Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal最新文献

In this article, I argue that adolescent medical transition is ethical by analogizing it to abortion and birth control. The interventions are similar insofar as they intervene on healthy physiological states by reason of the person's fundamental self-conception and desired life, and their effectiveness is defined by their ability to achieve patients' embodiment goals. Since the evidence of mental health benefits is comparable between adolescent medical transition, abortion, and birth control, disallowing transition-related interventions would betray an unacceptable double standard. While great enough risks can override autonomy over fundamental aspects of personal identity, I demonstrate that the available scientific evidence does not corroborate the view that adolescent medical transition is dangerous. Consequently, adolescent medical transition should be recognized as ethical and remain available.

While the literature on psychedelic medicine emphasizes the importance of set and setting alongside the quality of subjective drug effects for therapeutic efficacy, few scholars have explored the therapeutic frameworks that are used alongside psychedelics in the lab or in the clinic. Based on a narrative analysis of the treatment manual and post-session experience reports from a pilot study of psilocybin-assisted treatment for tobacco smoking cessation, this article examines how therapeutic frameworks interact with the psychedelic substance in ways that can rapidly reshape participants' identity and sense of self. We identified multiple domains relating to identity shift that appear to serve as smoking cessation mechanisms during psilocybin sessions, each of which had an identifiable presence in the manualized treatment. As psychedelic medicine becomes mainstream, consensual and evidence-based approaches to psychedelic-assisted identity shift that respect patient autonomy and encourage empowerment should become areas of focus in the emergent field of psychedelic bioethics.

An emerging line of research in bioethics questions whether enhanced love is less significant or valuable than otherwise, where "enhanced love" generally refers to cases where drugs (e.g., oxytocin, etc.) are relied on to maintain romantic relationships. Separate from these debates is a recent body of literature on the philosophy and psychology of "Virtual Reality (VR) dating," where romantic relationships are developed and sustained in a way that is mediated by VR. Interestingly, these discussions have proceeded largely independently from each other. This article considers whether and to what extent philosophical arguments leveled against the value of enhanced love in the pharmacological case extend to cases where loving relationships are technologically mediated via VR rather than pharmacologically mediated. It will be argued that, while some worries about the pharmacological case do not extend over in a way that will be particularly problematic for VR, two (of the four arguments considered) are more prima facie serious. I conclude by suggesting why even these stronger argument strategies are not insurmountable and, thus, that there is reason to be cautiously optimistic that VR-mediated love can largely withstand variations on the bioconservative critiques that target pharmacologically enhanced love.

One consequence of the lockdowns that many countries have introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic is that people have become more vulnerable to loneliness. In this contribution, I argue that even if this does not render lockdowns unjustified, it is morally incumbent upon states to make reasonable efforts to protect their residents from loneliness for as long as their social confinement measures remain in place. Without attempting to provide an exhaustive list of ways in which this might be done, I identify four broad measures that I believe many, if not most, states ought to take. These require states to (i) help ensure that people have affordable access to the internet, as well as opportunities for learning how to use this medium so as that they can digitally connect to others; (ii) help people to have harmonious and rewarding intimate relationships; and try to make (iii) non-human companionship as well as (iv) various non-social solutions to loneliness widely available.

What just societies owe to non-citizen immigrants is a controversial question. This paper considers three accounts of the requirements of distributive justice for non-citizens to determine what they might suggest about the provision of publicly funded health care to pregnant undocumented immigrants. These accounts are compared to locate an overlapping consensus on the duty of the state to provide care to pregnant undocumented immigrants. The aim of this paper is not to take a substantive position on the "right" prenatal policy, but rather to explore the moral space that this issue occupies and suggest that real moral progress can be achieved through the consistent application of shared values.