Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal最新文献

Abilify MyCite was granted regulatory approval in 2017, becoming the world’s first “smart pill” that could digitally track whether patients had taken their medication. The new technology was introduced as one that had gained the support of patients and ethicists alike, and could contribute to solving the widespread and costly problem of patient nonadherence. Here, we offer an in-depth exploration of this narrative, through an examination of the origins and development of Abilify, the drug that would later become MyCite. This history illuminates how an antipsychotic can become a top-selling drug and maintain its blockbuster status for more than a decade. It also provides a detailed case study for how knowledge is constructed within the logic of biomedical capitalism, providing impetus to reexamine claims regarding how MyCite addresses patient nonadherence, engenders patient support, and is ethicist-approved.

Social robots are increasingly being deployed to address social isolation and loneliness, particularly among older adults. Clips on social media attest that individuals availing themselves of this option are pleased with their robot companions. Yet, some people find the use of social robots to meet fundamental human emotional needs disturbing. This article clarifies and critically evaluates this response. It sets forth a framework for loneliness, which characterizes one kind of loneliness as involving an affective experience of lacking human relations that provide certain social goods. Next, the article discusses social robots and critically reviews the literature on the ethics of using them in light of this loneliness characterization. Third, we present a normative argument connecting the philosophical critique of loneliness-as-absence with the design and deployment of social robots. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for public health and for interrogating the aims of commercial companies who make social robots.

• Editor’s Note
• Quill Kukla, Editor-in-Chief

This issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal contains two essays and one dialogue, all of which concern ethical and epistemological issues that arise at the meeting point of our cognitive and mental lives and technology.

In the first piece, two leading bioethicists with expertise in neurotechnology, James Giordano and Joseph J. Fins, discuss a wide range of complex problems surrounding people with disorders of consciousness that make their mental states opaque to observers. It is especially difficult to know how to respectfully care for and interact with such people, since we cannot directly communicate with them and our technological methods for discerning whether and how they are conscious are nascent and unreliable. People with these disorders challenge our norms for decision-making and patient care, including end of life care. It is easy for doctors, who may only sporadically have contact with people with these disorders, to be unaware of their consciousness altogether. Because caring for people with these sorts of consciousness disorders is typically technologically intense, such care also raises difficult questions concerning resource allocation. Giordano and Fins discuss these and a wide range of other issues in depth. Their discussion of how the tools of disability studies and disability rights advocacy can and should be applied when it comes to people with whom we cannot communicate is particularly powerful. As Fins points out, the important principle, “Nothing about us without us,” cannot be honored in the case of people whose voices and experiences we cannot discern; this slogan presupposes communicative abilities. Fins and Giordano challenge us to revisit our concepts of accessibility and inclusion in ways that might let them be adapted to the needs of people with consciousness disorders.

Phoebe Friesen and Anna Swartz—in “The First Smart Pill: Digital Revolution or Last Gasp?”—offer a critical social history of Abilify MyCite, a version of the popular antipsychotic drug Abilify, which contains a small sensor that digitally tracks when patients take the medication, thereby enabling compliance information to be shared with health care professionals. Friesen and Swartz show in detail the ways in which the story [End Page ix] of this drug’s use and uptake were fundamentally shaped by marketing pressures and financial incentives. Even though we do not actually have good evidence that the drug provides benefits that normal Abilify does not provide, nor that it increases compliance, Abilify MyCite was marketed as a success story. Bioethicists who were paid consultants for Otsuka, the maker of the drug, offered shallow analyses that justified the drug’s existe

One of the central aims of mental healthcare should be to increase a person's autonomous agency. In a mental healthcare context, it is often argued that mental healthcare should maximize a person's autonomy so they can make autonomous choices about their treatment. My argument in this paper is broader: mental healthcare should increase autonomous agency so that a person can exercise direction over their life and live a life of meaning. Mental healthcare can and ought to increase autonomous agency by helping the person achieve both internal and external conditions of autonomy. Mental healthcare can fulfill these conditions by reducing mental illness symptoms and thus enhancing competence and voluntariness, increasing the capacity for reflective endorsement by examining the influence of social norms, enabling normative authority through the development of self-worth, and connecting individuals with services that can provide multiple good options to choose from.

This article analyzes the meaning of solidarity for bioethics and healthcare. Drawing on the anthropology of embodiment, it argues that solidarity arises upon relations of care for our vulnerable bodies and transforms it into our common democratic project. Its main focus is, therefore, not on distribution, which is the purpose of justice, but on the recognition and democratic inclusion of persons who-due to the vulnerable condition of their bodies-are still deprived of full participation in the public sphere. By reorienting caring relationships around the horizontal axis, solidarity obliges us to treat a person who is cared for not only as a passive recipient of healthcare goods, but as a fellow citizen and a partner in the process of care. It is argued that the model of narrative citizenship, by establishing discursive equality between a patient and a physician, can contribute to greater inclusion of vulnerable individuals into our societies.