En ciencia cognitiva se han propuesto teorias de doble proceso para explicar competencias como razonamiento y toma de decisiones. Machery (2009) distingue entre arquitectura cognitiva unificada, segun la cual a una competencia le subyace solamente un tipo de proceso y arquitectura de multiples procesos, segun la cual a una competencia le subyacen al menos dos tipos de procesos. Basandonos en esta distincion, intentaremos mostrar que si se explicitan y se analizan los criterios de coordinacion entre procesos, las teorias de doble proceso articuladas para el razonamiento y la toma de decisiones parecerian ofrecer mas bien una arquitectura unificada y no de multiples procesos.
{"title":"Teorías de doble proceso: ¿una arquitectura cognitiva unificada?","authors":"Mariela Destéfano, Fernanda Velázquez Coccia","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17730","url":null,"abstract":"En ciencia cognitiva se han propuesto teorias de doble proceso para explicar competencias como razonamiento y toma de decisiones. Machery (2009) distingue entre arquitectura cognitiva unificada, segun la cual a una competencia le subyace solamente un tipo de proceso y arquitectura de multiples procesos, segun la cual a una competencia le subyacen al menos dos tipos de procesos. Basandonos en esta distincion, intentaremos mostrar que si se explicitan y se analizan los criterios de coordinacion entre procesos, las teorias de doble proceso articuladas para el razonamiento y la toma de decisiones parecerian ofrecer mas bien una arquitectura unificada y no de multiples procesos.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"75 1","pages":"61-76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77198595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Review of Sergio F. Martinez y Xiang Huang. 2015. Hacia una Filosofia de la Ciencia Centrada en Practicas
Sergio F. Martinez和Xiang Huang评论，2015。走向以实践为中心的科学哲学
{"title":"Sergio F. Martínez y Xiang Huang. 2015. Hacia una Filosofía de la Ciencia Centrada en Prácticas","authors":"Pablo Ruiz de Olano","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.18065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.18065","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Sergio F. Martinez y Xiang Huang. 2015. Hacia una Filosofia de la Ciencia Centrada en Practicas","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"32 1","pages":"390-392"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87937987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Review of Alberto Moretti, Eleonora Orlando y Nora Stigol, comp. 2016. A medio siglo de Formas logicas, realidad y significado de Thomas Moro Simpson.
Alberto Moretti, Eleonora Orlando和Nora Stigol的评论，comp. 2016。托马斯·莫罗·辛普森半个世纪的逻辑形式、现实和意义。
{"title":"Alberto Moretti, Eleonora Orlando y Nora Stigol, comp. 2016. A medio siglo de Formas lógicas, realidad y significado de Thomas Moro Simpson","authors":"J. J. Acero","doi":"10.1387/theoria.18064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18064","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Alberto Moretti, Eleonora Orlando y Nora Stigol, comp. 2016. A medio siglo de Formas logicas, realidad y significado de Thomas Moro Simpson.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"77 1","pages":"387-389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82808461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Explanations are supposed to provide us with understanding. It is common to make a distinction between genuine, scientific understanding, and the phenomenological, or ‘aha’ notion of understanding, where the former is considered epistemically relevant, the latter irrelevant. I argue that there is a variety of phenomenological understanding that does play a positive epistemic role. This phenomenological understanding involves a similarity between bodily sensations that is used as evidence for mechanistic hypotheses. As a case study, I will consider 17th and 18th century research into the mechanism behind the electric eel’s power to shock.
