‘Deep-free trade agreements (FTA)-maker-multilateralist’ nations are obliged to find unconventional ways to co-exist with China in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and this obligation is becoming more obvious. There is a possibility for Japan’s involvement in enlisting soft law mechanisms in order to ensure China’s BRI projects conform to high standards; and this serves as a main argument of this article. In my view, with its unique geographic position, the existing fierce rivalry in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the country’s intertwining market with China, Japan’s capacity to reform the BRI from the inside should not be underestimated. On the contrary, by persisting with high Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) principles promoted in the last three years, Japan has been successful in nudging China toward these principles. The country has also enabled China to endorse the notion of high-quality infrastructure at the second BRI forum. With Japan’s leadership, the G20 Osaka Summit has contributed considerably into bolstering of the QII principles. Moreover, despite being less institutionalized and having soft law nature, the Japan-China Memorandum on Business Cooperation in Third Countries is effective: The Memorandum utilizes and suppresses the harm caused by the economic activities of Chinese businesses in third-country markets. Presently, Sino-Japanese collaboration in Thailand’s East- West Economic Corridor Program is testing whether the Chinese government is capable of earnestly engaging in ‘Third Party Market Cooperation’, or whether this endeavour is futile. BRI, FOIP, quality infrastructure, third-party market cooperation forum, China-Japan Relations
{"title":"Reforming the BRI from the Inside: Japan’s Contribution via Soft Law Diplomacy","authors":"Alisher Umirdinov","doi":"10.54648/trad2022019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022019","url":null,"abstract":"‘Deep-free trade agreements (FTA)-maker-multilateralist’ nations are obliged to find unconventional ways to co-exist with China in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and this obligation is becoming more obvious. There is a possibility for Japan’s involvement in enlisting soft law mechanisms in order to ensure China’s BRI projects conform to high standards; and this serves as a main argument of this article. In my view, with its unique geographic position, the existing fierce rivalry in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the country’s intertwining market with China, Japan’s capacity to reform the BRI from the inside should not be underestimated. On the contrary, by persisting with high Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) principles promoted in the last three years, Japan has been successful in nudging China toward these principles. The country has also enabled China to endorse the notion of high-quality infrastructure at the second BRI forum. With Japan’s leadership, the G20 Osaka Summit has contributed considerably into bolstering of the QII principles. Moreover, despite being less institutionalized and having soft law nature, the Japan-China Memorandum on Business Cooperation in Third Countries is effective: The Memorandum utilizes and suppresses the harm caused by the economic activities of Chinese businesses in third-country markets. Presently, Sino-Japanese collaboration in Thailand’s East- West Economic Corridor Program is testing whether the Chinese government is capable of earnestly engaging in ‘Third Party Market Cooperation’, or whether this endeavour is futile.\u0000BRI, FOIP, quality infrastructure, third-party market cooperation forum, China-Japan Relations","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44506294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Chinese Anti-Sanction Law (ASL 2021) has for the first time created a legal basis for sanctioning specific foreign entities for conduct inconsistent with China’s core interests and policies. Those involved in implementing foreign sanction measures can be put on an anti-sanctions list and may be denied entry into China or be expelled from the country. The escalated confrontations are part of a broader global trend of tightening export controls, sanctions and foreign investment controls on national security or public interest grounds. At the heart of the problem is the incongruity between the US and Chinese perspectives on distinct values such as human rights, national security and other public policies. The conflict of law arises inevitably as a multinational company (MNC) attempts to comply with both US law and ASL 2021. The law creates a legal conundrum for foreign MNCs, which are placed in a proverbial rock-and-hard-place situation. Using in-depth analyses of China’s evolving sanctions regime, it is essential to explore resolutions to mitigate the escalated tension and break the deadlock. It is therefore necessary for foreign entities to navigate a delicate balancing act between compliance with US laws and China’s requirements for continued transactions. Blocking Mechanism, Anti-Sanction Law, National Security, Entity List
