The hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China has generated tectonic geoeconomic shifts with massive implications for global trade. Global trade, inextricably linked with national prosperity, international politics and global governance, is increasingly driven less by economic realities and more by great power rivalry. Demonstrating both the dynamic nature of US-China trade tensions and the impact of and international political relations, are allegations of Chinese human rights violations being injected by the US as part of trade policy. Invoking human rights in the trade context has already caused multi-dimensional complexities impacting businesses; supply-chains; coalition building; and spurring counter measures. Linking human rights to trade policies might also lead to increasing economic nationalism, regionalism, protectionism, and further counter-measures. Significantly, given economic and trade realism, whether the current Western concern over human rights is sustainable longer-term is an open question. Accordingly, weaponizing human rights in trade relations constitutes an omnipresent risk not only to China, but also to the US since economic practicalities and trade pragmatism could potentially precipitate a more Chinacentric international trade governance. Regardless of the outcome, connecting trade to human rights will likely lead to a re-shaping of the existing trade architecture. global trade, hegemonic rivalry, human rights, national security
{"title":"The Weaponization of Human Rights in US-China Trade Policy: Impacts and Risks","authors":"J. Slawotsky","doi":"10.54648/trad2022022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022022","url":null,"abstract":"The hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China has generated tectonic geoeconomic shifts with massive implications for global trade. Global trade, inextricably linked with national prosperity, international politics and global governance, is increasingly driven less by economic realities and more by great power rivalry. Demonstrating both the dynamic nature of US-China trade tensions and the impact of and international political relations, are allegations of Chinese human rights violations being injected by the US as part of trade policy. Invoking human rights in the trade context has already caused multi-dimensional complexities impacting businesses; supply-chains; coalition building; and spurring counter measures. Linking human rights to trade policies might also lead to increasing economic nationalism, regionalism, protectionism, and further counter-measures. Significantly, given economic and trade realism, whether the current Western concern over human rights is sustainable longer-term is an open question. Accordingly, weaponizing human rights in trade relations constitutes an omnipresent risk not only to China, but also to the US since economic practicalities and trade pragmatism could potentially precipitate a more Chinacentric international trade governance. Regardless of the outcome, connecting trade to human rights will likely lead to a re-shaping of the existing trade architecture.\u0000global trade, hegemonic rivalry, human rights, national security","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49522460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
World Trade Organization (WTO) judicial bodies face dual obstacles because of their limited legal authority: they do not have the power to investigate members, so they depend primarily on submissions from disputants. They have no authority to sanction members directly, so they rely on decentralized enforcement. The legalization of the trade regime depends on consent and voluntary compliance. This article focuses on the role of third parties in the dispute settlement process and investigates how they contribute to the legalization of the WTO. I use an original dataset covering all WTO disputes from 1995 to 2012, containing unusually detailed information about the number of third parties, the total dispute settlement period, and the final stage that disputants use, etc. In contrast to the existing literature, which characterizes third parties as spoilers that prevent early settlement, I find that WTO third parties have heterogeneous motivations for participation; moreover, participation by third parties with differing motivations has different effects on dispute settlement and compliance. In particular, third parties that claim to have ‘systemic interests’–a legal designation that allows them to participate despite their negligible stakes in a dispute–have considerable influence on dispute resolution. Specifically: (1) their briefs provide higher-quality information than other third-party briefs to panels and the Appellate Body; (2) they help to accelerate dispute settlement; and (3) their participation makes respondents more likely to comply with panel and Appellate Body rulings. WTO, third parties, trade disputes, legalization, trade laws, systemic interests, panels, Appellate Body
