One recent body of work has concerned medicalization and how it can create epistemic injustice. It focuses on medicalization as a hermeneutical process that shapes the conceptual framework(s) we use to refer to some conditions/experiences. In parallel, some scholars with lived experience of madness have started to explore the epistemic harms suffered by the Mad community. Building on this, I argue that the process of medicalization in psychiatry affects the Mad community in a specific way that has been overlooked in the literature on medicalization and epistemic injustice. That is, medicalization can create what is called "contributory injustice." This form of injustice occurs when marginalized communities have been able to create alternative hermeneutical resources, but these resources are dismissed or discredited by the dominant group. I argue that the emerging field of Mad Studies is a victim of this type of injustice when Mad experiences are unilaterally medicalized.
{"title":"Medicalization, Contributory Injustice, and Mad Studies.","authors":"Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0023","DOIUrl":"10.1353/ken.2022.0023","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>One recent body of work has concerned medicalization and how it can create epistemic injustice. It focuses on medicalization as a hermeneutical process that shapes the conceptual framework(s) we use to refer to some conditions/experiences. In parallel, some scholars with lived experience of madness have started to explore the epistemic harms suffered by the Mad community. Building on this, I argue that the process of medicalization in psychiatry affects the Mad community in a specific way that has been overlooked in the literature on medicalization and epistemic injustice. That is, medicalization can create what is called \"contributory injustice.\" This form of injustice occurs when marginalized communities have been able to create alternative hermeneutical resources, but these resources are dismissed or discredited by the dominant group. I argue that the emerging field of Mad Studies is a victim of this type of injustice when Mad experiences are unilaterally medicalized.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45682080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Robert Veatch argues that physician oaths should not be valued as substantive moral commitments, transformational rituals, or symbolic acts. Further, he insists that oath recitation in medical schools is immoral. I respond to Veatch's criticisms and argue that, with alterations to their content and practice, oaths can have value for articulating moral commitments and building a sense of moral community within the profession. I break down Veatch's multitude of objections to oaths over his career, and I suggest how medical schools can avoid the pitfalls identified by Veatch. A promising and innovative path forward is to integrate a commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion-though with an understanding that a few lines in an oath are far from sufficient for institutional culture, faculty accountability, or students' education.
{"title":"Reimagining Commitments to Patients and the Public in Professional Oaths.","authors":"Laura Guidry-Grimes","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0018","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Robert Veatch argues that physician oaths should not be valued as substantive moral commitments, transformational rituals, or symbolic acts. Further, he insists that oath recitation in medical schools is immoral. I respond to Veatch's criticisms and argue that, with alterations to their content and practice, oaths can have value for articulating moral commitments and building a sense of moral community within the profession. I break down Veatch's multitude of objections to oaths over his career, and I suggest how medical schools can avoid the pitfalls identified by Veatch. A promising and innovative path forward is to integrate a commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion-though with an understanding that a few lines in an oath are far from sufficient for institutional culture, faculty accountability, or students' education.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40669656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper offers a novel argument for the claim that "environmental" explanations of obesity meant to help address racial health disparities may actually reinforce racism. While some contend that these explanations reinforce racist and sizeist interracial dynamics, we argue that environmental explanations can bolster intraracial hierarchies of whiteness that reinforce white supremacy. Deployments of environmental accounts in contexts like the U.S. invoke and intertwine two damaging dichotomies: the "good fatty/bad fatty" and the "good white person/bad white person." This supports a cultural system that oppresses people of color and enables thin, white proponents to position themselves as "good white people" against those who deploy racist, moralizing accounts of obesity, and against fat white people, who are implicitly framed as morally inferior. This analysis furthers our understanding of racist and sizeist discourse about fatness and the insidious ways that attempts to address racism can reinforce it.