{"title":"Between a Rock and a Hard Place Under China’s Anti-Sanction Law 2021: The Game- Theoretical Perspective","authors":"Qingxiu Bu","doi":"10.54648/trad2022014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022014","url":null,"abstract":"The Chinese Anti-Sanction Law (ASL 2021) has for the first time created a legal basis for sanctioning specific foreign entities for conduct inconsistent with China’s core interests and policies. Those involved in implementing foreign sanction measures can be put on an anti-sanctions list and may be denied entry into China or be expelled from the country. The escalated confrontations are part of a broader global trend of tightening export controls, sanctions and foreign investment controls on national security or public interest grounds. At the heart of the problem is the incongruity between the US and Chinese perspectives on distinct values such as human rights, national security and other public policies. The conflict of law arises inevitably as a multinational company (MNC) attempts to comply with both US law and ASL 2021. The law creates a legal conundrum for foreign MNCs, which are placed in a proverbial rock-and-hard-place situation. Using in-depth analyses of China’s evolving sanctions regime, it is essential to explore resolutions to mitigate the escalated tension and break the deadlock. It is therefore necessary for foreign entities to navigate a delicate balancing act between compliance with US laws and China’s requirements for continued transactions.\u0000Blocking Mechanism, Anti-Sanction Law, National Security, Entity List","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47994806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the failure of states to adopt multilateral rules to address the circumvention of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, efforts have more recently been deployed by the United States to focus on the issue of ‘duty evasion’. After failed attempts to discuss the issue at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) specifically addresses cooperation between Parties regarding information sharing and duty evasion verification requests with a view to ensuring the enforcement of trade remedy laws. Can the elaboration of duty evasion provisions in regional trade agreements facilitate the negotiation of rules to address the issue of anti-circumvention at the multilateral level? This article argues that the motivations and inherent limits underlying the USMCA duty evasion provisions are most likely to impede broad adoption at the multilateral level. It proceeds in two steps. First, while the United States is playing a pivotal role as a norm entrepreneur in the emergence of these duty evasion provisions, the article demonstrates a clear evolution in its strategy toward a populist approach to international economic policy. Second, after identifying similarities with other provisions, the article addresses the lacunae in the USMCA duty evasion provisions from a legal perspective. duty evasion, anti-circumvention, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, norm entrepreneur, populism
{"title":"Duty Evasion in Free Trade Agreements: Norm Emergence and Implications","authors":"J. Marcoux, Andrea K. Bjorklund","doi":"10.54648/trad2022009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022009","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the failure of states to adopt multilateral rules to address the circumvention of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, efforts have more recently been deployed by the United States to focus on the issue of ‘duty evasion’. After failed attempts to discuss the issue at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) specifically addresses cooperation between Parties regarding information sharing and duty evasion verification requests with a view to ensuring the enforcement of trade remedy laws. Can the elaboration of duty evasion provisions in regional trade agreements facilitate the negotiation of rules to address the issue of anti-circumvention at the multilateral level? This article argues that the motivations and inherent limits underlying the USMCA duty evasion provisions are most likely to impede broad adoption at the multilateral level. It proceeds in two steps. First, while the United States is playing a pivotal role as a norm entrepreneur in the emergence of these duty evasion provisions, the article demonstrates a clear evolution in its strategy toward a populist approach to international economic policy. Second, after identifying similarities with other provisions, the article addresses the lacunae in the USMCA duty evasion provisions from a legal perspective.\u0000duty evasion, anti-circumvention, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, norm entrepreneur, populism","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46208747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The World Trade Organization’s expansion in terms of its activities is becoming increasingly demanding for Members. Members may not express their acceptance or rejection to every statement or action taking place in the WTO, and they may remain silent to intentionally signify their position. This article examines the legal significance of Members’ silence in the WTO, in particular in the consensus-based decision-making procedures, in committees and council meetings, in the determination of subsequent practice when interpreting WTO provisions, schedules and practices, and in the assessment of whether or not a WTO Member has relinquished its right to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings. A