Pub Date : 2022-11-13DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2144000
H. Pfeifer, Regine Schwab
Abstract The introduction to the special issue starts from the observation that the political nature of rebel governance is so far understudied. Moving beyond the functionalism and instrumentalism inherent in parts of the literature, we propose a politicisation of the rebel governance paradigm through a spatial and temporal widening of analytical approaches. To address the methodological localism of existing research, rebel governance should be studied across actors and scales, as well as through their interlinkages. Taking time seriously, it also has to be investigated as a sequential phenomenon, at different conflict stages and with regard to its legacies in post-conflict settings.
{"title":"Politicising the rebel governance paradigm. Critical appraisal and expansion of a research agenda","authors":"H. Pfeifer, Regine Schwab","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2144000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2144000","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The introduction to the special issue starts from the observation that the political nature of rebel governance is so far understudied. Moving beyond the functionalism and instrumentalism inherent in parts of the literature, we propose a politicisation of the rebel governance paradigm through a spatial and temporal widening of analytical approaches. To address the methodological localism of existing research, rebel governance should be studied across actors and scales, as well as through their interlinkages. Taking time seriously, it also has to be investigated as a sequential phenomenon, at different conflict stages and with regard to its legacies in post-conflict settings.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44916702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-03DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2139130
Evert Kleynhans, Anri Delport
ABSTRACT In early 1922, in the wake of a global depression followed by rapidly deteriorating labour and economic conditions, several thousand white mine workers on the Witwatersrand in the Union of South Africa went on strike. These miners armed and organised themselves into commandos and took to the streets. During the opening phases of the unrest, these paramilitary units clashed with the South African Police. By the beginning of March, the strikes transformed into a violent insurrection with railway workers also joining its ranks after negotiations between the mine workers, mine owners, and the government failed and new militant leadership assumed command. As chaos and disorder engulfed large tracts of the Johannesburg goldfields and levels of violence assumed new proportions, the state’s legitimacy increasingly came under threat. In response, martial law was declared, and elements of the Union Defence Force were deployed to quell the so-called 1922 Rand Revolt. Historically unaccustomed to urban warfare and without an appropriate doctrine, the defence force became involved in several high-intensity urban counterinsurgency operations against the strike commandos. Drawing from a variety of archival material, this article investigates the combat operations undertaken by the UDF to suppress the 1922 Rand Revolt.
{"title":"Urban counterinsurgency: the Union Defence Force and the suppression of the 1922 Rand Revolt","authors":"Evert Kleynhans, Anri Delport","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2139130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2139130","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In early 1922, in the wake of a global depression followed by rapidly deteriorating labour and economic conditions, several thousand white mine workers on the Witwatersrand in the Union of South Africa went on strike. These miners armed and organised themselves into commandos and took to the streets. During the opening phases of the unrest, these paramilitary units clashed with the South African Police. By the beginning of March, the strikes transformed into a violent insurrection with railway workers also joining its ranks after negotiations between the mine workers, mine owners, and the government failed and new militant leadership assumed command. As chaos and disorder engulfed large tracts of the Johannesburg goldfields and levels of violence assumed new proportions, the state’s legitimacy increasingly came under threat. In response, martial law was declared, and elements of the Union Defence Force were deployed to quell the so-called 1922 Rand Revolt. Historically unaccustomed to urban warfare and without an appropriate doctrine, the defence force became involved in several high-intensity urban counterinsurgency operations against the strike commandos. Drawing from a variety of archival material, this article investigates the combat operations undertaken by the UDF to suppress the 1922 Rand Revolt.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42381380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2136922
K. Roy
ABSTRACT Sikh dominance in the Indian military started under the British in the late nineteenth century. The Sikh insurgency which rocked Punjab in the 1980s remains independent India’s most serious internal rebellion. In fact, the warrior ethos and military martyrdom in the Sikh community could be traced back to the precolonial era. This essay traces the history of the evolution of Khalsa’s military culture. I argue that the Sikhs were already a ‘martial race’ like the Marathas, Rajputs and the Gurkhas before the British imperial conquest. By making a case study of Sikh insurgency against the Mughal Empire, this essay shows that insurgency serves as a major educational and military mobilising tool in the creation of martial cultures/races.
