Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal最新文献

Cities are struggling to balance the moral imperatives of sustainable development, with equity and social justice often ignored and negatively impacted by climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet, the nature of these impacts on social justice has not been comprehensively investigated and little ethical guidance exists on how to better promote social justice in urban climate change planning practice. This article addresses the normative question: How should urban climate change planning advance social justice? It gathers empirical literature documenting the inclusivity and equity impacts of urban climate change planning and thematically analyses that literature for dimensions of social justice drawn from philosophical and urban justice theory. Study findings demonstrate that four characteristics of climate change planning in cities-underlying neoliberal ideology, unequal treatment, green gentrification, and exclusion from decisionmaking-comprise, create, or worsen social injustices across six dimensions. These characteristics are often interconnected and inseparable. Where neoliberal ideology guides urban climate change planning, the other three characteristics frequently occur as well. The article concludes by arguing that, at a minimum, urban planners and climate planners have an obligation of justice to avoid undertaking climate change planning that exhibits any of the four characteristics and to address injustices generated where planning has such characteristics. It further suggests that planners' negative obligations likely extend beyond this because the literature review revealed gaps in existing empirical data on the equity impacts of urban climate change planning.

Effective Altruism is a popular social movement that encourages individuals to donate to organizations that effectively address humanity's most severe poverty. However, because Effective Altruists are committed to doing the most good in the most effective ways, they often argue that it is wrong to help those nearest to you. In this article, I target a major subset of Effective Altruists who consider it a moral obligation to do the most good possible. Call these Obligation-Oriented Effective Altruists (OOEAs), and their movement Obligation-Oriented Effective Altruism (OOEA). I argue that, insofar as this variety of OOEA seems to commit us to refrain from helping the people right in front of us, there is something intuitively wrong about it. In response, I introduce an alternative model that embraces partiality: Mutual Aid. Mutual Aid is a network of community members, usually from the same geographical region, who share a commitment to offer, receive, and exchange material goods, wealth, and social support. I recommend Mutual Aid as a liberatory model, which-through empathy, solidarity, and care-mobilizes community-building and provides a catalyst for community advocacy. As such, we should resist the claims of OOEAs that partially distributing our funds to people or causes we care about is morally wrong or even less than ideal. We do not have a moral obligation to use our funds "effectively"; rather, we have a broader obligation to address human suffering, and Mutual Aid is one moral alternative for discharging this duty.

Effective altruism has a strategy problem. Overreliance on a strategy of donating to the most effective charities keeps us on the firefighter's treadmill, continually pursuing the next-highest quantifiable marginal gain. But on its own, this is politically shortsighted. Without any long-term framework within which these individual rescues fit together to bring about the greatest overall impact, we are almost certainly leaving a lot of value on the table. Thus, effective altruists' preferred means undercut their professed aims. Alongside the charity framework, the more effective altruist ought to consider a mutual aid framework, which better acknowledges and honors the unavoidably political commitments of effective altruism to reimagine and remake the world.

The judgments of conscientious and informed experts play a central role in two elements of clinical equipoise. The first, and most widely discussed, element involves ensuring that no participant in a randomized trial is allocated to a level of treatment that everyone agrees is substandard. The second, and less often discussed, element involves ensuring that trials are likely to generate social value by producing the information necessary to resolve a clinically meaningful uncertainty or disagreement about the relative merits of a set of interventions. The distribution of judgments in expert communities can take many forms, each with important implications for whether a trial satisfies one or both elements of clinical equipoise. In this article we use a graphical approach to represent three ways in which expert community uncertainty can vary: by spread, modality, and skew. Understanding these different distributions of expert judgment has three important implications: it helps to make operational the requirement of social value, it shows that some conditions for initiating studies to promote social value diverge from common assumptions about clinical equipoise, and it has important implications for how trials should be designed and monitored, and what patients should be told during informed consent.