brief description of the state of play of silence in public international law serves as a reference point to guide the analysis of silence in WTO law, which highlights the fact-specific nature of silence in both fields. While this article reveals that silence plays a role in the consensus decision-making function of the WTO, whether silence can amount to acquiescence in the context of councils and committees meetings remains unclear. Similarly, the Appellate Body has left the door open to the possibility that Members’ silence may provide evidence of subsequent practice for purposes of treaty interpretation. Contrary to international law where it has been suggested that silence may lead to a waiver of a state’s right to invoke the responsibility of another State, a relinquishment of a WTO Member’s right to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings must be formulated in clear and unambiguous language. WTO, silence, protest, acceptance, relinquishment of rights, practice, decision-making, interpretation, subsequent practice
{"title":"Silence in WTO","authors":"G. Marceau, R. Walker, Niki Koumadoraki","doi":"10.54648/trad2022008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022008","url":null,"abstract":"The World Trade Organization’s expansion in terms of its activities is becoming increasingly demanding for Members. Members may not express their acceptance or rejection to every statement or action taking place in the WTO, and they may remain silent to intentionally signify their position. This article examines the legal significance of Members’ silence in the WTO, in particular in the consensus-based decision-making procedures, in committees and council meetings, in the determination of subsequent practice when interpreting WTO provisions, schedules and practices, and in the assessment of whether or not a WTO Member has relinquished its right to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings. A brief description of the state of play of silence in public international law serves as a reference point to guide the analysis of silence in WTO law, which highlights the fact-specific nature of silence in both fields. While this article reveals that silence plays a role in the consensus decision-making function of the WTO, whether silence can amount to acquiescence in the context of councils and committees meetings remains unclear. Similarly, the Appellate Body has left the door open to the possibility that Members’ silence may provide evidence of subsequent practice for purposes of treaty interpretation. Contrary to international law where it has been suggested that silence may lead to a waiver of a state’s right to invoke the responsibility of another State, a relinquishment of a WTO Member’s right to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings must be formulated in clear and unambiguous language.\u0000WTO, silence, protest, acceptance, relinquishment of rights, practice, decision-making, interpretation, subsequent practice","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42450867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Who decides about the promotion of social objectives in EU’s trade policies? The existing literature oscillates between giving emphasis to the EU Commission or to interest group lobbying. Both approaches have limitations. To overcome those limitations, I here revisit the EU history of promoting labour provisions at the bi – and multilateral trade levels between 1993 and 2016. I argue that the EU Commission acts in line with the political positions and preferences of EU constituents on trade-labour linkage and that its autonomy depends on how polarized and salient those positions are. After finding evidence in line with that argument, I conclude that EU principals are ultimately in control of the link between trade and social objectives in EU trade policy and that the autonomy of the Commission, although existent, is limited. This article applies nuance to arguments centred on the power of the Commission to promote its own preferences at the expense of its constituents’. In doing so, it also contributes to understanding the politics of the design of social and sustainable development provisions in EU trade agreements. Trade Agreements. Labour. Social Issues. Principal-Agent Relations. Historical Narratives. European Union. EU Commission. Autonomy. Decision-making. Sanctions
{"title":"Who Governs the Promotion of Social Objectives in EU’s Trade Policies?","authors":"Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar","doi":"10.54648/trad2022012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022012","url":null,"abstract":"Who decides about the promotion of social objectives in EU’s trade policies? The existing literature oscillates between giving emphasis to the EU Commission or to interest group lobbying. Both approaches have limitations. To overcome those limitations, I here revisit the EU history of promoting labour provisions at the bi – and multilateral trade levels between 1993 and 2016. I argue that the EU Commission acts in line with the political positions and preferences of EU constituents on trade-labour linkage and that its autonomy depends on how polarized and salient those positions are. After finding evidence in line with that argument, I conclude that EU principals are ultimately in control of the link between trade and social objectives in EU trade policy and that the autonomy of the Commission, although existent, is limited. This article applies nuance to arguments centred on the power of the Commission to promote its own preferences at the expense of its constituents’. In doing so, it also contributes to understanding the politics of the design of social and sustainable development provisions in EU trade agreements.