{"title":"Sikh insurgency in pre-British India: origin, context and legacies","authors":"K. Roy","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2136922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2136922","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Sikh dominance in the Indian military started under the British in the late nineteenth century. The Sikh insurgency which rocked Punjab in the 1980s remains independent India’s most serious internal rebellion. In fact, the warrior ethos and military martyrdom in the Sikh community could be traced back to the precolonial era. This essay traces the history of the evolution of Khalsa’s military culture. I argue that the Sikhs were already a ‘martial race’ like the Marathas, Rajputs and the Gurkhas before the British imperial conquest. By making a case study of Sikh insurgency against the Mughal Empire, this essay shows that insurgency serves as a major educational and military mobilising tool in the creation of martial cultures/races.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48713498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-28DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2138258
A. Wessels
ABSTRACT The year 1901 saw an upsurge in Boer guerrilla and concomitant British counterinsurgency operations during the Anglo-Boer (South African) War of 1899 to 1902 – especially in the wake of the failed Middelburg peace negotiations. One hundred and twenty years later, it is appropriate that these events should be revisited. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the Boer guerrilla and British counterinsurgency operations, including events in the Cape Colony, where the conflict had grave implications for the local white, brown and black inhabitants, who were caught up between the British and Boer forces, and where in certain areas of the war zone, a civil war was fought. The reactions and views of Lord Kitchener, the British Commander-in-Chief, receive particular attention, as he tried to bring the war to a close as soon as possible, and in the process laying waste to large areas of the war zone, thanks to the scorched-earth policy implemented by the British Army in South Africa.
{"title":"A Historical Overview of Boer Guerrilla and British Counterinsurgency Operations During the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902","authors":"A. Wessels","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2138258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2138258","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The year 1901 saw an upsurge in Boer guerrilla and concomitant British counterinsurgency operations during the Anglo-Boer (South African) War of 1899 to 1902 – especially in the wake of the failed Middelburg peace negotiations. One hundred and twenty years later, it is appropriate that these events should be revisited. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the Boer guerrilla and British counterinsurgency operations, including events in the Cape Colony, where the conflict had grave implications for the local white, brown and black inhabitants, who were caught up between the British and Boer forces, and where in certain areas of the war zone, a civil war was fought. The reactions and views of Lord Kitchener, the British Commander-in-Chief, receive particular attention, as he tried to bring the war to a close as soon as possible, and in the process laying waste to large areas of the war zone, thanks to the scorched-earth policy implemented by the British Army in South Africa.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46102042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-16DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2127296
B. Noordam
ABSTRACT Many of the non-Chinese minorities inhabiting the south-western regions of the Ming empire (1368-1644) rebelled during the course of the dynasty’s existence, including the Miao, who at the end of the sixteenth century launched an uprising under the leadership of Yang Yinglong (1551-1600). The uprising and the resulting insurgency were eventually suppressed under the leadership of two civil officials, Guo Zizhang (1543-1618) and Li Hualong (1554-1611). During the early dynasty forceful suppression by the military together with the generous offering of amnesties and rewards to induce peaceful surrender had constituted the strategy for dealing with minority insurgencies. In contrast, civil officials, like Neo-Confucian thinker Wang Yangming (1472-1529), conceptualized mixed policies emphasizing moral exhortations and social engineering, in combination with military force using advanced technologies, as integrated solutions to the problem in the course of the sixteenth century. This paper will look at the extent to which these mixed policies were advocated and applied, and their relative measures of success.
{"title":"Heart-minds and harquebuses: the Bozhou rebellion in China (1587-1600)","authors":"B. Noordam","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2127296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2127296","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Many of the non-Chinese minorities inhabiting the south-western regions of the Ming empire (1368-1644) rebelled during the course of the dynasty’s existence, including the Miao, who at the end of the sixteenth century launched an uprising under the leadership of Yang Yinglong (1551-1600). The uprising and the resulting insurgency were eventually suppressed under the leadership of two civil officials, Guo Zizhang (1543-1618) and Li Hualong (1554-1611). During the early dynasty forceful suppression by the military together with the generous offering of amnesties and rewards to induce peaceful surrender had constituted the strategy for dealing with minority insurgencies. In contrast, civil officials, like Neo-Confucian thinker Wang Yangming (1472-1529), conceptualized mixed policies emphasizing moral exhortations and social engineering, in combination with military force using advanced technologies, as integrated solutions to the problem in the course of the sixteenth century. This paper will look at the extent to which these mixed policies were advocated and applied, and their relative measures of success.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47571222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-11DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2131285
C. R. Okoli, B. Nwosu, Francis N. Okpaleke, Ezenwa E. Olumba
ABSTRACT Idris Déby’s counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the Sahel crafted imaginaries of Déby as a bulwark against terrorism in the region. Existing scholarship argues that Deby's death has accentuated insecurity in the region. The study adopts critical analysis and is anchored in the theory of security regionalism; it argues that the politics of Déby as a regional strongman constricted democratic spaces, invited violent opposition, and sustained rebellion in parts of the region. Although Déby provided occasional pushback when the terrorists inflicted harm on Chadian interests, he would not have won the war against terror unilaterally without regional cooperation.
