Pub Date : 2022-08-26DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2113675
L. Cline
ABSTRACT As the strategic environments worsened both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US tried to improve security by sharply increasing the number of troops. In the case of Iraq, the US achieved at least operational success, but the results were seemingly minimal in Afghanistan. Two factors were critical in Iraq: surge forces were focused on a relatively small center of gravity, and the operations were greatly assisted by the rise of the Awakening movement. The additional forces in Afghanistan had a much broader geographical area for their operations, and although efforts were made to mobilize local security forces, the results were at best mixed. The public time constraints on the additional forces in Afghanistan also were more prominent, leading to a ‘good enough’ approach by necessity. Although not strictly part of the surge, the US was able to turn over more security responsibilities to Iraqi forces as the ‘clear-hold-build-transfer’ process than they were to the Afghanistan forces. The results in Afghanistan in particular lead to questions as to how well expeditionary counterinsurgency forces can succeed in widespread insurgencies.
{"title":"The two surges: Iraq and Afghanistan in comparison","authors":"L. Cline","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2113675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2113675","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As the strategic environments worsened both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US tried to improve security by sharply increasing the number of troops. In the case of Iraq, the US achieved at least operational success, but the results were seemingly minimal in Afghanistan. Two factors were critical in Iraq: surge forces were focused on a relatively small center of gravity, and the operations were greatly assisted by the rise of the Awakening movement. The additional forces in Afghanistan had a much broader geographical area for their operations, and although efforts were made to mobilize local security forces, the results were at best mixed. The public time constraints on the additional forces in Afghanistan also were more prominent, leading to a ‘good enough’ approach by necessity. Although not strictly part of the surge, the US was able to turn over more security responsibilities to Iraqi forces as the ‘clear-hold-build-transfer’ process than they were to the Afghanistan forces. The results in Afghanistan in particular lead to questions as to how well expeditionary counterinsurgency forces can succeed in widespread insurgencies.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43736173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-21DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2111497
James Bonk
ABSTRACT This article explores women’s experiences during the White Lotus War (1796–1804), examining disparities related to the state’s calculation of women’s value as agents of institutional reproduction, sources of intelligence, and symbols of disorder. The state cared assiduously for widows of officers killed in battle, converting their grief into a commitment to raising sons as officers, while offering only meagre assistance to soldiers’ widows. Interrogators used female captives to verify identities of captured men, taking their emotions as evidence of attachment. Officials resettling female refugees treated them as threats to social order who need to be returned to families or remarried.
{"title":"Blown like cotton in the wind: women’s experiences of the White Lotus War (1796-1804)","authors":"James Bonk","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2111497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2111497","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores women’s experiences during the White Lotus War (1796–1804), examining disparities related to the state’s calculation of women’s value as agents of institutional reproduction, sources of intelligence, and symbols of disorder. The state cared assiduously for widows of officers killed in battle, converting their grief into a commitment to raising sons as officers, while offering only meagre assistance to soldiers’ widows. Interrogators used female captives to verify identities of captured men, taking their emotions as evidence of attachment. Officials resettling female refugees treated them as threats to social order who need to be returned to families or remarried.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45356581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-18DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2111496
Amos C. Fox
{"title":"The donbas in flames: an operational level analysis of Russia”s 2014-2015 donbas campaign","authors":"Amos C. Fox","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2111496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2111496","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88910053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-17DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2111858
T. Mockaitis
America's longest war ended unceremoniously in August 2021 amid chaotic scenes of Afghan civilians storming the Kabul airport in a desperate effort to board a flight out of the country. The twenty-year war took the lives of 2,448 U.S. service members, 1,144 allied service members, 66,000 Afghan military and police, 3,846 U.S. contractors, 444 aid workers, 72 journalists, and 47,245 Afghan civilians as well as 51,191 Taliban and other insurgents. It cost the United States an estimated $2 trillion, billions of it spent on an Afghan army that collapsed in a matter of weeks. By any measure the mission was an utter failure bought at a terrible price in blood and treasure. While the current public argument focuses on assigning political blame, a more serious discussion has already begun. Debate rests on a broad fundamental question: Did failure result from mistakes made at crucial junctures during the campaign, or was the war unwinnable at a cost the United States could bear? Many of those analysts who insist that the war was lost rather than unwinnable focus on the early days of the conflict. The invasion of Afghanistan and initial occupation went very well, they note. President George W. Bush sent an ultimatum to the Taliban government of Mullah Mohammed Omar: turn over all al-Qaeda leaders, close terrorist training camps, and give the United States access to the camps to make sure they remain closed. Omar refused, and the U.S. invaded with the full support of NATO, which for the first time in its history invoked article 5 of its founding treaty declaring that an attack upon one member is an attack upon all, in response to 9/11. The bombing campaign began on October 7, by midNovember, coalition forces in cooperation with the Northern Alliance had taken the capital Kabul and all major cities, and by early December, the Taliban had collapsed. It took the coalition about a year and half to pacify the countryside, but bin Laden escaped to the border region of Pakistan.