\u0000Trade Agreements. Labour. Social Issues. Principal-Agent Relations. Historical Narratives. European Union. EU Commission. Autonomy. Decision-making. Sanctions","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46833071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union (EU)’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU (AVMS Directive) requires broadcasters to seek to ensure that a majority of transmission time is dedicated to ‘European works’. The definition of eligible works for this cultural quota includes states party to the European Convention on Transfrontier Television (ECTT), of which twenty EU Member States and the UK are among the members. EU broadcasters can hence satisfy the quota with UK works. It appears, however, that post-Brexit the European Commission contemplates an attempt to exclude UK works from the definition, so as to enlarge the share of the market available to EU Member State producers. This article examines that ambition against the obligations of the EU and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the ECTT, concluding that several obstacles stand in the way of achieving that policy goal. AVMS, ‘Television without Frontiers’, European works, broadcasting quota, Brexit, GATS
{"title":"TV Quotas Under the AVMS Directive After Brexit","authors":"Thomas Dillon","doi":"10.54648/trad2022013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022013","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU)’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU (AVMS Directive) requires broadcasters to seek to ensure that a majority of transmission time is dedicated to ‘European works’. The definition of eligible works for this cultural quota includes states party to the European Convention on Transfrontier Television (ECTT), of which twenty EU Member States and the UK are among the members. EU broadcasters can hence satisfy the quota with UK works. It appears, however, that post-Brexit the European Commission contemplates an attempt to exclude UK works from the definition, so as to enlarge the share of the market available to EU Member State producers. This article examines that ambition against the obligations of the EU and its Member States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the ECTT, concluding that several obstacles stand in the way of achieving that policy goal.\u0000AVMS, ‘Television without Frontiers’, European works, broadcasting quota, Brexit, GATS","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49238140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the possible impact of the disputes advanced through the Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (‘MPIA’) and preferential trade agreements (‘PTAs’) on the jurisprudential legacy of the Appellate Body (‘AB’) and shows that those alternative dispute settlement mechanisms can play a significant role in preserving and further developing World Trade Organization’s (‘WTO’) case law. In the future, the importance of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms resolving arguments of international trade law is bound to increase (especially, in light of the ongoing deadlock at the WTO). That said, this does not come without risks for the (much disputed) coherence of WTO precedence by way of departure from established interpretations of the WTO acquis. Ultimately, it is the quality of the alternative dispute settlement awards that will determine the extent to which the jurisprudential legacy of the AB will be maintained. This article demonstrates that alternative dispute settlement mechanisms pose both challenges and opportunities for the consistency of the WTO case law. This article sheds further light on the potential risks and virtues pertaining to each one of them and argues that until the functioning of the Appellate Body is restored, alternative dispute adjudicating bodies must observe its jurisprudential legacy to promote legal certainty and predictability in international trade dispute settlement. WTO Dispute Settlement, Alternative Dispute Settlement, Appellate Body, Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, Preferential Trade Agreements
{"title":"Alternative Dispute Settlement and the Jurisprudential Legacy of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body","authors":"George A. Papaconstantinou, Luigi F. Pedreschi","doi":"10.54648/trad2022011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022011","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the possible impact of the disputes advanced through the Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (‘MPIA’) and preferential trade agreements (‘PTAs’) on the jurisprudential legacy of the Appellate Body (‘AB’) and shows that those alternative dispute settlement mechanisms can play a significant role in preserving and further developing World Trade Organization’s (‘WTO’) case law. In the future, the importance of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms