The international trade architecture is out-of-date. A consensus among Members is almost impossible to achieve. Tariffs make little sense in an era of global supply chains. The trade system ignores most important environmental, governmental, labour, and human rights challenges. Anti-globalization rhetoric is undermining the international economy and the rules-based trading system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) needs to evolve. The provocative views expressed in this article are designed to stimulate discussion and an eventual dialogue on WTO reform. WTO, reform, consensus, tariffs, environment, unfair competition
{"title":"Heterodox Views: What Is Wrong With the WTO and How to Fix It","authors":"A. Appleton, Patrick F. J. Macrory","doi":"10.54648/trad2022029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022029","url":null,"abstract":"The international trade architecture is out-of-date. A consensus among Members is almost impossible to achieve. Tariffs make little sense in an era of global supply chains. The trade system ignores most important environmental, governmental, labour, and human rights challenges. Anti-globalization rhetoric is undermining the international economy and the rules-based trading system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) needs to evolve. The provocative views expressed in this article are designed to stimulate discussion and an eventual dialogue on WTO reform.\u0000WTO, reform, consensus, tariffs, environment, unfair competition","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46135146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The growing energy security and climate change concerns have created a huge demand and global market for renewable energy technologies such as solar panels. The race to capture a share of this lucrative global market and other political economy considerations have inspired a trade war. Much of this war has been fought with and against green industrial policy measures such as subsidies tied to local content requirements (LCRs) and trade remedy instruments such as antidumping and countervailing duties. Safeguard measures are the latest additions to the armoury of trade defence measures in this burgeoning trade war. This article examines the dynamics behind and the implications of the turn to renewable energy safeguards for the global effort to accelerate the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies in light of the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel report on US – Safeguard Measure on PV Products. The article makes three interrelated arguments. First, the WTO jurisprudence on renewable energy support measures and rapidly evolving global value chains in renewable energy technologies helped spur the turn to safeguard measures (SGMs). Second, the seal of approval from the Panel will drive interest in the use of renewable energy safeguards. Third, the increased and unfettered use of safeguard measures is detrimental to the transition towards sustainable energy sources. Safeguards, Solar Panels: Renewable Energy, Trade War, DS562, Trade and Environment
{"title":"The Turn to Safeguard Measures in the Solar Trade War","authors":"H. Asmelash","doi":"10.54648/trad2022033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022033","url":null,"abstract":"The growing energy security and climate change concerns have created a huge demand and global market for renewable energy technologies such as solar panels. The race to capture a share of this lucrative global market and other political economy considerations have inspired a trade war. Much of this war has been fought with and against green industrial policy measures such as subsidies tied to local content requirements (LCRs) and trade remedy instruments such as antidumping and countervailing duties. Safeguard measures are the latest additions to the armoury of trade defence measures in this burgeoning trade war. This article examines the dynamics behind and the implications of the turn to renewable energy safeguards for the global effort to accelerate the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies in light of the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel report on US – Safeguard Measure on PV Products. The article makes three interrelated arguments. First, the WTO jurisprudence on renewable energy support measures and rapidly evolving global value chains in renewable energy technologies helped spur the turn to safeguard measures (SGMs). Second, the seal of approval from the Panel will drive interest in the use of renewable energy safeguards. Third, the increased and unfettered use of safeguard measures is detrimental to the transition towards sustainable energy sources.\u0000Safeguards, Solar Panels: Renewable Energy, Trade War, DS562, Trade and Environment","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43667198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Trade negotiations address issues that are increasingly pertinent to substate governments, leading many to insist on being included in trade negotiations. The increasingly multilevel nature of trade negotiations and the influence of substate governments in the negotiation process is beginning to attract theoretical attention. The Canadian case is interesting here as it allows us to test two recent theories about the role of substate governments in trade negotiations. Canadian provinces are increasingly included in trade negotiations despite the fact that they do not have veto power and the Senate of Canada does not represent their interests. The Canadian case demonstrates that, contrary to the means-of-influence theory, inclusion in the negotiation process is more important than formal constitutional powers. Moreover, contrary to a recent theory that questions the joint-decision trap perspective, in the case of the NAFTA renegotiation, granting veto power to the provinces would likely have been a major problem for Canadian negotiators. This article compares the role Ontario and Québec played in the NAFTA renegotiations with their role in CETA and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) negotiations. Trade negotiation, federalism, means of influence, joint-decision trap, Canadian provinces, Ontario, Québec, NAFTA renegotiations, CETA, CPTPP
