Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000423
Ann Kristin Glenster
alisation with various social domains and disciplinary discourses” (p. 28). In short, the selective reader is best advised to pick contributions on the basis of title, rather than by reference to the “parts”. In conclusion, the volume presents a collection of voices from diverse fields to tackle a pressing example of personal data being used to shape the world. The application of different lenses highlights the pertinence of a broad range of existing philosophical concepts and legal frameworks. Ultimately, most of the contributions point towards the need for policy changes: as the conclusion highlights, the collection is essentially a “call to understand the potential of law to counter-balance the impact of personalisation on the social order as a whole” (p. 303). The book is therefore recommended for lawyers and policy-makers, but the more abstract contributions should be read alongside the more practical.
{"title":"Research Handbook on Information Law and Governance. Edited by Sharon K. Sandeen, Christoph Rademacher and Ansgar Ohly. [Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021. x + 352 pp. Hardback £170.00. ISBN 978-1-78811-991-7.]","authors":"Ann Kristin Glenster","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000423","url":null,"abstract":"alisation with various social domains and disciplinary discourses” (p. 28). In short, the selective reader is best advised to pick contributions on the basis of title, rather than by reference to the “parts”. In conclusion, the volume presents a collection of voices from diverse fields to tackle a pressing example of personal data being used to shape the world. The application of different lenses highlights the pertinence of a broad range of existing philosophical concepts and legal frameworks. Ultimately, most of the contributions point towards the need for policy changes: as the conclusion highlights, the collection is essentially a “call to understand the potential of law to counter-balance the impact of personalisation on the social order as a whole” (p. 303). The book is therefore recommended for lawyers and policy-makers, but the more abstract contributions should be read alongside the more practical.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"440 - 442"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47966065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S000819732200040X
A. Mills
{"title":"Executive Decision-making and the Courts: Revisiting the Origins of Modern Judicial Review. Edited by T.T. Arvind, Richard Kirkham, Daithi Mac Sithigh and Lindsay Stirton. [Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2021. xxxvi + 466 pp. Hardback £85.00. ISBN 978-1-50993-033-3.]","authors":"A. Mills","doi":"10.1017/S000819732200040X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S000819732200040X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"433 - 436"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43855821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000447
Donáta Szabó
{"title":"Peacebuilding Paradigms: The Impact of Theoretical Diversity on Implementing Sustainable Peace. Edited by Henry F. Carey. [Cambridge University Press, 2020. xx + 403 pp. Hardback £85.00. ISBN 978-1-108-48372-8.]","authors":"Donáta Szabó","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000447","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"446 - 448"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43527832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000198
Marie Manikis
Abstract Censure, blame and harms are central concepts in sentencing that have evolved over the years to take into account social context and experiential knowledge. Flexibility, however, remains limited as the current analysis in sentencing focuses on the offender while failing to engage with the state's contribution in creating wrongs and harms. This risks giving rise to defective practices of responsibility since the state can also contribute to their production. The following article presents a complementary and additional framework within sentencing to account for state censure, blame and harms. The framework is rooted in communicative theories of punishment that integrate a responsive understanding of censure and a relational account of responsibility.
{"title":"RECOGNISING STATE BLAME IN SENTENCING: A COMMUNICATIVE AND RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK","authors":"Marie Manikis","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000198","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Censure, blame and harms are central concepts in sentencing that have evolved over the years to take into account social context and experiential knowledge. Flexibility, however, remains limited as the current analysis in sentencing focuses on the offender while failing to engage with the state's contribution in creating wrongs and harms. This risks giving rise to defective practices of responsibility since the state can also contribute to their production. The following article presents a complementary and additional framework within sentencing to account for state censure, blame and harms. The framework is rooted in communicative theories of punishment that integrate a responsive understanding of censure and a relational account of responsibility.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"294 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45449687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000307
Stevie Martin
{"title":"MUD STICKS: PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRE-CHARGE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND THE TORT OF MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION","authors":"Stevie Martin","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000307","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"232 - 235"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56690630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/s0008197322000496
{"title":"CLJ volume 81 issue 2 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0008197322000496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008197322000496","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":" ","pages":"f1 - f2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43681991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S000819732200023X
Michael P. Foran
Abstract Equality before the law is a foundational principle of the common law and is of particular importance for administrative law, given the connection between judicial review and the rule of law. Analysis as to the precise requirements of this principle can help us better to understand the role that obligations to act consistently play within judicial review. This article will examine whether consistency ought to be classed as a separate ground of review and argue that this is unnecessary. Examination of the role that legal equality plays within common law reason generally will shed light on the role that it plays within administrative law in particular. Consistency is best conceived as a background principle, informed by the value of legal equality, housed within reasonableness review and not as a separate ground of review that could elide the distinction between review and appeal.
