[ e-13 ] 12. Unfortunately, Killmister doesn’t seem aware of Darwall’s revision of his own view, which distinguishes two kinds of recognition respect: honor respect and moral respect. Given that Darwall ties the former to the idea of socially constructed “human kinds,” which Killmister considers later in her discussion of status dignity, her take on this revision would have been relevant. Indeed, because Darwall further argues that social kinds are tied up with hierarchical interpersonal attitudes, this revision complicates any attempt, like Killmister’s, to make human dignity a species of status dignity. See e.g. Stephen Darwall, “Respect As Honor and As Accountability,” In Honor, History, & Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
{"title":"Review of For the Common Good: Philosophical Foundations of Research Ethics","authors":"Douglas Mackay","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0015","url":null,"abstract":"[ e-13 ] 12. Unfortunately, Killmister doesn’t seem aware of Darwall’s revision of his own view, which distinguishes two kinds of recognition respect: honor respect and moral respect. Given that Darwall ties the former to the idea of socially constructed “human kinds,” which Killmister considers later in her discussion of status dignity, her take on this revision would have been relevant. Indeed, because Darwall further argues that social kinds are tied up with hierarchical interpersonal attitudes, this revision complicates any attempt, like Killmister’s, to make human dignity a species of status dignity. See e.g. Stephen Darwall, “Respect As Honor and As Accountability,” In Honor, History, & Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"E-13 - E-28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42577818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-21DOI: 10.21428/3e88f64f.31304008
J. Guiliano, Roopika Risam
{"title":"Editors' Note: March 2022","authors":"J. Guiliano, Roopika Risam","doi":"10.21428/3e88f64f.31304008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21428/3e88f64f.31304008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67758809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of When Death Becomes Life: Notes from a Transplant Surgeon","authors":"A. Omelianchuk","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"E-12 - E-8"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49251733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely-related proposals to rectify the problem: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a conception of inductive risk that aligns with this distinction, not one between internal/external phases in science; iii) to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a unique epistemic risk, no less significant than inductive risk. We outline the implications of each proposal for current debates in the values in science literature.
{"title":"The Epistemic Risk in Representation","authors":"S. Harvard, Eric Winsberg","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0001","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely-related proposals to rectify the problem: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a conception of inductive risk that aligns with this distinction, not one between internal/external phases in science; iii) to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a unique epistemic risk, no less significant than inductive risk. We outline the implications of each proposal for current debates in the values in science literature.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"1 - 31"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46951490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Scientists have the ability to influence policy in important ways through how they present their results. Surprisingly, existing codes of scientific ethics have little to say about such choices. I propose that we can arrive at a set of ethical guidelines to govern scientists' presentation of information to policymakers by looking to bioethics: roughly, just as a clinician should aim to promote informed decision-making by patients, a scientist should aim to promote informed decision-making by policymakers. Though this may sound like a natural proposal, I show it offers guidance that conflicts with standard scientific practices. I conclude by considering one cost of the proposal: that it would prevent scientists from acting as advocates in a way that is currently common in certain fields. I accept that the proposal would restrict scientists' political advocacy rights, but argue that the benefits of adopting it—promoting democratic governance—justify the restriction.
{"title":"An Ethical Framework for Presenting Scientific Results to Policy-Makers","authors":"S. Schroeder","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0002","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Scientists have the ability to influence policy in important ways through how they present their results. Surprisingly, existing codes of scientific ethics have little to say about such choices. I propose that we can arrive at a set of ethical guidelines to govern scientists' presentation of information to policymakers by looking to bioethics: roughly, just as a clinician should aim to promote informed decision-making by patients, a scientist should aim to promote informed decision-making by policymakers. Though this may sound like a natural proposal, I show it offers guidance that conflicts with standard scientific practices. I conclude by considering one cost of the proposal: that it would prevent scientists from acting as advocates in a way that is currently common in certain fields. I accept that the proposal would restrict scientists' political advocacy rights, but argue that the benefits of adopting it—promoting democratic governance—justify the restriction.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"33 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46363026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Harvard, Eric Winsberg, S. Schroeder, Tobias Schönwitz, S. Tresker, D. Howard, A. Omelianchuk
ABSTRACT:Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely-related proposals to rectify the problem: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a conception of inductive risk that aligns with this distinction, not one between internal/external phases in science; iii) to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a unique epistemic risk, no less significant than inductive risk. We outline the implications of each proposal for current debates in the values in science literature.