{"title":"Afghanistan and the COIN conundrum","authors":"T. Mockaitis","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2111858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2111858","url":null,"abstract":"America's longest war ended unceremoniously in August 2021 amid chaotic scenes of Afghan civilians storming the Kabul airport in a desperate effort to board a flight out of the country. The twenty-year war took the lives of 2,448 U.S. service members, 1,144 allied service members, 66,000 Afghan military and police, 3,846 U.S. contractors, 444 aid workers, 72 journalists, and 47,245 Afghan civilians as well as 51,191 Taliban and other insurgents. It cost the United States an estimated $2 trillion, billions of it spent on an Afghan army that collapsed in a matter of weeks. By any measure the mission was an utter failure bought at a terrible price in blood and treasure. While the current public argument focuses on assigning political blame, a more serious discussion has already begun. Debate rests on a broad fundamental question: Did failure result from mistakes made at crucial junctures during the campaign, or was the war unwinnable at a cost the United States could bear? Many of those analysts who insist that the war was lost rather than unwinnable focus on the early days of the conflict. The invasion of Afghanistan and initial occupation went very well, they note. President George W. Bush sent an ultimatum to the Taliban government of Mullah Mohammed Omar: turn over all al-Qaeda leaders, close terrorist training camps, and give the United States access to the camps to make sure they remain closed. Omar refused, and the U.S. invaded with the full support of NATO, which for the first time in its history invoked article 5 of its founding treaty declaring that an attack upon one member is an attack upon all, in response to 9/11. The bombing campaign began on October 7, by midNovember, coalition forces in cooperation with the Northern Alliance had taken the capital Kabul and all major cities, and by early December, the Taliban had collapsed. It took the coalition about a year and half to pacify the countryside, but bin Laden escaped to the border region of Pakistan.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45562098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-17DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2109371
Saimum Parvez, Justin V. Hastings
ABSTRACT Notwithstanding the discernable participation of women in terrorist groups, empirical research on women in terrorism is very scant in Bangladesh. To fill this gap, our article examines women’s involvement in terrorism by analyzing the life stories of dozens of Bangladeshi women terrorists. We use a terrorist lifecycle approach to understand the role of digital media in female participation, particularly in terms of when in the lifecycle digital media becomes important, and in terms of how digital media interacts with other factors to shape women’s involvement in terrorist organizations. After analyzing female profiles and their socio-demographic traits, we provide an in-depth analysis of three female terrorist lifecycles. An analysis of the profiles of Bangladeshi terrorists who use digital media reveals that women were more likely to use digital media than men in the recruitment phase. The in-depth case studies of three female terrorist profiles find that multiple and different factors impact their terrorist life cycles. Social networks – families and friends – typically play a role in individuals’ decision to become involved and further engagement in terrorism. Specifically, digital media allows women to expand their social interactions beyond what is possible in person, thus allowing for virtual pathways into terrorism.