{"title":"THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR LAW: EQUALITY, CONSISTENCY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW","authors":"Michael P. Foran","doi":"10.1017/S000819732200023X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S000819732200023X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Equality before the law is a foundational principle of the common law and is of particular importance for administrative law, given the connection between judicial review and the rule of law. Analysis as to the precise requirements of this principle can help us better to understand the role that obligations to act consistently play within judicial review. This article will examine whether consistency ought to be classed as a separate ground of review and argue that this is unnecessary. Examination of the role that legal equality plays within common law reason generally will shed light on the role that it plays within administrative law in particular. Consistency is best conceived as a background principle, informed by the value of legal equality, housed within reasonableness review and not as a separate ground of review that could elide the distinction between review and appeal.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"249 - 272"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48256579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000290
H. Hooper
assumptions” (at [41]–[42]). One of such assumptions – derived from R. v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants [1996] EWCA Civ 1293, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275 – was that “statutory rights are not to be cut down by subordinate legislation passed under the vires of a different Act” (at [34], [39], [41]–[42]). The court stressed that when the decision maker was empowered by the 2014 Act to set the level of the fee, there was no express “criterion of affordability”. Rather, she was allowed to set the fee in a way that (inter alia) “subsidised the wider immigration and nationality system” (at [45]– [46], [49]). The “appropriateness of imposing the [impugned] fee” was a “question of policy which is for political determination”, but not that for the court (at [51]). This reasoning seemed to have ignored the abovementioned assumption in statutory interpretation. The 2014 Act states that the impugned fee may go beyond the costs for processing the application, but the question of affordability does not seem to have been directly addressed. The 2014 Act does not expressly rule out the potential relevance of affordability, when (say) the decision maker examines the “fees charged by or on behalf of governments of other countries in respect of comparable functions”: see the 2014 Act, s. 68(9)(e). There are two ways to read this legislative silence: either the decision maker can impose any fee she wants, or she must impose it in a way that must not be entirely unaffordable, albeit exceeding the costs for processing the application. The absence of an express criterion of affordability (per Lord Hodge) is logically consistent with either reading. Critically, the abovementioned assumption would suggest that the latter reading should be taken, and this matter should not be reduced to purely one of political determination.
假设”(在100亿美元至100亿美元之间)。其中一个假设——来自R. v .国务秘书，移民福利联合委员会[1996]EWCA Civ 1293， [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275——是“法定权利不会被在不同法案的权力下通过的附属立法所削减”(见[34]，[39]，[41]-[42])。法院强调，当2014年法案授权决策者设定费用水平时，并没有明确的“负担能力标准”。相反，她被允许以一种(除其他外)“补贴更广泛的移民和国籍体系”的方式设定费用(在1亿英镑至2亿英镑，10亿英镑之间)。“征收[被质疑的]费用的适当性”是一个“政治决定的政策问题”，而不是法院的问题(b[51])。这种推理似乎忽略了法定解释中的上述假设。2014年的法案规定，被质疑的费用可能超出处理申请的成本，但负担能力的问题似乎没有得到直接解决。2014年法案没有明确排除可负担性的潜在相关性，当(例如)决策者审查“由其他国家政府或代表其他国家政府就可比功能收取的费用”时:见2014年法案第68(9)(e)条。有两种方式来解读这种立法沉默:要么决策者可以征收任何她想要的费用，要么她必须以一种不能完全负担不起的方式征收，尽管超出了处理申请的成本。没有明确的负担能力标准(根据霍奇勋爵的说法)，从逻辑上讲，这两种解读都是一致的。至关重要的是，上述假设表明，应采取后一种解读，而不应将这个问题简化为纯粹的政治决定问题。
{"title":"TRUST AS A CORE PRINCIPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION","authors":"H. Hooper","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000290","url":null,"abstract":"assumptions” (at [41]–[42]). One of such assumptions – derived from R. v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants [1996] EWCA Civ 1293, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275 – was that “statutory rights are not to be cut down by subordinate legislation passed under the vires of a different Act” (at [34], [39], [41]–[42]). The court stressed that when the decision maker was empowered by the 2014 Act to set the level of the fee, there was no express “criterion of affordability”. Rather, she was allowed to set the fee in a way that (inter alia) “subsidised the wider immigration and nationality system” (at [45]– [46], [49]). The “appropriateness of imposing the [impugned] fee” was a “question of policy which is for political determination”, but not that for the court (at [51]). This reasoning seemed to have ignored the abovementioned assumption in statutory interpretation. The 2014 Act states that the impugned fee may go beyond the costs for processing the application, but the question of affordability does not seem to have been directly addressed. The 2014 Act does not expressly rule out the potential relevance of affordability, when (say) the decision maker examines the “fees charged by or on behalf of governments of other countries in respect of comparable functions”: see the 2014 Act, s. 68(9)(e). There are two ways to read this legislative silence: either the decision maker can impose any fee she wants, or she must impose it in a way that must not be entirely unaffordable, albeit exceeding the costs for processing the application. The absence of an express criterion of affordability (per Lord Hodge) is logically consistent with either reading. Critically, the abovementioned assumption would suggest that the latter reading should be taken, and this matter should not be reduced to purely one of political determination.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"228 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45736117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0008197322000435
