This article examines the potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and blockchain technologies to help resolve trade disputes, facilitate multilateral trade and increase efficiency within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It looks at how AI and blockchain can be used to automate more complex trade processes, such as anti-dumping measures. The article also outlines the challenges associated with implementing such technologies, such as the need for developing countries to invest in infrastructure, the need to ensure correct data is available, and the potential for future regulatory challenges. Finally, it identifies the key measures that must be taken before AI and blockchain can become part of the WTO dispute settlement and trade facilitation system. WTO, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Trade Facilitation, Dumping, Dispute Settlement
{"title":"The WTO and Using Digital Economy Technologies: Surviving the Race With Preferential Trade Agreements","authors":"Mohammad Abualethem Nsour","doi":"10.54648/trad2023031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023031","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and blockchain technologies to help resolve trade disputes, facilitate multilateral trade and increase efficiency within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It looks at how AI and blockchain can be used to automate more complex trade processes, such as anti-dumping measures. The article also outlines the challenges associated with implementing such technologies, such as the need for developing countries to invest in infrastructure, the need to ensure correct data is available, and the potential for future regulatory challenges. Finally, it identifies the key measures that must be taken before AI and blockchain can become part of the WTO dispute settlement and trade facilitation system.\u0000WTO, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Trade Facilitation, Dumping, Dispute Settlement","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International trade requires sufficient, reliable, and affordable sources of financing. Export credit agencies (ECAs) fill trade finance gaps by offering financing, insurance and guarantees to provide liquidity or mitigate risks. They help to create or secure jobs in the domestic economy. However, comprehensive government support is required to create significant impact. This includes ‘full faith and credit’ of the state. In the context of public foreign trade promotion, full faith and credit is defined as an explicit, direct or indirect, irrevocable, legal commitment to accept all liabilities of an ECA as unconditional obligations of the respective government. Our policy recommendations for countries with relatively young ECAs, for example in Ukraine, Armenia, and Malawi, are to establish a full guarantee in addition to an efficient legal set-up, sufficient capital, and sound risk management of the respective agency. Without full faith and credit, policy goals of fostering economic growth through foreign trade fall short. trade promotion, trade finance, export credit, export credit agency, export-import bank, full faith and credit, government guarantee
{"title":"Improving Export Credit Agency Impact Through Full Faith and Credit","authors":"Andreas Klasen, Hans Janus","doi":"10.54648/trad2023032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023032","url":null,"abstract":"International trade requires sufficient, reliable, and affordable sources of financing. Export credit agencies (ECAs) fill trade finance gaps by offering financing, insurance and guarantees to provide liquidity or mitigate risks. They help to create or secure jobs in the domestic economy. However, comprehensive government support is required to create significant impact. This includes ‘full faith and credit’ of the state. In the context of public foreign trade promotion, full faith and credit is defined as an explicit, direct or indirect, irrevocable, legal commitment to accept all liabilities of an ECA as unconditional obligations of the respective government. Our policy recommendations for countries with relatively young ECAs, for example in Ukraine, Armenia, and Malawi, are to establish a full guarantee in addition to an efficient legal set-up, sufficient capital, and sound risk management of the respective agency. Without full faith and credit, policy goals of fostering economic growth through foreign trade fall short.\u0000trade promotion, trade finance, export credit, export credit agency, export-import bank, full faith and credit, government guarantee","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Managing Intellectual Property (IP) protection over test data is a growth strategy in the trade competition, embodied as one of the crucial topics of US-China trade negotiations. Accordingly, the US took the trade war as a tool for the rivalry in the pharmaceutical industry and furnishing domestic companies with better protection schemes and more symmetrical access to the Chinese market. Even though the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Phase-one Trade Agreement) quelled the trade war, the dualism protection mechanism – ‘confidential business information’ protection and data exclusivity rules for pharmaceutical test data warrants exploring the legal basis and practical reasons. This article explores and clarifies the China and US trade arguments on test data