{"title":"Understanding the role of digital media in female participation in terrorism: the case of Bangladesh","authors":"Saimum Parvez, Justin V. Hastings","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2109371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2109371","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Notwithstanding the discernable participation of women in terrorist groups, empirical research on women in terrorism is very scant in Bangladesh. To fill this gap, our article examines women’s involvement in terrorism by analyzing the life stories of dozens of Bangladeshi women terrorists. We use a terrorist lifecycle approach to understand the role of digital media in female participation, particularly in terms of when in the lifecycle digital media becomes important, and in terms of how digital media interacts with other factors to shape women’s involvement in terrorist organizations. After analyzing female profiles and their socio-demographic traits, we provide an in-depth analysis of three female terrorist lifecycles. An analysis of the profiles of Bangladeshi terrorists who use digital media reveals that women were more likely to use digital media than men in the recruitment phase. The in-depth case studies of three female terrorist profiles find that multiple and different factors impact their terrorist life cycles. Social networks – families and friends – typically play a role in individuals’ decision to become involved and further engagement in terrorism. Specifically, digital media allows women to expand their social interactions beyond what is possible in person, thus allowing for virtual pathways into terrorism.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47514002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-11DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2109888
Nicola Mathieson
ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationship between prior conflict experience and the impact of foreign fighters on armed groups. This paper addresses the findings in existing research that describes foreign fighters as both assets and liabilities by disaggregating foreign fighters into first-conflict foreign fighters and veteran foreign fighters. While prior experience determines the potential impact of foreign fighters, I introduce the concept of foreign fighter integration to understand how this experience is utilized or leveraged by armed groups. The theory-building framework helps explain why we see certain groups leverage foreign fighters in ways that shape their repertoires of violence, tactics, or even ideology, while, in other instances, the influence of foreign fighters appears to be limited – with any consequent effects restricted to the small factions into which foreign fighters have been assigned. Using this theoretical framework of experience and integration, I re-examine in the cases Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to demonstrate how and where foreign fighters impact armed groups.
{"title":"Foreign fighter experience and impact","authors":"Nicola Mathieson","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2109888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2109888","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationship between prior conflict experience and the impact of foreign fighters on armed groups. This paper addresses the findings in existing research that describes foreign fighters as both assets and liabilities by disaggregating foreign fighters into first-conflict foreign fighters and veteran foreign fighters. While prior experience determines the potential impact of foreign fighters, I introduce the concept of foreign fighter integration to understand how this experience is utilized or leveraged by armed groups. The theory-building framework helps explain why we see certain groups leverage foreign fighters in ways that shape their repertoires of violence, tactics, or even ideology, while, in other instances, the influence of foreign fighters appears to be limited – with any consequent effects restricted to the small factions into which foreign fighters have been assigned. Using this theoretical framework of experience and integration, I re-examine in the cases Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to demonstrate how and where foreign fighters impact armed groups.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47502380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-11DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2108277
Anns George K G, S. Jha
ABSTRACT The intended purpose of this paper is to examine the viability of political resolution as a counterinsurgency strategy. We have selected numerous political negotiation processes between insurgents and government of India in general and Mizoram in particular. The political resolution with Mizo National Front is considered as the most successful counterinsurgency operation in India. Placing this as a model, the government of India employed the strategy of negotiation with various other insurgent groups. The degree of success in Mizoram was not replicated in other insurgency theatres. This was analyzed with the help of a comparative study with other insurgent groups in India, particularly within the state of Assam. It is found that the model of Mizo resolution has been influencing the peace process that came later. And also the strategy of negotiation has been evolving into incorporating civil society groups as signatories to the final peace settlement signed between insurgents and government. This analysis of the peace process is also based on the conceptualization developed from various authors.
{"title":"Dynamic insurgencies and peace nuances in India’s northeast region","authors":"Anns George K G, S. Jha","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2108277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2108277","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The intended purpose of this paper is to examine the viability of political resolution as a counterinsurgency strategy. We have selected numerous political negotiation processes between insurgents and government of India in general and Mizoram in particular. The political resolution with Mizo National Front is considered as the most successful counterinsurgency operation in India. Placing this as a model, the government of India employed the strategy of negotiation with various other insurgent groups. The degree of success in Mizoram was not replicated in other insurgency theatres. This was analyzed with the help of a comparative study with other insurgent groups in India, particularly within the state of Assam. It is found that the model of Mizo resolution has been influencing the peace process that came later. And also the strategy of negotiation has been evolving into incorporating civil society groups as signatories to the final peace settlement signed between insurgents and government. This analysis of the peace process is also based on the conceptualization developed from various authors.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42873732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2104297
S. van Baalen, Niels Terpstra
ABSTRACT This article examines the conditions that foster state-insurgent cooperation in rebel governance. State-insurgent cooperation is puzzling because it can alienate hardliners, undermine the parties’ legitimacy, reveal sensitive information, and cause autonomy losses. We propose that conflict parties are more likely to discount these costs when they have overlapping civilian constituencies with high governance provision expectations. Analysing rebel governance in Côte d’Ivoire and Sri Lanka using original data, we find that civilian expectations prompt cooperation even when the parties appeal to separate constituencies. The article nuances existing theories of rebel governance and contributes new knowledge on state-insurgent interactions in civil war.
