In an attempt to overcome the current WTO Appellate Body crisis, a number of WTO Members agreed to participate in the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement pursuant to Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (MPIA). The majority of the WTO Members have not yet agreed to participate in the MPIA have been attempting to assess the effectiveness of the MPIA in meeting their interests. This leads to the question as to whether the MPIA can serve as the temporary solution for the Appellate Body crisis. Is it a practically effective mechanism for dispute resolution, or is it simply a political declaration by MPIA participants that they stick to the two-tier dispute settlement system? To respond to these questions, this article analyses the legal basis of the MPIA and its negotiating history. This article also addresses the differences between the appeal mechanisms provided for in the MPIA and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and provides a conceptual discussion with regard to the legal nature of the MPIA. Finally, the article identifies the main advantages and drawbacks of MPIA. It should be taken into account that the effectiveness of the MPIA will only be assessed when any of the disputes submitted for consideration under the MPIA rules is resolved. WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, WTO Panels, Constructed Value, CV Profit, USDOC, Anti-Dumping Investigation, US – OCTG (Korea), Reform, Best Information Available
{"title":"Is the MPIA a Solution to the WTO Appellate Body Crisis?","authors":"Olga Starshinova","doi":"10.54648/trad2021033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021033","url":null,"abstract":"In an attempt to overcome the current WTO Appellate Body crisis, a number of WTO Members agreed to participate in the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement pursuant to Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (MPIA). The majority of the WTO Members have not yet agreed to participate in the MPIA have been attempting to assess the effectiveness of the MPIA in meeting their interests. This leads to the question as to whether the MPIA can serve as the temporary solution for the Appellate Body crisis. Is it a practically effective mechanism for dispute resolution, or is it simply a political declaration by MPIA participants that they stick to the two-tier dispute settlement system? To respond to these questions, this article analyses the legal basis of the MPIA and its negotiating history. This article also addresses the differences between the appeal mechanisms provided for in the MPIA and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and provides a conceptual discussion with regard to the legal nature of the MPIA. Finally, the article identifies the main advantages and drawbacks of MPIA. It should be taken into account that the effectiveness of the MPIA will only be assessed when any of the disputes submitted for consideration under the MPIA rules is resolved.\u0000WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, WTO Panels, Constructed Value, CV Profit, USDOC, Anti-Dumping Investigation, US – OCTG (Korea), Reform, Best Information Available","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43614627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There has been a crisis prevailing at the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since December 2019. The United States’ (US) refusal to allow the appointment of members to the WTO’s Appellate Body has disturbed the functioning of the entire WTO dispute settlement process. In order to mitigate the effects of this, the European Union (EU) has proposed a multi-party interim appeal arbitration agreement (MPIA) which has been joined by over twenty other WTO members. In the absence of rules-based dispute settlement, countries will most probably resort to bilateral negotiations. This will be prejudicial to the interests of developing countries that have consistently been disadvantaged during bilateral negotiations and fared better in proceedings with third-party adjudication. Though India has expressed concerns about the Appellate Body crisis, it has not joined the MPIA and has stated that it does not intend to do so either. This article explains why India would benefit from joining the MPIA especially given the disputes it has pending before WTO Panels. Joining the MPIA will help India avoid unilateral sanctions at the first instance and increase the likelihood of compliance by other WTO members that are a part of the MPIA. WTO, Appellate Body, India, dispute settlement, multilateralism, United States, European Union
{"title":"Appellate Body Crisis at the World Trade Organization: View from India","authors":"Vishakha Raj, M. Mohan","doi":"10.54648/trad2021035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021035","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a crisis prevailing at the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since December 2019. The United States’ (US) refusal to allow the appointment of members to the WTO’s Appellate Body has disturbed the functioning of the entire WTO dispute settlement process. In order to mitigate the effects of this, the European Union (EU) has proposed a multi-party interim appeal arbitration agreement (MPIA) which has been joined by over twenty other WTO members. In the absence of rules-based dispute settlement, countries will most probably resort to bilateral negotiations. This will be prejudicial to the interests of developing countries that have consistently been disadvantaged during bilateral negotiations and fared better in proceedings with third-party adjudication. Though India has expressed concerns about the Appellate Body crisis, it has not joined the MPIA and has stated that it does not intend to do so either. This article explains why India would benefit from joining the MPIA especially given the disputes it has pending before WTO Panels. Joining the MPIA will help India avoid unilateral sanctions at the first instance and increase the likelihood of compliance by other WTO members that are a part of the MPIA.