{"title":"Editor's Note, March 2022","authors":"S. Harvard, Eric Winsberg, S. Schroeder, Tobias Schönwitz, S. Tresker, D. Howard, A. Omelianchuk","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0000","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely-related proposals to rectify the problem: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a conception of inductive risk that aligns with this distinction, not one between internal/external phases in science; iii) to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a unique epistemic risk, no less significant than inductive risk. We outline the implications of each proposal for current debates in the values in science literature.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"1 - 101 - 103 - 126 - 31 - 33 - 67 - 69 - E-1 - E-12 - E-8 - E-8 - ix - vi - vi - vii"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49448198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:How to deal with non-epistemic values in science presents a pressing problem for science and society as well as for philosophers of science. In recent years, accounts of democratizing science have been proposed as a possible solution to this. By providing a case study on the establishment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy comment: Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services comment: (IPBES), I argue that such accounts run into a problem when values are embedded in the general scientific and societal setup to such an extent that they shape the terrain upon which such a democratization needs to take place. I introduce the notion of particularities as manifestations of values in science and state a problem of particularity, posed by the ways in which the interactive dimension of particularities interferes with democratic procedures for resolving value judgements in science. As a possible remedy, I propose enriching accounts of democratizing science by agonistic theories of democracy.
{"title":"Values in Science, Biodiversity Research, and the Problem of Particularity","authors":"Tobias Schönwitz","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0003","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:How to deal with non-epistemic values in science presents a pressing problem for science and society as well as for philosophers of science. In recent years, accounts of democratizing science have been proposed as a possible solution to this. By providing a case study on the establishment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy comment: Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services comment: (IPBES), I argue that such accounts run into a problem when values are embedded in the general scientific and societal setup to such an extent that they shape the terrain upon which such a democratization needs to take place. I introduce the notion of particularities as manifestations of values in science and state a problem of particularity, posed by the ways in which the interactive dimension of particularities interferes with democratic procedures for resolving value judgements in science. As a possible remedy, I propose enriching accounts of democratizing science by agonistic theories of democracy.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"101 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48564260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Danielle Spencer’s book, “Metagnosis: Revelatory Narratives of Health and Identity,” does many things. It is a work of autotheory, putting Spencer’s own embodied narrative in constant conversation with the testimony of others along with a remarkably diverse set of critical and theoretical approaches. In the book, Spencer coins a new term, “metagnosis”, which occurs when one is newly diagnosed in adulthood with a lifelong condition. The book explores Spencer’s own metagnostic experience involving her eyesight along with chronicling the experiences of others to highlight the ways in which newfound knowledge of a diagnosis can in itself transform us. Born with strabismus—“misaligned eyes,” Spencer is practiced at negotiating the meaning of having a non-normative visual experience and presentation. For the most part, growing up with the condition and frequently subjected to medical attention because of it, Spencer remained largely unconcerned about whether or not she saw differently. But, as the book chronicles, in adulthood, after enduring subpar medical treatment and a series of frustrating surgeries, Spencer is additionally diagnosed with a different visual field condition, homonymous hemianopia, that was likely sustained in infancy, but which up until the diagnosis neither she nor her various doctors had detected. Spencer describes how she discovers in her orthoptist’s office that she can see only half of the visual world of each eye. This discovery leads to a deep ambivalence on Spencer’s part—which includes feelings of physical vulnerability, shame that the condition had gone unnoticed for so long, as well as relief for not having to suffer through the stigma and exclusion that may have come with the additional medical diagnosis in childhood. It also leads to a theoretical examination of the limited narrative and theoretical resources that avail us in trying to make sense of such revelatory experiences and the frustrating inexplicability that such transformative experiences can have for others. This intimate narrative approach democratizes theory. As Spencer says near the end of the book, WEB CONTENT ONLY
