"Not rational, but not brutely causal either: A reply to Fodor on concept acquisition","authors":"L. Antony","doi":"10.1387/theoria.21031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21031","url":null,"abstract":"Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or \"rational-causal\" process, but can only be a \"brute-causal\" process of acquisition. This position generates the \"doorknob --> DOORKNOB\" problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor's taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call \"intelligible-causal processes.\" Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than Fodor's to the doorknob --> DOORKNOB problem.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"20 1","pages":"45-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75233902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.
{"title":"Fodor and demonstratives in LOT","authors":"Una Stojnić, E. Lepore","doi":"10.1387/theoria.20906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20906","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"20 1","pages":"75-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74201558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jerry Fodor's arguments for a language of thought (LOT) are largely theoretical. Is there any empirical evidence that supports the existence of LOT? There is. Research on Global Aphasia supports the existence of LOT. In this paper, I discuss this evidence and why it supports Fodor's theory that there is a language of thought.
{"title":"Global aphasia and the language of thought","authors":"F. Adams","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.20430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.20430","url":null,"abstract":"Jerry Fodor's arguments for a language of thought (LOT) are largely theoretical. Is there any empirical evidence that supports the existence of LOT? There is. Research on Global Aphasia supports the existence of LOT. In this paper, I discuss this evidence and why it supports Fodor's theory that there is a language of thought.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"225 1","pages":"9-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85997657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The DSM by American Psychiatric Association (APA) is the most relevant classification of mental disorders in the clinic and academic field. It is a manual that has been changing according to its context, although not always due to advances in scientific knowledge. The historical review of the manual’s successive editions shows its sociopolitical nature. Indeed ideological or political factors have been very influential in its configuration. These factors help to explain the properties of current psychiatry represented by the DSM-5 and understand the strong critiques addressed to it.
{"title":"The construction of the DSM: Genealogy of a sociopolitical product","authors":"Omar García Zabaleta","doi":"10.1387/theoria.19779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.19779","url":null,"abstract":"The DSM by American Psychiatric Association (APA) is the most relevant classification of mental disorders in the clinic and academic field. It is a manual that has been changing according to its context, although not always due to advances in scientific knowledge. The historical review of the manual’s successive editions shows its sociopolitical nature. Indeed ideological or political factors have been very influential in its configuration. These factors help to explain the properties of current psychiatry represented by the DSM-5 and understand the strong critiques addressed to it.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"59 1","pages":"441-460"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86898501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In order to show how technological innovation and scientific innovation are linked in the course of research in human science, we present an account of a series of innovations made in our laboratory (Distal Glove – Tactos system – Intertact server – Dialtact module). We will thus see how research on the technical constitution of cognitive and perceptual activities can be associated with a process of innovation. Devices which were initially developed for the purposes of performing experiments contributed both to scientific inventions and to developments with a practical and social finality.
{"title":"Technical innovation in human science: Examples in cognitive technologies","authors":"C. Lenay","doi":"10.1387/theoria.17901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17901","url":null,"abstract":"In order to show how technological innovation and scientific innovation are linked in the course of research in human science, we present an account of a series of innovations made in our laboratory (Distal Glove – Tactos system – Intertact server – Dialtact module). We will thus see how research on the technical constitution of cognitive and perceptual activities can be associated with a process of innovation. Devices which were initially developed for the purposes of performing experiments contributed both to scientific inventions and to developments with a practical and social finality.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"65 1","pages":"389-403"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83931636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article starts from the debate in philosophy of science between the theoretical and the experimental traditions, and it aims to show its relation with the study of innovation and invention processes in science, thus crossing the most theoretical approaches of the philosophy of science with issues more related to the philosophy of technology and applied science. In this way we analyze the interrelation between experiment and theory in the processes of invention and innovation and connect the fields of theoretical and applied science, thus showing the continuity between them. That way, we can also show how in science there is always mutual dependence on theory and experimentation, and how that dependence can also be extrapolated to the processes of innovation and invention. Taking as starting point the debate around the theoretical and experimental traditions, we will see to what extent the arguments that question the theoretical traditions and opt for the experimental ones fit with the phenomena of invention and innovation. The case that we are going to take as a reference to apply this analysis is that of « machine learning » , as a branch of computational algorithms designed to emulate human intelligence by learning from the environment. This field is relevant because, in spite of its eminently theoretical nature –in substance it is applied mathematics–, it presents a whole series of characteristics that makes it very similar to the analysis from the experimental traditions.
