Pub Date : 2023-06-14DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2220503
P. Wilson, Katerina Tkacova, T. Pert
ABSTRACT The example of the Thirty Years War (1618–48) demonstrates that small war was already integral to the conduct of premodern hostilities. Commanders employed these methods with a purpose and generally tried to limit the accompanying violence to preserve discipline and effectiveness, as well as their claims to be waging a just war. We explain why conventional histories have neglected the presence of small war in premodernity, and show how its importance, methods, and wider impact can be reconstructed through innovative digital mapping techniques, which have the potential to be applied to conflicts in other times and places.
{"title":"Mapping premodern small war: The case of the Thirty Years War (1618-48)","authors":"P. Wilson, Katerina Tkacova, T. Pert","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2220503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2220503","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The example of the Thirty Years War (1618–48) demonstrates that small war was already integral to the conduct of premodern hostilities. Commanders employed these methods with a purpose and generally tried to limit the accompanying violence to preserve discipline and effectiveness, as well as their claims to be waging a just war. We explain why conventional histories have neglected the presence of small war in premodernity, and show how its importance, methods, and wider impact can be reconstructed through innovative digital mapping techniques, which have the potential to be applied to conflicts in other times and places.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46942034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2220501
Bianca Berman
ABSTRACT On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a major escalation of a war that had been persisting since 2014. This article explores three of Sergei Loznitsa’s films set in Ukraine and examines the way in which their shared observational style informs the Russia-Ukraine war and may influence viewers’ perceptions of the complexities of the conflict. A close analysis reveals that the observational mode used in Maidan (2014), Donbass (2018), and The Kiev Trial (2022) has two primary effects. First, in Donbass and The Kiev Trial, the unfiltered style serves as a contrast to the often farcical and ‘staged’ content, thereby exposing the lies underpinning Soviet presence in Ukraine and the current Russian invasion. Second, in addition to exposing Russian misinformation, Loznitsa’s observational style in Maidan and Donbass facilitates identification with the Ukrainian people by visually and auditorily immersing the viewer in the world on the screen. The article concludes with a discussion of the significance of Loznitsa’s work in shaping the public’s perception of – and continued commitment to – the war in Ukraine.
{"title":"Sergei Loznitsa, ethereal documentarian: untangling the Russia-Ukraine war in the Kiev Trial, Donbass, and Maidan","authors":"Bianca Berman","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2220501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2220501","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a major escalation of a war that had been persisting since 2014. This article explores three of Sergei Loznitsa’s films set in Ukraine and examines the way in which their shared observational style informs the Russia-Ukraine war and may influence viewers’ perceptions of the complexities of the conflict. A close analysis reveals that the observational mode used in Maidan (2014), Donbass (2018), and The Kiev Trial (2022) has two primary effects. First, in Donbass and The Kiev Trial, the unfiltered style serves as a contrast to the often farcical and ‘staged’ content, thereby exposing the lies underpinning Soviet presence in Ukraine and the current Russian invasion. Second, in addition to exposing Russian misinformation, Loznitsa’s observational style in Maidan and Donbass facilitates identification with the Ukrainian people by visually and auditorily immersing the viewer in the world on the screen. The article concludes with a discussion of the significance of Loznitsa’s work in shaping the public’s perception of – and continued commitment to – the war in Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45652197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-07DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2197671
B. Arnold, John A. Nagl
ABSTRACT Special Operations Forces (SOF) played an important role in defeating the Islamic State (ISIS) physical caliphate in Syria. Acting as a force multiplier, SOF successfully mobilized, armed, supplied, and directed an indigenous guerrilla force across northern Syria against a numerically superior entrenched enemy. This effort was underpinned by a flexible operational approach that adapted operational art to the unique characteristics of unconventional warfare. This paper provides a case study on the conflict with ISIS in Syria, focusing on the first phase of the campaign from 2014 until 2016, examining the elements of operational art which had the most significant impact on the outcome of the conflict. The application of operational art throughout the campaign sought to preserve and strengthen the friendly center of gravity – the Syrian Defense Forces, or SDF – by improving access to critical capabilities, controlling tempo, recognizing culmination criteria, and properly phasing operations and resources. SOF’s practice of sustained engagement garnered influence with the SDF and provided situational awareness to key decision makers, connecting tactics to strategy, engendering mutual trust, and allowing the agility that led to battlefield success.