resolving arguments of international trade law is bound to increase (especially, in light of the ongoing deadlock at the WTO). That said, this does not come without risks for the (much disputed) coherence of WTO precedence by way of departure from established interpretations of the WTO acquis. Ultimately, it is the quality of the alternative dispute settlement awards that will determine the extent to which the jurisprudential legacy of the AB will be maintained. This article demonstrates that alternative dispute settlement mechanisms pose both challenges and opportunities for the consistency of the WTO case law. This article sheds further light on the potential risks and virtues pertaining to each one of them and argues that until the functioning of the Appellate Body is restored, alternative dispute adjudicating bodies must observe its jurisprudential legacy to promote legal certainty and predictability in international trade dispute settlement.\u0000WTO Dispute Settlement, Alternative Dispute Settlement, Appellate Body, Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, Preferential Trade Agreements","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45184131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The world has become increasingly sensitive to the need to shift away from the utilization of crude oil and other fossil fuels. Nonetheless, the former continues to be a major contributor to the energy industry. Many crude oil-rich nations rely on foreign suppliers to provide them with production know-how and technology services within the ambit of the 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services. While the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains several obligations of importance, the focus here is on the agreement’s market access and national treatment obligations. More narrowly, the Schedule of service sector commitments agreed to by Saudi Arabia, the world’s single largest crude oil exporter, is examined in the context of three important sectors essential to the crude oil industry. The examination is conducted through the lens of the basic interpretive principles articulated in and gleaned from the small handful of World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicative decisions addressing the matter of GATS Schedule interpretation. This approach illustrates how those principles operate in the context of real language deployed in the actual Schedule of an important energy supplier. market access, national treatment, MA, NT, ‘bound’, ‘unbound’, ‘none’, horizontal, engineering, mining, construction, pipelines, Vienna Convention, CPC, Sectoral Classification, Article XVI, Article XX, Saudi Arabia
世界对减少使用原油和其他化石燃料的必要性越来越敏感。尽管如此,前者仍然是能源行业的主要贡献者。根据1994年签订的《服务贸易总协定》(General Agreement on Trade in services),许多原油资源丰富的国家依赖外国供应商向它们提供生产诀窍和技术服务。虽然《服务贸易总协定》(GATS)包含若干重要义务,但这里的重点是该协定的市场准入和国民待遇义务。更狭义地说,世界上最大的原油出口国沙特阿拉伯同意的服务部门承诺时间表,是在原油工业必不可少的三个重要部门的背景下进行审查的。审查是根据世界贸易组织(世贸组织)关于服务贸易总协定附表解释问题的少数裁决决定所阐述和收集的基本解释原则进行的。这种方法说明了这些原则如何在一个重要能源供应商的实际时间表中使用的真实语言的背景下运作。市场准入、国民待遇、MA、NT、“限定”、“未限定”、“无限定”、横向、工程、采矿、建筑、管道、维也纳公约、CPC、部门分类、第16条、第20条、沙特阿拉伯
{"title":"Interpreting GATS Schedules: Saudi Arabia and Crude Oil Energy Services","authors":"R. Zedalis","doi":"10.54648/trad2022010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022010","url":null,"abstract":"The world has become increasingly sensitive to the need to shift away from the utilization of crude oil and other fossil fuels. Nonetheless, the former continues to be a major contributor to the energy industry. Many crude oil-rich nations rely on foreign suppliers to provide them with production know-how and technology services within the ambit of the 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services. While the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains several obligations of importance, the focus here is on the agreement’s market access and national treatment obligations. More narrowly, the Schedule of service sector commitments agreed to by Saudi Arabia, the world’s single largest crude oil exporter, is examined in the context of three important sectors essential to the crude oil industry. The examination is conducted through the lens of the basic interpretive principles articulated in and gleaned from the small handful of World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicative decisions addressing the matter of GATS Schedule interpretation. This approach illustrates how those principles operate in the context of real language deployed in the actual Schedule of an important energy supplier.\u0000market access, national treatment, MA, NT, ‘bound’, ‘unbound’, ‘none’, horizontal, engineering, mining, construction, pipelines, Vienna Convention, CPC, Sectoral Classification, Article XVI, Article XX, Saudi Arabia","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45788728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do some countries promptly implement free trade rules, whereas others opt for slow adaptation? The Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) provisions serve as a tool for the developing and least-developed countries to delay the implementation of World Trade Organization (WTO) free trade rules. SDT supporters point out the positive impacts of the provisions in facilitating free trade in the long term. In their view, developing countries may improve their economic status by