{"title":"Convergence between experiment and theory in the processes of invention and innovation","authors":"D. Casacuberta, A. Estany","doi":"10.1387/theoria.17921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17921","url":null,"abstract":"This article starts from the debate in philosophy of science between the theoretical and the experimental traditions, and it aims to show its relation with the study of innovation and invention processes in science, thus crossing the most theoretical approaches of the philosophy of science with issues more related to the philosophy of technology and applied science. In this way we analyze the interrelation between experiment and theory in the processes of invention and innovation and connect the fields of theoretical and applied science, thus showing the continuity between them. That way, we can also show how in science there is always mutual dependence on theory and experimentation, and how that dependence can also be extrapolated to the processes of innovation and invention. Taking as starting point the debate around the theoretical and experimental traditions, we will see to what extent the arguments that question the theoretical traditions and opt for the experimental ones fit with the phenomena of invention and innovation. The case that we are going to take as a reference to apply this analysis is that of « machine learning » , as a branch of computational algorithms designed to emulate human intelligence by learning from the environment. This field is relevant because, in spite of its eminently theoretical nature –in substance it is applied mathematics–, it presents a whole series of characteristics that makes it very similar to the analysis from the experimental traditions.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"25 13","pages":"373-387"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72387620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the 19 th century, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity, according to which methods and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important say in the social sciences. In the 20 th century, this thesis was considered unacceptable as part of the sharp separation of biology from the social sciences. Recent advances in the biological sciences suggest a way in which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated, to suggest new ways of explaining innovation in the social sciences. Key kinds of innovation can be explained in terms of the evolution of robust complex systems, interpreted as processes of path creation.
{"title":"What is innovation? New lessons from biology","authors":"Sergio F. Martínez","doi":"10.1387/theoria.18863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18863","url":null,"abstract":"During the 19 th century, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity, according to which methods and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important say in the social sciences. In the 20 th century, this thesis was considered unacceptable as part of the sharp separation of biology from the social sciences. Recent advances in the biological sciences suggest a way in which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated, to suggest new ways of explaining innovation in the social sciences. Key kinds of innovation can be explained in terms of the evolution of robust complex systems, interpreted as processes of path creation.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"28 1","pages":"343-355"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81059698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken.
{"title":"The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem","authors":"C. Hoefer, C. Viger, Daniel Viger","doi":"10.1387/theoria.20040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20040","url":null,"abstract":"We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"517 1","pages":"407-421"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77149000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper takes an organicist perspective of Jan Swammerdam's conception of metamorphis which allows us to identify a continuity betweem W. Harvey's epigenetism and G.W. Leibniz' preformationism – two historically opposed perspectives. In line with this reading, I provide a critical assessment of the different preformationist interpretations of Swammerdam. The thesis that I defend in this paper is that the idea of preformation does not imply so much a theory about the origin of the embryo but a model of ontogenetic development that cannot be catalogued as mechanistic or as vitalist.
{"title":"Jan Swammerdam and the limits of preformationism","authors":"Miguel Escribano Cabeza","doi":"10.1387/theoria.20336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20336","url":null,"abstract":"This paper takes an organicist perspective of Jan Swammerdam's conception of metamorphis which allows us to identify a continuity betweem W. Harvey's epigenetism and G.W. Leibniz' preformationism – two historically opposed perspectives. In line with this reading, I provide a critical assessment of the different preformationist interpretations of Swammerdam. The thesis that I defend in this paper is that the idea of preformation does not imply so much a theory about the origin of the embryo but a model of ontogenetic development that cannot be catalogued as mechanistic or as vitalist.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"60 1","pages":"423-439"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77174837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I offer an analysis of the concept of scientific innovation. When research is innovated, highly noveland usefulelements of investigation begin to spread through a scientific community, resulting from a process which is neither due to blind chance nor to necessity, but to a minimal use of rationality. This, however, leads to tension between two claims: (1) scientific innovation can be explained rationally; (2) no existing account of rationality explains scientific innovation. There are good reasons to maintain (1) and (2), but it is difficult for both claims to be accepted simultaneously by a rational subject. In particular, I argue that neither standard nor bounded theories of rationality can deliver a satisfactory explanation of scientific innovations.
{"title":"Scientific innovation: A conceptual explication and a dilemma","authors":"T. Sturm","doi":"10.1387/theoria.20652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20652","url":null,"abstract":"I offer an analysis of the concept of scientific innovation. When research is innovated, highly noveland usefulelements of investigation begin to spread through a scientific community, resulting from a process which is neither due to blind chance nor to necessity, but to a minimal use of rationality. This, however, leads to tension between two claims: (1) scientific innovation can be explained rationally; (2) no existing account of rationality explains scientific innovation. There are good reasons to maintain (1) and (2), but it is difficult for both claims to be accepted simultaneously by a rational subject. In particular, I argue that neither standard nor bounded theories of rationality can deliver a satisfactory explanation of scientific innovations.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"76 1","pages":"321-341"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74508645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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