Research in Economics最新文献

This paper analyzes the effects of a stronger patent regime on innovation incentives, patenting propensity and scientist mobility when an innovating firm can partially recover its damage due to scientist movement from the infringing rival. The strength of the patent system, which is a function of litigation success probability and damage recovery proportion, stipulates expected indemnification. We show that stronger patents fail to reduce the likelihood of infringement and further, decrease the innovation’s expected profitability. Higher potential reparation also reduces the scientist’s expected return on R&D knowledge, entailing greater R&D investment. Our results suggest important considerations for patent reforms.

Digital transformation entails new sources of economic information in the form of rich texts, which can provide a deeper understanding of banking sector developments. With textual data available and accessible in digital format, this paper develops three distinct indices based on a large corpus of economic news articles to forecast banking crises. The methodological approaches feature the identification of key topics within a large volume of texts. A Banking Crisis Lexicon Index and Sentiment Index are developed through analysing a vast number of economic articles to detect the evolution of banking sector discourse. Findings from Granger causality highlight leading indicator status of the Banking Crisis Lexicon Index, signalling a change in the banking crisis series four years in advance, accentuated by innovations from a VAR analysis using Cholesky decomposition, and substantiated by receiver operating characteristics with under the curve estimates suggesting robust predictive performance strength above 70%, on a global scale, for developed economies and crisis countries. Serving as benchmark, the Sentiment Index constitutes a concurrent indicator, which moves in tandem with the crisis series, thereby providing more granular information on banking developments. A combined Banking Crisis Lexicon and Sentiment Index exhibits solid forecasting performance, which is comparable to the Banking Crisis Lexicon Index, yet with shorter lead time. In a robustness test, German-based indices outperform those based on English reporting in a predominantly German speaking region, highlighting the value of textual analysis in the vernacular. In reading between the lines, this paper contributes to the literature on quantitative analyses of textual data in constructing text-based banking crisis indicators to support a preemptive policy response.

This research uses a dynamic modelling approach to design and simulate an equilibrium model of the interaction between CBDC issuance, deposits and bank reserves. With many central banks announcing their intention to issue central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), it has become imperative to rigorously analyse the potential impact of these issues on the banking system. This study aims to examine the implications of the introduction of CBDCs within a robust analytical framework, in order to inform policymakers and financial sector players about the possible consequences of this major monetary innovation. The study results show that overconfidence of economic agents towards CBDCs can drastically reduce bank reserves, thereby limiting the lending capacity of banks and creating liquidity problems. Similarly, increasing reserve requirements in fiat currency for each unit of CBDC issued can constrain bank reserves and restrict loans and deposits. Additionally, a rise in interest rates on CBDC-related loans can discourage borrowers, thereby reducing loan demand and affecting banking activity. An increase in interest rates leads to a decrease in the quantity of CBDC in circulation, an increase in bank reserves and deposits in CBDC, and a decrease in bank loans. Monitoring the level of confidence of economic agents towards CBDCs is crucial to avoid excessive speculation.

Motivated by empirical evidence, I study the properties of a monopolistic competition model with private ownership. Toward that goal, I consider a monopolistic competition model with additive preferences, homogeneous workers and homogeneous firms. I then introduce in such a standard framework a single additional ingredient: private ownership. Private ownership means that each firm is owned and managed by a single household called the entrepreneur, and this entrepreneur receives profits as sole revenues. In turn, private ownership changes the nature of entry. Free entry in the industry is no longer satisfied. Rather, the number of firms is now determined through occupational choice. Armed with this new framework, I provide a full characterization of a market equilibrium, and compare it to the standard model with collective ownership and free entry. Notably, I find new results concerning optimality, the transmission of aggregate shocks and the ability of the new model to replicate well-established empirical facts.