{"title":"Behind enemy lines: State-insurgent cooperation on rebel governance in Côte d’Ivoire and Sri Lanka","authors":"S. van Baalen, Niels Terpstra","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2104297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2104297","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines the conditions that foster state-insurgent cooperation in rebel governance. State-insurgent cooperation is puzzling because it can alienate hardliners, undermine the parties’ legitimacy, reveal sensitive information, and cause autonomy losses. We propose that conflict parties are more likely to discount these costs when they have overlapping civilian constituencies with high governance provision expectations. Analysing rebel governance in Côte d’Ivoire and Sri Lanka using original data, we find that civilian expectations prompt cooperation even when the parties appeal to separate constituencies. The article nuances existing theories of rebel governance and contributes new knowledge on state-insurgent interactions in civil war.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48635823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2104298
Andrea Beccaro
ABSTRACT The paper focuses on how technology impacts on irregular conflicts, i.e. conflicts fought by non-state actors. The ability to inflict destruction and produce casualties is no longer directly related to the ability to organize large numbers of people and manage vast stores of resources that has been typical of large, organized state armies, and consequently smaller groups can now inflict more serious and extensive damage than their predecessors. It follows that the relationship between irregular fighters and technology is one of the most crucial elements in understanding contemporary conflicts. The paper is divided into five sections. The first is a brief paragraph focused on the definition problem, explaining why and how we use the term ‘irregular fighters’, and the second is a historical overview on how the relationship between ‘irregular fighters’ and technology has changed in the last two centuries. The third section is a study of current trends in the relationship between modern technology and current irregular warfare. The fourth section is intended to study current impacts of technology on irregular warfare, looking at ISIS’s operations in 2016–2017 and its use of drones. Finally, the conclusions section presents both lessons learned and findings.
{"title":"Non-state actors and modern technology","authors":"Andrea Beccaro","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2104298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2104298","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper focuses on how technology impacts on irregular conflicts, i.e. conflicts fought by non-state actors. The ability to inflict destruction and produce casualties is no longer directly related to the ability to organize large numbers of people and manage vast stores of resources that has been typical of large, organized state armies, and consequently smaller groups can now inflict more serious and extensive damage than their predecessors. It follows that the relationship between irregular fighters and technology is one of the most crucial elements in understanding contemporary conflicts. The paper is divided into five sections. The first is a brief paragraph focused on the definition problem, explaining why and how we use the term ‘irregular fighters’, and the second is a historical overview on how the relationship between ‘irregular fighters’ and technology has changed in the last two centuries. The third section is a study of current trends in the relationship between modern technology and current irregular warfare. The fourth section is intended to study current impacts of technology on irregular warfare, looking at ISIS’s operations in 2016–2017 and its use of drones. Finally, the conclusions section presents both lessons learned and findings.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44504969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-26DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2097399
A. Alijla
ABSTRACT When rebels and non-state actors provide services, do they have an effect on identities? The literature suggests that service provision by rebel’s influence identities, which affect post-conflict reconstruction and have some policy-implications on service provision. I argue that service provision has a potential effect on sub-identities and shape the preference of how people self-identify themselves. Based on a conjoint experiment in Gaza, I explore how Hamas’ governance has affected self-reported identities in the Gaza Strip after more than a decade of taking control of the Gaza Strip. The findings suggest that Hamas’s governance has influenced the self-reported identities in Gaza. It suggests that individuals with higher education, higher income and believes that Hamas provides less services tends to identify themselves in nationalistic sense as ‘Only Palestinian’, while individuals who identify themselves more as Muslims are less educated, have less income and more believes that Hamas provides more services than others.
{"title":"Thorny identity? Non-state actors, service provision, identities, and Hamas in Gaza","authors":"A. Alijla","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2097399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2097399","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT When rebels and non-state actors provide services, do they have an effect on identities? The literature suggests that service provision by rebel’s influence identities, which affect post-conflict reconstruction and have some policy-implications on service provision. I argue that service provision has a potential effect on sub-identities and shape the preference of how people self-identify themselves. Based on a conjoint experiment in Gaza, I explore how Hamas’ governance has affected self-reported identities in the Gaza Strip after more than a decade of taking control of the Gaza Strip. The findings suggest that Hamas’s governance has influenced the self-reported identities in Gaza. It suggests that individuals with higher education, higher income and believes that Hamas provides less services tends to identify themselves in nationalistic sense as ‘Only Palestinian’, while individuals who identify themselves more as Muslims are less educated, have less income and more believes that Hamas provides more services than others.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41542639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：