Pub Date : 2022-09-16DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000460
Jia Qing Yap, Ernest Lim
Abstract Clear understanding of artificial intelligence (AI) usage risks and how they are being addressed is needed, which requires proper and adequate corporate disclosure. We advance a legal framework for AI Fairness Reporting to which companies can and should adhere on a comply-or-explain basis. We analyse the sources of unfairness arising from different aspects of AI models and the disparities in the performance of machine learning systems. We evaluate how the machine learning literature has sought to address the problem of unfairness through the use of different fairness metrics. We then put forward a nuanced and viable framework for AI Fairness Reporting comprising: (1) disclosure of all machine learning models usage; (2) disclosure of fairness metrics used and the ensuing trade-offs; (3) disclosure of de-biasing methods used; and (d) release of datasets for public inspection or for third-party audit. We then apply this reporting framework to two case studies.
{"title":"A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FAIRNESS REPORTING","authors":"Jia Qing Yap, Ernest Lim","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000460","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Clear understanding of artificial intelligence (AI) usage risks and how they are being addressed is needed, which requires proper and adequate corporate disclosure. We advance a legal framework for AI Fairness Reporting to which companies can and should adhere on a comply-or-explain basis. We analyse the sources of unfairness arising from different aspects of AI models and the disparities in the performance of machine learning systems. We evaluate how the machine learning literature has sought to address the problem of unfairness through the use of different fairness metrics. We then put forward a nuanced and viable framework for AI Fairness Reporting comprising: (1) disclosure of all machine learning models usage; (2) disclosure of fairness metrics used and the ensuing trade-offs; (3) disclosure of de-biasing methods used; and (d) release of datasets for public inspection or for third-party audit. We then apply this reporting framework to two case studies.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"610 - 644"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47347602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-14DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000253
Massimo Lando
Abstract The literature on the identification of rules of customary international law is extensive. Commentators have focused on isolating the methodologies by which international courts and tribunals identify customary international law, with most of the debate revolving around the use of induction, or deduction and assertion as methods of custom identification. However, the existing literature has overlooked that the choice among custom identification methodologies takes place behind closed doors, during confidential deliberation processes. When all that scholars see may be deduction or assertion, international courts and tribunals may have ascertained the existence of customary rules by induction, but induction may not have made it into the final text of the decision. This article elaborates on the impact of judicial deliberations at the International Court of Justice on the choice among custom identification methodologies. It argues that individual-driven stages of deliberations favour custom identification by induction, while collegial stages promote custom identification by non-inductive methodologies.
{"title":"SECRET CUSTOM or THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW","authors":"Massimo Lando","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000253","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The literature on the identification of rules of customary international law is extensive. Commentators have focused on isolating the methodologies by which international courts and tribunals identify customary international law, with most of the debate revolving around the use of induction, or deduction and assertion as methods of custom identification. However, the existing literature has overlooked that the choice among custom identification methodologies takes place behind closed doors, during confidential deliberation processes. When all that scholars see may be deduction or assertion, international courts and tribunals may have ascertained the existence of customary rules by induction, but induction may not have made it into the final text of the decision. This article elaborates on the impact of judicial deliberations at the International Court of Justice on the choice among custom identification methodologies. It argues that individual-driven stages of deliberations favour custom identification by induction, while collegial stages promote custom identification by non-inductive methodologies.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"550 - 580"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48167968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-12DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000472
K. Lau
Abstract Professor Goode once observed that “Novation need not be left to ad hoc agreement; it is open to the parties to provide for it in advance and in particular to establish a contractual mechanism by which novation takes place automatically on the occurrence of a designated act or event”. This deceptively straightforward proposition is examined in the present article. It explores the legal footing for, and the risks in adopting a pristine version of, the proposition, and considers possible safeguards that may be incorporated within the process of scrutiny, if in any case there arises concern over the effectiveness of a novation that is undertaken pursuant to consent given in advance.
{"title":"NOVATION AND ADVANCE CONSENT","authors":"K. Lau","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000472","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Professor Goode once observed that “Novation need not be left to ad hoc agreement; it is open to the parties to provide for it in advance and in particular to establish a contractual mechanism by which novation takes place automatically on the occurrence of a designated act or event”. This deceptively straightforward proposition is examined in the present article. It explores the legal footing for, and the risks in adopting a pristine version of, the proposition, and considers possible safeguards that may be incorporated within the process of scrutiny, if in any case there arises concern over the effectiveness of a novation that is undertaken pursuant to consent given in advance.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"581 - 609"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44595853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-26DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000484
S. Theil
Abstract Contemporary liberal accounts of free expression are almost exclusively preoccupied with the permissible exercises of state power. Influenced by this framing, free expression guarantees under the ECHR, as well as the US and German Constitutions, focus on protecting a private sphere from state interference: what happens within that sphere is only of peripheral concern. This approach is deeply unsatisfactory, especially given the significant threats emanating from private social media platforms that shape the conditions under which individuals may express themselves online. The article argues that we should take private platforms seriously as a source of significant threats, without abandoning the distinction between private actors and the state. Private platforms that are generally open to the public should have obligations to uphold free speech in their contractual relationship to users under certain conditions: if they are structurally dominant, make arbitrary decisions or significantly impact a user's societal participation.
