Pub Date : 2023-02-17DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2182580
Paul B. Rich
This special issue explores a neglected dimension in the wide-ranging historiography of twentieth century South Africa: the evolution of the state and its security arm in the form of the police and the military in a context of resistance by a variety of insurgent and rebel formations at the local level. The issue covers the period from the South African War (otherwise known as the Anglo Boer War) of 1899–1902 to the advent of apartheid in 1948. South African historiography has usually approached instances of rebellion and resistance on a case-by-case basis and proved reluctant to integrate military factors into a broader perspective focused on the expansion and consolidation of state power. This neglect might appear, at first hand, to be somewhat puzzling given the centrality of military factors in the shaping of South African history: the period from 1900 to 1948, for instance, includes varying degrees of South African engagement in three cases of total war while the later political transition from white minority rule in 1994 came in the wake of a limited war fought on South Africa’s sub-imperial frontier of Angola and Namibia. The lack of historical focus on military themes clearly requires some explanation: one which can be found, it shall be argued here, in the indifference, if not hostility, of many historians over the decades to the study of South African military history. The reasons for the indifference are complex but relate in part to the way South African academic history has been shaped. The period from the early 1970s to mid-1990s was one of intense debate between rival groups of liberal and Marxist (sometimes called revisionist) historians on the forces behind racial segregation, apartheid and the genesis and evolution of South Africa’s capitalist economy. A pattern emerged from this, comparable to those in some other historical contexts, when questions concerning the impact of
{"title":"Insurgency, counter-insurgency, and the military and security dimensions of South African racial segregation","authors":"Paul B. Rich","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2182580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2182580","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue explores a neglected dimension in the wide-ranging historiography of twentieth century South Africa: the evolution of the state and its security arm in the form of the police and the military in a context of resistance by a variety of insurgent and rebel formations at the local level. The issue covers the period from the South African War (otherwise known as the Anglo Boer War) of 1899–1902 to the advent of apartheid in 1948. South African historiography has usually approached instances of rebellion and resistance on a case-by-case basis and proved reluctant to integrate military factors into a broader perspective focused on the expansion and consolidation of state power. This neglect might appear, at first hand, to be somewhat puzzling given the centrality of military factors in the shaping of South African history: the period from 1900 to 1948, for instance, includes varying degrees of South African engagement in three cases of total war while the later political transition from white minority rule in 1994 came in the wake of a limited war fought on South Africa’s sub-imperial frontier of Angola and Namibia. The lack of historical focus on military themes clearly requires some explanation: one which can be found, it shall be argued here, in the indifference, if not hostility, of many historians over the decades to the study of South African military history. The reasons for the indifference are complex but relate in part to the way South African academic history has been shaped. The period from the early 1970s to mid-1990s was one of intense debate between rival groups of liberal and Marxist (sometimes called revisionist) historians on the forces behind racial segregation, apartheid and the genesis and evolution of South Africa’s capitalist economy. A pattern emerged from this, comparable to those in some other historical contexts, when questions concerning the impact of","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"520 - 540"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42538911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2175529
H. Królikowski
ABSTRACT After regaining independence in 1918, Poland faced many fundamental and strategic challenges. One of them was the issue of border crossings on the German-Polish border in Silesia. It was a region dominated by modern heavy industry, to which both the modern states laid claim. The course of the border was to be decided by a plebiscite, but the parties to the conflict resorted to violence and military means. In a complicated international situation and without the possibility of open military intervention, Poland effectively used the strategic tool of special operations – known more widely today as unconventional warfare. Thanks to their skillful application, the German military advantage was effectively eliminated and strategic goals were achieved. Poles effectively cut lines of communication, making it impossible to support pro-German organizations in Silesia, and successfully organized insurgent forces that achieved the goals important for Poland’s development policy. This paper tells the story of a special mission unit called the Destruction Group ‘Wawelberg’ and its use as a tool for implementing the state policy of unconventional warfare during the Third Silesian Uprising.