{"title":"Phenomenological understanding and electric eels","authors":"Raoul Gervais","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17294","url":null,"abstract":"Explanations are supposed to provide us with understanding. It is common to make a distinction between genuine, scientific understanding, and the phenomenological, or ‘aha’ notion of understanding, where the former is considered epistemically relevant, the latter irrelevant. I argue that there is a variety of phenomenological understanding that does play a positive epistemic role. This phenomenological understanding involves a similarity between bodily sensations that is used as evidence for mechanistic hypotheses. As a case study, I will consider 17th and 18th century research into the mechanism behind the electric eel’s power to shock.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"24 1","pages":"293-302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90864470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas son estructuras coordinantes que conllevan necesariamente un contraste entre dos elementos relacionados con los enunciados que unen. El contraste es un concepto heterogeneo, ya que podemos identificar tres tipos de contraste (que corresponden a tres significados diferentes de las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas): restrictivo, correctivo y aditivo. Propondremos una interpretacion semantica para cada tipo de contraste, y defenderemos el caracter presuposicional del contraste restrictivo. Con ello, pondremos de relieve que el discurso en el que se insertan las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas debe plantear alternativas que, cuando el tipo de contraste no esta univocamente lexicalizado, guian la interpretacion de las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas.
{"title":"Sobre las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas","authors":"F. Murga","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16192","url":null,"abstract":"Las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas son estructuras coordinantes que conllevan necesariamente un contraste entre dos elementos relacionados con los enunciados que unen. El contraste es un concepto heterogeneo, ya que podemos identificar tres tipos de contraste (que corresponden a tres significados diferentes de las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas): restrictivo, correctivo y aditivo. Propondremos una interpretacion semantica para cada tipo de contraste, y defenderemos el caracter presuposicional del contraste restrictivo. Con ello, pondremos de relieve que el discurso en el que se insertan las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas debe plantear alternativas que, cuando el tipo de contraste no esta univocamente lexicalizado, guian la interpretacion de las conjunciones coordinantes adversativas.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"170 1","pages":"303-327"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72909315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recientemente Casasanto y Lupyan (2015) han sostenido que no hay conceptos independientes del contexto: todos los conceptos serian construidos ad hoc en el momento de su instanciacion. El presente articulo muestra que el marco de la cognicion ad hoc puede caracterizarse mediante una teoria de similaridad conceptual, y distingue dos nociones de concepto —asociadas a diferentes fases de su ciclo de vida (almacenamiento e instanciacion)—. Esta propuesta reune virtudes de enfoques opuestos: (a) invariantista: la estabilidad del concepto almacenado permite acumular nueva informacion; (b) contextualista: la dependencia contextual del concepto instanciado explica nuestra capacidad de adaptacion. /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}
{"title":"Ciclo de vida de un concepto en el marco de la cognición ad hoc","authors":"J. V. H. Conde","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16216","url":null,"abstract":"Recientemente Casasanto y Lupyan (2015) han sostenido que no hay conceptos independientes del contexto: todos los conceptos serian construidos ad hoc en el momento de su instanciacion. El presente articulo muestra que el marco de la cognicion ad hoc puede caracterizarse mediante una teoria de similaridad conceptual, y distingue dos nociones de concepto —asociadas a diferentes fases de su ciclo de vida (almacenamiento e instanciacion)—. Esta propuesta reune virtudes de enfoques opuestos: (a) invariantista: la estabilidad del concepto almacenado permite acumular nueva informacion; (b) contextualista: la dependencia contextual del concepto instanciado explica nuestra capacidad de adaptacion. /* Style Definitions */\u0000 table.MsoNormalTable\u0000 {mso-style-name:\"Tabla normal\";\u0000 mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;\u0000 mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;\u0000 mso-style-noshow:yes;\u0000 mso-style-priority:99;\u0000 mso-style-qformat:yes;\u0000 mso-style-parent:\"\";\u0000 mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\u0000 mso-para-margin-top:0cm;\u0000 mso-para-margin-right:0cm;\u0000 mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt;\u0000 mso-para-margin-left:0cm;\u0000 line-height:115%;\u0000 mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\u0000 font-size:11.0pt;\u0000 font-family:\"Calibri\",\"sans-serif\";\u0000 mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;\u0000 mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;\u0000 mso-fareast-font-family:\"Times New Roman\";\u0000 mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;\u0000 mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;\u0000 mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"28 1","pages":"271-292"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81440857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to contextualists, communication has to do with pragmatically adjusted content, not with conventional meaning. This pragmatic content is sometimes identified with speaker meaning or with the thought the speaker intends to express. I will argue that given the sociolinguistic role of utterance content—the fact it provides reasons for action, liabilities and entitlements—locutionary content should not be modelled as a variety of speaker meaning.