increasing their chances of participating in free trade. SDT provisions can play a positive role, although they prolong the prompt implementation of free trade rules. However, not all poor WTO members utilize SDT provisions when implementing free trade rules. Some poor members accept the rules without requesting SDT. This study attempts to answer why some such member countries of the WTO use SDT provisions more than others. We found that member countries’ (1) domestic policy implementation capabilities and (2) international socialization determine the utilization of the provisions. When countries lack these factors, they are more likely to request provisions. Our argument is supported by evidence from the implementation of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). World Trade Organization, Special and Differential Treatment, Trade Facilitation Agreement, policy implementation capability, international socialization
{"title":"Who Uses the Special and Differential Treatment Provisions of the WTO?","authors":"Hyoseon Lee, Youngwan Kim","doi":"10.54648/trad2022006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022006","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some countries promptly implement free trade rules, whereas others opt for slow adaptation? The Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) provisions serve as a tool for the developing and least-developed countries to delay the implementation of World Trade Organization (WTO) free trade rules. SDT supporters point out the positive impacts of the provisions in facilitating free trade in the long term. In their view, developing countries may improve their economic status by increasing their chances of participating in free trade. SDT provisions can play a positive role, although they prolong the prompt implementation of free trade rules. However, not all poor WTO members utilize SDT provisions when implementing free trade rules. Some poor members accept the rules without requesting SDT. This study attempts to answer why some such member countries of the WTO use SDT provisions more than others. We found that member countries’ (1) domestic policy implementation capabilities and (2) international socialization determine the utilization of the provisions. When countries lack these factors, they are more likely to request provisions. Our argument is supported by evidence from the implementation of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). World Trade Organization, Special and Differential Treatment, Trade Facilitation Agreement, policy implementation capability, international socialization","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"151 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71321662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Geographical indications (GIs), valuable intellectual property assets for their respective countries and regions, are in danger of being considered as generic names for types of products and falling into public domain. Driven by trade interests, both the EU and US are competing in China to promote their conflicting approaches to the determination of generic status and the preventive measures against genericide. This article demonstrates that the EU-US competition results in a hybrid of both approaches, which cannot help overcome the difficulty of assessing generic status under China’s current GI system and may lead to a loss of legislative coherence. Furthermore, the hybrid compromises the intended goals of the bilateral agreements between China and the EU/US. Since the ‘bilateral treaty model’ fails to satisfy the need of each contractual party, we propose that national GI laws must be designed on the basis of the distinguishing function of GIs. Generic terms, Geographical indications, Terroir, Trade competition, Bilateral agreements, Consumer perception, Harmonized approach, Distinguishing function
{"title":"Terroir and Trade War: Reforming China’s Legislation on Generic Terms Under the nfluence of the EU and US","authors":"Xiaoyan Wang, Xinzhe Song","doi":"10.54648/trad2022007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022007","url":null,"abstract":"Geographical indications (GIs), valuable intellectual property assets for their respective countries and regions, are in danger of being considered as generic names for types of products and falling into public domain. Driven by trade interests, both the EU and US are competing in China to promote their conflicting approaches to the determination of generic status and the preventive measures against genericide. This article demonstrates that the EU-US competition results in a hybrid of both approaches, which cannot help overcome the difficulty of assessing generic status under China’s current GI system and may lead to a loss of legislative coherence. Furthermore, the hybrid compromises the intended goals of the bilateral agreements between China and the EU/US. Since the ‘bilateral treaty model’ fails to satisfy the need of each contractual party, we propose that national GI laws must be designed on the basis of the distinguishing function of GIs. Generic terms, Geographical indications, Terroir, Trade competition, Bilateral agreements, Consumer perception, Harmonized approach, Distinguishing function","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71321680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}