{"title":"A light footprint in Syria: operational art in operation inherent resolve","authors":"B. Arnold, John A. Nagl","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2197671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2197671","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Special Operations Forces (SOF) played an important role in defeating the Islamic State (ISIS) physical caliphate in Syria. Acting as a force multiplier, SOF successfully mobilized, armed, supplied, and directed an indigenous guerrilla force across northern Syria against a numerically superior entrenched enemy. This effort was underpinned by a flexible operational approach that adapted operational art to the unique characteristics of unconventional warfare. This paper provides a case study on the conflict with ISIS in Syria, focusing on the first phase of the campaign from 2014 until 2016, examining the elements of operational art which had the most significant impact on the outcome of the conflict. The application of operational art throughout the campaign sought to preserve and strengthen the friendly center of gravity – the Syrian Defense Forces, or SDF – by improving access to critical capabilities, controlling tempo, recognizing culmination criteria, and properly phasing operations and resources. SOF’s practice of sustained engagement garnered influence with the SDF and provided situational awareness to key decision makers, connecting tactics to strategy, engendering mutual trust, and allowing the agility that led to battlefield success.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42443295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-02DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2195339
L. Bester
ABSTRACT The fascination with special forces could be ascribed to the prominence of their use in contemporary conflicts across the globe. There is, however, a paradox of employing such a highly lethal force in order to pursuit peace. With peacekeeping evolving parallel with the strategic environment, especially in Africa, the trend towards more robust interventions has become prevalent since the end of the Cold War. As such, the requirement for accurate and timely intelligence in peace missions has become crucial. Admittedly, special forces would not necessarily be the soldiers expected to wear blue berets and participate in peace missions. It may come as a surprise to the uninformed, though, to learn that special forces have indeed participated, and are still involved, in peace missions across the globe. Drawing from a case study where special forces have been involved in peace missions under the umbrella of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this article investigates the utilization of special forces and the role they could play in peace missions in Africa.
{"title":"The utilization of special forces in peace missions: perspectives from South Africa","authors":"L. Bester","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2195339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2195339","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The fascination with special forces could be ascribed to the prominence of their use in contemporary conflicts across the globe. There is, however, a paradox of employing such a highly lethal force in order to pursuit peace. With peacekeeping evolving parallel with the strategic environment, especially in Africa, the trend towards more robust interventions has become prevalent since the end of the Cold War. As such, the requirement for accurate and timely intelligence in peace missions has become crucial. Admittedly, special forces would not necessarily be the soldiers expected to wear blue berets and participate in peace missions. It may come as a surprise to the uninformed, though, to learn that special forces have indeed participated, and are still involved, in peace missions across the globe. Drawing from a case study where special forces have been involved in peace missions under the umbrella of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this article investigates the utilization of special forces and the role they could play in peace missions in Africa.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48572781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-29DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2187201
Sean M. Wiswesser
ABSTRACT Russia’s airpower failure in the Ukraine war was due to incompetent air campaigning and execution, coupled with the success of a highly effective Ukrainian ground-based air defense. The Russian Air Forces (VKS) attempted to execute what they term a ‘Strategic Air Operation’ based on a ‘non-contact’ doctrine, articulated widely in recent years. But they could not achieve this in practice. As a result, like the famous Potemkin Village of Catherine the Great’s time, Russia’s Air Force today is only a façade of a modern twenty-first-century Air Force. Throughout the first eight months of the invasion, Russia failed to achieve air superiority, failed at suppression of enemy air defense, and failed to deny the use of airpower to its adversary. The absence of Russian airpower was prominently on display during the September 2022 counterattack in the Kharkiv area, where Ukraine took back 3,000 plus square miles of its territory and again with the counteroffensives in the south, where Ukraine retook Kherson. This paper explores both the ‘how’ of Russia’s airpower failure along with ‘why’ it could not execute its own stated doctrine.