{"title":"How Do the Third Parties Contribute to WTO Dispute Resolution?","authors":"J. Ryu","doi":"10.54648/trad2022024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022024","url":null,"abstract":"World Trade Organization (WTO) judicial bodies face dual obstacles because of their limited legal authority: they do not have the power to investigate members, so they depend primarily on submissions from disputants. They have no authority to sanction members directly, so they rely on decentralized enforcement. The legalization of the trade regime depends on consent and voluntary compliance. This article focuses on the role of third parties in the dispute settlement process and investigates how they contribute to the legalization of the WTO. I use an original dataset covering all WTO disputes from 1995 to 2012, containing unusually detailed information about the number of third parties, the total dispute settlement period, and the final stage that disputants use, etc. In contrast to the existing literature, which characterizes third parties as spoilers that prevent early settlement, I find that WTO third parties have heterogeneous motivations for participation; moreover, participation by third parties with differing motivations has different effects on dispute settlement and compliance. In particular, third parties that claim to have ‘systemic interests’–a legal designation that allows them to participate despite their negligible stakes in a dispute–have considerable influence on dispute resolution. Specifically: (1) their briefs provide higher-quality information than other third-party briefs to panels and the Appellate Body; (2) they help to accelerate dispute settlement; and (3) their participation makes respondents more likely to comply with panel and Appellate Body rulings.\u0000WTO, third parties, trade disputes, legalization, trade laws, systemic interests, panels, Appellate Body","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42796717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the institutional designs of online personal data protection, location of computing facilities and cross-border data flows (hereinafter referred to as ‘data-related issues’) in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded between/among the RCEP Parties (hereinafter referred to as ‘inner-FTAs’). Varied institutional designs of the RCEP’s inner-FTAs suggest that uneven liberalization of data flows and regulatory fragmentation are prominent among the parties, but the inner-FTAs are still rooted in the conventional rationale of embedded liberalization. Comparatively, the RCEP’s institutional design concerning data-related issues diverts from the conventional rationale by formally harmonizing its heterogeneous inner-FTAs: the RCEP partially assimilates its inner-FTAs while making some innovations referring to some old elements of the multilateral trading system. In substance, the RCEP allows the Parties to have more autonomy to cultivate consensus and re-adjust the regional legal order as it reasserts the dominance of domestic regulation. The RCEP may head for two directions: it may either complement the multilateral trading system or grow into a novel regional legal order. The destination largely depends on whether the Parties can reach consensus. During the transitional period, soft law and non-state actors will play important roles in bridging the regulatory divide under the shadow of domestic regulation. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), free trade agreements, institution, institutional design, online personal data protection, cross-border data flows, data localization, soft law, non-state actor, new legal order
{"title":"Online Personal Data Protection and Data Flows Under the RCEP: A Nostalgic New Start?","authors":"Xin Wang","doi":"10.54648/trad2022027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022027","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the institutional designs of online personal data protection, location of computing facilities and cross-border data flows (hereinafter referred to as ‘data-related issues’) in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded between/among the RCEP Parties (hereinafter referred to as ‘inner-FTAs’). Varied institutional designs of the RCEP’s inner-FTAs suggest that uneven liberalization of data flows and regulatory fragmentation are prominent among the parties, but the inner-FTAs are still rooted in the conventional rationale of embedded liberalization. Comparatively, the RCEP’s institutional design concerning data-related issues diverts from the conventional rationale by formally harmonizing its heterogeneous inner-FTAs: the RCEP partially assimilates its inner-FTAs while making some innovations referring to some old elements of the multilateral trading system. In substance, the RCEP allows the Parties to have more autonomy to cultivate consensus and re-adjust the regional legal order as it reasserts the dominance of domestic regulation. The RCEP may head for two directions: it may either complement the multilateral trading system or grow into a novel regional legal order. The destination largely depends on whether the Parties can reach consensus. During the transitional period, soft law and non-state actors will play important roles in bridging the regulatory divide under the shadow of domestic regulation.\u0000Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), free trade agreements, institution, institutional design, online personal data protection, cross-border data flows, data localization, soft law, non-state actor, new legal order","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48714454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