{"title":"‘Destructors’ in action, support for insurgents: case study of the Third Silesian Uprising","authors":"H. Królikowski","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2175529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2175529","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT After regaining independence in 1918, Poland faced many fundamental and strategic challenges. One of them was the issue of border crossings on the German-Polish border in Silesia. It was a region dominated by modern heavy industry, to which both the modern states laid claim. The course of the border was to be decided by a plebiscite, but the parties to the conflict resorted to violence and military means. In a complicated international situation and without the possibility of open military intervention, Poland effectively used the strategic tool of special operations – known more widely today as unconventional warfare. Thanks to their skillful application, the German military advantage was effectively eliminated and strategic goals were achieved. Poles effectively cut lines of communication, making it impossible to support pro-German organizations in Silesia, and successfully organized insurgent forces that achieved the goals important for Poland’s development policy. This paper tells the story of a special mission unit called the Destruction Group ‘Wawelberg’ and its use as a tool for implementing the state policy of unconventional warfare during the Third Silesian Uprising.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"853 - 881"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41597192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-14DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2167454
Antonio Garcia, Evert Kleynhans
The idea of counterinsurgency, and for that matter irregular warfare, along with its accompanying terminology, occupies a contested space in South African history. This is the argument put forward by Deane-Peter Baker and Mark O’Neil, who posit that the people of South Africa suffered at the hands of counterinsurgent forces throughout the colonial period and well into the twentieth century. This is framed in the political context of fighting for change, where various cultural groups in South Africa successfully utilised irregular or guerrilla tactics in their protracted resistance against colonial encroachment and subjugation. Some major examples, among others, in this regard include: the Khoikhoi–Dutch Wars (1659–1677), the British operations against the Xhosa during the Cape Frontier Wars (1779–1879), the subjugation of the South African interior following the Great Trek (1836c.1876), the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), the First Anglo-Boer War (1880– 1881), the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), and the broader liberation struggle in South Africa that occurred throughout most of the twentieth century up until the advent of democracy in 1994. The negative connotations associated with counterinsurgent forces in South Africa, who found themselves on the wrong side of history, are directly associated with colonialism and their oppression and subjugation of the people. This perhaps helps to explain the evident gap in the South African historiography in research related to this contested topic. In general, interest in South African counterinsurgency directly correlates with the duration of the so-called Border War (1966–1989) in Namibia. During this period, the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) counterinsurgency operations were primarily directed against the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and its People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The SADF also gradually became involved in several cross-border operations
反叛乱的概念，以及非正规战争的概念，以及随之而来的术语，在南非历史上占据了一个有争议的空间。这是Deane-Peter Baker和Mark O 'Neil提出的论点，他们认为南非人民在整个殖民时期和进入20世纪都饱受反叛乱部队之苦。这是在争取变革的政治背景下形成的，南非的各种文化团体在长期抵抗殖民侵占和征服时成功地利用了非正规或游击战术。这方面的一些主要例子包括:科伊科伊-荷兰战争(1659-1677)，英国在开普边境战争(1779-1879)期间对科萨人的行动，在大跋涉(1836 - 1876)之后对南非内陆的征服，盎格鲁-祖鲁战争(1879)，第一次盎格鲁-布尔战争(1880 - 1881)，第二次盎格鲁-布尔战争(1899-1902)，以及在南非发生的更广泛的解放斗争，整个20世纪的大部分时间，直到1994年民主的到来。南非反叛乱部队发现自己站在历史错误的一边，与之相关的负面含义与殖民主义及其对人民的压迫和征服直接相关。这也许有助于解释南非史学在与这个有争议的话题相关的研究中存在明显的差距。总的来说，对南非反叛乱的兴趣与纳米比亚所谓的边境战争(1966-1989)的持续时间直接相关。在此期间，南非国防军(SADF)的反叛乱行动主要针对西南非洲人民组织(SWAPO)及其纳米比亚人民解放军(PLAN)。南非国防军也逐渐参与了几次跨境行动
{"title":"The evolution of resistance and counterinsurgency in the South African state, 1899-1948","authors":"Antonio Garcia, Evert Kleynhans","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2167454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2167454","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of counterinsurgency, and for that matter irregular warfare, along with its accompanying terminology, occupies a contested space in South African history. This is the argument put forward by Deane-Peter Baker and Mark O’Neil, who posit that the people of South Africa suffered at the hands of counterinsurgent forces throughout the colonial period and well into the twentieth century. This is framed in the political context of fighting for change, where various cultural groups in South Africa successfully utilised irregular or guerrilla tactics in their protracted resistance against colonial encroachment and subjugation. Some major examples, among others, in this regard include: the Khoikhoi–Dutch Wars (1659–1677), the British operations against the Xhosa during the Cape Frontier Wars (1779–1879), the subjugation of the South African interior following the Great Trek (1836c.1876), the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), the First Anglo-Boer War (1880– 1881), the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), and the broader liberation struggle in South Africa that occurred throughout most of the twentieth century up until the advent of democracy in 1994. The negative connotations associated with counterinsurgent forces in South Africa, who found themselves on the wrong side of history, are directly associated with colonialism and their oppression and subjugation of the people. This perhaps helps to explain the evident gap in the South African historiography in research related to this contested topic. In general, interest in South African counterinsurgency directly correlates with the duration of the so-called Border War (1966–1989) in Namibia. During this period, the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) counterinsurgency operations were primarily directed against the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and its People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The SADF also gradually became involved in several cross-border operations","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"317 - 327"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42462698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2158615
M. Stewart
ABSTRACT The contributors to this special issue have put forth a research agenda that centers the politics of civil war, in contrast to what the introduction presents as the dominant rationalist paradigm. This paper anchors the special issue by first synthesizing the works contained therein. In particular, the articles in this issue focus on how individual and collective identity, networks and orders, and learning or socialization from previous experiences shape behaviors during and after conflict. Next, the conclusion to this special issue aims to move forward a perspective of civil wars that takes seriously the political in civil war by building upon the works contained in this collection and presenting a number of avenues for future research. In particular, this article advocates for taking seriously how individual experiences, identities, and relationships embedded within broader social processes shape and co-constitute civil war dynamics.