{"title":"Utterance content, speaker’s intentions and linguistic liability","authors":"Claudia Picazo Jaque","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16720","url":null,"abstract":"According to contextualists, communication has to do with pragmatically adjusted content, not with conventional meaning. This pragmatic content is sometimes identified with speaker meaning or with the thought the speaker intends to express. I will argue that given the sociolinguistic role of utterance content—the fact it provides reasons for action, liabilities and entitlements—locutionary content should not be modelled as a variety of speaker meaning.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"42 1","pages":"329-345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80496753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers, firstly, to what extent the administration of oxytocin can augment the capacity of empathy in human beings; and secondly, whether or not such practice ought to be allowed. In relation to the latter, the author develops an argument in favour of this intervention by virtue of its consistency with the belief that, if a therapeutic treatment is to be considered acceptable, it is essential that it maximizes the well-being of those affected and that it does not compromise the autonomy of the patient. Having rejected several objections related to the nature of this intervention, the author finally questions its morality on the basis of a concern with its universalizability.
{"title":"Oxytocin, Empathy and Human Enhancement","authors":"Francisco Lara","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17890","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers, firstly, to what extent the administration of oxytocin can augment the capacity of empathy in human beings; and secondly, whether or not such practice ought to be allowed. In relation to the latter, the author develops an argument in favour of this intervention by virtue of its consistency with the belief that, if a therapeutic treatment is to be considered acceptable, it is essential that it maximizes the well-being of those affected and that it does not compromise the autonomy of the patient. Having rejected several objections related to the nature of this intervention, the author finally questions its morality on the basis of a concern with its universalizability.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"18 1","pages":"367-384"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80658919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El marco teorico desde el cual se llevan a cabo investigaciones acerca de la pseudociencia es deficiente, dado que suele incluir otros tipos de creencias carentes de garantia epistemica. En este articulo, se repasaran los mecanismos de explotacion de la autoridad cientifica por parte de la pseudociencia, desarrollando asi un marco psicocognitivo mas refinado para caracterizar el fenomeno. Se analizara la psicologia del engano pseudocientifico, las raices cognitivas que posibilitan la epidemiologia de este tipo de ideas y sus mecanismos de autolegitimacion, como la superioridad dialectica, el falso apoyo externo o la falsa superioridad etica y/o epistemologica.
{"title":"Los parásitos de la ciencia. Una caracterización psicocognitiva del engaño pseudocientífico","authors":"A. Fasce","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17775","url":null,"abstract":"El marco teorico desde el cual se llevan a cabo investigaciones acerca de la pseudociencia es deficiente, dado que suele incluir otros tipos de creencias carentes de garantia epistemica. En este articulo, se repasaran los mecanismos de explotacion de la autoridad cientifica por parte de la pseudociencia, desarrollando asi un marco psicocognitivo mas refinado para caracterizar el fenomeno. Se analizara la psicologia del engano pseudocientifico, las raices cognitivas que posibilitan la epidemiologia de este tipo de ideas y sus mecanismos de autolegitimacion, como la superioridad dialectica, el falso apoyo externo o la falsa superioridad etica y/o epistemologica.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"4 1","pages":"347-365"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85319256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Review of Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio. 2015. Biological autonomy: a philosophical and theoretical enquiry
《阿尔瓦罗·莫雷诺与马特奥·莫西奥评论》，2015。生物自主性:哲学与理论的探讨
{"title":"Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio. 2015. Biological autonomy: a philosophical and theoretical enquiry","authors":"L. Holt, Sune Holm","doi":"10.1387/theoria.18066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18066","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio. 2015. Biological autonomy: a philosophical and theoretical enquiry","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"27 1","pages":"392-395"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82538101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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