Introducing the dynamic accumulation of “capability assets”, we extend the base model of Aghion = Tirole (1994), which applied the property rights approach of Grossman=Hart=Moore (1986,1990) to innovation management, into the two-period version, and analyze how “changes in firm boundaries” affect innovation and how “firm boundaries” regarding innovation are determined from a long-term perspective. In our two-period model (with organizational capability asset), it is optimal to allocate property rights to those with higher marginal efficiency of investment including dynamic effects (direct effects and strategic effects). If the dynamic marginal efficiency of investment of the research firm is sufficiently large, Non-integration (R-Ownership) regime will be chosen and “Open Innovation” will emerge. If the dynamic marginal efficiency of investment of the production firm is sufficiently large, Integration (P-Ownership) regime will be chosen and “Closed Innovation” by large firms will emerge. If the dynamic marginal efficiency of investment of the production firm is not so high, even when it is optimal to “integrate” in a static game, it can be optimal in a dynamic framework to remain “non-integrated” and keep the partnership relationship between independent firms to induce investment incentives from both sides. An extension to longer-periods and the discussion on Cash Constraints are also presented.
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