{"title":"Security in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel region after Idris Déby","authors":"C. R. Okoli, B. Nwosu, Francis N. Okpaleke, Ezenwa E. Olumba","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2131285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2131285","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Idris Déby’s counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the Sahel crafted imaginaries of Déby as a bulwark against terrorism in the region. Existing scholarship argues that Deby's death has accentuated insecurity in the region. The study adopts critical analysis and is anchored in the theory of security regionalism; it argues that the politics of Déby as a regional strongman constricted democratic spaces, invited violent opposition, and sustained rebellion in parts of the region. Although Déby provided occasional pushback when the terrorists inflicted harm on Chadian interests, he would not have won the war against terror unilaterally without regional cooperation.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48933038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-08DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2119695
René Geyer
ABSTRACT The first internal deployment of the Union Defence Force (UDF) since its inception in 1912 was to suppress a violent labour strike in January 1914. Because the inexperienced UDF was still assimilating various British and Boer military traditions, the Permanent Force was not yet sufficiently organised to quell the strike on its own. Therefore, the commandos of the Citizen Force Reserve were deployed. The traditional commando system of the former Boer republics and the Transvaal Colony was thus briefly revived to subdue the strike, in the unstable and complex South African socio-economic environment of 1914. This operation marked the end of the Boer commando system in its established format. It formed part of a vanishing military culture and was destined to be replaced by the modernising military systems of the early twentieth century. The deployment of burghers during the strike sets the background against which the article investigates both the customary and changing nature of military service for the long-established commandos. This article explores the conditions, abilities, and experiences of the ‘burghers’ on commando that participated in the crushing of the strike from a social-military history perspective.
{"title":"The 1914 South African industrial strike: the first internal deployment of the Union Defence Force","authors":"René Geyer","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2119695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2119695","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The first internal deployment of the Union Defence Force (UDF) since its inception in 1912 was to suppress a violent labour strike in January 1914. Because the inexperienced UDF was still assimilating various British and Boer military traditions, the Permanent Force was not yet sufficiently organised to quell the strike on its own. Therefore, the commandos of the Citizen Force Reserve were deployed. The traditional commando system of the former Boer republics and the Transvaal Colony was thus briefly revived to subdue the strike, in the unstable and complex South African socio-economic environment of 1914. This operation marked the end of the Boer commando system in its established format. It formed part of a vanishing military culture and was destined to be replaced by the modernising military systems of the early twentieth century. The deployment of burghers during the strike sets the background against which the article investigates both the customary and changing nature of military service for the long-established commandos. This article explores the conditions, abilities, and experiences of the ‘burghers’ on commando that participated in the crushing of the strike from a social-military history perspective.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48823608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-03DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2120299
Phil J. S. Williams
ABSTRACT Several factors militated against successful counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, but the real failure was a failure of governance. The US and its allies created a central government which proved extremely powerful at resource extraction while dismally weak at service provision, Development aid, the opium economy and the lack of political accountability created new forms of highly pernicious corruption, akin to those in many African states. The result was that legitimacy of the Afghan government was eroded, thereby setting the scene for a Taliban victory. The article concludes with three lessons from Afghanistan for the future.
{"title":"US intervention in Afghanistan and the failure of governance","authors":"Phil J. S. Williams","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2120299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2120299","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Several factors militated against successful counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, but the real failure was a failure of governance. The US and its allies created a central government which proved extremely powerful at resource extraction while dismally weak at service provision, Development aid, the opium economy and the lack of political accountability created new forms of highly pernicious corruption, akin to those in many African states. The result was that legitimacy of the Afghan government was eroded, thereby setting the scene for a Taliban victory. The article concludes with three lessons from Afghanistan for the future.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47786370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-03DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2118417
Zahid Ullah
ABSTRACT After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, a Pakistan spy chief told journalists in Kabul: ‘don’t worry, everything will be okay’ in Afghanistan. What is interesting to note in this assertion is that Pakistan had consistently been accused of playing a ‘double game’ in the war on terror since 2001. This paper examines the return of the Taliban and Pakistan’s role in their victory in August-2021. In particular, it addresses the following questions: Why are Pakistan-Afghanistan relations so fraught? What is the pattern of Pakistan’s influence over the Afghan Taliban? How different is the post- 2021 Taliban regime from its Taliban predecessors (1996–2001)? What might the long-term implications of the Taliban victory be for Pakistan? This paper employs the security-cum-rentier state framework to explain Pakistan’s double game in the war on terror. Moreover, this paper aims to situate and contextualize the situation in Afghanistan (2001–2021) in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry, i.e. Quad/ Indo-Pacific Strategy (West) versus the Belt and Road Initiative (China). Methodologically, this study is based on secondary sources and some primary sources (official documents).
