Pub Date : 2022-07-25DOI: 10.1017/S095382082200019X
Scott Forschler
Abstract Christopher Jay has recently argued that one version of subjective consequentialism is objectionable because it entails ‘arbitrary deontic variance’ in which the permissibility of some action can depend upon an arbitrary, non-moral choice of which possible results of the action to investigate or even reflect upon. This author argues that this deontic variance is actually entirely innocuous, and results from what may be the best subjective strategy for such investigation and reflection in cases involving uncertainty and cognitive limitations.
Christopher Jay最近认为，主观结果主义的一个版本是令人反感的，因为它需要“任意道义变异”，其中一些行为的可容许性可能取决于一个任意的，非道德的选择，其中行动的可能结果进行调查甚至反思。作者认为，这种道义上的差异实际上是完全无害的，并且可能是在涉及不确定性和认知限制的情况下进行此类调查和反思的最佳主观策略的结果。
{"title":"Reply to Jay on Subjective Consequentialism and Deontic Variance","authors":"Scott Forschler","doi":"10.1017/S095382082200019X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382082200019X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Christopher Jay has recently argued that one version of subjective consequentialism is objectionable because it entails ‘arbitrary deontic variance’ in which the permissibility of some action can depend upon an arbitrary, non-moral choice of which possible results of the action to investigate or even reflect upon. This author argues that this deontic variance is actually entirely innocuous, and results from what may be the best subjective strategy for such investigation and reflection in cases involving uncertainty and cognitive limitations.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"344 - 347"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48763507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-25DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000115
Dustin Crummett
Abstract First, I introduce the concept of a “non-agential subject,” where a non-agential subject (1) exists within an organism and (2) has phenomenally conscious experiences in a morally significant way, but (3) is not morally responsible for (some or all of) the organism's voluntary actions. Second, I argue that it's a live possibility that typical adult humans contain non-agential subjects. Finally, I argue that, if there are non-agential subjects, this has important and surprising implications for a variety of ethical issues. Accordingly, ethicists should pay more attention to whether there are non-agential subjects and what their implications for ethics would be.
{"title":"What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?","authors":"Dustin Crummett","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000115","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract First, I introduce the concept of a “non-agential subject,” where a non-agential subject (1) exists within an organism and (2) has phenomenally conscious experiences in a morally significant way, but (3) is not morally responsible for (some or all of) the organism's voluntary actions. Second, I argue that it's a live possibility that typical adult humans contain non-agential subjects. Finally, I argue that, if there are non-agential subjects, this has important and surprising implications for a variety of ethical issues. Accordingly, ethicists should pay more attention to whether there are non-agential subjects and what their implications for ethics would be.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"317 - 334"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49531789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-25DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000206
Lizzy Ventham
Approach in Practice); and deliberative democracy (e.g. David Crocker’s Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy). And of course, the most recent scholarly literature can be found in The Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, which publishes on all aspects of the capability approach. To sum up, although the Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach satisfies the need for a dedicated handbook and offers several new insights that contribute to the understanding of the capability approach, it is difficult to pinpoint the gap in the capability literature that it fills. That said, both new and established capability scholars might find value in some of the individual chapters of the Handbook depending on their research interests. In the end, the Handbook is a bit like those supermarket-bought mozzarella balls that come wrapped in plastic: safe, inoffensive, and likely to have a broad appeal. However, for those bothering to look, there are alternatives out there with more depth and flavour.
{"title":"Christopher Woodard, Taking Utilitarianism Seriously (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 217.","authors":"Lizzy Ventham","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000206","url":null,"abstract":"Approach in Practice); and deliberative democracy (e.g. David Crocker’s Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy). And of course, the most recent scholarly literature can be found in The Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, which publishes on all aspects of the capability approach. To sum up, although the Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach satisfies the need for a dedicated handbook and offers several new insights that contribute to the understanding of the capability approach, it is difficult to pinpoint the gap in the capability literature that it fills. That said, both new and established capability scholars might find value in some of the individual chapters of the Handbook depending on their research interests. In the end, the Handbook is a bit like those supermarket-bought mozzarella balls that come wrapped in plastic: safe, inoffensive, and likely to have a broad appeal. However, for those bothering to look, there are alternatives out there with more depth and flavour.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"363 - 366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46027582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-21DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000231
M. F. Byskov
{"title":"Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, Siddiqur Osmani, and Mozaffar Qizilbash (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. xxii + 718.","authors":"M. F. Byskov","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000231","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"359 - 363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43482785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-21DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000152
R. Shaver
Abstract Sidgwick saw egoism as important and undefeated. Not long afterward, egoism is largely ignored. Immediately after Sidgwick, many arguments were given against egoism – most poor – but one argument deserves attention as both influential and plausible. Call it the “grounds objection.” It has two strands. It objects that there are justifying reasons for action other than that an action will maximize my self-interest. It also objects that sometimes, what makes an action right is a fact other than its maximizing my self-interest. I briefly explain and criticize many of the arguments given against egoism in the period, then explain and defend the grounds objection.