{"title":"Means of Influence, the Joint-Decision Trap and Multilevel Trade Negotiations: Ontario and Québec and the Renegotiation of NAFTA Compared","authors":"S. Paquin","doi":"10.54648/trad2022035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022035","url":null,"abstract":"Trade negotiations address issues that are increasingly pertinent to substate governments, leading many to insist on being included in trade negotiations. The increasingly multilevel nature of trade negotiations and the influence of substate governments in the negotiation process is beginning to attract theoretical attention. The Canadian case is interesting here as it allows us to test two recent theories about the role of substate governments in trade negotiations. Canadian provinces are increasingly included in trade negotiations despite the fact that they do not have veto power and the Senate of Canada does not represent their interests. The Canadian case demonstrates that, contrary to the means-of-influence theory, inclusion in the negotiation process is more important than formal constitutional powers. Moreover, contrary to a recent theory that questions the joint-decision trap perspective, in the case of the NAFTA renegotiation, granting veto power to the provinces would likely have been a major problem for Canadian negotiators. This article compares the role Ontario and Québec played in the NAFTA renegotiations with their role in CETA and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) negotiations.\u0000Trade negotiation, federalism, means of influence, joint-decision trap, Canadian provinces, Ontario, Québec, NAFTA renegotiations, CETA, CPTPP","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46630651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The objective of ‘level playing field’ has become increasingly more present in international trade affairs. The European Union (EU) has recently embarked on a quest to promote and protect the level playing field within and outside the borders of the internal market. The most recent manifestation of this objective is the regulation of foreign subsidies, i.e., subsidies provided by non-EU countries to undertakings operating within the EU. The European Commission issued its proposal for a new Regulation with the goal of tackling distortions to the level playing field caused by foreign subsidies. The present article introduces the major concepts of the Proposal and provides a comparative analysis with EU State Aid law and the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. Further, it pursues an economic analysis of the anticipated impact of the Proposal with a view of examining whether the Proposal is capable of addressing global distortions caused by foreign subsidies and ensure a level playing field. Lastly, the article examines the compatibility of the Proposal with Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. Trade Remedies, WTO Law, Subsidies, Treaty Interpretation, EU Law, International Trade Law
{"title":"Playing the Game: The EU’s Proposed Regulation on Foreign Subsidies","authors":"Marios Tokas","doi":"10.54648/trad2022032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022032","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of ‘level playing field’ has become increasingly more present in international trade affairs. The European Union (EU) has recently embarked on a quest to promote and protect the level playing field within and outside the borders of the internal market. The most recent manifestation of this objective is the regulation of foreign subsidies, i.e., subsidies provided by non-EU countries to undertakings operating within the EU. The European Commission issued its proposal for a new Regulation with the goal of tackling distortions to the level playing field caused by foreign subsidies. The present article introduces the major concepts of the Proposal and provides a comparative analysis with EU State Aid law and the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. Further, it pursues an economic analysis of the anticipated impact of the Proposal with a view of examining whether the Proposal is capable of addressing global distortions caused by foreign subsidies and ensure a level playing field. Lastly, the article examines the compatibility of the Proposal with Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.\u0000Trade Remedies, WTO Law, Subsidies, Treaty Interpretation, EU Law, International Trade Law","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44977976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2017, the EU introduced the ‘distorted economy’ rules in EU antidumping law. The new rules target in particular China. The question is whether the new rules and their application by the Commission provide an improvement of legal certainty for Chinese exporters and EU importers compared to the old antidumping regime of non-market economy treatment of China. This article makes a comparison between the new and old rules and their application by the EU institutions. The article argues that the new rules slightly improve legal certainty but that new uncertainties emerge as well. For example, the context of international labour law and international environmental law raises new questions. antidumping, distorted economy, EU, China, WTO, legal certainty