and specific provisions of the Phase-one Trade Agreement from both empirical and normative perspectives. The empirical study sheds light on the pharmaceutical market competition between the US and China. Then it assesses the test data protection under the Phase-one Trade Agreement in light of US free trade agreements (FTAs), domestic legislation, and the Chinese test data protection legal system. In addition to providing contextual reflections, this article proposes China-US further negotiation for test data protection from a public health-friendly perspective, considering the US and Chinese legal frameworks and priorities regarding pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceutical, intellectual property, test data, confidential business information, data exclusivity, public health, US-China trade war, foreign trade agreements, Phase-one Trade Agreement
{"title":"Rethinking Test Data Protection in China-US Trade War: Integrating Empirical and Normative Analysis","authors":"Qian Yin","doi":"10.54648/trad2023033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023033","url":null,"abstract":"Managing Intellectual Property (IP) protection over test data is a growth strategy in the trade competition, embodied as one of the crucial topics of US-China trade negotiations. Accordingly, the US took the trade war as a tool for the rivalry in the pharmaceutical industry and furnishing domestic companies with better protection schemes and more symmetrical access to the Chinese market. Even though the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Phase-one Trade Agreement) quelled the trade war, the dualism protection mechanism – ‘confidential business information’ protection and data exclusivity rules for pharmaceutical test data warrants exploring the legal basis and practical reasons. This article explores and clarifies the China and US trade arguments on test data and specific provisions of the Phase-one Trade Agreement from both empirical and normative perspectives. The empirical study sheds light on the pharmaceutical market competition between the US and China. Then it assesses the test data protection under the Phase-one Trade Agreement in light of US free trade agreements (FTAs), domestic legislation, and the Chinese test data protection legal system. In addition to providing contextual reflections, this article proposes China-US further negotiation for test data protection from a public health-friendly perspective, considering the US and Chinese legal frameworks and priorities regarding pharmaceuticals.\u0000Pharmaceutical, intellectual property, test data, confidential business information, data exclusivity, public health, US-China trade war, foreign trade agreements, Phase-one Trade Agreement","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135761988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Inventions that rely on genetic resources are subject to different source disclosure models in the domestic laws of different countries. Different source disclosure models can indirectly affect the quantity and quality of patents issued in a country, thus resulting in different social benefits. Therefore, an analysis of which source disclosure model is applicable to the patent protection of genetic resources is of great importance. The economic approach of game theory is used to analyse the game of interests between patent applicants and the patent examination authority. It is found that the patent examination authority is required to introduce source disclosure rules and that the optimal equilibrium for patent applications can be achieved by requiring companies to comply with a voluntary source disclosure model under intense examination pressure. Based on this, the legislative policies of typical resource-rich countries are selected for analysis to verify the validity of the game conclusions. Finally, policy recommendations for source disclosure requirements for genetic resources in China are proposed based on the game conclusions. genetic resources, source disclosure, patent law, game theory, mandatory model, voluntary model, patent applications, regulatory bodies, cost-benefit perspective
{"title":"Game Analysis of Different Source Disclosure Model for Genetic Resources and Implications for China","authors":"Liwen Qi, Xiaoting Song, Diligena Dilixiati","doi":"10.54648/trad2023035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023035","url":null,"abstract":"Inventions that rely on genetic resources are subject to different source disclosure models in the domestic laws of different countries. Different source disclosure models can indirectly affect the quantity and quality of patents issued in a country, thus resulting in different social benefits. Therefore, an analysis of which source disclosure model is applicable to the patent protection of genetic resources is of great importance. The economic approach of game theory is used to analyse the game of interests between patent applicants and the patent examination authority. It is found that the patent examination authority is required to introduce source disclosure rules and that the optimal equilibrium for patent applications can be achieved by requiring companies to comply with a voluntary source disclosure model under intense examination pressure. Based on this, the legislative policies of typical resource-rich countries are selected for analysis to verify the validity of the game conclusions. Finally, policy recommendations for source disclosure requirements for genetic resources in China are proposed based on the game conclusions.