{"title":"The Decline of Egoism","authors":"R. Shaver","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000152","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Sidgwick saw egoism as important and undefeated. Not long afterward, egoism is largely ignored. Immediately after Sidgwick, many arguments were given against egoism – most poor – but one argument deserves attention as both influential and plausible. Call it the “grounds objection.” It has two strands. It objects that there are justifying reasons for action other than that an action will maximize my self-interest. It also objects that sometimes, what makes an action right is a fact other than its maximizing my self-interest. I briefly explain and criticize many of the arguments given against egoism in the period, then explain and defend the grounds objection.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"300 - 316"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42879621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-20DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000176
Ben Davies
Abstract Hun Chung argues for a theory of distributive justice – ‘prospect utilitarianism’ – that overcomes two central problems purportedly faced by sufficientarianism: giving implausible answers in ‘lifeboat cases’, where we can save the lives of some but not all of a group, and failing to respect the axiom of continuity. Chung claims that prospect utilitarianism overcomes these problems, and receives empirical support from work in economics on prospect theory. This article responds to Chung's criticisms of sufficientarianism, showing that they are misplaced. It then shows that prospect utilitarianism faces independent problems, since it too requires a threshold, which Chung bases on the idea of ‘adequate functioning’. The article shows that there are problems with this as a threshold, and that it is not empirically supported by prospect theory.
{"title":"The Prospects for ‘Prospect Utilitarianism’","authors":"Ben Davies","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000176","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hun Chung argues for a theory of distributive justice – ‘prospect utilitarianism’ – that overcomes two central problems purportedly faced by sufficientarianism: giving implausible answers in ‘lifeboat cases’, where we can save the lives of some but not all of a group, and failing to respect the axiom of continuity. Chung claims that prospect utilitarianism overcomes these problems, and receives empirical support from work in economics on prospect theory. This article responds to Chung's criticisms of sufficientarianism, showing that they are misplaced. It then shows that prospect utilitarianism faces independent problems, since it too requires a threshold, which Chung bases on the idea of ‘adequate functioning’. The article shows that there are problems with this as a threshold, and that it is not empirically supported by prospect theory.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"335 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45161001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-15DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000139
Brian Zamulinski
Abstract It is morally negligent or reckless to believe without sufficient evidence. The foregoing proposition follows from a rule that is a modified expression of W. K. Clifford's ethics of belief. Clifford attempted to prove that it is always wrong to believe without sufficient evidence by advancing a doxastic counterpart to an act utilitarian argument. Contrary to various commentators, his argument is neither purely nor primarily epistemic, he is not a non-consequentialist, and he does not use stoicism to make his case. Clifford's conclusion is a universal generalisation that is in a precarious position because of potential counterexamples. But the counterexamples do not preclude a rule against going beyond the available evidence and it is worthwhile making a moral case for such a rule.
{"title":"Clifford's Consequentialism","authors":"Brian Zamulinski","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000139","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is morally negligent or reckless to believe without sufficient evidence. The foregoing proposition follows from a rule that is a modified expression of W. K. Clifford's ethics of belief. Clifford attempted to prove that it is always wrong to believe without sufficient evidence by advancing a doxastic counterpart to an act utilitarian argument. Contrary to various commentators, his argument is neither purely nor primarily epistemic, he is not a non-consequentialist, and he does not use stoicism to make his case. Clifford's conclusion is a universal generalisation that is in a precarious position because of potential counterexamples. But the counterexamples do not preclude a rule against going beyond the available evidence and it is worthwhile making a moral case for such a rule.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"289 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43702525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-10DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000127
Andréa Daventry
tional cooperative scheme. There seems to be no reason why the elderly should be bound less by the principles of fairness. In conclusion, Heath has aimed to offer philosophical foundations for the kind of climate change policy proposed within mainstream economics. While this may result in recommendations that are readily digestible by policymakers, the philosophical foundations Heath offers are radical within the discourse of environmental philosophy. In combination with Heath’s polemical style, it remains to be seen whether he succeeds in ‘promoting greater dialogue’ (p. 23) between philosophers and economists.
{"title":"Jonathan Pugh, Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 287.","authors":"Andréa Daventry","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000127","url":null,"abstract":"tional cooperative scheme. There seems to be no reason why the elderly should be bound less by the principles of fairness. In conclusion, Heath has aimed to offer philosophical foundations for the kind of climate change policy proposed within mainstream economics. While this may result in recommendations that are readily digestible by policymakers, the philosophical foundations Heath offers are radical within the discourse of environmental philosophy. In combination with Heath’s polemical style, it remains to be seen whether he succeeds in ‘promoting greater dialogue’ (p. 23) between philosophers and economists.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"355 - 359"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46497051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：