{"title":"EU’s ‘Distorted Economy’ Antidumping Approach Towards China: Improvement of Legal Certainty or New Legal Distortions?: Some Overall Observations","authors":"H. Andersen","doi":"10.54648/trad2022030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022030","url":null,"abstract":"In 2017, the EU introduced the ‘distorted economy’ rules in EU antidumping law. The new rules target in particular China. The question is whether the new rules and their application by the Commission provide an improvement of legal certainty for Chinese exporters and EU importers compared to the old antidumping regime of non-market economy treatment of China. This article makes a comparison between the new and old rules and their application by the EU institutions. The article argues that the new rules slightly improve legal certainty but that new uncertainties emerge as well. For example, the context of international labour law and international environmental law raises new questions.\u0000antidumping, distorted economy, EU, China, WTO, legal certainty","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42274242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In early 2020, the world economy plunged into a major recession due to the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and non-performing loans (NPLs) went back on the agenda for banks and regulators in many countries. This is a timely article as it focuses on an attention-drawing regulatory catalyst for changes to the position of foreign investors in the Chinese NPLs disposal market. It uses the Phase One Trade Deal between the United States (US) and China as an opportunity to assess whether or not China is ready to shift towards a new approach for foreign investors trading in the primary NPLs market. Existing studies have been quick to conclude that the US–China Phase One Trade Deal will lead to a policy shift in the Chinese NPLs market through Article 4.5 contained therein. If the US– China Phase One Trade Deal is reviewed in its entirety and if China’s concepts of stability, its state ownership policy and its recent treaty practice are all carefully considered, however, the involvement of foreign investment in the NPLs market may be viewed less optimistically. Using the US–China Phase One Trade Deal as a prism, it can be seen that bilateralism in trade policy may have its own limitations. China’s perception of and policy towards international institutions and regimes show its willingness to integrate into the existing multilateral trade order even though its policy is still obscure and hesitant. Washington should be prepared to soften its decoupling stance to promote cooperation and coordination of the two countries in multilateral institutions. China, United States, US–China Phase One Trade Deal, US–China Trade Tensions, Non-Performing Loans, Foreign Investment, State-Ownership, Financial Stability, Bilateralism, Multilateralism
{"title":"Another Hole in China’s ‘Great Wall of Money’? Conceptualizing the Involvement of Foreign Investments in the Chinese Non-performing Loans Market Under the US-China Trade Deal","authors":"W. Shen, Beibei Zhang","doi":"10.54648/trad2022031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022031","url":null,"abstract":"In early 2020, the world economy plunged into a major recession due to the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and non-performing loans (NPLs) went back on the agenda for banks and regulators in many countries. This is a timely article as it focuses on an attention-drawing regulatory catalyst for changes to the position of foreign investors in the Chinese NPLs disposal market. It uses the Phase One Trade Deal between the United States (US) and China as an opportunity to assess whether or not China is ready to shift towards a new approach for foreign investors trading in the primary NPLs market. Existing studies have been quick to conclude that the US–China Phase One Trade Deal will lead to a policy shift in the Chinese NPLs market through Article 4.5 contained therein. If the US– China Phase One Trade Deal is reviewed in its entirety and if China’s concepts of stability, its state ownership policy and its recent treaty practice are all carefully considered, however, the involvement of foreign investment in the NPLs market may be viewed less optimistically. Using the US–China Phase One Trade Deal as a prism, it can be seen that bilateralism in trade policy may have its own limitations. China’s perception of and policy towards international institutions and regimes show its willingness to integrate into the existing multilateral trade order even though its policy is still obscure and hesitant. Washington should be prepared to soften its decoupling stance to promote cooperation and coordination of the two countries in multilateral institutions.\u0000China, United States, US–China Phase One Trade Deal, US–China Trade Tensions, Non-Performing Loans, Foreign Investment, State-Ownership, Financial Stability, Bilateralism, Multilateralism","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47851551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The coexistence principle presents a means for resolving the conflict between prior trademarks and later geographical indications (GIs). This principle has been increasingly adopted in several countries due to recent negotiation efforts of the EU that are meant to combat the ‘first in time, first in right’ (‘FITFIR’) principle promoted by the US. This article focuses on three controversial issues raised in the application of the coexistence principle. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel Reports in the Australia-EU (DS290) and US-EU (DS174) disputes related to EU Regulation 2081/92 mentioned these issues but left them unresolved, thereby making space for the EU to require trade partners to widen the scope of coexistence between prior trademarks and later GIs in a manner that runs counter to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Furthermore, these unresolved issues led to difficulties in applying the coexistence principle and EU-type coexistence clause adopted in non-EU WTO Members. Based on the findings, this article recommends appropriate methods for implementing the coexistence principle that are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. geographical indication, trademark, coexistence, principle of priority, World Trade Organization, likelihood of confusion, misleading use, reputation of prior trademark, descriptive use, use in a trademark sense