National security rhetoric has gained prominence due to increasingly pervasive digitalization, the emergence of cutting-edge technologies, and developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning. Increased reliance on these areas fuels industrial development but also renders national economies vulnerable to foreign interference. Ultimately, the current wave of technological development with its potential threats intensifies competition between states and redefines their economic and military advantages over potential global rivals. Against this background, certain states have expanded the scope of their export control regimes by extending the lists of controlled items and/or imposing ‘catch-all’ control. Used in conjunction with economic sanctions, weaponized tariffs, and extensive investment screening mechanisms aimed to protect national security interests, such measures go beyond conventional non-proliferation purposes to address economic security, technological supremacy, and human rights concerns for which those states are willing to sacrifice the economic efficiency that accompanies trade liberalization. Using the United States, the European Union, China, and Russia as case studies, this article discusses to which extent different export control objectives of these international actors have been securitized. Securitization of certain states’ interests is inevitable, even if not desirable. Yet, this article argues that international law can be managed to control and limit the level of securitization of domestic policies in order to strengthen the international legal system as a whole. export controls, national security, economic security, securitization, emerging technologies, technological supremacy
{"title":"Export Controls and Securitization of Economic Policy: Comparative Analysis of the Practice of the United States, the European Union, China, and Russia","authors":"O. Hrynkiv","doi":"10.54648/trad2022026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022026","url":null,"abstract":"National security rhetoric has gained prominence due to increasingly pervasive digitalization, the emergence of cutting-edge technologies, and developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning. Increased reliance on these areas fuels industrial development but also renders national economies vulnerable to foreign interference. Ultimately, the current wave of technological development with its potential threats intensifies competition between states and redefines their economic and military advantages over potential global rivals. Against this background, certain states have expanded the scope of their export control regimes by extending the lists of controlled items and/or imposing ‘catch-all’ control. Used in conjunction with economic sanctions, weaponized tariffs, and extensive investment screening mechanisms aimed to protect national security interests, such measures go beyond conventional non-proliferation purposes to address economic security, technological supremacy, and human rights concerns for which those states are willing to sacrifice the economic efficiency that accompanies trade liberalization. Using the United States, the European Union, China, and Russia as case studies, this article discusses to which extent different export control objectives of these international actors have been securitized. Securitization of certain states’ interests is inevitable, even if not desirable. Yet, this article argues that international law can be managed to control and limit the level of securitization of domestic policies in order to strengthen the international legal system as a whole.\u0000export controls, national security, economic security, securitization, emerging technologies, technological supremacy","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45361651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In February 2021, the members of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) endorsed the first-ever Voluntary Guidelines on Food Systems and Nutrition (VGFSyN) aimed at supporting countries in their efforts to eradicate all forms of hunger and malnutrition, while strengthening the process towards sustainable food systems. This article investigates whether and how the VGFSyN address international trade, whose role in the functioning of food systems is clearly highlighted in current global policy initiatives. The analysis examines the relationship between trade policies and food security and nutrition. It highlights the most important positions on the matter of the members of the CFS during the preparation of the guidelines. We argue that the CFS missed the opportunity to include trade and its profound effect on nutrition in the supposedly systemic approach adopted in the guidelines. We believe that the VGFSyN would have been an ideal opportunity to emphasize the relationship between trade and food and nutrition security, and to call attention to the importance of trade in the transition towards sustainable food systems. world food security, nutrition security, food systems, sustainable food systems, trade policies, Voluntary Guidelines on Food Systems and Nutrition (VGFSyN), WTO Agreement on Agriculture, non-trade concerns, agricultural trade liberalization, right to food
{"title":"International Trade in the CFS Voluntary Guidelines on Food Systems and Nutrition: A Missed Opportunity?","authors":"Mariagrazia Alabrese, Francesca Coli","doi":"10.54648/trad2022028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022028","url":null,"abstract":"In February 2021, the members of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) endorsed the first-ever Voluntary Guidelines on Food Systems and Nutrition (VGFSyN) aimed at supporting countries in their efforts to eradicate all forms of hunger and malnutrition, while strengthening the process towards sustainable food systems. This article investigates whether and how the VGFSyN address international trade, whose role in the functioning of food systems is clearly highlighted in current global policy initiatives. The analysis examines the relationship between trade policies and food security and nutrition. It highlights the most important positions on the matter of the members of the CFS during the preparation of the guidelines. We argue that the CFS missed the opportunity to include trade and its profound effect on nutrition in the supposedly systemic approach adopted in the guidelines. We believe that the VGFSyN would have been an ideal opportunity to emphasize the relationship between trade and food and nutrition security, and to call attention to the importance of trade in the transition towards sustainable food systems.