Bobby V. Reddy
will recognise how such a proprietary right would be highly problematic and would fly in the face of the foundational doctrinal principle of intellectual property law. This takes me to the third lingering question that runs throughout this volume: the difficult concept of property, particularly in relation to information, data and trade secrets. As the editors have chosen to label this a Handbook on Information Law and not Intellectual Property Law, classic intellectual property law doctrine does not necessarily apply. The result is an inevitable hodgepodge of usage, where terms such as “commodity”, “ownership” and “owner” of data are scattered throughout the chapters. The difficulty in pinning down the terminology also illustrates the uncertainty that exists regarding information law’s relationship to traditional property doctrine, misappropriation and competition law. Part III of the Handbook is dedicated to trade secrecy, and Part IV to data protection, privacy and cybersecurity. While focusing most of the book on the US, UK and EU, two of the chapters are dedicated to a non-Western jurisdiction: a chapter by Tatsuhiro Ueno on recent legislative reform in Japan regarding copyright and trade secrets (Chapter 6, “Big Data in Japan”), and a chapter by Henrike Weiden and Kensaku Takase on the reception of European data protection law in Japan (Chapter 14, “Data Privacy in Europe and Its Reception Under Japanese Law”). The discussions of legal issues and emerging technologies are dispersed throughout the volume, with a few dedicated chapters at the end, such as Margot E. Kaminski’s chapter on the right to explainability in EU data protection law (Chapter 15, “The Right to Explanation, Explained”), and Faye Fangfei Wang’s chapter on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity (Chapter 17, “Legislative Developments on Cybersecurity in the EU in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”), engaging with the frontiers of the academic debates in these areas of law. This Handbook is undoubtedly a good resource for anyone interested in the foundational tenets of many areas of information law. However, the heavy focus on established intellectual property scholarship begs the question whether its authors are ready to embrace this field as a new branch of law, as argued for in Nathenson’s first chapter, or simply stretch the intellectual property umbrella even wider. Cognisant that any volume can only represent a small fraction of a field, the omission of many of the new areas of information law suggests that there is room for the publisher’s Information Law Series to continue to make salient contributions to this growing literature for quite some time.
{"title":"Mergers, Acquisitions and International Financial Regulation: Analysing Special Purpose Acquisition Companies. By Daniele D'Alvia. [London: Routledge, 2021. 258 pp. Hardback £120.00. ISBN 978-0-36760-986-3.]","authors":"Bobby V. Reddy","doi":"10.1017/S0008197322000435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197322000435","url":null,"abstract":"will recognise how such a proprietary right would be highly problematic and would fly in the face of the foundational doctrinal principle of intellectual property law. This takes me to the third lingering question that runs throughout this volume: the difficult concept of property, particularly in relation to information, data and trade secrets. As the editors have chosen to label this a Handbook on Information Law and not Intellectual Property Law, classic intellectual property law doctrine does not necessarily apply. The result is an inevitable hodgepodge of usage, where terms such as “commodity”, “ownership” and “owner” of data are scattered throughout the chapters. The difficulty in pinning down the terminology also illustrates the uncertainty that exists regarding information law’s relationship to traditional property doctrine, misappropriation and competition law. Part III of the Handbook is dedicated to trade secrecy, and Part IV to data protection, privacy and cybersecurity. While focusing most of the book on the US, UK and EU, two of the chapters are dedicated to a non-Western jurisdiction: a chapter by Tatsuhiro Ueno on recent legislative reform in Japan regarding copyright and trade secrets (Chapter 6, “Big Data in Japan”), and a chapter by Henrike Weiden and Kensaku Takase on the reception of European data protection law in Japan (Chapter 14, “Data Privacy in Europe and Its Reception Under Japanese Law”). The discussions of legal issues and emerging technologies are dispersed throughout the volume, with a few dedicated chapters at the end, such as Margot E. Kaminski’s chapter on the right to explainability in EU data protection law (Chapter 15, “The Right to Explanation, Explained”), and Faye Fangfei Wang’s chapter on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity (Chapter 17, “Legislative Developments on Cybersecurity in the EU in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”), engaging with the frontiers of the academic debates in these areas of law. This Handbook is undoubtedly a good resource for anyone interested in the foundational tenets of many areas of information law. However, the heavy focus on established intellectual property scholarship begs the question whether its authors are ready to embrace this field as a new branch of law, as argued for in Nathenson’s first chapter, or simply stretch the intellectual property umbrella even wider. Cognisant that any volume can only represent a small fraction of a field, the omission of many of the new areas of information law suggests that there is room for the publisher’s Information Law Series to continue to make salient contributions to this growing literature for quite some time.","PeriodicalId":46389,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"81 1","pages":"442 - 445"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42809031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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