{"title":"Rethinking Coexistence Between Prior Trademarks and Later Geographical Indications","authors":"Xiaoyan Wang, Xinzhe Song","doi":"10.54648/trad2022034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022034","url":null,"abstract":"The coexistence principle presents a means for resolving the conflict between prior trademarks and later geographical indications (GIs). This principle has been increasingly adopted in several countries due to recent negotiation efforts of the EU that are meant to combat the ‘first in time, first in right’ (‘FITFIR’) principle promoted by the US. This article focuses on three controversial issues raised in the application of the coexistence principle. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel Reports in the Australia-EU (DS290) and US-EU (DS174) disputes related to EU Regulation 2081/92 mentioned these issues but left them unresolved, thereby making space for the EU to require trade partners to widen the scope of coexistence between prior trademarks and later GIs in a manner that runs counter to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Furthermore, these unresolved issues led to difficulties in applying the coexistence principle and EU-type coexistence clause adopted in non-EU WTO Members. Based on the findings, this article recommends appropriate methods for implementing the coexistence principle that are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.\u0000geographical indication, trademark, coexistence, principle of priority, World Trade Organization, likelihood of confusion, misleading use, reputation of prior trademark, descriptive use, use in a trademark sense","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46002278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the different trade-restrictive measures and legal strategies carried out by the United States and the European Union during the solar trade remedies saga. It focuses on the US and EU use of rules of origin as a protectionist device against the alleged circumvention of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as on the cartelizing effect of US and the EU legal strategies with respect to solar trade remedies. It concludes that the US and EU solar trade remedies saga has resulted in the globalization of mercantilism. The elimination of trade remedies on products used in renewable energy is hereby proposed trade remedies, trade-restrictive measures, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, safeguard measures, circumvention, globalization, environment, solar trade remedies, CSPV cells products
{"title":"The US and EU Solar Trade Remedies Saga: The Globalization of Mercantilism","authors":"Julio G. López, María Moreno Sancho","doi":"10.54648/trad2022025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022025","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the different trade-restrictive measures and legal strategies carried out by the United States and the European Union during the solar trade remedies saga. It focuses on the US and EU use of rules of origin as a protectionist device against the alleged circumvention of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as on the cartelizing effect of US and the EU legal strategies with respect to solar trade remedies. It concludes that the US and EU solar trade remedies saga has resulted in the globalization of mercantilism. The elimination of trade remedies on products used in renewable energy is hereby proposed\u0000trade remedies, trade-restrictive measures, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, safeguard measures, circumvention, globalization, environment, solar trade remedies, CSPV cells products","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49123279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China has generated tectonic geoeconomic shifts with massive implications for global trade. Global trade, inextricably linked with national prosperity, international politics and global governance, is increasingly driven less by economic realities and more by great power rivalry. Demonstrating both the dynamic nature of US-China trade tensions and the impact of and international political relations, are allegations of Chinese human rights violations being injected by the US as part of trade policy. Invoking human rights in the trade context has already caused multi-dimensional complexities impacting businesses; supply-chains; coalition building; and spurring counter measures. Linking human rights to trade policies might also lead to increasing economic nationalism, regionalism, protectionism, and further counter-measures. Significantly, given economic and trade realism, whether the current Western concern over human rights is sustainable longer-term is an open question. Accordingly, weaponizing human rights in trade relations constitutes an omnipresent risk not only to China, but also to the US since economic practicalities and trade pragmatism could potentially precipitate a more Chinacentric international trade governance. Regardless of the outcome, connecting trade to human rights will likely lead to a re-shaping of the existing trade architecture. global trade, hegemonic rivalry, human rights, national security