{"title":"PRIVATE CENSORSHIP AND STRUCTURAL DOMINANCE: WHY SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS SHOULD HAVE OBLIGATIONS TO THEIR USERS UNDER FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION","authors":"S. Theil","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000484","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contemporary liberal accounts of free expression are almost exclusively preoccupied with the permissible exercises of state power. Influenced by this framing, free expression guarantees under the ECHR, as well as the US and German Constitutions, focus on protecting a private sphere from state interference: what happens within that sphere is only of peripheral concern. This approach is deeply unsatisfactory, especially given the significant threats emanating from private social media platforms that shape the conditions under which individuals may express themselves online. The article argues that we should take private platforms seriously as a source of significant threats, without abandoning the distinction between private actors and the state. Private platforms that are generally open to the public should have obligations to uphold free speech in their contractual relationship to users under certain conditions: if they are structurally dominant, make arbitrary decisions or significantly impact a user's societal participation.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"645 - 672"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46684968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000381
Ziyu Liu
{"title":"Law's Reality: A Philosophy of Law. By Allan Beever. [Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021. xvii + 352 pp. Hardback £100.00. ISBN 978-1-80037-414-0.]","authors":"Ziyu Liu","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000381","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"427 - 430"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47342922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000368
David Foxton
small role in the Anglo-Australian tradition. That accords with an interesting comparison between the UK and the US. Duxbury records that Holmes J produced more dissents of note than all of the Lords of Appeal put together, and that, Liversidge v Anderson aside, most non-lawyers could not be expected to confess any sort of familiarity with any dissenting British judgment (p. 219). The contrast is marked, and Duxbury explores why that is so. The second essay concludes, like the first, with the 21 century, with a personal communication from Lord Leggatt, from August 2020, explaining the current practice of the Supreme Court’s post-hearing meeting in which all judges give their provisional view (Lord Hope’s Diaries, Volume IV (Edinburgh 2019) reveals how nerve-wracking the post-hearings were, at least to him), before the presiding judge allocates the writing of the first draft, choosing a judge likely to achieve broad support. The former practice (not unknown in Australia) whereby a judge tries to shape the court’s opinion by distributing a draft early is said now to have been superseded. I warmly recommend this lepidum novum libellum. Its charm is different from that of Catullus, but it is immensely readable, and readers will be richly rewarded.
英澳传统中的小角色。这与英国和美国之间的一个有趣的比较相吻合。Duxbury记录称，Holmes J提出的异议比所有上诉法院的异议加起来还要多，而且，除了Liversidge诉Anderson一案之外，大多数非律师都不能承认对任何持不同意见的英国判决有任何熟悉程度（第219页）。这种对比是明显的，Duxbury探讨了为什么会这样。第二篇文章与第一篇文章一样，以2020年8月Leggatt勋爵的个人通信结束了21世纪，解释了最高法院听证会后会议的现行做法，在听证会上，所有法官都发表了他们的临时意见（《霍普勋爵日记》，第四卷（爱丁堡2019）揭示了听证会后的紧张程度，至少对他来说是如此），然后主审法官分配初稿，选择一位可能获得广泛支持的法官。以前的做法（在澳大利亚并非未知）是，法官试图通过提前分发草案来形成法院的意见，据说现在已经被取代了。我强烈推荐这款lepidum novum libellum。它的魅力不同于卡图卢斯，但它可读性很强，读者会得到丰厚的回报。
{"title":"Making Commercial Law Through Practice 1830–1970. By Ross Cranston. [Cambridge University Press, 2021. xliv + 483 pp. Hardback £85.00. ISBN 978-1-10-818283-6.]","authors":"David Foxton","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000368","url":null,"abstract":"small role in the Anglo-Australian tradition. That accords with an interesting comparison between the UK and the US. Duxbury records that Holmes J produced more dissents of note than all of the Lords of Appeal put together, and that, Liversidge v Anderson aside, most non-lawyers could not be expected to confess any sort of familiarity with any dissenting British judgment (p. 219). The contrast is marked, and Duxbury explores why that is so. The second essay concludes, like the first, with the 21 century, with a personal communication from Lord Leggatt, from August 2020, explaining the current practice of the Supreme Court’s post-hearing meeting in which all judges give their provisional view (Lord Hope’s Diaries, Volume IV (Edinburgh 2019) reveals how nerve-wracking the post-hearings were, at least to him), before the presiding judge allocates the writing of the first draft, choosing a judge likely to achieve broad support. The former practice (not unknown in Australia) whereby a judge tries to shape the court’s opinion by distributing a draft early is said now to have been superseded. I warmly recommend this lepidum novum libellum. Its charm is different from that of Catullus, but it is immensely readable, and readers will be richly rewarded.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"420 - 423"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49313398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/s0008197322000459