{"title":"Contextualising the Taliban redux (2021): is the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan a Pyrrhic Victory for Pakistan?","authors":"Zahid Ullah","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2118417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2118417","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, a Pakistan spy chief told journalists in Kabul: ‘don’t worry, everything will be okay’ in Afghanistan. What is interesting to note in this assertion is that Pakistan had consistently been accused of playing a ‘double game’ in the war on terror since 2001. This paper examines the return of the Taliban and Pakistan’s role in their victory in August-2021. In particular, it addresses the following questions: Why are Pakistan-Afghanistan relations so fraught? What is the pattern of Pakistan’s influence over the Afghan Taliban? How different is the post- 2021 Taliban regime from its Taliban predecessors (1996–2001)? What might the long-term implications of the Taliban victory be for Pakistan? This paper employs the security-cum-rentier state framework to explain Pakistan’s double game in the war on terror. Moreover, this paper aims to situate and contextualize the situation in Afghanistan (2001–2021) in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry, i.e. Quad/ Indo-Pacific Strategy (West) versus the Belt and Road Initiative (China). Methodologically, this study is based on secondary sources and some primary sources (official documents).","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46917663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-29DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2128279
F. Monama
ABSTRACT In September 1939, when the Union of South Africa entered what became the Second World War, the country was confronted with wide-spread political dissent and anti-war resistance which threatened internal security and stability. Incidents of violence, sabotage, riots, bomb explosions, cutting of tele-communication lines and constant militarism designed to thwart the country’s war effort were reported. These incidents were perpetuated by the disaffected radical Afrikaner nationalists who opposed the Union’s war policy, particularly the militant Ossewabrandwag (OB) led by Dr Johannes Frederik Janse (Hans) van Rensburg, in collaboration with Nazi espionage agents. The government of General Jan Christiaan Smuts implemented multi-faceted security arrangements, which included passing the War Measures Act, unleashing the security services and adopting the internment policy to subdue the militants and preserve internal security. This article examines the development of anti-war resistance and militarism in the Union and reflects on the counter-subversive efforts by the Smuts government to preserve internal security during the Second World War. Ultimately, given the magnitude of the anti-war destabilisation campaign, this analysis illustrates how and why the Smuts government survived a two-front war and managed to sustain the war effort.
摘要1939年9月，当南非联盟进入第二次世界大战时，该国面临着广泛的政治异见和反战抵抗，这威胁到了国内安全与稳定。据报道，发生了暴力、破坏、暴乱、炸弹爆炸、切断电信线路和持续的军国主义事件，目的是挫败该国的战争努力。这些事件是由心怀不满的激进南非白人民族主义者造成的，他们反对联盟的战争政策，特别是由Johannes Frederik Janse（Hans）van Rensburg博士领导的激进的Ossewabrandwag（OB）与纳粹间谍合作。Jan Christiaan Smuts将军的政府实施了多方面的安全安排，其中包括通过《战争措施法》、释放安全部门以及采取拘留政策，以制服武装分子并维护内部安全。本文考察了联邦反战抵抗和军国主义的发展，并反思了第二次世界大战期间斯穆特政府为维护国内安全所做的反颠覆努力。最终，考虑到反战破坏稳定运动的规模，这一分析说明了斯穆特政府是如何以及为什么在两线战争中幸存下来，并设法维持战争努力的。
{"title":"Enemy within the gates: militarism, sabotage, subversion and counter-subversion in South Africa, 1939-1945","authors":"F. Monama","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2128279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2128279","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In September 1939, when the Union of South Africa entered what became the Second World War, the country was confronted with wide-spread political dissent and anti-war resistance which threatened internal security and stability. Incidents of violence, sabotage, riots, bomb explosions, cutting of tele-communication lines and constant militarism designed to thwart the country’s war effort were reported. These incidents were perpetuated by the disaffected radical Afrikaner nationalists who opposed the Union’s war policy, particularly the militant Ossewabrandwag (OB) led by Dr Johannes Frederik Janse (Hans) van Rensburg, in collaboration with Nazi espionage agents. The government of General Jan Christiaan Smuts implemented multi-faceted security arrangements, which included passing the War Measures Act, unleashing the security services and adopting the internment policy to subdue the militants and preserve internal security. This article examines the development of anti-war resistance and militarism in the Union and reflects on the counter-subversive efforts by the Smuts government to preserve internal security during the Second World War. Ultimately, given the magnitude of the anti-war destabilisation campaign, this analysis illustrates how and why the Smuts government survived a two-front war and managed to sustain the war effort.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45947063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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