{"title":"Potemkin on the Dnieper: the Failure of Russian Airpower in the Ukraine war","authors":"Sean M. Wiswesser","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2187201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2187201","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Russia’s airpower failure in the Ukraine war was due to incompetent air campaigning and execution, coupled with the success of a highly effective Ukrainian ground-based air defense. The Russian Air Forces (VKS) attempted to execute what they term a ‘Strategic Air Operation’ based on a ‘non-contact’ doctrine, articulated widely in recent years. But they could not achieve this in practice. As a result, like the famous Potemkin Village of Catherine the Great’s time, Russia’s Air Force today is only a façade of a modern twenty-first-century Air Force. Throughout the first eight months of the invasion, Russia failed to achieve air superiority, failed at suppression of enemy air defense, and failed to deny the use of airpower to its adversary. The absence of Russian airpower was prominently on display during the September 2022 counterattack in the Kharkiv area, where Ukraine took back 3,000 plus square miles of its territory and again with the counteroffensives in the south, where Ukraine retook Kherson. This paper explores both the ‘how’ of Russia’s airpower failure along with ‘why’ it could not execute its own stated doctrine.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45695162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-22DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2174762
Peter A. Lorge
In Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History, Jeremy Black argued that insurgencies should be studied, ‘without political blinkers, national prejudices, or conceptual and historiographical confusion’. As a military historian, Professor Black emphasized that insurgency was neither a new phenomenon, nor one confined to the concerns of Western powers. He was, however, writing in response to the majority of current studies in the field that seldom concern themselves with either pre-19 century history or the non-West except from a Western perspective. Of course, military theorists have taken an ahistorical view of insurgencies from at least the 16 century, so the current state of the field has a long, and scarcely recognized, tradition. Black is also not the first scholar to lament the lack of cultural awareness in studies of insurgency and will not be the last. He, at least, has a long record of arguing for, and writing about, the rest of the world in his many military histories. Studies of insurgency in the West have naturally been connected to ‘pragmatic’ concerns of current events and tend toward 20 century studies and Western interests. An edited volume, by Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir, Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures, has one or two chapters that look further back in history, but it is mostly about the 20 and 21 centuries, and mostly Western-centric. The Middle East and Afghanistan are longstanding interests of Western powers, as is, at least theoretically, modern China. The successful Communist Chinese insurgency, and Mao Zedong’s influential theoretical writings about insurgency, established a place for modern China in the security studies and political science fields that developed in the Cold War. Yet Mao and China have been abstracted from historical context in order to accommodate them to theoretical models that do not allow for cultural or temporal variables.