{"title":"CLJ volume 81 issue 2 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0008197322000459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008197322000459","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"b1 - b5"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45879776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000411
Aislinn Kelly-Lyth
problems posed by ouster clauses. There must be some question as to whether the decision in Conway deserves the attention which it receives in this volume. A number of authors note that this decision lacks continuing significance. Latham-Gambi points out that it was not an action for judicial review (in terms of a challenge to decision-making) at all, and that this explained why the House of Lords took a different approach: “[r]ather than making the decision-maker reconsider his decision, in Conway the House of Lords assumed responsibility to take the decision itself” (p. 388). Given that Conway is unlikely to be familiar for those reading current administrative law cases and commentary, it may be that emphasis on it could have been reduced. Alternatively, Arvind and Stirton, in their chapter on Conway, could have explained why it has fallen into relative obscurity in practice but nevertheless deserves prominence in research. The analysis in these papers contains much insight and factual interest. One perspective which is lacking is a sectoral approach to the Quartet. Knight says that citation of the Quartet “is almost a signal to say, ‘there’s nothing to see here”’ (p. 314). However, the citation of the Quartet may more accurately be an acknowledgement by an advocate that “I have no context-specific authority for you on this point”. Scott makes the comment that “the application of the rules of natural justice after Ridge is almost infinitely context-dependent” (p. 247). It is a shame that the lengthy volume does not consider how decisions in the Quartet have applied in various sectors subject to administrative law (e.g. the Quartet in environmental law, the Quartet in immigration law). Further, in the introduction, the editors refer (without reference) to “those who view [the ‘break with the past’ reading of the Quartet] as wrong turn which muddied the separation of powers in the UK” (p. 13). This collection might have been better in terms of balance had it included more contributions from a political constitutionalist angle. That said, this is already a rich collection of essays, providing food for thought for even the hungriest scholar of administrative law.
{"title":"Data-driven Personalisation in Markets, Politics and the Law. Edited by Uta Kohl and Jacob Eisler. [Cambridge University Press, 2021. xvi + 316 pp. Hardback £85.00. ISBN 978-1-10-883569-5.]","authors":"Aislinn Kelly-Lyth","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000411","url":null,"abstract":"problems posed by ouster clauses. There must be some question as to whether the decision in Conway deserves the attention which it receives in this volume. A number of authors note that this decision lacks continuing significance. Latham-Gambi points out that it was not an action for judicial review (in terms of a challenge to decision-making) at all, and that this explained why the House of Lords took a different approach: “[r]ather than making the decision-maker reconsider his decision, in Conway the House of Lords assumed responsibility to take the decision itself” (p. 388). Given that Conway is unlikely to be familiar for those reading current administrative law cases and commentary, it may be that emphasis on it could have been reduced. Alternatively, Arvind and Stirton, in their chapter on Conway, could have explained why it has fallen into relative obscurity in practice but nevertheless deserves prominence in research. The analysis in these papers contains much insight and factual interest. One perspective which is lacking is a sectoral approach to the Quartet. Knight says that citation of the Quartet “is almost a signal to say, ‘there’s nothing to see here”’ (p. 314). However, the citation of the Quartet may more accurately be an acknowledgement by an advocate that “I have no context-specific authority for you on this point”. Scott makes the comment that “the application of the rules of natural justice after Ridge is almost infinitely context-dependent” (p. 247). It is a shame that the lengthy volume does not consider how decisions in the Quartet have applied in various sectors subject to administrative law (e.g. the Quartet in environmental law, the Quartet in immigration law). Further, in the introduction, the editors refer (without reference) to “those who view [the ‘break with the past’ reading of the Quartet] as wrong turn which muddied the separation of powers in the UK” (p. 13). This collection might have been better in terms of balance had it included more contributions from a political constitutionalist angle. That said, this is already a rich collection of essays, providing food for thought for even the hungriest scholar of administrative law.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"436 - 440"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43779620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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