{"title":"Identity, networks, and learning in the study of rebel governance","authors":"M. Stewart","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2158615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2158615","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The contributors to this special issue have put forth a research agenda that centers the politics of civil war, in contrast to what the introduction presents as the dominant rationalist paradigm. This paper anchors the special issue by first synthesizing the works contained therein. In particular, the articles in this issue focus on how individual and collective identity, networks and orders, and learning or socialization from previous experiences shape behaviors during and after conflict. Next, the conclusion to this special issue aims to move forward a perspective of civil wars that takes seriously the political in civil war by building upon the works contained in this collection and presenting a number of avenues for future research. In particular, this article advocates for taking seriously how individual experiences, identities, and relationships embedded within broader social processes shape and co-constitute civil war dynamics.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"305 - 315"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46488978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-22DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2159738
R. Snyder
ABSTRACT The conventional view has been that Trump and Biden made the correct decision to withdraw the US from Afghanistan, but the actual departure was flawed. On the contrary, the US should not have withdrawn and the actual departure was not a failure. The withdrawal was against the US’ larger strategic interests beyond counterterrorism. If it withdrew, it should not have done so unconditionally, for both its interests (including humanitarian) and assets were substantial. The US should not have negotiated with the Taliban absent the Afghan government, thereby undermining the government’s and its security forces’ will to fight. Thus, the success of the Taliban’s revolution owed more to the Afghan government’s collapse than its revolutionary mobilization. In withdrawing from Afghanistan, the US showed that it failed to learn lessons from its withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which led to internal political decay in Iraq, the re-emergence of terrorism, and larger strategic setbacks for Washington. More broadly, the US failed to appreciate how its withdrawal of support for regimes dependent on it often facilitates the coming to power of hostile revolutionary movements.
{"title":"‘The Fall of Afghanistan: An American Tragedy’","authors":"R. Snyder","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2159738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2159738","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The conventional view has been that Trump and Biden made the correct decision to withdraw the US from Afghanistan, but the actual departure was flawed. On the contrary, the US should not have withdrawn and the actual departure was not a failure. The withdrawal was against the US’ larger strategic interests beyond counterterrorism. If it withdrew, it should not have done so unconditionally, for both its interests (including humanitarian) and assets were substantial. The US should not have negotiated with the Taliban absent the Afghan government, thereby undermining the government’s and its security forces’ will to fight. Thus, the success of the Taliban’s revolution owed more to the Afghan government’s collapse than its revolutionary mobilization. In withdrawing from Afghanistan, the US showed that it failed to learn lessons from its withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which led to internal political decay in Iraq, the re-emergence of terrorism, and larger strategic setbacks for Washington. More broadly, the US failed to appreciate how its withdrawal of support for regimes dependent on it often facilitates the coming to power of hostile revolutionary movements.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"747 - 758"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44996156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-08DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2153468
A. M. Fokkens
ABSTRACT Mandume ya Ndemufayo, the last king of the Oukwanyama, resisted the subjugation of his people by colonial powers. To the Portuguese, Germans, and South Africans (and other missionaries), he was a recalcitrant, bloodthirsty, and murderous despot. But to the people of Namibia and Angola, he is a hero of the African people, with permanent remembrance at the Namibian National Heroes’ Acre, a university named after him in the City of Lubango, with street names, monuments, and memorials commemorating his acts of resistance against colonial rule. His demise at the hands of the Ovamboland Expeditionary Force on 6 February 1917 is the archetypal story of the colonial period in Africa – and elsewhere – that opposition to colonial rule was not tolerated and subdued, forcefully if necessary. European interests, along with superior firepower, facilitated the subjugation of many indigenous populations. It was no different in Ovamboland, yet in a period where kingdoms were tumbling, the Oukwanyama resisted.