Jeremy Black在《叛乱与反叛乱：全球史》一书中认为，应该“在没有政治偏见、民族偏见或概念和历史混乱的情况下”研究叛乱。作为一名军事历史学家，布莱克教授强调，叛乱既不是一种新现象，也不局限于西方大国的担忧。然而，他写这篇文章是为了回应该领域目前的大多数研究，这些研究很少涉及19世纪前的历史或非西方，除非从西方的角度来看。当然，至少从16世纪起，军事理论家就对叛乱采取了非历史性的观点，因此该领域的现状有着悠久而鲜为人知的传统。布莱克也不是第一个在叛乱研究中哀叹缺乏文化意识的学者，也不会是最后一个。至少，在他的许多军事历史中，他有着长期为世界其他地方争论和写作的记录。对西方叛乱的研究自然与对时事的“务实”关注有关，并倾向于20世纪的研究和西方利益。Beatrice Heuser和Eitan Shamir编辑的《叛乱和反叛乱：国家风格和战略文化》一书有一两章可以追溯到历史，但它大多是关于20世纪和21世纪的，大多以西方为中心。中东和阿富汗是西方大国的长期利益，至少从理论上讲，现代中国也是如此。成功的中国共产党叛乱，以及毛泽东关于叛乱的有影响力的理论著作，为现代中国在冷战时期发展起来的安全研究和政治学领域奠定了基础。然而，毛和中国已经从历史背景中抽象出来，以便将它们纳入不考虑文化或时间变量的理论模型中。
{"title":"Counterinsurgency in China and India: an Introduction","authors":"Peter A. Lorge","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2174762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2174762","url":null,"abstract":"In Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History, Jeremy Black argued that insurgencies should be studied, ‘without political blinkers, national prejudices, or conceptual and historiographical confusion’. As a military historian, Professor Black emphasized that insurgency was neither a new phenomenon, nor one confined to the concerns of Western powers. He was, however, writing in response to the majority of current studies in the field that seldom concern themselves with either pre-19 century history or the non-West except from a Western perspective. Of course, military theorists have taken an ahistorical view of insurgencies from at least the 16 century, so the current state of the field has a long, and scarcely recognized, tradition. Black is also not the first scholar to lament the lack of cultural awareness in studies of insurgency and will not be the last. He, at least, has a long record of arguing for, and writing about, the rest of the world in his many military histories. Studies of insurgency in the West have naturally been connected to ‘pragmatic’ concerns of current events and tend toward 20 century studies and Western interests. An edited volume, by Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir, Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures, has one or two chapters that look further back in history, but it is mostly about the 20 and 21 centuries, and mostly Western-centric. The Middle East and Afghanistan are longstanding interests of Western powers, as is, at least theoretically, modern China. The successful Communist Chinese insurgency, and Mao Zedong’s influential theoretical writings about insurgency, established a place for modern China in the security studies and political science fields that developed in the Cold War. Yet Mao and China have been abstracted from historical context in order to accommodate them to theoretical models that do not allow for cultural or temporal variables.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49609815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-17DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2190217
Weiting Guo
ABSTRACT Using an autobiography written by a Qing local official, Duan Guangqing (段光清, 1798–1878), this article explores the personal experiences of local officials who developed ways of coping with atrocities, trauma, and various local affairs during the Taiping War (1851–1864). Contrary to studies that focus on large-scale combat operations in Taiping China, this essay adopts a decentered approach to explore the small-scale wars in which local officials and various actors strategized their actions and manipulated their relationships. This article argues that the strategies and actions of local figures during small-scale conflicts provide a vivid and decentered picture of Taiping China.
{"title":"The logics of atrocities: a local official and the small wars in Taiping China, 1851–1864","authors":"Weiting Guo","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2190217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2190217","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Using an autobiography written by a Qing local official, Duan Guangqing (段光清, 1798–1878), this article explores the personal experiences of local officials who developed ways of coping with atrocities, trauma, and various local affairs during the Taiping War (1851–1864). Contrary to studies that focus on large-scale combat operations in Taiping China, this essay adopts a decentered approach to explore the small-scale wars in which local officials and various actors strategized their actions and manipulated their relationships. This article argues that the strategies and actions of local figures during small-scale conflicts provide a vivid and decentered picture of Taiping China.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43624092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2179809
Christopher Tuck
ABSTRACT For Western militaries, the choice between enemy-centric and population-centric approaches to unconventional warfare is really no choice at all. Contemporary counterinsurgency doctrines are clear on the decisive importance of hearts and minds in delivering success: in these conflicts, the population is the prize. As this article identifies, however, context may limit in important ways the relevance of many hearts and minds activities. Despite the scale of Commonwealth military success against Indonesia during Operation Claret in 1965–66, and despite the declared importance of hearts and mind activities in support of this success, the specific context that existed during the campaign limited the extent to which hearts and minds could exert a decisive impact. In particular, the limited nature of Commonwealth objectives, which did not seek to change the political ownership of the border area, meant that the local population could not, in the long term, be protected from the consequences of choosing to side with Commonwealth forces. Therefore, despite often being well disposed to Commonwealth troops, rational concerns for their own well-being limited the willingness of border villagers to provide overt help.