\u0000WTO, Appellate Body, India, dispute settlement, multilateralism, United States, European Union","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43283148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anti-dumping investigations involve a highly technical process of dumping margin calculations that use voluminous and complex data. Investigating authorities often find that ideal sources of such data enabling accurate calculations are unavailable. While the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) sets out the basic rules on anti-dumping investigations, it provides a certain level of flexibility and discretion to investigating authorities. However, such flexibility may lead to disputes and abuse by investigating authorities. Article 2.2.2 of the ADA, which establishes the rules regarding the calculation of a reasonable amount of profit for constructed value, is one such example. The provision envisages situations in which the actual data of relevant profit are unavailable and provides three alternative sources of data to be used in such situations. In the US – OCTG (Korea) case in 2017, the key issue was the US investigating authority’s use of a controversial source for the calculation of a reasonable amount of profit under one such alternative. While the panel ruled that the US investigating authority’s use of the source was inconsistent with Article 2.2.2, the issues raised in the case and the difficult questions the panel did not answer laid bare the ambiguities and incoherence in the ADA that can be abused by investigating authorities. WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, WTO Panels, Constructed Value, CV Profit, USDOC, Anti-Dumping Investigation, US – OCTG (Korea), Reform, Best Information Available
{"title":"A Curious Case of Unreasonable Profit: US – OCTG (Korea)","authors":"Hyuntaik Lee","doi":"10.54648/trad2021032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021032","url":null,"abstract":"Anti-dumping investigations involve a highly technical process of dumping margin calculations that use voluminous and complex data. Investigating authorities often find that ideal sources of such data enabling accurate calculations are unavailable. While the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) sets out the basic rules on anti-dumping investigations, it provides a certain level of flexibility and discretion to investigating authorities. However, such flexibility may lead to disputes and abuse by investigating authorities. Article 2.2.2 of the ADA, which establishes the rules regarding the calculation of a reasonable amount of profit for constructed value, is one such example. The provision envisages situations in which the actual data of relevant profit are unavailable and provides three alternative sources of data to be used in such situations. In the US – OCTG (Korea) case in 2017, the key issue was the US investigating authority’s use of a controversial source for the calculation of a reasonable amount of profit under one such alternative. While the panel ruled that the US investigating authority’s use of the source was inconsistent with Article 2.2.2, the issues raised in the case and the difficult questions the panel did not answer laid bare the ambiguities and incoherence in the ADA that can be abused by investigating authorities.\u0000WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, WTO Panels, Constructed Value, CV Profit, USDOC, Anti-Dumping Investigation, US – OCTG (Korea), Reform, Best Information Available","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46382868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China’s decision to withdraw from the dispute pertaining to its Non-Market Economy (NME) status has bolstered the Member States’ intentions of resorting to stronger disciplinary actions against China and other NMEs. While anti-dumping measures have traditionally been pursued against NMEs, in recent years Member States have resorted to anti-subsidization measures as well. Even though the Appellate Body has warned against double counting, Member States continue to undertake Countervailing Duties (CVD) investigations against NMEs in addition to Anti-Dumping Duties (ADD) investigations. This article moves beyond the conventional discussions around double counting and attempts to determine whether the emphasis on antisubsidization measures against NMEs is justified. The paper focusses on the specifics of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, particularly the rules on benefit determination. There have been instances where the Appellate Body has adopted innovative methods of benefit determination to deal with situations where governments’ actions have distorted the markets. Can these same rules be applied against NMEs? And if so, are they effective and do they factor in all aspects of market distortions in NMEs? This article attempts to answer these questions by relying on China as an example. SCM Agreement, Benefit Determination, NME, NME Methodology, Alternative Benchmarks
