Space Policy最新文献

This paper explores the impacts of a potential royalty mechanism by considering the effects of different royalty and tax rates on the economics of a hypothetical commercial lunar ice mining project. The study also examines the conceivable benefits that could be generated from a royalty regime from a global perspective and considers the possible impacts of royalties on operational decision making in a commercial lunar ice mining context. There has been substantial debate since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 regarding how to ensure the international community benefits from the commercial exploitation of space resources, should these activities eventuate. This includes the recent initiative by the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to establish a Working Group to explore potential models for a legal framework to govern space resource activities. No formal proposal to include a royalty mechanism has yet been made; however, it is apparent that part of the mandate of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee could be to explore the issue of benefit sharing, and it is possible that a royalty mechanism or something similar could ultimately be proposed. After considering the impact of royalties on a hypothetical lunar ice mining project, this paper finds that royalties, in particular ad valorem royalties, could have a meaningful impact on the economics and operational parameters of a commercial lunar ice mining project, in turn potentially impacting the ability to raise the funding required to develop such projects. The study also finds that under plausible scenarios, the benefits generated on a per capita basis would be negligible, even assuming significant industry growth rates over 50 years. The study, therefore, concludes that the rationale for imposing a royalty mechanism on space resource activities for the purposes of benefit sharing through direct monetary distribution to recipients would need to be carefully examined should such a royalty mechanism ever be proposed.

We are witnessing the emergence of a new “techno-economic paradigm” in the New Space economy. The entrepreneur research during the current “Innovation and Communication” paradigm captured the co-creation of the digital ecosystem through the affordances and platforms of the digital technology. Similarly, New Space is creating opportunities for a new generation of space entrepreneurs, known as astropreneurs, to co-create the ecosystem through the affordances and platforms enabled by space technology. For astropreneurs, the affordances vary depending on whether the application of the space technology is intended for use in space, on earth or “spin-off” to another market. Additionally, the co-creation across the groups of astropreneurs and the fluidity of the technology across markets differs depending on their associated affordances. By exploring how the different context of space and its associated technology affordances introduces new models of co-creation and fluidity across the astropreneurial community, this article aims to broaden the fluidity and co-creation research of entrepreneurs.

In this article, we develop a response to Wright, et al.'s article “Geopolitical Implications of a Successful SETI Program,” which is a critique of our own prior article in 2020 that develop a realpolitik analysis of risks related to contact with extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI).

This paper will argue that there are pragmatic reasons to further cooperation between Indigenous peoples and space agencies, exemplified by Navajo-NASA cooperation. These pragmatic reasons rest upon an argument from belonging: space expansion involves a series of multi-generation projects. The significance of our contributions to these project will depend upon the actions of other generations who are unlikely to accept goals which are idiosyncratic, rather than drawing upon some deeper human concern with space. Such concern can be informed through Indigenous inclusion. The paper will remain officially neutral about a broader range of discourses concerning land rights, sovereignty, and attempts to situate dissent as resistance to colonial settler states. It will, however, presuppose a broad sympathy with Indigenous predicaments and group survival. The approach will be pragmatic in the sense that three nonarbitrary constraints/adequacy conditions will have to be met: (i) the overall approach must be geared to policy discussions rather than counterculture; (ii) Indigenous knowledge must be acknowledged as more than ecological, in order to be relevant to the matter at hand; and (iii) the practical role assigned to Indigenous peoples must be significant and distinctive. The overall aim is to explain that there is at least one important practical advantage of extending and deepening Indigenous inclusion.

For two decades, there has been an ongoing debate in the European Union (EU) on how to link space programmes with its security and defence policy and how to translate words into action. This article examines the approaches proposed by two interesting contributions to this debate. The first has been put forward by the EUISS and proposes a top-down institutional approach taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the EU's “Strategic Compass” process on security and defence. Thus, the case of a dedicated “EU Space and Defence Strategy” to be established is proposed. The second approach has been put forward by the French ARES Group and argues that a bottom-up approach can enhance a common strategic view better than top-down declarations. By highlighting the possibility of funding for the development of military space capabilities by the European Defence Fund, the authors argue that the Commission's European secure connectivity project can be an ideal test case for the EU member states to blend their national capabilities with those of the EU. This article contributes to this debate by examining both arguments. It compares them with work done from 2002 to 2006, which was intended, according to a 2004 Council decision “to serve as a reference for future proceedings in the field of military capacities”. This analysis differs from the EUISS argument in that it proposes an update of the 2007 EU Space Policy to redefine the Common Security and Defence Policy goals first. Regarding the ARES Group, a bottom-up approach analysis validates the communication needs and their hierarchy, thus concluding that if implemented, it can be a timely solution in the Permanent Structured Cooperation framework. The analysis suggests that a relevant combined cooperative process in the Common Security and Defence Policy domain can give the EU time to examine the space implications of the Russia–Ukraine conflict and to establish its space vision for the European Defence Union.