\u0000genetic resources, source disclosure, patent law, game theory, mandatory model, voluntary model, patent applications, regulatory bodies, cost-benefit perspective","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU is adopting a set of unilateral trade-related measures that are designed to produce specific environmental effects. Increasing recourse to environmental leverage triggers an array of questions surrounding the treatment of ‘differently situated’ (including developing and least developed) countries. This article critically examines the extent to which the Chapeau (introductory clause) of Article XX GATT requires regulating Members to differentiate the treatment of ‘differently situated’ countries where the same relevant conditions prevail, or take their different prevailing conditions into account at the regulatory design or regulatory implementation stage. It finds that the dispute settlement organs’ narrow interpretative approach cannot do justice to the claims of ‘differently situated’ countries, but has several beneficial implications in environmental protection terms. As the climate crisis spirals out of control, the environmental cost of differentiation has become too high. Regulating Members should rather combine stringent unilateral standards with truly ambitious enabling and capacity-building strategies. Chapeau of Article XX GATT, Environmental Unilateralism, npr-PPMs, Anti- Deforestation Standards, CBAM, EU – Palm Oil, Developing Countries, Least Developed Countries, Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination, Line of Equilibrium
{"title":"Environmental Unilateralism and the Chapeau of Article XX GATT: The ‘Line of Equilibrium’ and the Question of ‘Differently Situated’ Countries","authors":"Giulia Claudia Leonelli","doi":"10.54648/trad2023030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023030","url":null,"abstract":"The EU is adopting a set of unilateral trade-related measures that are designed to produce specific environmental effects. Increasing recourse to environmental leverage triggers an array of questions surrounding the treatment of ‘differently situated’ (including developing and least developed) countries. This article critically examines the extent to which the Chapeau (introductory clause) of Article XX GATT requires regulating Members to differentiate the treatment of ‘differently situated’ countries where the same relevant conditions prevail, or take their different prevailing conditions into account at the regulatory design or regulatory implementation stage. It finds that the dispute settlement organs’ narrow interpretative approach cannot do justice to the claims of ‘differently situated’ countries, but has several beneficial implications in environmental protection terms. As the climate crisis spirals out of control, the environmental cost of differentiation has become too high. Regulating Members should rather combine stringent unilateral standards with truly ambitious enabling and capacity-building strategies.\u0000Chapeau of Article XX GATT, Environmental Unilateralism, npr-PPMs, Anti- Deforestation Standards, CBAM, EU – Palm Oil, Developing Countries, Least Developed Countries, Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination, Line of Equilibrium","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA), the paper demonstrates the operationalization of differentiated differentiation – an implicit threshold approach to differentiation in the WTO and one that is amenable to the principle of graduation. We use this approach to objectively identify which countries (from a pool of fifty developed, developing, and least developed WTO member countries) are entitled to derogate from specific CVA obligations based on special and differential treatment (SDT). Offering an alternative to the current SDT practice, differentiated differentiation requires that countries must justify, based on objective criteria, the need for a waiver from rule obligation for a limited period rather than qualifying for such a waiver by mere categorization as a developing country. The paper further defines a threshold at which SDT beneficiaries may be graduated out of SDT using a statistically-based scoring procedure. WTO, developing countries, special and differential treatment, differentiation, country categorization, graduation, composite indicators, capacity constraints, trade agreements, international trade law, social science
{"title":"Differentiated Differentiation in the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement","authors":"Sangeeta Khorana, Aniekan Ukpe","doi":"10.54648/trad2023029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023029","url":null,"abstract":"Using the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA), the paper demonstrates the operationalization of differentiated differentiation – an implicit threshold approach to differentiation in the WTO and one that is amenable to the principle of graduation. We use this approach to objectively identify which countries (from a pool of fifty developed, developing, and least developed WTO member countries) are entitled to derogate from specific CVA obligations based on special and differential treatment (SDT). Offering an alternative to the current SDT practice, differentiated differentiation requires that countries must justify, based on objective criteria, the need for a waiver from rule obligation for a limited period rather than qualifying for such a waiver by mere categorization as a developing country. The paper further defines a threshold at which SDT beneficiaries may be graduated out of SDT using a statistically-based scoring procedure.