\u0000world food security, nutrition security, food systems, sustainable food systems, trade policies, Voluntary Guidelines on Food Systems and Nutrition (VGFSyN), WTO Agreement on Agriculture, non-trade concerns, agricultural trade liberalization, right to food","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44747355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article studies the case of the sanctions against the Russian war on the Ukraine in 2022 against the background of four major and well-documented historical sanction episodes: (1) the anti-Apartheid sanctions of the 1980s, (2) the sanctions against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, (3) the sanctions against Iranian nuclear capabilities and (4) the US and EU sanctions against the Russian annexation of the Crimea. Two cases (South Africa and Iran) have a comparatively low probability of success based on pre-sanction trade linkage between sender and target and the target’s regime type (the autocracy score). The key to understanding their success is in the banking channel (debt-crisis and international payment system sanctions) and the behaviour of the private sector (divestment and over-compliance). The failure of the sanctions against Iraq underscores the importance of regime type and the need for a viable exit strategy and shows that some decision-makers cannot be influenced with economic hardship. The 2014 sanctions against Russia illustrate the comparative vulnerability of the European democracies and their weakness in organizing comprehensive sanctions that bite. Given the increased Russian resilience, the increasingly autocratic nature of President Putin’s government, the credibility of his 2014 tit-for-tat strategy and the failure of European democracies to implement appropriate strong and broad-based measures, smart and targeted sanctions are unlikely to influence the Kremlin’s calculus. The European Union could only influence that calculus by restoring its reputation as a credible applicant of strong sanctions, including an embargo on capital goods and a boycott of Russian energy. Sanctions, Comprehensive sanctions, Smart sanctions, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, Apartheid, Iran, Iraq, Crimea, comparative case study
{"title":"Sanctions Against the Russian War on Ukraine: Lessons from History and Current Prospects","authors":"Peter A. G. van Bergeijk","doi":"10.54648/trad2022023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022023","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies the case of the sanctions against the Russian war on the Ukraine in 2022 against the background of four major and well-documented historical sanction episodes: (1) the anti-Apartheid sanctions of the 1980s, (2) the sanctions against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, (3) the sanctions against Iranian nuclear capabilities and (4) the US and EU sanctions against the Russian annexation of the Crimea. Two cases (South Africa and Iran) have a comparatively low probability of success based on pre-sanction trade linkage between sender and target and the target’s regime type (the autocracy score). The key to understanding their success is in the banking channel (debt-crisis and international payment system sanctions) and the behaviour of the private sector (divestment and over-compliance). The failure of the sanctions against Iraq underscores the importance of regime type and the need for a viable exit strategy and shows that some decision-makers cannot be influenced with economic hardship. The 2014 sanctions against Russia illustrate the comparative vulnerability of the European democracies and their weakness in organizing comprehensive sanctions that bite. Given the increased Russian resilience, the increasingly autocratic nature of President Putin’s government, the credibility of his 2014 tit-for-tat strategy and the failure of European democracies to implement appropriate strong and broad-based measures, smart and targeted sanctions are unlikely to influence the Kremlin’s calculus. The European Union could only influence that calculus by restoring its reputation as a credible applicant of strong sanctions, including an embargo on capital goods and a boycott of Russian energy.\u0000Sanctions, Comprehensive sanctions, Smart sanctions, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, Apartheid, Iran, Iraq, Crimea, comparative case study","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41621665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO recognized the need for positive steps to be taken to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth of international trade that is commensurate with their economic development needs. This article discusses how the WTO helps to facilitate Africa’s integration into the WTO multilateral trading system. It is argued that while African countries are actively engaged in the work of the WTO and are pursuing their economic and policy interests, some key challenges remain. These include further diversifying their production, linking to global value chains (GVCs) and developing adequate infrastructure to facilitate digital trade so that it becomes a vehicle for economic growth. The WTO, working closely with partner institutions, supports Africa in its endeavours to tackle some of these challenges, offering a range of programmes that are geared towards trade capacity-building. It is argued that the work undertaken by WTO Chairs and academic institutions under the aegis of the WTO’s Chairs Programme (WCP) is of critical importance in providing the analytical underpinnings for the policy choices that will encourage fuller integration into the multilateral trading system. This programme was significantly expanded and deepened in 2021 with a view to strengthening its capacity to provide support to beneficiaries and especially least-developed countries (LDCs) (largely African countries) so that they can more fully embrace the multilateral trading system. trade, capacity-building, Africa, WTO, global value chains, academic support