Space weaponization should be prevented because of its detrimental effects on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities (LTSOSA). International law that currently governs weaponization in outer space should be implemented, and international rules that pertain to the LTSOSA should impose direct and indirect soft-law constraints on space weaponization. Nevertheless, the direct and indirect roles of international law in inhibiting space weaponization are limited, and a legal lacuna still exists in the governance of conventional weapons in the Earth's orbit. Independent and more focused discussions on specific issues related to space security are recommended given that the disagreement on related issues has prevented real progress from being made during multilateral discussions addressing the space technologies that could be used in a hostile manner. The integration of some norms of responsible space activity into the new LTSOSA Guidelines discussed under the auspices of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is also recommended, along with an ongoing strong political constraint on the deployment and testing of dedicated space weapons in outer space through the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions and international condemnation. The latter is a good alternative under the current circumstances to preserve the LTSOSA by working against the weaponization of outer space.

We discuss the recent “realpolitik” analysis of Wisian and Traphagan (2020) of the potential geopolitical fallout of the success of the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI). They conclude that “passive” SETI involves an underexplored yet significant risk. This is the risk that, in the event of a successful, passive detection of extraterrestrial technology, state-level actors could seek to gain an information monopoly on communications with an extraterrestrial intelligence. These attempts could lead to international conflict and potentially disastrous consequences. In response to this possibility, they argue that scientists and facilities engaged in SETI should preemptively engage in significant security protocols to forestall this risk. We find several flaws in their analysis. While we do not dispute that a realpolitik response is possible, we uncover concerns with Wisian and Traphagan's presentation of the realpolitik paradigm, and we argue that sufficient reason is not given to justify treating this potential scenario as action-guiding over other candidate geopolitical responses. Furthermore, even if one assumes that a realpolitik response is the most relevant geopolitical response, we show that it is highly unlikely that a nation could successfully monopolize communication with ETI. Instead, the real threat that the authors identify is based on the perception by state actors that an information monopoly is likely. However, as we show, this perception is based on an overly narrow contact scenario. Overall, we critique Wisian and Traphagan's argument and resulting recommendations on technical, political, and ethical grounds. Ultimately, we find that not only are Wisian and Traphagan's recommendations unlikely to work, they may also precipitate the very ills that they foresee. As an alternative to the Wisian and Traphagan recommendations, we recommend transparency and data sharing (which are consistent with currently accepted best practices), further development of postdetection protocols, and better education of policymakers in this space.

Despite evidence that shows how the support for space programs correlates with liberal political views and a lower level of religiosity, recent data suggest that more conservative positions may have an even more substantial effect under the appropriate conditions. Using the available data from Pew's American Trends Panel, we seek to clarify this interactional effect of political and religious preferences on the level of interest in the space programs and commitment to space politics support among Evangelicals as it changed during Trump's presidency. Our research hypothesizes that during this time, the simultaneous presence of nationalist views in both accounts of politics and religion may be linked to the underlying concept of “space nationalism,” that is, the belief that the United States should lead in space exploration, resulting in an increased level of support for space programs. This article presents the results of several iterations of linear regression models. Controlling for robust sociodemographic variables, our findings show a statistically significant effect of nationalist views and religious beliefs. Our results confirm that a combination of nationalism and religious views is a robust predictor of Evangelicals' space exploration support.

Both international society and individual states are placing considerable emphasis on the imminent threats of cyber-attacks on space activities. States play a major role in combatting against cyber-attacks in the space; thus, their international responsibility regime requires re-examination within this unique context. This study analyzes the responsibility regime established by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) aiming to adapt the time-honored provisions to the current challenges posed by space cyber-attacks. Simultaneously, it aims to focus on three aspects: attribution rules, the scope of obligations of States Parties and the specific measures that states should undertake. This study concludes that in situations of space cyber-attacks, a case-tailored method should be adopted to identify the responsible state. This may likely involve the broadening of states' obligations, invocation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, the due diligence obligations, and other lex specialis obligations, such as conducting space activities for peaceful purposes, due regard obligations and non-interference obligations. Furthermore, the conclusion suggests that states should act nationally as well as internationally to successfully combat against cyber-attacks on space activities.

This article brings into conversation scholarship in law and the social studies of outer space around the question of the “uses” of outer space, the shortcomings of existing legal instruments, and the possibility to reform them to place environmental concerns at their core. Starting from the Outer Space Treaty (OST), and using legal geography and an environmental lens, we highlight the interconnections between de-territorializing outer space, the image of the province of (hu)mankind, and the seemingly consequent egalitarian principle of benefit sharing. By reading this language of the OST against its historical context, we note that these seemingly egalitarian clauses mask the persisting hegemony of older space powers in access to and benefits from outer space. In this context, environmental protection clauses originally proposed by Japan, which were marginalized in the drafting of the OST, remain marginal to many governance mechanisms. Even when we decentre the OST and look at multiple legal and governance frameworks of outer space, from Planetary Protection to the International Telecommunications Union, these different approaches reiterate a utilitarian view of space environments that ties them to their usefulness to exploration and exploitation. These mechanisms, while useful for de-homogenizing outer space, do not go far enough in proposing that environmental protection underpins all principles of space governance. One of the effects of this failure is that more technically able nations keep crowding the orbits with megaconstellations. We propose an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the complex interrelation between space governance, geopolitics, and concerns about the future of outer space environments. A critical legal geography of outer space provides us with a possibility to examine the role of the law in relation to both geographical imaginaries and historical contexts and advance discussions on the role and responsibilities of humans beyond the planet we inhabit.