\u0000WTO, developing countries, special and differential treatment, differentiation, country categorization, graduation, composite indicators, capacity constraints, trade agreements, international trade law, social science","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite eight neighbouring Member States of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) signing the intra-regional preferential trade agreement (PTA), trade between South Asian countries is among the lowest in the world. This article analyses one aspect of the trade under the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) – anti-dumping duties in the internal trade between the SAFTA contracting parties. It demonstrates that SAFTA has a very sketchy rule on anti-dumping, and even that has hardly made any impact on the intra-SAARC trade. The article argues that the SAFTA as a PTA within the broader framework of a regional institutional mechanism needs to be more ambitious in scope and should dismantle the antidumping duties in intra-SAARC trade. Anti-dumping, SAARC, SAFTA, South Asia, free trade agreements
{"title":"A Tale of Too Little: Anti-dumping Tariff Between SAFTA Contracting Parties","authors":"","doi":"10.54648/trad2023034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023034","url":null,"abstract":"Despite eight neighbouring Member States of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) signing the intra-regional preferential trade agreement (PTA), trade between South Asian countries is among the lowest in the world. This article analyses one aspect of the trade under the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) – anti-dumping duties in the internal trade between the SAFTA contracting parties. It demonstrates that SAFTA has a very sketchy rule on anti-dumping, and even that has hardly made any impact on the intra-SAARC trade. The article argues that the SAFTA as a PTA within the broader framework of a regional institutional mechanism needs to be more ambitious in scope and should dismantle the antidumping duties in intra-SAARC trade.\u0000Anti-dumping, SAARC, SAFTA, South Asia, free trade agreements","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article critically reviews the Turkey-Pharmaceutical Products Dispute, focusing on the question of whether Turkey’s drug insurance reimbursement scheme can be regarded as government procurement, which would allow Turkey’s drug production localization policy to be exempt from national treatment obligation. Both the panel (on the account that there was no ownership by the government) and the arbitrators (on the account that there was insufficient control of pharmaceutical products subject to the dispute), ruled against Turkey’s government procurement defence. In contrast, this article argues that given rising health costs and repeated global pandemics which compel governments to build up sufficient national production capability of health products to facilitate timely supply of medical products, it would be desirable to take a broad approach towards interpreting the scope of Article III:8(a) with respect to the pharmaceutical sector, granting greater policy space for member governments. pharmaceuticals, government procurement, national treatment, Article III:8(a) derogation, drug insurance reimbursement, domestic localization policy, health policy, Turkey
{"title":"Government Procurement Defence Under GATT 1994 Article III:8(a): A Critical Review of the Turkey-Pharmaceutical Products Dispute","authors":"Mikyung Yun","doi":"10.54648/trad2023007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023007","url":null,"abstract":"This article critically reviews the Turkey-Pharmaceutical Products Dispute, focusing on the question of whether Turkey’s drug insurance reimbursement scheme can be regarded as government procurement, which would allow Turkey’s drug production localization policy to be exempt from national treatment obligation. Both the panel (on the account that there was no ownership by the government) and the arbitrators (on the account that there was insufficient control of pharmaceutical products subject to the dispute), ruled against Turkey’s government procurement defence. In contrast, this article argues that given rising health costs and repeated global pandemics which compel governments to build up sufficient national production capability of health products to facilitate timely supply of medical products, it would be desirable to take a broad approach towards interpreting the scope of Article III:8(a) with respect to the pharmaceutical sector, granting greater policy space for member governments.