{"title":"The Weaponization of Human Rights in US-China Trade Policy: Impacts and Risks","authors":"J. Slawotsky","doi":"10.54648/trad2022022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022022","url":null,"abstract":"The hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China has generated tectonic geoeconomic shifts with massive implications for global trade. Global trade, inextricably linked with national prosperity, international politics and global governance, is increasingly driven less by economic realities and more by great power rivalry. Demonstrating both the dynamic nature of US-China trade tensions and the impact of and international political relations, are allegations of Chinese human rights violations being injected by the US as part of trade policy. Invoking human rights in the trade context has already caused multi-dimensional complexities impacting businesses; supply-chains; coalition building; and spurring counter measures. Linking human rights to trade policies might also lead to increasing economic nationalism, regionalism, protectionism, and further counter-measures. Significantly, given economic and trade realism, whether the current Western concern over human rights is sustainable longer-term is an open question. Accordingly, weaponizing human rights in trade relations constitutes an omnipresent risk not only to China, but also to the US since economic practicalities and trade pragmatism could potentially precipitate a more Chinacentric international trade governance. Regardless of the outcome, connecting trade to human rights will likely lead to a re-shaping of the existing trade architecture.\u0000global trade, hegemonic rivalry, human rights, national security","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49522460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
World Trade Organization (WTO) judicial bodies face dual obstacles because of their limited legal authority: they do not have the power to investigate members, so they depend primarily on submissions from disputants. They have no authority to sanction members directly, so they rely on decentralized enforcement. The legalization of the trade regime depends on consent and voluntary compliance. This article focuses on the role of third parties in the dispute settlement process and investigates how they contribute to the legalization of the WTO. I use an original dataset covering all WTO disputes from 1995 to 2012, containing unusually detailed information about the number of third parties, the total dispute settlement period, and the final stage that disputants use, etc. In contrast to the existing literature, which characterizes third parties as spoilers that prevent early settlement, I find that WTO third parties have heterogeneous motivations for participation; moreover, participation by third parties with differing motivations has different effects on dispute settlement and compliance. In particular, third parties that claim to have ‘systemic interests’–a legal designation that allows them to participate despite their negligible stakes in a dispute–have considerable influence on dispute resolution. Specifically: (1) their briefs provide higher-quality information than other third-party briefs to panels and the Appellate Body; (2) they help to accelerate dispute settlement; and (3) their participation makes respondents more likely to comply with panel and Appellate Body rulings. WTO, third parties, trade disputes, legalization, trade laws, systemic interests, panels, Appellate Body
{"title":"How Do the Third Parties Contribute to WTO Dispute Resolution?","authors":"J. Ryu","doi":"10.54648/trad2022024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022024","url":null,"abstract":"World Trade Organization (WTO) judicial bodies face dual obstacles because of their limited legal authority: they do not have the power to investigate members, so they depend primarily on submissions from disputants. They have no authority to sanction members directly, so they rely on decentralized enforcement. The legalization of the trade regime depends on consent and voluntary compliance. This article focuses on the role of third parties in the dispute settlement process and investigates how they contribute to the legalization of the WTO. I use an original dataset covering all WTO disputes from 1995 to 2012, containing unusually detailed information about the number of third parties, the total dispute settlement period, and the final stage that disputants use, etc. In contrast to the existing literature, which characterizes third parties as spoilers that prevent early settlement, I find that WTO third parties have heterogeneous motivations for participation; moreover, participation by third parties with differing motivations has different effects on dispute settlement and compliance. In particular, third parties that claim to have ‘systemic interests’–a legal designation that allows them to participate despite their negligible stakes in a dispute–have considerable influence on dispute resolution. Specifically: (1) their briefs provide higher-quality information than other third-party briefs to panels and the Appellate Body; (2) they help to accelerate dispute settlement; and (3) their participation makes respondents more likely to comply with panel and Appellate Body rulings.\u0000WTO, third parties, trade disputes, legalization, trade laws, systemic interests, panels, Appellate Body","PeriodicalId":46019,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Trade","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42796717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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