{"title":"Review of Metagnosis: Revelatory Narratives of Health and Identity","authors":"D. Howard","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Danielle Spencer’s book, “Metagnosis: Revelatory Narratives of Health and Identity,” does many things. It is a work of autotheory, putting Spencer’s own embodied narrative in constant conversation with the testimony of others along with a remarkably diverse set of critical and theoretical approaches. In the book, Spencer coins a new term, “metagnosis”, which occurs when one is newly diagnosed in adulthood with a lifelong condition. The book explores Spencer’s own metagnostic experience involving her eyesight along with chronicling the experiences of others to highlight the ways in which newfound knowledge of a diagnosis can in itself transform us. Born with strabismus—“misaligned eyes,” Spencer is practiced at negotiating the meaning of having a non-normative visual experience and presentation. For the most part, growing up with the condition and frequently subjected to medical attention because of it, Spencer remained largely unconcerned about whether or not she saw differently. But, as the book chronicles, in adulthood, after enduring subpar medical treatment and a series of frustrating surgeries, Spencer is additionally diagnosed with a different visual field condition, homonymous hemianopia, that was likely sustained in infancy, but which up until the diagnosis neither she nor her various doctors had detected. Spencer describes how she discovers in her orthoptist’s office that she can see only half of the visual world of each eye. This discovery leads to a deep ambivalence on Spencer’s part—which includes feelings of physical vulnerability, shame that the condition had gone unnoticed for so long, as well as relief for not having to suffer through the stigma and exclusion that may have come with the additional medical diagnosis in childhood. It also leads to a theoretical examination of the limited narrative and theoretical resources that avail us in trying to make sense of such revelatory experiences and the frustrating inexplicability that such transformative experiences can have for others. This intimate narrative approach democratizes theory. As Spencer says near the end of the book, WEB CONTENT ONLY","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"E-1 - E-8"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49457358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Medical epistemology lately has seen a strengthening of the view that the construction of evidence should be sensitive to the social context in which it is produced. A poignant illustration of this is the undue influence of the pharmaceutical industry on research results and reporting. I challenge a particular application of this view by examining a common practice in the medical and scientific community: mandatory author disclosure of conflicts of interest (COIs) in published articles. In illustrating problems with COI disclosure policies in biomedical publishing, including unappreciated shortcomings of the scant empirical data supporting mandatory disclosure, I hope to demonstrate that the value given to journal COI disclosure policies as a way to protect the reliability of medical evidence might well be misplaced. Rather than extract away the "messy" details of the real world, the analysis is ultimately more responsive to how medical knowledge is produced and disseminated.
{"title":"Unreliable Threats: Conflicts of Interest Disclosure and the Safeguarding of Biomedical Knowledge","authors":"S. Tresker","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0004","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Medical epistemology lately has seen a strengthening of the view that the construction of evidence should be sensitive to the social context in which it is produced. A poignant illustration of this is the undue influence of the pharmaceutical industry on research results and reporting. I challenge a particular application of this view by examining a common practice in the medical and scientific community: mandatory author disclosure of conflicts of interest (COIs) in published articles. In illustrating problems with COI disclosure policies in biomedical publishing, including unappreciated shortcomings of the scant empirical data supporting mandatory disclosure, I hope to demonstrate that the value given to journal COI disclosure policies as a way to protect the reliability of medical evidence might well be misplaced. Rather than extract away the \"messy\" details of the real world, the analysis is ultimately more responsive to how medical knowledge is produced and disseminated.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"103 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49488258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One recent body of work has concerned medicalization and how it can create epistemic injustice. It focuses on medicalization as a hermeneutical process that shapes the conceptual framework(s) we use to refer to some conditions/experiences. In parallel, some scholars with lived experience of madness have started to explore the epistemic harms suffered by the Mad community. Building on this, I argue that the process of medicalization in psychiatry affects the Mad community in a specific way that has been overlooked in the literature on medicalization and epistemic injustice. That is, medicalization can create what is called "contributory injustice." This form of injustice occurs when marginalized communities have been able to create alternative hermeneutical resources, but these resources are dismissed or discredited by the dominant group. I argue that the emerging field of Mad Studies is a victim of this type of injustice when Mad experiences are unilaterally medicalized.
{"title":"Medicalization, Contributory Injustice, and Mad Studies.","authors":"Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0023","DOIUrl":"10.1353/ken.2022.0023","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>One recent body of work has concerned medicalization and how it can create epistemic injustice. It focuses on medicalization as a hermeneutical process that shapes the conceptual framework(s) we use to refer to some conditions/experiences. In parallel, some scholars with lived experience of madness have started to explore the epistemic harms suffered by the Mad community. Building on this, I argue that the process of medicalization in psychiatry affects the Mad community in a specific way that has been overlooked in the literature on medicalization and epistemic injustice. That is, medicalization can create what is called \"contributory injustice.\" This form of injustice occurs when marginalized communities have been able to create alternative hermeneutical resources, but these resources are dismissed or discredited by the dominant group. I argue that the emerging field of Mad Studies is a victim of this type of injustice when Mad experiences are unilaterally medicalized.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"401-434"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45682080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：