There is a rough, long-term tradeoff between rate of innovation and degree of strong realism in scientific practice, a point reflected in historically changing conceptions of method as they retreat from epistemological foundationism to a highly fallibilistic, modeling perspective. The successively more liberal, innovation-stimulating methods open up to investigation deep theoretical domains at the cost, in many cases, of moving away from strong realism as a likely outcome of research. The crowbar model of method highlights this tension, expressed as the crowbar compromise and the crowbar fallacy . The tools-to-theories heuristic, described and evaluated by Gigerenzer and colleagues, can be regarded as an attempt by some scientific realists to overcome this compromise. Instead, it is an instance of it. Nonetheless, in successful applications the crowbar model implies a modest, instrumental (nonrepresentational) realism.
{"title":"The crowbar model of method and its implications","authors":"T. Nickles","doi":"10.1387/theoria.19070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.19070","url":null,"abstract":"There is a rough, long-term tradeoff between rate of innovation and degree of strong realism in scientific practice, a point reflected in historically changing conceptions of method as they retreat from epistemological foundationism to a highly fallibilistic, modeling perspective. The successively more liberal, innovation-stimulating methods open up to investigation deep theoretical domains at the cost, in many cases, of moving away from strong realism as a likely outcome of research. The crowbar model of method highlights this tension, expressed as the crowbar compromise and the crowbar fallacy . The tools-to-theories heuristic, described and evaluated by Gigerenzer and colleagues, can be regarded as an attempt by some scientific realists to overcome this compromise. Instead, it is an instance of it. Nonetheless, in successful applications the crowbar model implies a modest, instrumental (nonrepresentational) realism.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"39 1","pages":"357-372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82680590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Manuel Vargas. 2013. Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility","authors":"F. Hiller","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.20076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.20076","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"128 1","pages":"541-543"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87910719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En este trabajo analizamos criticamente el enfoque mecanicista de explicacion cientifica centrandonos principalmente en la forma en la que este da cuenta de los fenomenos biologicos. Nos proponemos complementar esta perspectiva con una concepcion de nivel como intervalo de cuasi-descomponibilidad que nos permite fundamentar metafisicamente las propuestas mecanicistas clasicas en las propiedades sistemicas caracteristicas de las entidades biologicas. A traves del analisis de ejemplos concretos, demostraremos como nuestra propuesta permite superar algunas de las limitaciones de los enfoques predominantes de explicacion mecanistica.
{"title":"¿Realmente mató la bacteria al coronel? Perspectiva sistémica, causación internivélica e intervalos de cuasi-descomponibilidad en las explicaciones mecanísticas en biología.","authors":"Emilio Cáceres Vázquez, Cristian Saborido","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.18295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.18295","url":null,"abstract":"En este trabajo analizamos criticamente el enfoque mecanicista de explicacion cientifica centrandonos principalmente en la forma en la que este da cuenta de los fenomenos biologicos. Nos proponemos complementar esta perspectiva con una concepcion de nivel como intervalo de cuasi-descomponibilidad que nos permite fundamentar metafisicamente las propuestas mecanicistas clasicas en las propiedades sistemicas caracteristicas de las entidades biologicas. A traves del analisis de ejemplos concretos, demostraremos como nuestra propuesta permite superar algunas de las limitaciones de los enfoques predominantes de explicacion mecanistica.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"201 1","pages":"129-148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77687097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Review of Juan Pimentel. 2017. The Rhinoceros and the Megatherium. An Essay in Natural History.
《胡安·皮门特尔评论》2017。犀牛和巨兽。《自然史随笔》
{"title":"Juan Pimentel. 2017. The Rhinoceros and the Megatherium. An Essay in Natural History","authors":"I. Podgorny","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.18974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.18974","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Juan Pimentel. 2017. The Rhinoceros and the Megatherium. An Essay in Natural History.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"67 1","pages":"151-153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73875939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel ( Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn's.
{"title":"Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics","authors":"Javier González de Prado Salas","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17736","url":null,"abstract":"Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel ( Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn's.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"57 1","pages":"5-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80825788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Segun Williamson, saber y creer son estados mentales, pero creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero no lo son. Ese tratamiento discriminatorio es relevante para la epistemologia de Williamson. Su principal tesis epistemologica negativa (sobre la supuesta imposibilidad de definir el saber conforme a cierto formato tradicional) y su principal tesis epistemologica positiva (una definicion, alternativa, del saber) estan en peligro si su teoria metafisica sobre lo mental es incorrecta. Presento aqui un problema para dicha teoria: impone limitaciones implausibles a los posibles usos de conceptos y expresiones linguisticas. Describire algunas opciones que tendria Williamson para evitar el problema; pero sostendre que acarrean cierta dosis de arbitrariedad.
{"title":"El dominio de lo mental en la filosofía de Williamson","authors":"M. Otero","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17629","url":null,"abstract":"Segun Williamson, saber y creer son estados mentales, pero creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero no lo son. Ese tratamiento discriminatorio es relevante para la epistemologia de Williamson. Su principal tesis epistemologica negativa (sobre la supuesta imposibilidad de definir el saber conforme a cierto formato tradicional) y su principal tesis epistemologica positiva (una definicion, alternativa, del saber) estan en peligro si su teoria metafisica sobre lo mental es incorrecta. Presento aqui un problema para dicha teoria: impone limitaciones implausibles a los posibles usos de conceptos y expresiones linguisticas. Describire algunas opciones que tendria Williamson para evitar el problema; pero sostendre que acarrean cierta dosis de arbitrariedad.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"33 1","pages":"23-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78130174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view.