{"title":"The ovamboland expedition of 1917: the deposing of King Mandume","authors":"A. M. Fokkens","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2153468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2153468","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mandume ya Ndemufayo, the last king of the Oukwanyama, resisted the subjugation of his people by colonial powers. To the Portuguese, Germans, and South Africans (and other missionaries), he was a recalcitrant, bloodthirsty, and murderous despot. But to the people of Namibia and Angola, he is a hero of the African people, with permanent remembrance at the Namibian National Heroes’ Acre, a university named after him in the City of Lubango, with street names, monuments, and memorials commemorating his acts of resistance against colonial rule. His demise at the hands of the Ovamboland Expeditionary Force on 6 February 1917 is the archetypal story of the colonial period in Africa – and elsewhere – that opposition to colonial rule was not tolerated and subdued, forcefully if necessary. European interests, along with superior firepower, facilitated the subjugation of many indigenous populations. It was no different in Ovamboland, yet in a period where kingdoms were tumbling, the Oukwanyama resisted.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"382 - 421"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44865430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-06DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2154435
H. Akins
ABSTRACT Within British India, the police were used to suppress challenges to colonial authority. Yet, police actions in fulfilling this role varied by region. Within the provinces, the police were a coercive force to enforce internal security, augmenting military efforts. On the frontier, the aim of the police was to integrate locals into the local security framework and weld their interests to government control, rather than the direct application of force. Relying on Indian archival records, this comparative analysis demonstrates the importance of considering this variation for a more complete understanding of the strategic logic of colonial policing.
{"title":"The strategic logic of policing in British India","authors":"H. Akins","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2154435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2154435","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Within British India, the police were used to suppress challenges to colonial authority. Yet, police actions in fulfilling this role varied by region. Within the provinces, the police were a coercive force to enforce internal security, augmenting military efforts. On the frontier, the aim of the police was to integrate locals into the local security framework and weld their interests to government control, rather than the direct application of force. Relying on Indian archival records, this comparative analysis demonstrates the importance of considering this variation for a more complete understanding of the strategic logic of colonial policing.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"828 - 852"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45774375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-05DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2152628
Tiina Hyyppä
ABSTRACT While scholars have focused on rebel governance in Syria and elsewhere, other forms of governance have been neglected. This article explores the local council established in the rebel-held city of Daraya, Syria. It informs the fields of rebel governance and civil resistance, specifically wartime order, during civil wars and proposes that the forms and practices of local governance in Daraya exhibited a type of governance best labelled as ‘civilocracy’. In contrast to councils in other opposition-held parts of Syria, the council was established and led by civilians who welcomed rebels to work with them. Based on findings from in-depth, semi-structured interviews with former council members, the article finds that four factors were crucial for this form of governance to emerge and to endure. Key wartime events – a massacre and a siege –, earlier experiences of nonviolent activists, local ties, and the creation of a military office created a space for the maintenance of civil-led order. Daraya offers a fascinating example of how community’s norms affected how rebel governance was created and maintained. This research introduces a new concept to explain wartime order and encourages researchers to find causal explanations for the emergence of this particular governance form in other conflicts.
{"title":"Council in war: civilocracy, order and local organisation in daraya during the Syrian War","authors":"Tiina Hyyppä","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2152628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2152628","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While scholars have focused on rebel governance in Syria and elsewhere, other forms of governance have been neglected. This article explores the local council established in the rebel-held city of Daraya, Syria. It informs the fields of rebel governance and civil resistance, specifically wartime order, during civil wars and proposes that the forms and practices of local governance in Daraya exhibited a type of governance best labelled as ‘civilocracy’. In contrast to councils in other opposition-held parts of Syria, the council was established and led by civilians who welcomed rebels to work with them. Based on findings from in-depth, semi-structured interviews with former council members, the article finds that four factors were crucial for this form of governance to emerge and to endure. Key wartime events – a massacre and a siege –, earlier experiences of nonviolent activists, local ties, and the creation of a military office created a space for the maintenance of civil-led order. Daraya offers a fascinating example of how community’s norms affected how rebel governance was created and maintained. This research introduces a new concept to explain wartime order and encourages researchers to find causal explanations for the emergence of this particular governance form in other conflicts.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"52 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46117541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-20DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2117824
Solveig Richter, Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal
ABSTRACT In the academic literature, it is widely accepted that one of the most difficult steps in a peace process is the reincorporation of former combatants. Colombia is a case in point. After the peace agreement with the former rebel group FARC-EP in 2016, the reintegration process of more than 13.000 ex-combatants has been marred with difficulties, be it half-hearted implementation of the stipulations of the accord from the side of the government or the re-armament of some dissident groups. However, the dynamics of the peace process differ considerably between the national and the local level, offering a wide range of pathways from even more violent confrontation up to successful reincorporation projects. In order to explain this variety, we integrate DDR and rebel governance studies and assume that socio-political orders need to be re-configurated when rebel groups have established strong forms of rebel governance, as was the case with the FARC-EP. We argue that patterns of interaction between local conflict-affected communities and ex-combatants are the key explanatory variables for the dynamics of peace processes at local level. We differentiate between clustered and entrenched post-war orders and demonstrate our argument with two case studies based on comprehensive field research.