{"title":"Inadequacy of SCM Rules of Benefit Determination in the Context of Non-market Economies","authors":"Harsha Srinivas Kuna","doi":"10.54648/trad2021031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021031","url":null,"abstract":"China’s decision to withdraw from the dispute pertaining to its Non-Market Economy (NME) status has bolstered the Member States’ intentions of resorting to stronger disciplinary actions against China and other NMEs. While anti-dumping measures have traditionally been pursued against NMEs, in recent years Member States have resorted to anti-subsidization measures as well. Even though the Appellate Body has warned against double counting, Member States continue to undertake Countervailing Duties (CVD) investigations against NMEs in addition to Anti-Dumping Duties (ADD) investigations. This article moves beyond the conventional discussions around double counting and attempts to determine whether the emphasis on antisubsidization measures against NMEs is justified. The paper focusses on the specifics of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, particularly the rules on benefit determination. There have been instances where the Appellate Body has adopted innovative methods of benefit determination to deal with situations where governments’ actions have distorted the markets. Can these same rules be applied against NMEs? And if so, are they effective and do they factor in all aspects of market distortions in NMEs? This article attempts to answer these questions by relying on China as an example.\u0000SCM Agreement, Benefit Determination, NME, NME Methodology, Alternative Benchmarks","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44317649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Free Trade Agreements to which the European Union is a party increasingly contain minimum obligations with respect to taxation, subsidies, and labour and environmental standards. Those obligations have been termed, in a highly pervasive and rhetorically effective metaphor, the ‘level playing field’. This article is directly concerned with the concept of the level playing field. Specifically, it examines the level playing field concept vis-à-vis ‘free trade’, how it has been implemented in recent EU free trade agreements (FTAs), particularly with respect to labour and environmental standards, why the concept seems to be gaining in influence and authority, and what that might mean for the liberal trading regime. level playing field, WTO law, EU Free Trade Agreements, free trade
{"title":"Let’s Play?: An Examination of the ‘Level Playing Field’ in EU Free Trade Agreements","authors":"M. Gillis","doi":"10.54648/trad2021030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021030","url":null,"abstract":"Free Trade Agreements to which the European Union is a party increasingly contain minimum obligations with respect to taxation, subsidies, and labour and environmental standards. Those obligations have been termed, in a highly pervasive and rhetorically effective metaphor, the ‘level playing field’. This article is directly concerned with the concept of the level playing field. Specifically, it examines the level playing field concept vis-à-vis ‘free trade’, how it has been implemented in recent EU free trade agreements (FTAs), particularly with respect to labour and environmental standards, why the concept seems to be gaining in influence and authority, and what that might mean for the liberal trading regime.\u0000level playing field, WTO law, EU Free Trade Agreements, free trade","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49489374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While global value chains (GVCs) necessitate effective global economic governance in providing a stable, rule-oriented international economic order for the cross-border flow of factors, it is witnessed that there’s an inevitable decline of multilateralism in the WTO in the contemporary era of deep globalization. This empirical puzzle has stimulated various theoretical explorations, including research on the multilateral trade negotiation model, North–South structural conflicts, and the absence of great power responsibility. The increasing friction between great powers around trade policy has illustrated that policy space conflicts constitute the central challenge of global trade governance. Policy space as a concept illustrates the scope and conditionality of domestic policy instruments when framed by supranational rules. By revisiting existing research, this article clarifies the nature of policy space and categorizes its conflict modes as regulatory diffusion, regulatory differentiation, regulatory competition, and regulatory conflict. The practice of global economic governance shows that deep globalization requires the convergence of diverse domestic regulations that reduce policy space; while maintaining competitive advantage of sovereign states in the global production system requires the preservation of certain flexibilities, especially in areas like interventionism, sequential reforms, or capacity building. This inherent tension causes policy space conflicts to evolve in kind with the escalation of competition among great powers in the global division of labour. Since 2017, the WTO reform agenda, US–EU–Japan trilateral coordination, and intense Trumpian trade wars have all proved that regulatory conflict has offered the dominant model. This shift has led to the decline of multilateralism and the weakening of the multilateral trading system. policy space, multilateralism, global value chains, regulatory competition, global trade politics, convergence and de-convergence, WTO reform