{"title":"‘Shaping hearts and minds: claret operations in Borneo, 1965–1966’","authors":"Christopher Tuck","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2179809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2179809","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For Western militaries, the choice between enemy-centric and population-centric approaches to unconventional warfare is really no choice at all. Contemporary counterinsurgency doctrines are clear on the decisive importance of hearts and minds in delivering success: in these conflicts, the population is the prize. As this article identifies, however, context may limit in important ways the relevance of many hearts and minds activities. Despite the scale of Commonwealth military success against Indonesia during Operation Claret in 1965–66, and despite the declared importance of hearts and mind activities in support of this success, the specific context that existed during the campaign limited the extent to which hearts and minds could exert a decisive impact. In particular, the limited nature of Commonwealth objectives, which did not seek to change the political ownership of the border area, meant that the local population could not, in the long term, be protected from the consequences of choosing to side with Commonwealth forces. Therefore, despite often being well disposed to Commonwealth troops, rational concerns for their own well-being limited the willingness of border villagers to provide overt help.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46174498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-28DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2185443
Vicken Cheterian
ABSTRACT The interaction between Russia and Turkey since 2015 suggests a new quality in foreign affairs combining tactical alliance and strategic competition. The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not change this. By studying the cases of Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, we observe not only elements of geopolitical competition and cooperation but also that the combination of the two contradictory approaches in foreign affairs created new opportunities beneficial to the two sides. Russian-Turkish interactions are a unique case study in international relations and are conditioned by their geopolitical competition with the west, a fact that the war in Ukraine did not alter.
{"title":"Friend and Foe: Russia–Turkey relations before and after the war in Ukraine","authors":"Vicken Cheterian","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2185443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2185443","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The interaction between Russia and Turkey since 2015 suggests a new quality in foreign affairs combining tactical alliance and strategic competition. The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not change this. By studying the cases of Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, we observe not only elements of geopolitical competition and cooperation but also that the combination of the two contradictory approaches in foreign affairs created new opportunities beneficial to the two sides. Russian-Turkish interactions are a unique case study in international relations and are conditioned by their geopolitical competition with the west, a fact that the war in Ukraine did not alter.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47351834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-17DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2020.1813937
A. Varsori
The Abstract should be as follows: In recent years, scholars and practitioners alike have acknowledged the threat posed by Military-Trained Gang Members (MTGMs). These individuals have the training, know-how, and expertise necessary to significantly increase the effectiveness and lethality of the armed group they belong to. Even though this threat is present in several criminal insurgencies, usage of the MTGM concept is limited to studies regarding the United States. This paper broadens this scope by assessing the presence and characters of the MTGM phenomenon in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Through a review of media output on the topic, spanning over more than 21 years, the paper exposes the roots and extent of this trend, as well as the roles played by MTGMs.
{"title":"Correction","authors":"A. Varsori","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2020.1813937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1813937","url":null,"abstract":"The Abstract should be as follows: In recent years, scholars and practitioners alike have acknowledged the threat posed by Military-Trained Gang Members (MTGMs). These individuals have the training, know-how, and expertise necessary to significantly increase the effectiveness and lethality of the armed group they belong to. Even though this threat is present in several criminal insurgencies, usage of the MTGM concept is limited to studies regarding the United States. This paper broadens this scope by assessing the presence and characters of the MTGM phenomenon in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Through a review of media output on the topic, spanning over more than 21 years, the paper exposes the roots and extent of this trend, as well as the roles played by MTGMs.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09592318.2020.1813937","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48833197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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