{"title":"Implicit Bias: from social structure to representational format","authors":"J. Toribio","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17751","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"27 1","pages":"41-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77770873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
espanolAqui profundizamos la tesis de que un modelo de simulacion permite crear conocimiento en forma de explicaciones causales sostenida por Paul Weirich. Sostenemos la validez de exportar resultados del modelo al mundo modelado en virtud de la similitud entre modelo y mundo, analizable en terminos de identidad parcial de estructura para eliminar la similitud superficial que repita los resultados empiricos al ajustar datos por calibracion. La estructura de relaciones rescatadas del mundo resulta critica al estudiar la mencionada similitud, como asi tambien ciertas propiedades que condicionan el tipo de relaciones entre los elementos del modelo que representan entidades del mundo. EnglishHere we enrich Paul Weirich’s thesis holding that a simulation model can create knowledge in the form of causal explanations. We sustain the validity of exporting results from the model to the modelized world in virtue of the similarity between model and world, which is analyzable in terms of partial identity of structure, eliminating the superficial similarity that repeats empirical results by adjusting data via calibration. The structure of relations rescues from the world critical results to analyze such similarity, as so certain properties which condition the kind of relations held between the elements of the model representing entities of the world.
在这里，我们深化了Paul Weirich提出的模拟模型允许以因果解释的形式创造知识的论点。我们支持将模型结果输出到基于模型和世界之间的相似性建模的世界的有效性，可以用部分结构同一性来分析，以消除在校准数据调整时重复经验结果的表面相似性。从世界中拯救出来的关系的结构是研究上述相似性的关键，以及决定代表世界实体的模型元素之间关系类型的某些属性。EnglishHere we enrich保罗Weirich thesis控股,由于模拟model can create knowledge in the form of explanations的因果。我们维持模型输出结果到模型世界的有效性，因为模型与世界之间具有相似之处，可以根据结构的部分同一性进行分析，消除了通过校正数据重复经验结果的表面相似之处。《世界关系结构》从分析这种相似性的关键结果中得出结论，因为某些性质规定了代表世界实体的模型各要素之间的关系类型。
{"title":"El modelo de simulación como generador de explicaciones causales","authors":"L. Giri, H. Miguel","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17826","url":null,"abstract":"espanolAqui profundizamos la tesis de que un modelo de simulacion permite crear conocimiento en forma de explicaciones causales sostenida por Paul Weirich. Sostenemos la validez de exportar resultados del modelo al mundo modelado en virtud de la similitud entre modelo y mundo, analizable en terminos de identidad parcial de estructura para eliminar la similitud superficial que repita los resultados empiricos al ajustar datos por calibracion. La estructura de relaciones rescatadas del mundo resulta critica al estudiar la mencionada similitud, como asi tambien ciertas propiedades que condicionan el tipo de relaciones entre los elementos del modelo que representan entidades del mundo. EnglishHere we enrich Paul Weirich’s thesis holding that a simulation model can create knowledge in the form of causal explanations. We sustain the validity of exporting results from the model to the modelized world in virtue of the similarity between model and world, which is analyzable in terms of partial identity of structure, eliminating the superficial similarity that repeats empirical results by adjusting data via calibration. The structure of relations rescues from the world critical results to analyze such similarity, as so certain properties which condition the kind of relations held between the elements of the model representing entities of the world.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"41 1","pages":"111-128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80587034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
At first glance, every metaphysics of laws (Humeanism, primitivism, Power metaphysics) can be combined with every ontology of time (eternalism, growing block, presentism). In contrast, the paper intends to show that Humeanism requires eternalism and that Power metaphysics must presuppose an existentially dynamical view of temporal existence, i.e. growing block or presentism. The presented arguments turn out to be completely independent of whether the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic: the world is non-productive and static or productively dynamical, the future be ‘open’ or not.
{"title":"Metaphysics of laws and ontology of time","authors":"C. Friebe","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17178","url":null,"abstract":"At first glance, every metaphysics of laws (Humeanism, primitivism, Power metaphysics) can be combined with every ontology of time (eternalism, growing block, presentism). In contrast, the paper intends to show that Humeanism requires eternalism and that Power metaphysics must presuppose an existentially dynamical view of temporal existence, i.e. growing block or presentism. The presented arguments turn out to be completely independent of whether the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic: the world is non-productive and static or productively dynamical, the future be ‘open’ or not.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"31 1","pages":"77-89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87208374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can mathematics contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena? One way to try to answer this question is by getting involved in the recent philosophical dispute about the existence of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. If there is such a thing, given the relation between explanation and understanding, we can say that there is an affirmative answer to our question. But what if we do not agree that mathematics can play an explanatory role in science? Can we still consider that the above question can have an affirmative answer? My main aim here is to give an account that takes mathematics, in some of the cases discussed in the literature, as contributing to our understanding of physical phenomena despite not being explanatory.
{"title":"Can we have mathematical understanding of physical phenomena?","authors":"Gabriel Târziu","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.18108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.18108","url":null,"abstract":"Can mathematics contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena? One way to try to answer this question is by getting involved in the recent philosophical dispute about the existence of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. If there is such a thing, given the relation between explanation and understanding, we can say that there is an affirmative answer to our question. But what if we do not agree that mathematics can play an explanatory role in science? Can we still consider that the above question can have an affirmative answer? My main aim here is to give an account that takes mathematics, in some of the cases discussed in the literature, as contributing to our understanding of physical phenomena despite not being explanatory.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"75 1","pages":"91-109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83823397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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