{"title":"Africa’s Integration into the WTO Multilateral Trading System: Academic Support and the Role of the WTO Chairs","authors":"M. Smeets","doi":"10.54648/trad2022020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022020","url":null,"abstract":"The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO recognized the need for positive steps to be taken to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth of international trade that is commensurate with their economic development needs. This article discusses how the WTO helps to facilitate Africa’s integration into the WTO multilateral trading system. It is argued that while African countries are actively engaged in the work of the WTO and are pursuing their economic and policy interests, some key challenges remain. These include further diversifying their production, linking to global value chains (GVCs) and developing adequate infrastructure to facilitate digital trade so that it becomes a vehicle for economic growth. The WTO, working closely with partner institutions, supports Africa in its endeavours to tackle some of these challenges, offering a range of programmes that are geared towards trade capacity-building. It is argued that the work undertaken by WTO Chairs and academic institutions under the aegis of the WTO’s Chairs Programme (WCP) is of critical importance in providing the analytical underpinnings for the policy choices that will encourage fuller integration into the multilateral trading system. This programme was significantly expanded and deepened in 2021 with a view to strengthening its capacity to provide support to beneficiaries and especially least-developed countries (LDCs) (largely African countries) so that they can more fully embrace the multilateral trading system.\u0000trade, capacity-building, Africa, WTO, global value chains, academic support","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42696204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Governments over two centuries have repeatedly confronted whether freer trade helps or hinders the problem of widespread food shortages. This issue is of utmost concern in the current pandemic and the accompanying reaction of food markets to COVID-19, in which food insecurity is now a central challenge. This article will consider the historical record of the Great Famine in Ireland and its economic, agronomic, and political lessons for food and trade policy. These lessons include the likelihood of supply chain disruptions and panic buying as well as export restrictions, food purchases from abroad and the complexities of political and military strife. It finds that allowing market forces to cause freer flows of commodities is important if not sufficient to deal with the crises that pandemics cause. Resolute political intervention is also critical: the historical record reinforces the role of political leadership in this process. Corn Laws, Tariffs, COVID-19, Potato Blight, Great Irish Famine, Robert Peel
{"title":"Famine and Free Trade in the Covid Age: Lessons from the Great Irish Famine","authors":"C. Runge","doi":"10.54648/trad2022018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022018","url":null,"abstract":"Governments over two centuries have repeatedly confronted whether freer trade helps or hinders the problem of widespread food shortages. This issue is of utmost concern in the current pandemic and the accompanying reaction of food markets to COVID-19, in which food insecurity is now a central challenge. This article will consider the historical record of the Great Famine in Ireland and its economic, agronomic, and political lessons for food and trade policy. These lessons include the likelihood of supply chain disruptions and panic buying as well as export restrictions, food purchases from abroad and the complexities of political and military strife. It finds that allowing market forces to cause freer flows of commodities is important if not sufficient to deal with the crises that pandemics cause. Resolute political intervention is also critical: the historical record reinforces the role of political leadership in this process.