{"title":"The Boundary of Supranational Rules: Revisiting Policy Space Conflicts in Global Trade Politics","authors":"Chuanjing Guan, Qinyi Xu","doi":"10.54648/trad2021036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021036","url":null,"abstract":"While global value chains (GVCs) necessitate effective global economic governance in providing a stable, rule-oriented international economic order for the cross-border flow of factors, it is witnessed that there’s an inevitable decline of multilateralism in the WTO in the contemporary era of deep globalization. This empirical puzzle has stimulated various theoretical explorations, including research on the multilateral trade negotiation model, North–South structural conflicts, and the absence of great power responsibility. The increasing friction between great powers around trade policy has illustrated that policy space conflicts constitute the central challenge of global trade governance. Policy space as a concept illustrates the scope and conditionality of domestic policy instruments when framed by supranational rules. By revisiting existing research, this article clarifies the nature of policy space and categorizes its conflict modes as regulatory diffusion, regulatory differentiation, regulatory competition, and regulatory conflict. The practice of global economic governance shows that deep globalization requires the convergence of diverse domestic regulations that reduce policy space; while maintaining competitive advantage of sovereign states in the global production system requires the preservation of certain flexibilities, especially in areas like interventionism, sequential reforms, or capacity building. This inherent tension causes policy space conflicts to evolve in kind with the escalation of competition among great powers in the global division of labour. Since 2017, the WTO reform agenda, US–EU–Japan trilateral coordination, and intense Trumpian trade wars have all proved that regulatory conflict has offered the dominant model. This shift has led to the decline of multilateralism and the weakening of the multilateral trading system.\u0000policy space, multilateralism, global value chains, regulatory competition, global trade politics, convergence and de-convergence, WTO reform","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47535925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many countries have imposed export restrictions based on economic and non-economic objectives. In 2020, Indonesia has followed this trend by imposing an export ban on nickel ore. The European Union reacted by launching a complaint at the WTO, claiming Indonesia’s export ban has unfairly limited its producers’ access to nickel. This article explores the way in which Indonesia could justify banning export on nickel ore, by looking at the current WTO rules and its judicial decisions. This article claims that Indonesia has no justification to impose this ban. Although it will most likely be temporarily applied, and be designed to prevent a critical shortage, nickel is not essential in Indonesia based on its domestic demand, ongoing plans, economic contribution, and the current mining law. Also, the ban will most likely not be justified based on general exception provisions under Article XX of the 1994. Export Bans, Export Restrictions, General Exception, Article XI GATT, Article XX GATT, Indonesia, Nickel Ore, the European Union, WTO Rules, WTO Dispute Settlement
{"title":"Indonesia’s Export Ban on Nickel Ore: Does It Violate the World Trade Organization (WTO) Rules?","authors":"I. P. Widiatedja","doi":"10.54648/trad2021028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021028","url":null,"abstract":"Many countries have imposed export restrictions based on economic and non-economic objectives. In 2020, Indonesia has followed this trend by imposing an export ban on nickel ore. The European Union reacted by launching a complaint at the WTO, claiming Indonesia’s export ban has unfairly limited its producers’ access to nickel. This article explores the way in which Indonesia could justify banning export on nickel ore, by looking at the current WTO rules and its judicial decisions. This article claims that Indonesia has no justification to impose this ban. Although it will most likely be temporarily applied, and be designed to prevent a critical shortage, nickel is not essential in Indonesia based on its domestic demand, ongoing plans, economic contribution, and the current mining law. Also, the ban will most likely not be justified based on general exception provisions under Article XX of the 1994.\u0000Export Bans, Export Restrictions, General Exception, Article XI GATT, Article XX GATT, Indonesia, Nickel Ore, the European Union, WTO Rules, WTO Dispute Settlement","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42725781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article an International Law and policy perspective is applied to the US Special 301 approach to the management of intellectual property rights of foreign States – with emphasis on the pharmaceutical sector and transfer of technology against the backdrop of US China trade tensions. In particular, the article draws upon the US Special 301 Reports between 2018 to 2020. The paper sets out to take a critical stance of Special 301. This evaluation is intended to equip in particular those who are at the receiving end of the Special 301mechanism. The paper concludes that Special 301 is lacking in informed, expert and empirically based inputs. Above all it lends itself to being hijacked by the narrow agenda of the executive without adequate international, constitutional and due process safeguards for those it is targeted at. US Special 301, Intellectual Property, WTO, Technology Transfer, Pharmaceuticals, TRIPS, China, International Law, Due Process