\u0000pharmaceuticals, government procurement, national treatment, Article III:8(a) derogation, drug insurance reimbursement, domestic localization policy, health policy, Turkey","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41744771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After ten years in the making, in 2022, the European Union adopted an International Procurement Instrument (IPI). This article examines how the 2022 IPI seeks to regulate the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement markets, as well as how it intends to support negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries. After setting out the background to the IPI proposal, the article identifies the main features in terms of its’ scope and coverage, procedures and obligations. The article then highlights key changes in design since the IPI was originally proposed in 2012 and again in the 2016 Amended Proposal. The article assesses the potential of the IPI to meet its’ objectives without provoking retaliation or challenges from its’ trading partners or placing an undue burden on the EU procurement process and businesses. It concludes that the 2022 IPI is better suited as a political tool for encouraging negotiations than as an effective economic instrument to create a level playing field in government procurement markets. EU International Procurement Instrument (IPI), government procurement, EU trade policy, reciprocity, WTO Government Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA), WTO Article III.8 (a), protectionism
{"title":"The EU 2022 International Procurement Regulation Enters in to Force Reciprocity","authors":"K. Dawar","doi":"10.54648/trad2023005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023005","url":null,"abstract":"After ten years in the making, in 2022, the European Union adopted an International Procurement Instrument (IPI). This article examines how the 2022 IPI seeks to regulate the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement markets, as well as how it intends to support negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries. After setting out the background to the IPI proposal, the article identifies the main features in terms of its’ scope and coverage, procedures and obligations. The article then highlights key changes in design since the IPI was originally proposed in 2012 and again in the 2016 Amended Proposal. The article assesses the potential of the IPI to meet its’ objectives without provoking retaliation or challenges from its’ trading partners or placing an undue burden on the EU procurement process and businesses. It concludes that the 2022 IPI is better suited as a political tool for encouraging negotiations than as an effective economic instrument to create a level playing field in government procurement markets.\u0000EU International Procurement Instrument (IPI), government procurement, EU trade policy, reciprocity, WTO Government Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA), WTO Article III.8 (a), protectionism","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42708366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union’s (EU’s) ‘New Generation’ Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) often contain ‘level playing field’ obligations. ‘Level playing field’ obligations, in this context, are minimum, reciprocal obligations usually with respect to taxation, state-aid, and both labour and environmental standards. This short article is not so much concerned with these obligations or their effect, as it is with the use of the ‘level playing field’ metaphor to describe them, specifically in the context of labour and environmental standards. Through an examination of the actual usage, meaning and context of the level playing field metaphor, the article analyses and rejects arguments that a commitment to a level playing field in fact indicates a change on the part of states away from ‘free’ trade to ‘fair’. Rather, it demonstrates that the level playing field metaphor, at least in the context of EU FTAs, in fact functions as a kind of linguistic disguise for a competitive move in trade agreements. Level Playing Field, EU Trade, Free Trade Agreements, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Sustainabilty, Labour, Environment, Metaphor, Cognitive Metaphor Theory
{"title":"The ‘Level Playing Field’ Metaphor: Revealing a Competitive Move in EU Free Trade Agreements","authors":"M. Gillis","doi":"10.54648/trad2023004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2023004","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union’s (EU’s) ‘New Generation’ Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) often contain ‘level playing field’ obligations. ‘Level playing field’ obligations, in this context, are minimum, reciprocal obligations usually with respect to taxation, state-aid, and both labour and environmental standards. This short article is not so much concerned with these obligations or their effect, as it is with the use of the ‘level playing field’ metaphor to describe them, specifically in the context of labour and environmental standards. Through an examination of the actual usage, meaning and context of the level playing field metaphor, the article analyses and rejects arguments that a commitment to a level playing field in fact indicates a change on the part of states away from ‘free’ trade to ‘fair’. Rather, it demonstrates that the level playing field metaphor, at least in the context of EU FTAs, in fact functions as a kind of linguistic disguise for a competitive move in trade agreements.\u0000Level Playing Field, EU Trade, Free Trade Agreements, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Sustainabilty, Labour, Environment, Metaphor, Cognitive Metaphor Theory","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42655878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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