{"title":"\"White, Fat, and Racist\": Racism and Environmental Accounts of Obesity.","authors":"Megan Dean, Nabina Liebow","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0024","DOIUrl":"10.1353/ken.2022.0024","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper offers a novel argument for the claim that \"environmental\" explanations of obesity meant to help address racial health disparities may actually reinforce racism. While some contend that these explanations reinforce racist and sizeist interracial dynamics, we argue that environmental explanations can bolster intraracial hierarchies of whiteness that reinforce white supremacy. Deployments of environmental accounts in contexts like the U.S. invoke and intertwine two damaging dichotomies: the \"good fatty/bad fatty\" and the \"good white person/bad white person.\" This supports a cultural system that oppresses people of color and enables thin, white proponents to position themselves as \"good white people\" against those who deploy racist, moralizing accounts of obesity, and against fat white people, who are implicitly framed as morally inferior. This analysis furthers our understanding of racist and sizeist discourse about fatness and the insidious ways that attempts to address racism can reinforce it.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44999284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Guidelines and regulations for medical research recognize that the experiences of humans and animals both matter morally. They thus set a presumption against harming research subjects, whether humans or animals, and mandate that the harms subjects experience should be the minimal necessary for achieving the scientific aims of the study. Beyond this, guidelines and regulations place upper limits on the extent to which human, but not animal, subjects may be harmed. They also mandate that human, but not animal, subjects should be compensated for the harms they experience. In this article, I argue that this common approach to regulating medical research is mistaken. In particular, there are upper limits on the extent to which animals may ethically be harmed in order to collect data to benefit others, and there are moral reasons to compensate them for the harms they experience. I conclude that guidelines and regulations for research with animals should be revised accordingly.
{"title":"Suffering in Animal Research: The Need for Limits and the Possibility of Compensation.","authors":"David Wendler","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0019","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Guidelines and regulations for medical research recognize that the experiences of humans and animals both matter morally. They thus set a presumption against harming research subjects, whether humans or animals, and mandate that the harms subjects experience should be the minimal necessary for achieving the scientific aims of the study. Beyond this, guidelines and regulations place upper limits on the extent to which human, but not animal, subjects may be harmed. They also mandate that human, but not animal, subjects should be compensated for the harms they experience. In this article, I argue that this common approach to regulating medical research is mistaken. In particular, there are upper limits on the extent to which animals may ethically be harmed in order to collect data to benefit others, and there are moral reasons to compensate them for the harms they experience. I conclude that guidelines and regulations for research with animals should be revised accordingly.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10103024/pdf/nihms-1885476.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9652567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although researchers generally take great care to ensure that human subjects do not suffer very serious harms from their involvement in research, the situation is different for nonhuman animal subjects. Significant progress has been made in reducing unnecessary animal suffering in research, yet researchers still inflict severe pain and distress on tens of thousands of animals every year for scientific purposes. Some bioethicists, scientists, and animal welfare advocates argue for placing an upper limit on the suffering researchers may impose on animal subjects, with rare exceptions for research that promises critical social benefits. In this article, I argue against such an upper limit on harm on the grounds that researchers often can compensate animal subjects for their suffering, even severe and long-lasting suffering. If animal subjects receive adequate compensation for the harms they suffer, then there is no general limit on how much suffering researchers may impose on them for scientific purposes.
{"title":"Compensation and Limits on Harm in Animal Research.","authors":"Jake Earl","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0020","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Although researchers generally take great care to ensure that human subjects do not suffer very serious harms from their involvement in research, the situation is different for nonhuman animal subjects. Significant progress has been made in reducing unnecessary animal suffering in research, yet researchers still inflict severe pain and distress on tens of thousands of animals every year for scientific purposes. Some bioethicists, scientists, and animal welfare advocates argue for placing an upper limit on the suffering researchers may impose on animal subjects, with rare exceptions for research that promises critical social benefits. In this article, I argue against such an upper limit on harm on the grounds that researchers often can compensate animal subjects for their suffering, even severe and long-lasting suffering. If animal subjects receive adequate compensation for the harms they suffer, then there is no general limit on how much suffering researchers may impose on them for scientific purposes.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40671064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing such obstruction. Drawing on social epistemology and theories of equality and distributive justice, we provide an account of epistemic equality. We regard participation in, and influence over a knowledge-generating discourse in an epistemic community as a limited good that needs to be justly distributed among putative members of the community. We argue that rather than trying to operationally formulate an exact criterion for distributing this good, epistemic equality may be realized by insisting on active participation of members of three groups in addition to credited experts: relevant disempowered groups, relevant uncredited experts, and relevant stakeholders. Meeting these conditions fulfills the political, moral, and epistemic aims of epistemic equality.