{"title":"United States Special 301 – A Deeply Flawed Tool for IPR Regulation?","authors":"A. Qureshi","doi":"10.54648/trad2021021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021021","url":null,"abstract":"In this article an International Law and policy perspective is applied to the US Special 301 approach to the management of intellectual property rights of foreign States – with emphasis on the pharmaceutical sector and transfer of technology against the backdrop of US China trade tensions. In particular, the article draws upon the US Special 301 Reports between 2018 to 2020. The paper sets out to take a critical stance of Special 301. This evaluation is intended to equip in particular those who are at the receiving end of the Special 301mechanism. The paper concludes that Special 301 is lacking in informed, expert and empirically based inputs. Above all it lends itself to being hijacked by the narrow agenda of the executive without adequate international, constitutional and due process safeguards for those it is targeted at.\u0000US Special 301, Intellectual Property, WTO, Technology Transfer, Pharmaceuticals, TRIPS, China, International Law, Due Process","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46221705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The growing number of free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) and the divergent contents of their preferential Rules of Origin (RoO) have led to the increasing complexity and diversity of such regulations. This has caused considerable concern among all parties involved in international trade. Although there has been some progress in attaining convergence of RoO in some product areas, particularly chemicals, similar initiatives have not been successful in other sectors, such as agricultural products, textiles, iron, steel and machinery. Instead, preferential RoO in these industries remain heterogeneous and often incompatible. This article examines the current state of preferential RoO. The regulatory rationale is analysed by separating the ‘content of rules’ from the ‘way of expressing rules’, with a focus on the World Trade Organization’s HarmonizationWork Programme of Non-Preferential Rules of Origin (HWP) and how this has influenced the development of preferential RoO. In addition, this article proposes the standardization of preferential RoO in key product sectors by harmonizing and simplifying the ‘way of expressing rules’ according to the ‘content of the rules’ to reduce disparities in the regulations. Rules of Origin, Preferential Rules of Origin, Non-Preferential Rules of Origin, Free Trade Agreements, Economic Partnership Agreements, World Trade Organization, Harmonization Work Programme
{"title":"Standardization of Complex and Diversified Preferential Rules of Origin","authors":"Hasegawa Jitsuya","doi":"10.54648/trad2021023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021023","url":null,"abstract":"The growing number of free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) and the divergent contents of their preferential Rules of Origin (RoO) have led to the increasing complexity and diversity of such regulations. This has caused considerable concern among all parties involved in international trade. Although there has been some progress in attaining convergence of RoO in some product areas, particularly chemicals, similar initiatives have not been successful in other sectors, such as agricultural products, textiles, iron, steel and machinery. Instead, preferential RoO in these industries remain heterogeneous and often incompatible. This article examines the current state of preferential RoO. The regulatory rationale is analysed by separating the ‘content of rules’ from the ‘way of expressing rules’, with a focus on the World Trade Organization’s HarmonizationWork Programme of Non-Preferential Rules of Origin (HWP) and how this has influenced the development of preferential RoO. In addition, this article proposes the standardization of preferential RoO in key product sectors by harmonizing and simplifying the ‘way of expressing rules’ according to the ‘content of the rules’ to reduce disparities in the regulations.\u0000Rules of Origin, Preferential Rules of Origin, Non-Preferential Rules of Origin, Free Trade Agreements, Economic Partnership Agreements, World Trade Organization, Harmonization Work Programme","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71322012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements can be thought of as an incomplete contract that needs to be completed either through renegotiation, the judiciary, or non-judicial interpretation. It provides for all three, but only the judicial route has functioned regularly. With that route now (also) in crisis, there is doubt whether the contract itself can continue to deliver the relative stability and openness in trade policy that has underpinned exceptional global economic performance post World War II. The paper asks whether the multiple crises in the WTO might stem from a common cause of institutional design or culture. New challenges such as climate change and the interface of technology and security may brutally expose further implications of this weakness. The paper concludes with thoughts on a way out. Dispute settlement, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International trade, World Trade Organization (WTO), WTO reform
{"title":"WTO Dispute Settlement and Rule-Making: One Crisis or Two?","authors":"Bradley J. McDonald","doi":"10.54648/trad2021015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021015","url":null,"abstract":"The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements can be thought of as an incomplete contract that needs to be completed either through renegotiation, the judiciary, or non-judicial interpretation. It provides for all three, but only the judicial route has functioned regularly. With that route now (also) in crisis, there is doubt whether the contract itself can continue to deliver the relative stability and openness in trade policy that has underpinned exceptional global economic performance post World War II. The paper asks whether the multiple crises in the WTO might stem from a common cause of institutional design or culture. New challenges such as climate change and the interface of technology and security may brutally expose further implications of this weakness. The paper concludes with thoughts on a way out.\u0000Dispute settlement, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International trade, World Trade Organization (WTO), WTO reform","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42125822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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