{"title":"Dynamics of peace or legacy of rebel governance? Patterns of cooperation between FARC-ex-combatants and conflict-affected communities in Colombia","authors":"Solveig Richter, Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2117824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2117824","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the academic literature, it is widely accepted that one of the most difficult steps in a peace process is the reincorporation of former combatants. Colombia is a case in point. After the peace agreement with the former rebel group FARC-EP in 2016, the reintegration process of more than 13.000 ex-combatants has been marred with difficulties, be it half-hearted implementation of the stipulations of the accord from the side of the government or the re-armament of some dissident groups. However, the dynamics of the peace process differ considerably between the national and the local level, offering a wide range of pathways from even more violent confrontation up to successful reincorporation projects. In order to explain this variety, we integrate DDR and rebel governance studies and assume that socio-political orders need to be re-configurated when rebel groups have established strong forms of rebel governance, as was the case with the FARC-EP. We argue that patterns of interaction between local conflict-affected communities and ex-combatants are the key explanatory variables for the dynamics of peace processes at local level. We differentiate between clustered and entrenched post-war orders and demonstrate our argument with two case studies based on comprehensive field research.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"165 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42605781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-16DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2137282
Tim Glawion, Anne-Clémence Le Noan
ABSTRACT Rebel governance assumes a symbiotic relationship between coercion and public goods provision. However, in the rebel-held town of Ndélé, Central African Republic, we find that governance happens in rebel-held territory, but rarely by rebels. Rebels allowed other actors to provide services for the people only when this did not hinder rebels extracting political clout and economic benefit from the people and their lands. We show how rebels’ extractive ambitions and governance discourses evolved during successive stages of rebellion through a diachronic comparison rooted in multimethod fieldwork from 2018 to 2022. We ask, why were rebel groups able to set up their rule, then rule for seven years, before ultimately losing power? Rebels evoked public goods at the onset of rebellion to justify the use of coercive means. After rebel rule was established, rebels outsourced public goods to international and state actors allowing for governance in rebel-held territory while focussing their own efforts on extraction. When their rule was challenged, rebels targeted governance actors and spaces in their territory in pursuit of economic gain and political dominance. Our findings call for a re-evaluation of existing rebel governance studies and the ways in which rebel groups are engaged with.
{"title":"Rebel governance or governance in rebel territory? Extraction and services in Ndélé, Central African republic","authors":"Tim Glawion, Anne-Clémence Le Noan","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2137282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2137282","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Rebel governance assumes a symbiotic relationship between coercion and public goods provision. However, in the rebel-held town of Ndélé, Central African Republic, we find that governance happens in rebel-held territory, but rarely by rebels. Rebels allowed other actors to provide services for the people only when this did not hinder rebels extracting political clout and economic benefit from the people and their lands. We show how rebels’ extractive ambitions and governance discourses evolved during successive stages of rebellion through a diachronic comparison rooted in multimethod fieldwork from 2018 to 2022. We ask, why were rebel groups able to set up their rule, then rule for seven years, before ultimately losing power? Rebels evoked public goods at the onset of rebellion to justify the use of coercive means. After rebel rule was established, rebels outsourced public goods to international and state actors allowing for governance in rebel-held territory while focussing their own efforts on extraction. When their rule was challenged, rebels targeted governance actors and spaces in their territory in pursuit of economic gain and political dominance. Our findings call for a re-evaluation of existing rebel governance studies and the ways in which rebel groups are engaged with.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"34 1","pages":"24 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45667070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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