{"title":"Epistemic Equality: Distributive Epistemic Justice in the Context of Justification.","authors":"Boaz Miller, Meital Pinto","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0011","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing such obstruction. Drawing on social epistemology and theories of equality and distributive justice, we provide an account of epistemic equality. We regard participation in, and influence over a knowledge-generating discourse in an epistemic community as a limited good that needs to be justly distributed among putative members of the community. We argue that rather than trying to operationally formulate an exact criterion for distributing this good, epistemic equality may be realized by insisting on active participation of members of three groups in addition to credited experts: relevant disempowered groups, relevant uncredited experts, and relevant stakeholders. Meeting these conditions fulfills the political, moral, and epistemic aims of epistemic equality.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40491550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editor's Note, December 2022.","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0026","DOIUrl":"10.1353/ken.2022.0026","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48582439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In these Conversations, Robert Veatch reveals remarkable moments of his intellectual journey through bioethics. In Part I, he recalls some of the major historical events that contributed to modern bioethics development from the 1970s onward. Going back more than one decade, he emphasizes the impact of the Antiwar and Civil Rights movements, his pacifist ideals, and his engagement as an activist. In Part II, Veatch discusses the core of his theoretical proposal for bioethics, which is based on seven principles. He explains how his principles work in practice and why he defends the lexical ordering strategy, prioritizing the duty-based principles over consequentialist ones. Finally, he addresses the issue of the universality of ethical principles while, at the same time, acknowledging that different cultural values may condition the interpretation of a problem and, thus, lead to a different conclusion.
{"title":"Foundations of Bioethics through the Voice of a Pioneer: Conversations with Robert M. Veatch.","authors":"Marta Dias Barcelos","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0017","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In these Conversations, Robert Veatch reveals remarkable moments of his intellectual journey through bioethics. In Part I, he recalls some of the major historical events that contributed to modern bioethics development from the 1970s onward. Going back more than one decade, he emphasizes the impact of the Antiwar and Civil Rights movements, his pacifist ideals, and his engagement as an activist. In Part II, Veatch discusses the core of his theoretical proposal for bioethics, which is based on seven principles. He explains how his principles work in practice and why he defends the lexical ordering strategy, prioritizing the duty-based principles over consequentialist ones. Finally, he addresses the issue of the universality of ethical principles while, at the same time, acknowledging that different cultural values may condition the interpretation of a problem and, thus, lead to a different conclusion.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40669655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Racial disparities in pain treatment are well documented. Such disparities are explained with reference to factors related to providers, health care structures, and patient behaviors. Racial differences in pain experiences, although well documented, are less well understood. Explanations for such differences usually involve genetic or psychological factors. Here, we argue that racial differences in pain experiences might also be explained by disparities in pain treatment. Based on what we know about the nature of pain, particularly the cognitive and affective aspects of the phenomenon, it is likely that disparities in the treatment of racialized patients can lead to significant racial differences in pain experience that show up at the population level. We argue that the failure of research programs to consider this causal factor is an example of white ignorance. We also consider several implications of the link between racial disparities in pain treatment and racial differences in pain experience.
{"title":"White Ignorance in Pain Research: Racial Differences and Racial Disparities.","authors":"Phoebe Friesen, Nada Gligorov","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0012","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Racial disparities in pain treatment are well documented. Such disparities are explained with reference to factors related to providers, health care structures, and patient behaviors. Racial differences in pain experiences, although well documented, are less well understood. Explanations for such differences usually involve genetic or psychological factors. Here, we argue that racial differences in pain experiences might also be explained by disparities in pain treatment. Based on what we know about the nature of pain, particularly the cognitive and affective aspects of the phenomenon, it is likely that disparities in the treatment of racialized patients can lead to significant racial differences in pain experience that show up at the population level. We argue that the failure of research programs to consider this causal factor is an example of white ignorance. We also consider several implications of the link between racial disparities in pain treatment and racial differences in pain experience.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40491551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editor's Note, September 2022.","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40669654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}