\u0000Corn Laws, Tariffs, COVID-19, Potato Blight, Great Irish Famine, Robert Peel","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46352473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Commission’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) aims to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, but it would levy imports even when there is no risk of carbon leakage, which may in turn increase greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The proposed CBAM also appears to cite the intermediate objective of ensuring a ‘level playing field’ for carbon pricing, but it is difficult to see the rationale for retroactively equalizing only the carbon price while ignoring the costs paid by producers to support other policies aimed at curbing nationwide GHG emissions and the costs of reducing the emissions from their own products. These issues essentially stem from the CBAM’s inherent and fundamental constraints in the institutional design that charges for emissions from the production process outside the EU’s jurisdiction and cannot be remedied by superficially tweaking the associated mechanism. The CBAM could be justified under Article XX(g) as a measure ‘relating to the conservation of’ an atmosphere with low GHG density without scrutinizing these issues. However, it is questionable to interpret Article XX(g) as authorizing inefficient resource conservation through unilateral measures, despite the exporting country potentially being able to conserve resources more efficiently. carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), carbon leakage, level playing field, European Union, GATT, border tax adjustment
{"title":"EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Will It Achieve Its Objective(s)?","authors":"Sakuya (Yoshida) Sato","doi":"10.54648/trad2022015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022015","url":null,"abstract":"The European Commission’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) aims to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, but it would levy imports even when there is no risk of carbon leakage, which may in turn increase greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The proposed CBAM also appears to cite the intermediate objective of ensuring a ‘level playing field’ for carbon pricing, but it is difficult to see the rationale for retroactively equalizing only the carbon price while ignoring the costs paid by producers to support other policies aimed at curbing nationwide GHG emissions and the costs of reducing the emissions from their own products. These issues essentially stem from the CBAM’s inherent and fundamental constraints in the institutional design that charges for emissions from the production process outside the EU’s jurisdiction and cannot be remedied by superficially tweaking the associated mechanism. The CBAM could be justified under Article XX(g) as a measure ‘relating to the conservation of’ an atmosphere with low GHG density without scrutinizing these issues. However, it is questionable to interpret Article XX(g) as authorizing inefficient resource conservation through unilateral measures, despite the exporting country potentially being able to conserve resources more efficiently.\u0000carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), carbon leakage, level playing field, European Union, GATT, border tax adjustment","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45649237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, the world’s largest economies and traders – the United States, China, and Japan – have chosen to use measures affecting international trade as a means to achieve political objectives in contravention of the rules of international economic law and the practices of international trade established over several decades. Since the end of World War II, the world economy and international trade have rapidly expanded and prospered by achieving a degree of separation between international trade and political struggles under the rule-based international trading system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization. Thus, the recent misuses of trade measures by the world’s largest traders are alarming, because they undermine the stability of the world trading system, which has been maintained for the past several decades. This article accounts politically-motivated trade measures (‘PTMs’) recently invoked by the United States, China, and Japan, assesses their incompatibilities with the rules of international economic law, and also examines the risks that these PTMs pose to the world trading system. Weaponizing Trade, The World Trade Organization, PTM, Section 301, National Security
{"title":"Weaponizing International Trade in Political Disputes: Issues Under International Economic Law and Systemic Risks","authors":"Y. Lee","doi":"10.54648/trad2022016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022016","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the world’s largest economies and traders – the United States, China, and Japan – have chosen to use measures affecting international trade as a means to achieve political objectives in contravention of the rules of international economic law and the practices of international trade established over several decades. Since the end of World War II, the world economy and international trade have rapidly expanded and prospered by achieving a degree of separation between international trade and political struggles under the rule-based international trading system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization. Thus, the recent misuses of trade measures by the world’s largest traders are alarming, because they undermine the stability of the world trading system, which has been maintained for the past several decades. This article accounts politically-motivated trade measures (‘PTMs’) recently invoked by the United States, China, and Japan, assesses their incompatibilities with the rules of international economic law, and also examines the risks that these PTMs pose to the world trading system.\u0000Weaponizing Trade, The World Trade Organization, PTM, Section 301, National Security","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48238210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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